Years of Persecution,
Years of Extermination

Saul Friedländer and the Future of Holocaust Studies

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Redemptive Antisemitism and the Imperialist Imaginary

A. Dirk Moses

1 INTRODUCTION

Saul Friedländer’s concept of “redemptive antisemitism” has become as classic as the book in which he first presented it in 1997.\(^2\) Eclipsing rival formulations like “eliminationist antisemitism,” “chimerical antisemitism,” and “revolutionary antisemitism,” it is a ubiquitously-cited reference point for commentators on Nazi Germany, and it is unlikely to be supplanted by new terms such as Jeffrey Herf’s striking “radical antisemitism.”\(^3\) Peter Pulzer spoke for many when he wrote:

…That the ideological driving force behind Hitler and his hard-core entourage was “redemptive antisemitism” is a proposition we can accept. No other explanation can tell us why the Holocaust was pursued with such relentless, escalating and ultimately counterproductive thoroughness, or why the Nazi leadership appeared to be convinced that Jews commanded the agenda of both Soviet Bolshevism and British and American capitalism.\(^4\)

What is more, the concept has been taken up by those who study Israel and the Middle East. Paul Landau, the French author of \textit{Tariq Ramadan and the Muslim Brotherhood}, wrote that Hamas’s ideology is suffused by a “millenarian and redemptive anti-Semitism,” a move that links the Palestinian Islamists to Nazis in the manner of the recent interventions by Herf, Matthias Künzel, and Paul Berman.\(^5\)

It is a testimony to Friedländer that others find his ideas useful to approach contemporary issues such as the Middle East. It is also fitting, perhaps, in view of Friedländer’s signing, along with other Hebrew University of Jerusalem luminaries, of a letter to the \textit{New York Review of Books} in 1973, protesting against diplomatic pressure on Israel to return the territories it conquered in 1967 in exchange for peace. Doing so, they argued, would make it “easier for them [the Arabs] to attack Israel.” Despite Israel’s peaceful intentions, it was constantly threatened: “For this fourth time since 1948, we have seen our country besieged and attacked, our friends and relatives killed; we have been the target of terror on a world-wide scale.” Without mentioning the Palestinians, their claim to
self-determination, or the incipient Jewish settlement of the so-called "occupied territories," the signatories affirmed Israel's right to exist in the community of nations: "The cause of organizing a peaceful world is based on the right of all peoples to free existence and harmonious national self-expression and self-government. These rights cannot be denied to Israel and its people." And yet they were by "present governments of the Arab states" which "go to any length to destroy the existence of Israel." Similar fears are being expressed today by the advocates of the "Islamofascism" thesis: contemporary Islamism at once borrows anti-Jewish themes from Nazism and represents an analogous threat. The catastrophic conclusion to which prominent scholars like Künzel, Herf, Berman, and Benny Morris come is that a "second Holocaust" is imminent.\footnote{17}

Saul Friedländer was working on the Holocaust at about the time he signed that letter. His famous memoir about his childhood and youth in Nazi-occupied Prague and France, and later emigration to Israel a few weeks after its establishment, appeared only a few years later.\footnote{18} In other words, intense anxiety about the survival of Israel as a Jewish state and autobiographical reflection on escaping the Nazis who murdered his parents coincided temporally with his historical scholarship. Can it be coincidental that the homologies between his political and historical analyses are so striking: European Jews, a tiny minority, isolated and friendless in a hostile Europe; Israel, a small nation surrounded by enemies, virtually alone in a hostile world? The Holocaust clearly had lessons to teach. Now, as then, the answer to Jewish survival was the same: the readiness of gentile society, whether Christian-European or Arab-Muslim, to accept Jews as they were.

An important publication that foreshadowed his two-volume magnum opus was an article in The Jerusalem Quarterly in 1976. Entitled "The Historical Significance of the Holocaust," it is a critique of historiographical attempts to subsume the Holocaust under concepts like totalitarianism, fascism, and economic exploitation.\footnote{19} Instead, the singularity of the Holocaust is asserted on the basis of the special Nazi motivation that set it off from previous genocides: "Thus, although there are precedents for an attempt at total physical eradication, the Nazi exterminatory drive was made unmistakably unique by its motivation." This motivation was distinguished by its totality and absoluteness—the intended murder of all Jews—unlike the relative and pragmatic aims of destruction directed towards Slavs and "Gypsies." Moreover, the genocide of the Jews was suffused with a millenarianism that transcended pragmatic concerns: it was driven by "a fundamental urge and a sacred mission, not a means to other objectives." Although he did not yet use the term "redemptive antisemitism"—Friedländer then referred to "murderous anti-Semitism, which was fueled by an element of true insanity"—he was surely heading in the direction of that formulation.\footnote{20}

That the Nazi project possessed a "redemptive" character was a claim already being made by Friedländer's slightly older colleague at the University of Tel Aviv, Uriel Tal (1926–1986). An expert in political theology and antisemitism, he wrote about the Nazis' "redemptive political messianism."\footnote{21} Behind them both loomed the older figures of Eric Voegelin, Jacob Talmon, Norman Cohn,
REDEMPTIVE ANTISEMITISM

and Jacob Taubes, who had written extensively about political messianism and political religion decades earlier. Joined by Yehuda Bauer (the same age as Tal), Friedländer and Tal were at the forefront of the attempt to assert the world-historical character of the Holocaust on the basis of the mythic and redemptive structure of Nazi anti-semitism. This move sought to establish anti-semitism as the fundamental explanatory concept not only for the Holocaust but for Nazism as well, challenging the then fashionable theories of fascism and totalitarianism.

The world-historical nature of the phenomena was not based solely on the total and absolute nature of Nazi anti-semitism. It was also entailed by the special status of the victims: Jews, the representatives of Western civilization. Their intended destruction was therefore not a regulation genocide, but rather a nihilistic attack on the monotheistic values that the Nazis sought to transvalue: "God, redemption, sin and revelation." Not for nothing does Dan Diner refer to the Holocaust as a "profound civilizational break." This cohort has succeeded brilliantly in advancing its project. If Tal is now largely forgotten due to his premature death and unpopular application of the political messianism paradigm to Israeli politics in the 1980s, Bauer and Friedländer have become celebrated historians in the Western academy, especially in Germany, where they are regarded with prophetic reverence as living representatives of the destroyed Jewish past in Europe; symbols of Jewish rebirth in the Holy Land. Whereas the Holocaust once rated only a few lines in textbooks on twentieth-century history, it now features prominently: the Holocaust as the negation telos of modernity.

This cohort has also seen off rival paradigms along the way. In the 1970s, Friedländer took on Geoffrey Barraclough's "post-liberal" prioritization of the social and economic factors over the political and ideological ones, that is, antisemitism, in Nazi Germany. A decade later, in a well-known exchange, he disposed of Martin Broszat's advocacy of a similar social and national "historization." Tal ensured there could be no confusion between the Holocaust and genocide, and others distinguished anti-semitism from racism. Diner then rebuked Götz Aly and Susanne Heim for their attempt to reimpose an economic paradigm on the Holocaust, a critique reiterated recently by Natan Sznaider in his review of Aly's depiction of the Nazi state as a project motivated less by anti-semitism than imperial plunder and racist redistribution. Whilst some scholars have insisted that modernity, technology and bureaucracy lay at the heart of Nazism and the Holocaust, this cohort has replied that anti-semitism is not a derivative or secondary phenomenon, but is a variable in its own right, independent, indeed primary.

The reasons for this success lie in the cogency of the arguments. For all that the Nazi treatment of Jews shares with their other victims - a commonality that I myself have been wont to stress - these scholars have been able to show that the nature of the prejudice, the fears, the anxieties, and the fantasies about Jews were distinctive in significant ways. Leaving aside the theological and political question of whether notions of "specialness" or "uniqueness" should be then
invested in these differences, the centrality of "the Jews" as a counter-race to "Aryans" in Nazi thought is a proposition whose analytical significance is readily apparent to anyone who studies the sources. It is no surprise, therefore, that scholars from different traditions, like the philosopher Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, have come to the same conclusion without reading Tal, Friedländer, or Bauer. By studying Heidegger's Nazi sympathies, he determined that "the extermination of the Jews [...] is a phenomenon which follows essentially no logic (political, economic, social, military, etc.) other than a spiritual one, degraded as it may be." Accordingly, the genocide of European Jewry should be distinguished from other genocides.23

Plausible as this position is, however, it seems caught on the horns of a temporal dilemma. How can one insist on the historical novum of the Holocaust while invoking the tradition of antisemitism, even in its most radical instantiation? Are Friedländer and his cohort substituting one continuity — antisemitism — for others such as imperialism? That the answer to this question can be answered affirmatively is suggested by books like Jeremy Cohen's The Friars and the Jews: The Evolution of Medieval Anti-Judaism, which purports to identify the origins of genocidal antisemitism in the "original vision of Europe's judenrein" entertained by thirteenth-century Christian monks.24 Invoking traditions of antisemitism thus embeds the Holocaust diachronically into a narrative of steadily intensifying anti-Jewish feeling with the Holocaust as effectively its possible, if not logical outcome. Leaving aside the fact that casting the Nazi project as an exclusively Gentile (German)—Jewish story omits other victims of the Nazis, whose targeting and suffering is a necessary inclusion in any adequate account of the Nazi regime, we are confronted with a temporal aporia regarding its continuity and rupture with European traditions. That the historical mind has reached the limits of its temporal horizon with the Nazi project is indicated in the ambivalence of various terms used to describe the salient intellectual context: conservative revolutionaries, reactionary modernism, redemptive antisemitism, and so forth. How can the tension between tradition and revolution be negotiated satisfactorily? And where do European Jews fit in?

The problem with this debate about continuities between Nazism, the Holocaust, and preceding events is that it implies a linear process in which discrete causal chains determine later events. Such a conception of history leads to nonsensical distinctions, such as whether colonialism or antisemitism or World War I are the principal "continuities" for the Holocaust. Setting the First World War against colonialism as an enabling context, for instance, misses the point that the former was a clash of imperial powers in which colonies were among the most strategically significant assets at stake; indeed, that the war was fought with methods hitherto reserved for "natives": the machine gun, gas, aerial bombing, and the general "barbarization of warfare" in which civilians often became fair game. Not for nothing did the belligerents invoke the classical colonial rhetoric of barbarism and savagery to accuse one another of outrages and excesses, especially when the allies used their non-European colonial troops against the Germans on
the western front. Furthermore, however brutalizing the war experiences may have been, had they not long been common in the colonies? The war in effect reproduced colonial experiences in Europe.

Metaphors of transfer, continuity and even knowledge-exchange are too linear and mechanical. They imply the circulation of discrete units of information or motivation that are transferred here or there, but miss the mediating dimension of interpretation and application. The solution to our temporal conundrum, then, is to re-imagine the role of human agency in historical processes. I proceed as follows. First, I suggest that an alternative temporal concept, namely the “political imaginary,” offers historians a more fruitful way to integrate human agency with historical processes. Secondly, I show how an imperialist political imaginary functioned in sections of the German political class between the 1890s and 1930s. Then I see how Adolf Hitler utilized this imaginary for his own purposes. In this way, I hope to offer an intellectually more satisfying approach to relation National Socialism and the Holocaust to world history without subsuming antisemitism and the Holocaust beneath a generic concept.

2 POLITICAL IMAGINARIES

Imaginaries, whether about gender, the social, the political, or nature, have become commonplace in the titles of scholarly books and articles over the past twenty years or so. But what are they and why can “the political imaginary” help us think more satisfactorily about broader patterns and processes? It is not entirely clear what the origin of the concept is – some suggest it lies in Jacques Lacan’s imaginaire – but the earliest and most systematic elaboration is by Cornelius Castoriadis in his book, *The Imaginary Institution of Society*. Disillusioned with structuralist Marxism in the 1970s and keen to revive the voluntarist dimensions of social protest and change from the 1960s, he developed the notion of the “social imaginary” as the symbolic, generative matrix within which people imagine their social world and constitute themselves as political subjects. It comprises the background assumptions about reality that makes daily praxis possible. It is not a set of ideas; it is what makes the formation and articulation of ideas possible. As Charles Taylor puts it, the imaginary is a pre-theoretical sense of human surroundings, “carried in images, stories, and legends”; it underlies and enables the repertoire of actions available for any particular society. Deeper than the immediate “background” understanding needed to interpret social life, the imaginary is also temporally constituted, because social interpretation necessarily entails a narrative of the collective “becoming” of the primary social group, for example, the nation, standing internationally in history. A culture’s sense of moral order is also part of the social imaginary – which lends it the revolutionary potential prized by Castoriadis.

Castoriadis’s project was explicitly political. Given that history was the realm of determinacy, the heteronomy of causal relations, the unsteered unfolding
of events, how can people become authors of their own destiny by imagining radically different life worlds? As the pre-political and sub-ideological basis of human communicative togetherness that is never exhausted by any particular social or political formation, the social imaginary is a potential source of critique, of novelty, even revolution. Imaginative praxis, based on the tropic nature of language—that is, the surplus meaning inherent in words, which allows official meanings to be challengeable—can serve as a resource with which to inaugurate a new society. Freedom subsists in the fact that this act of imagination cannot be deduced logically or causally from the previous actions of events.

The conception of human freedom as rupturing the heteronomy of the historical process is very important when we consider Hitler’s political imaginary below. Also important will be Castoriadis’s French contemporary Gilles Deleuze who, though not attracted to the notion of the imaginary, also conceived of history as the realm of determination and of philosophy as the possibility of freedom; in his case, when history is interrupted by sublime moments of condensation, that is, revolutionary moments in which pure events erupt into the flow of historical events. And, like Castoriadis, he thought that reinterpretation of the past was a radical act of politics because, following Nietzsche, it could inaugurate an “untimely”—unexpected and unpredicted experience and reality. Such moments occur in particular when “pure events,” as he conceived them, overwhelm our interpretive capacities to understand what has occurred. Existing frameworks need to be discarded and we find ourselves in a new horizon of possibilities. We can observe how traumatic historical experiences inaugurate learning processes that, in the name of freedom from history’s “terror,” lead to revolutionary politics. Unfortunately, Castoriadis and Deleuze were incorrect in thinking that such a catastrophic sensibility has to be on the Left.

3 EUROPEAN CULTURAL IMAGINARY

The central dimension of the European social and political imaginary in the 100 years after 1850 was imperial and colonial. Edward Said drew attention to the imperialist nature of the modern imaginary when he noted that empire depended on a “structure of attitude and reference.” Politics could not be conceived except in terms of binaries like colonizer and colonized, occupier and occupied; or as the economist Max Weber (1857–1939) put it at a pro-colonial policy discussion in 1907, “Here, the maxim counts that whoever does not want to be the hammer will become the anvil,” closely echoing Thucydides’ Athenian justification of empire. “[I]t was not we who set the example, for it has always been the law that the weaker should be subject to the stronger. Besides, we believe ourselves to be worthy of our position.” Hitler, we will see below, made exactly this argument in foreshadowing his version of German empire in Europe.

This harkening to antiquity should also make us question the postulated modernity of the imperialist imaginary. Customarily, the imperialist imaginary
is thought to have originated in the period of intense European imperial and colonial expansion followed by intra-European wars characterized by genocide. In fact, it was suffused with medieval beliefs about violent relations among different peoples, beliefs based on the Old Testament and antique legends, such as the destruction of Carthage, Melos, and Troy. These myths showed that migration and settlement, the divine mission of particular people, and the merciless slaughter or dispersion of others accorded with destiny or divine will. They percolated into the heroic sagas of many European clans, tribes, and peoples — legends of indigenous pasts, safeguarded by warriors and endless violence.31

Taylor argues that a modern social and economic imaginary of individualism and social contract replaced this early modern imaginary based on "hierarchical division into types," natural domination, the priority of the communal and divine order.35 But such images persisted "nonsynchronously," as Ernst Bloch would put it. They could be activated against the modern imaginary in destructive ways at moments of crisis, as we will see with Hitler. Moses Finley's observation of the Athenian empire of antiquity could apply to paranoid political leaders millennia later: "[A] reassertion of the universal ancient belief in the naturalness of domination."36 Where Bloch attributed the persistence of such myths to the crises of declining premodern social classes, I would argue that they were generally accessible and available cultural resources.37

Just as importantly, imaginaries framed how politics was imagined at all. European powers distinguished between their active historical agency, which spread civilization through colonialism on the one hand, and the passive objects of their endeavours, the colonized, waiting to be enlightened and modernized on the other. Such a worldview was necessarily racist because it presumed the inherent, indeed often biological superiority of the European colonizers over non-Europeans, as well as their inherent right to dominate other peoples. At the very least, the Europeans were Kulturvölker (peoples of culture) and most non-Europeans were Naturvölker (people of nature).38

Nowhere was the imperialist imaginary more apparent than in the contemporary fascination with the global spread of European empires and settlers, and the consequent "disappearance" of the "natives." The German Darwinians noted, and some even welcomed, this disappearance, and such observations were usually comparative in nature.39 After his extensive travels around the British Empire, English radical and later politician Charles Dilke proclaimed with some satisfaction in his best-selling Greater Britain that: "The Saxon is the only extirpating race on earth. Up to the commencement of the now inevitable destruction of the Red Indians of Central North America, of the Maories [sic], and of the Australians by the English colonists, no numerous race had ever been blotted out by an invader."40 Writing twenty years later, Theodore Roosevelt, the future US president, was equally entranced by the "spread of the English-speaking peoples." Having moved to North America, they were natural conquerors whose destiny was "to grasp literally world-wide power."41 Part of this "race history," as he put it, was the superiority of their "race characteristics," which meant that:
"The English had exterminated or assimilated the Celts of Britain, and they substantially repeated the process with the Indians of America." Both Dilke and Roosevelt compared the British conquering and settling prowess favourably with the Iberian powers, whose colonists had disastrously intermarried with the Indians of the Americas and even been expelled by them on occasion. Madison Grant was equally blunt in his assessment of racial history: "No ethnic conquests can be complete," he wrote, "unless the natives are exterminated and the invaders bring their own women with them," lest they be racially absorbed.43

German commentators felt they could learn from the Anglo-American experience, and possessed no illusions about the violence of conquest. Thus one author, in the pages of the German Colonial Society’s journal, answered the question of what the authorities should do with the survivors of Herero genocide by looking to America. He approvingly noted the earlier “policy of extermination” (Politik der Vernichtung) against the “Red Skins,” followed by one of protective reservations.44 Support of colonialism did not have to approve of genocide, but even “scientific” colonialism regarded the fate of “dying races” with equanimity.45 The liberal Bernard Dernburg, the German-Jewish first state secretary of the Colonial Office from 1907 to 1910, was a reformer who opposed genocidal policies toward Germany’s African subjects. However, he noted in similar terms that:

It cannot be doubted that some aboriginal tribes, like some animals, will have to disappear in the civilization process (“in der Zivilisation untergehen müssen”) if they are not to degenerate and become wards of the state. We are fortunate in our German colonies that we are not too heavily burdened by such elements. But the history of colonization of the United States, surely the greatest colonial project that the world has ever seen, had as its first act, the virtually complete extermination (“Vernichtung”) of the aborigines.

He was happy to report that if destruction marked the old style of colonization, the new style relied on conserving the native population and exploiting the land’s resources scientifically.46 In this vein, thirty years later, the anthropologist Richard C. Thurnwald (1869–1954), Professor of Ethnology, Race Psychology, and Sociology at the University of Berlin, defended his plans for a “scientific” exploitation of future Nazi-governed African colonies by comparing them with previous colonialisms: “My proposal is, in any event, more humane than the practice of the Americans when they largely exterminated the Indians, and the Australians when they made sport of shooting the blacks, as well as the violent deportations of the Russian communists.”47

The question that German academic elites were asking was: how do we compete, indeed, survive in an international system of states and empires in which we are such late starters? One consequent anxiety was biopolitical. British settler colonies – the USA, Canada, and Australia – had become home to millions of German settlers who rapidly assimilated at the expense of global Deutschsäum. Writing in 1905, the Pan-German leader Ernst Hasse commented explicitly on Dilke’s and Roosevelt’s celebration of the Anglo-Saxon expansion, warning of
German vulnerability abroad. This anxiety about biopolitical strength recurs consistently among liberals and conservatives. Max Weber and later Carl Schmitt observed enviourly that those Anglo-Saxons knew how to retain their national homogeneity. In Australia, "the immigration of Chinese is banned," wrote Weber, comparing them to "the Poles [who] are even more dangerous due to the possibility of mixing and of bringing down German culture." The political imaginary of a zero-sum game struggle between peoples was virtually ubiquitous, framing the analysis of sophisticated intellectuals. Decades later, Hitler made challenging Anglo-Saxon word hegemony, coded as Jewish domination, the keystone of his political program.

Another anxiety was land and imperial competition. The competition among core states for resources and geopolitical advantage was registered by anyone with an interest in global affairs, such as Professor Dietrich Schäfer in 1907:

Our colonial policy does not deal with the will or lack of will of individuals. We are standing amid a gigantic movement that has all nations in its grasp, and in which we must participate if we want to avoid being overrun. [...] The earth is being given away; we must seize land ["Besitz ergreifen"] that is still on offer and that is useful and necessary for us.

Lessons were offered by rival powers. The geographer Friedrich Ratzel (1844–1904) gained his interest in continental expansion and control from his visit to the United States, where he met the famous historian Frederick Jackson Turner. Likewise, Max Sering travelled in the US and Canada, where he too admired the American settlers. He drew specifically German conclusions in the book, Die innere Kolonisation im östlichen Deutschland, in which he regarded eastern Europe as a frontier equivalent for settlement, as did his colleague Gustav Schmoller and many others. Not for nothing did Pan-German leaders like Ernst Hasse come to see the east rather than Africa as the destiny of the German Empire. The fascinating circulation of notions of continental expansion and German expansion eastwards occurred in a hyper-imperialist context; that is what makes it meaningful.

This context determined the self-understanding of Germany in the international system. Paul Rohrbach (1869–1956) was typical in taking a consistent anti-British, anti-French, and anti-imperial line in the 1920s and 1930s, praising the nationalist movements of colonial peoples seeking independence from the established European powers. As the historian Eric Kurlander shows in his book on German liberals and the Nazis, Rohrbach claimed to recognize equally the rights of all "oppressed" peoples, be they German, Indian, Arab, or African. According to this common view, Germany was a young nation that, like these non-Europeans ones, had to cast off the yolk of Anglo-French world domination. For this reason, he defended Japan's occupation of China and Southeast Asia in the mid-1930s as a reaction to Anglo-Saxon imperialism and American economic warfare, though he thought Germany's allies had an obligation to respect the rights of sovereign nations.
Later, in the Weimar Republic, eugenicists also felt the compulsion to "catch-up" with Western rivals. It was "absolutely necessary to create a scientific center for anthropology, human heredity, and eugenics in Germany," noted leaders of the Kaiser-Wilhelm Gesellschaft, "since Sweden, the United States, and England have gone ahead with work in this area, in particular because these inadequacies and dilettante efforts in this area have to be countered." As we shall see below, Hitler, too, wanted both to counter the Germany's enemies and perfect their imperial policies.

This is also the context for the truculent reaction of humiliated Germans to the Treaty of Versailles, which sliced territory off Germany's eastern and western borders and entrusted its African colonies to its colonial rivals. German complaints that world politics remained imperial and colonial, despite the post-colonial rhetoric of the League of Nations, were borne out by statements of British politicians who regarded their ex-German African trusts as de facto annexations unaccountable to any foreign body. Germany had been relegated to the second rung of European powers or worse while Britain and France continued, in effect, to rule much of the world.

The imperialist imaginary was also readily apparent in the mutual penetration of antisemitism and colonial racism at the end of the nineteenth century. Contrary to the conventional view that these two racisms represent entirely distinct "continuities" to the Holocaust, recent research has shown how they became rhetorically intertwined and impossible to disentangle entirely. The social location of this intersection between colonial racism and antisemitism is the right-wing milieu of the Pan-Germans. Their understanding of a future German European empire in the twenty years before the First World War was influenced by contemporaneous discussions about German colonialism in Africa and the Pacific; and it is entirely possible that the reverse was also the case.

Upset by the success of Jewish integration into German society, they became obsessed with racial mixing, which they called "bastardization," a problem that they thought led to the destruction of the Roman Empire. Their ideal of a "tribal empire" (Stammeerreich) in Europe posited a racially pure utopia of German rule over Slavs. Radical völkisch ideology was the nexus that explains Pan-German imperialism, the drive for living space on the continent, ethnic cleansing, and a "progressive" belief in social engineering/welfare, from Hassen – and Heinrich Class (president of the Pan-German League from 1908 to 1939) – to Hitler.

German rule over Africans provided the model of racial subjugation, segregation, and oppression. For instance, in the 1890s these anti-Semites demanded that Jews be placed under a special alien law at the same time as they advocated that Africans be subject to a separate "native law." They defended Carl Peters – the German colonial adventurer whose brutal treatment of the locals in German East Africa scandalized sensibilities at home – by insisting that European norms of war could not apply to Africans, who effectively occupied another moral universe. Above all, the understanding of the Jewish presence in Germany occurred in the context of a race-conscious worldview in which conquest and
colonization of foreign peoples, hierarchies of civilization, progress and decline, survival and extinction were central elements.\textsuperscript{62}

4 JEWS AND COLONIAL RULE IN THE ANTISEMITIC IMAGINATION

For all these similarities and mutual imbrications, an important distinction between colonial racism and antisemitism was the fact that Jews were \textit{in} Germany and doing well. This spatial difference inverted the framing dichotomy of colonizer-colonized in Germany. Especially during the First World War, anti-Semites coded events in terms of Jewish success and non-Jewish German suffering, indeed, as Jewish domination over non-Jewish Germans. Already during the 1912 national elections, right-wing Germans had derided supposed Jewish control of the "red" and "gold" internationals. In Austria, they complained that Jews owned more than 50 per cent of banks and held 80 per cent of the key positions in that sector. The development of capitalism was regarded as a Jewish imposition, a "control system" over gentiles.\textsuperscript{63} During the war, the military, in particular, complained about shirking and profiteering by Jews. Ludendorff levelled an accusation that would be common during the Weimar Republic:

They acquired a dominant influence in the "war corporations" [...] which gave them the occasion to enrich themselves at the expense of the German people and to take possession of the German economy, in order to achieve one of the power goals of the German people.\textsuperscript{64}

In other words, many Germans regarded themselves as an "indigenous" people who were being slowly colonized by foreigners, namely Jews. The cult of indigeneity was signalled by the \textit{völkisch} obsession with "ancient German tribes" whose virtues of simplicity and honesty were contrasted with the decadent civilization of the French and British. The trend to identify with "Aryans" participated in this cultural phenomenon, eventually locating their origin not in India but in northern Europe.\textsuperscript{65} This ideology culminated in the "blood and soil" rhetoric of the Nazis, who idealized the peasant rooted in the land. Nomadic peoples like Arabs and Jews were parasites, whereas settlers, such as "Nordic" colonists in North America, spread civilization and advanced humanity.\textsuperscript{66} If settlers were mobile as well, they eventually became agriculturalists and rooted in the soil. Ironically, the environmentalist racialism prevalent in Germany speculated that Jews could not be part of the \textit{Völkskörper} because their racial characteristics had been formed by another geographical environment.\textsuperscript{67} Applying the North American term of "nativism," Jeremy Cohen identifies this reaction already in the medieval period in Christian Germany.\textsuperscript{68} It is a nativism that justifies colonial expansion by coding its movement as productive and that of "nomads" – and sedentary Slavic peasants – as parasitic.
The anxiety about "colonization" by Jews was compounded after the First World War when the Rhineland was occupied by French troops from Africa. Not only had Germany been forcibly decolonized by its imperial rivals (and recolonized by its rivals under the mandate system), now they had imposed "inferior" black troops on the country. Germany was now the colonized, not the colonizer.69 Right-wing Germans launched a massive propaganda campaign against the "black disgrace" of the occupation, replete with lurid tales of rapes and violence against local women. In thrall to conspiracy theories, they believed the occupation was an international plot to contaminate Germans with "inferior blood." Foreign Minister Adolf Köster spoke for many when he complained that "the German Volkskörper was facing permanent annihilation on his western front."70 In effect, the occupation was a policy of genocide, as Hitler believed in Mein Kampf.

It was and is the Jews who bring the negro to the Rhine with the same concealed thought and clear goal of destroying, by the bastardisation which would necessarily set in, the white race which they hate, to throw it down from its cultural and political height and in turn to rise personally to the position of master.71

His sense of panic about Jewish rule was palpable. Jews, as a "foreign people," had erected a "tyranny" over Germany, and now enslaved, through the stock exchange and media, but also via cultural life and the state, the Weimar Republic.72 His arguments that Jews had infiltrated the ruling strata by intermarriage were echoed by other writers, like Sippenforscher Heinrich Banniza von Bazan, who deplored Jewish emancipation and the "flood" of immigration from Poland. "It looks like a planned dividing up of all German cultural areas. Four sons enter the four university faculties, another becomes an artist, while the daughter disports herself as the wife of the pastor." His integration did not bode well for Germany. "Since the collapse of the German people after the world war, [Jewish] domination over the political fate of the nation became totally naked. A racially alien strata developed that arrogated to itself the power to codetermine the welfare and direction of the German people." As a result, by the Nazi seizure of power in 1933, "some 2.5 million residents had Jewish blood coursing through their veins."73

Not unlike the Pan-German leader, Heinrich von Class, Hitler's "indigenous" response at this perceived colonization and foreign rule was to expel the colonists and establish an autarkic economy, that is, to preserve its "national character" by removing it from "international finance control," that is, from Jewish hands.74 Otherwise the fate that met other peoples in the past awaited Germany: "Carthage's fall is the horrible picture of such a slow self-earned execution of a nation."75 Time was short. The perceived Jewish colonizer was pressing its rule over the world: "The British Empire is slowly becoming a colony of the American Jews."76
5 HITLER AND SELF-CONSCIOUS IMPERIALISM

Surveying the wreck of German empire in the 1920s, Hitler concluded, on the basis of his eclectic reading and exposure to the new discipline of geopolitics with its concepts of continental domination and Lebensraum (living space), that Germany's future lay in a European empire. Here, too, he followed in the steps of the Pan-Germans, who had advocated annexation and ethnic cleansing in east-central Europe during the First World War. Past empires — Greek, Persian, Mongol, Aztecs, Inca, and Spanish — were part of Hitler's historical repertoire. He was especially interested in the Roman Empire, whose success he attributed to its absorption of Aryan blood by its ruling strata. The destruction of that empire was — here he followed the Pan-German view — caused by racial intermixing. Christianity, with its pernicious doctrine of racial equality, was to blame. A Jewish invention as well, Bolshevism performed the same corrosive, levelling function.27

Traumatized by Germany's loss in the First World War and convinced that Germans faced extinction, Hitler consciously applied the perceived lessons of world history imagined imperialistically and without sentimentality. In his hands, he fantasized, Germany would never again be open to internal colonization by a foreign people (Jews), at the mercy of foreign powers, or vulnerable to the labor movement that he thought had stabbed the army in the back.28 Applying these lessons meant founding an autarkic continental empire — "a great Germanic empire" — eradicating opposition, depopulating superfluous Slavs, and settling its border regions with "Aryan" colonists.29 The Indian intellectual Ashis Nandy has drawn attention to the conscious nature of this project, which was not mechanically repeating patterns but radicalizing them:

The industrialized, scientized, technological violence Europe had tried outside Europe. In Europe, there was at most you could say trench warfare, but that was not self-conscious. Even in World War 1, the killings in places like Flanders were not self-conscious exercises, as was Nazism; outside Europe it was often a self-conscious enterprise. Nazis, with Teutonic thoroughness, brought that experience to work within Europe; they applied to Europe what Europe had done outside Europe.30

This German Empire would not be formed "in a fit of absence of mind," then, but deliberately in light of world history. Hitler drew on an ancient imperialist imaginary to make sense of Germany's place in the world:

We have the so-called white race that, since the collapse of antiquity, has over around 2,000 years taken on a leading position in the world. I cannot understand the economic dominance of the white race over the rest of the world unless I relate it closely to a political dominance that the white race has possessed naturally for hundreds of years and that it has projected outwards. Think of any area; consider India: England has not won India with justice and law but without regard for the desires, aspirations or laws of the natives, and it has when necessary maintained its dominance with the most brutal
measures (*Rücksichtslosigkeit*): just like Cortez or Pizarro claimed Central America and the northern states of South America not on the grounds of some legal basis but out of the absolute, inherited feeling of dominance of the white race. The settlement of the North American continent succeeded just as little from some democratic or international conception of legal claims, but out of a sense of justice that is rooted only in the conviction of superiority and with that the right of the white race.*

World history did not yield examples of peaceful economic conquest, especially British history: "no nation has more carefully prepared its economic conquest with the sword with greater brutality and defended it later on more ruthlessly than the British." The British Empire, he thought, was not based on the professed humanitarian ideals of its apologists, but on ruthless exploitation. Its wealth stemmed from the "capitalist exploitation of 350 million slaves." In effect, Hitler was observing what Partha Chatterjee later called "the rule of colonial difference," in which the postulated equality of colonial subjects is forever deferred by the ruler's racist judgement that they are not sufficiently mature for self-government. Of course, if Indians and Hitler concurred in decrying British hypocrisy, they differed in their assessment of European domination. Long rule in India had inculcated in the British a racial arrogance and born-to-rule mentality that Hitler wished Germans to emulate. His imperial commissars in Ukraine should act like viceroyes.

Hitler has been interpreted as being, in principle, against far-off colonies, but a careful reading of his texts shows that he admired how the British could use many of their colonies for both settlement and resource exploitation. The problem with Germany's African colonies was that their harsh climate and economy was ill-suited to North American- or Australian-style settler colonialism. They were dominated by capitalists rather than settlers. A *völkische Boden* - and Raumpolitik (folkish land/ground and space policy) for Germany must be based, therefore, on contiguous territory in eastern Europe. Germany needed to colonize this space as it had so successfully in the past. Dismissing the Western rhetoric of civilizational uplift and local autonomy as brazen hypocrisy, Hitler enjoined ruthless exploitation in the manner in which he thought the West actually governed their colonial possessions. He wanted an extractive empire like the British had in India, but also settler colonies like North America, supplemented by outright plunder. In Hitler, the imperial models of centuries of human history coalesced into a single, total, imperial fantasy of genocidal conquest, colonization, and exploitation. The Nazis turned the ubiquitous ideology of colonial rule into ruthless expansionism by emphasizing its exploitative dimension over any meliorative counter-discourses. Nazism's *raison d'être* was imperial expansion. The purpose was not just to challenge the "Judeo-Bolshevism" of the Soviet Union, but also to secure continental hegemony for the ultimate showdown with the United States, whose awesome economic power Hitler had begun to appreciate only after writing *Mein Kampf*.

To trivialize these fantasies as hapless groping for orientation or as post facto
legitimations of conquest, as critics of the continuity thesis have, misses the point about the framing function of the imperialist imaginary. The rise and fall of empires and concomitant extinction of peoples was constitutive of the global political gaze, as we saw with Dilke, Roosevelt, and Thurwald. These were not marginal figures but popular writers, national leaders, and intellectuals. This gaze meant that when senior bureaucrats, academics, and Nazis gathered in 1934 to plan the Nuremberg laws they were inspired less by the intermarriage ban in the former German colonies than by such bans in North American states.

6 REDEMPITIVE ANISEMITISM

How can we understand this particularly disturbing learning process? The imperial, indeed, genocidal history of humanity lay before Hitler, as for his contemporaries like Oswald Spengler, who also expounded on the rise and fall of civilizations, for interpretation and guidance. That much seems clear. But why the catastrophic and, indeed, apocalyptic conclusions drawn by Hitler? Recall that Castoriadis and Deleuze regarded history as the realm of heteronomous determination, the almost mechanical unfolding of events stymieing human freedom. Spengler's rigid historical philosophy is a case in point, with its pessimistic conclusion that Western culture was dying because it had reached the stage of over-cultivated civilization. His cyclical theory was pessimistic because of its maudlin acceptance of long-term, inevitable developments that cultured men had to stoically bear.

Hitler, by contrast to those of bildungsbürgerliche sensibility, was a revolutionary who would not accept the cards that history and world events had dealt the German people. He wanted to assert that people's freedom against its destiny by an act of radical imagination. The First World War had been an "event" in the Deleuzean sense, rupturing received categories of political and historical interpretation, opening up the political and imaginative space for revolutionary activity in the name of rival projects of human freedom, whether Bolshevist or racist.

National Socialism was experienced as "national liberation" by many Germans, who wanted to rid the country of parliamentarism and "Jewish social democracy"; in other words, to replace modern political imaginary of the social contract and liberalism represented by "the Jew" with a premodern one of hierarchy and order embodied by National Socialism – though of course with ultra-modern techniques. The natural order would be restored after the disorder of modern German politics. There would be a "rebirth of our racial life force," as Walter Gross, the Nazi Party's Department for Racial Matters, put it. Max Wundt, too, wrote of "rebirth," linking it to his "unshakeable faith in the liberating mission of the Führer." The question, then, is less about "continuities" than the "caesura" that Lacoue-Labarthe discerns in the Nazi project, the quasi-aesthetic attempt to "fiction" a new beginning in light of a disastrous past, to effect a "violent
abortion of [the old] Germany in its frenzied attempt to appropriate itself as such (to identify itself) and to step into the light of history. Only a radical gesture of political imagination and action could inaugurate and vouchsafe the national-racial German project by rupturing the temporal flow of events that had conspired to prevent German "becoming." Enduring for a thousand years, it would defeat its enemies - and time itself.

What of "redemptive anti-Semitism"? In light of the imperialist imaginary, it is worth exploring the broader context in which the political emotions associated with redemptive violence develop: after all, violence is a core implication of redemptive anti-Semitism. In view of the colonial metaphors that suffused not only the Nazi imperial project but also its framing of the Jewish presence in Germany, that context has to be the imperial imaginary. Frantz Fanon's writings on violence and nation liberation are a good starting point because he was sensitive to colonialism's psychological effects and legacies. Evicting the settlers and their state was insufficient, he noted, because the subjectivity cultivated under occupation, a subjectivity that internalized racist stereotypes, would endure. True liberation required the violent, indeed, fatal attack on the European colonizer; it was therapeutic because it destroyed the inferiority complex of the subaltern habitus. As Sartre put it in his famous introduction to Fanon's The Wretched of the Earth: "[T]o shoot down a European is to kill two birds with one stone, to destroy the oppressor and the man he oppresses at the same time: there remains a dead man, and a free man: the survivor, for the first time, feels a national soil under his foot." Here is liberation that is genuinely redemptive because it is cathartic: an expression of freedom from the past, implying revenge, and of self-fashioning in the present and future; "it is man recreating himself," as Sartre wrote. Or as Tsenay Serequeberhan puts it, "[I]t is only when the colonized appropriates the violence of the colonizer and puts forth his own concrete counterviolence that he reenters the realm of history and human historical becoming."

For the Nazis and their supporters, destroying the "Jewish spirit" and its bearers, "the Jews," was necessary for the birth of a new Germany, a Germany inhabited by now racially conscious citizens that had transcended the bitter class divisions of the Weimar years, an imperial Germany that would protect itself from inner and outer enemies. An imperial country that had been thwarted by the Jewish colonizer whose international system held Germany in its thrall, Germany could now embark on its destiny.

Needless to say, Germany was not in fact being colonized by Jews as Algeria was by the French. And there are obvious and significant differences between Fanon's and Hitler's project that space limitations prevent me from elaborating here. But if we are interested in political subjectivities, as we must be when the focus of redemptive anti-Semitism is on the perpetrators, then the stories they tell themselves are centrally important - especially if they are paranoid. The consciousness of the Nazis needs to be invested with analytical weight, rather than being ascribed to any particular "continuity." For all the differences between the Nazis' anti-Semitism and anti-colonial "nativist" violence, then, the tendency
to hold members of the “occupying” group collectively guilty is striking. So is the totality of the ambition. Fanon wrote that “Liberation is the total destruction of the colonial system”\textsuperscript{105}; Hitler also aimed at total destruction of the Jews who, in his view, ran the corrupt world and Weimar systems that were on the brink of destroying the Germans.

Perhaps, Fanon and Friedländer can be linked in another way, as well, namely regarding the status of the victims. Where Friedländer, Tal, and others postulated the uniqueness of the Holocaust in part because Jews incarnated Western civilization, Fanon condemns that civilization for perpetrating colonialism on the rest of the world: “The West saw itself as a spiritual adventure. It is in the name of the spirit, in the name of the spirit of Europe, that Europe has made her encroachments, that she has justified her crimes and legitimized the slavery in which she holds four-fifths of humanity”\textsuperscript{106} For Friedländer, the Nazis are nihilist opponents of the West, for Fanon they embody its pathologies in the most virulent way. What the imperialist imaginary shows is that genocidal racism and imperial conquest transcend any particular civilization – which is far more disturbing. Sartre clearly sided with Fanon, deriding the Western justifications of empire as “the strip tease of our humanism” and an “ideology of lies.”\textsuperscript{107} As much as he opposed antisemitism, he would have equally opposed German Jews who participated in the German imperial project, like the jurist Max Fleischmann who, at the 1910 Kolonialkongress in Halle, denounced “mixed-marriages” in the colonies by appealing to the “racial consciousness” (Rassenbewusstsein) of Europeans.\textsuperscript{108} To this extent, Friedländer, Tal and others are correct to note that Jews at least participated in Western civilization, indeed represented its origins.

Speaking on behalf of Europeans, Sartre proposed an antidote: decolonizing the self by rooting out the settler lurking in each of us.\textsuperscript{109} He was not the first to advance such an idea. After Arab rioting in 1929, Hans Kohn, the famous historian of nationalism and, like Friedländer, Jewish native of Prague, abandoned Palestine for the USA, accusing Zionism-in-practice of colonial tendencies in relation to the Palestinian Arabs; there had been no “serious effort to obtain the agreement of the people, to negotiate with the people that live in the country,” he wrote, and consequently they had perpetrated atrocities against Jews that were “typical of a colonial uprising.” Echoing the revisionist Zionist Vladimir Jabotinsky – though critically – he observed that the only way for the settlement to endure was “on the basis of our ability to defend ourselves, internal militarization, and outwardly directed inflammatory rhetoric.” Unlike Sartre, however, his decision was undertaken in the name of humanism, which he called “a moral spiritual movement” that was pacifist as well as liberal.\textsuperscript{110} Seen in this light, Sartre’s advice participates in the Manichean either/or logic of colonialism that Fanon had so carefully exposed. Kohn’s was a vision of an alternative moral order, rooted in a non-imperialist imaginary whose calling into consciousness the twentieth century has shown to be as urgent as ever; the willingness to forgo collective redemption at the expense of others.
Notes

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10 Ibid., 2–4, 15.


16 Friedländer won the Peace Prize of the German Book Trade in 2007, and his views are regularly sought in newspaper interviews, for example, “‘Heute interessiert mich Walser nicht mehr‘”, *Der Tagesspiegel*, 13 October 2007. In 1998, Bauer spoke before the German Bundestag on the occasion of the annual commemoration of the Victims of National Socialism: http://www.bundestag.d/geschichte/gastredner/bauer/rede.html.
23 Lacour-Labarthe, Heidegger, Art and Politics, 37.
30 Deleuze defines the pure event as that part of every event that escapes its own actualization. Pure eventness in this sense is the highest object of historical thought. It is what must be thought from an historical point of view, but at the same time that which can never, or never exhaustively, be thought since it is only given to us through what actually happens. See Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, trans. Mark Secco and Charles Stivale, eds., Constantin Boundas (London: Athlone Press, 1999).
32 Max Scheler, in Schneider, Derrida, Delbrück, Scheler, Sering, Schilling, Brunner, Jastrow, Penck, Kahl unter Reichstagsaufstand und Kolonialpolitik, offizieller stenographischer Bericht über die Versammlung in der Berliner Hochschule für Musik am 8. Januar 1907, ed. Kolonialpolitischen Ak tionkomitee (Berlin: Dr. Wedekind, 1907), 25.
36 Moses I. Finley, "The Athenian Empire: A Balance Sheet," in Peter D. A. Garnsey and Charles R.

37 Ernst Bloch, "Nonsynchronism and the Obligation of its Dialectics," *New German Critique* 11 (1977), 22–38. This article was originally published in 1932.


42 Ibid., 11–2.


48 Ernst Hesse, *Das Deutsche Reich als Nationalstaat* (Munich: J. S. Lehmann's Verlag, 1905), 122–3.


Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1940), 448–9.

Ibid., 426–33.


Hitler, Mein Kampf, 380, 969.


Timothy W. Mason stresses that Hitler blamed the labor movement in particular; see Mason, "Die Faschisten der Novemberrevolution für den Nationalsozialismus," in Mason, Sozialpolitik im Dritten Reich: Arbeitnehmer- und Volksgemeinschaft (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1977), 15–41.


Hitler, Mein Kampf, 189.

89 Ibid., 353.
91 Philipp Gassert, Amerika im Dritten Reich (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1997); 'Toose, Wages of Destruction, 10.
95 Both quotations in ibid., "Of Structures of Political Theology and Myth," 49, 59.
96 Smith, The Continuities of German History.
97 Lacoste-Labanthe, Heidegger, Art, and Politics, 75–82 (emphasis in the original).
99 Jean-Paul Sartre, "Preface," in Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 22 (emphasis in the original).
100 Ibid., 21.
104 Cf. Ranajit Guha, Elementary Aspect of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999), who argues that consciousness of peasant insurgents has been ignored by historiography, which consistently reduces it to an expression of some larger story.
106 Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 313.