was forged not just in the synagogue, the home, the school or the expanding networks of Jewish associational life but through encounters with the mass-produced medium of print. In the nineteenth century, in other words, Judaism became an imagined identity in a radically new way, the product of acts of newspaper and journal reading and the consumption of the novel forms of belles lettres produced through Jewish print media.

Claiming that print culture enabled the construction of a new form of imagined Jewish identity, of course, does not mean that this form of identity was not real. Nor does this entail claiming a privileged significance for print that would set it apart from the numerous other important ways in which Jewish identity was produced and transformed in the nineteenth-century German-speaking world. Indeed, studying German-Jewish print culture is important because it enables us to see connections between so many facets of both Jewish and non-Jewish life in this period. In terms of method, it allows us to articulate the local with both the national and the transnational, while forcing us to integrate the tools of literary criticism, social- and intellectual history and media history as well. Historians, of course, have long since turned to the German-Jewish press as source material. Now seems, however, to be a particularly auspicious moment for considering German-Jewish print culture not just as an historical resource for our reconstruction of the past but as one of the major venues through which modern German-Jewish culture began to imagine itself into existence.

THE CONTRADICTORY LEGACIES OF GERMAN JEWRY

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Hannah Arendt's reply to Karl Jaspers' invitation to write for his new journal, Die Wandlung is a revealing document of the identity dilemmas facing German Jews after the Holocaust. "I know you will not misunderstand me when I say that it is not an easy thing for me to contribute to a German journal," she wrote, while also expressing her unhappiness about the "desperate resolve" of Jews to leave Europe for Palestine. Her ambivalence about the place of Jews in Europe was captured in a new axiom: "If Jews are to be able to stay in Europe, then they cannot stay as Germans or Frenchmen, etc., as if nothing had happened... We can return only if we are welcome as Jews."44 This axiom has been heeded by all "sides" ever since. Germans and Jews are invariably juxtaposed as if they do not mix, like oil and water, although Germany is home for tens of thousands of Jews for whom German is their mother tongue. Children of Holocaust survivors like Eva Hoffman insist that no reconciliation or accommodation is possible between Germans and Jews.

the perpetrators and the victims.\textsuperscript{45} And even writers sympathetic to the humanistic legacy of the supposed "German-Jewish symbiosis", like Shulamit Volkov and Liliane Weissberg, seem to posit Germans and Jews as ontologically distinct categories. The humanistic dimension is the hope that people from different backgrounds can live "together in a democracy that is capable of providing the range of prerequisites for a genuine cooperation among them."\textsuperscript{46}

The field of German-Jewish history, then, is still informed by what Pierre Bourdieu called "our primary inclination to think the social world in a substantialist manner"\textsuperscript{47}: ethnic relations are regarded as a zero-sum game of interaction in which a cultural adaptation, layered or co-mingled identity is coded as a loss or gain for a minority or majority, an intuitive and understandable framing of the human imaginary for anyone who, like Volkov, was raised in the shadow of the Holocaust and formed by a "Zionism that felt unable to openly discuss doubts".\textsuperscript{48} This subconscious division of the world into Jews and non-Jews—with nothing in between—subtends understandings of Jewish emancipation in Germany as amounting to "utter Jewish assimilation" and the decline of autonomous Jewish strength and vitality. This is a remarkable view in light of David Sorkin's well-known argument that German Jews developed their own sub-culture that transcended such stark dichotomies.\textsuperscript{49} That this interpretive tendency persists in serious scholarship is also surprising after Sam Moyn's complaint in these pages thirteen years ago about the baleful consequences of "ethnic absolutism" and the negative teleology of the Holocaust on the historiography of German Jewry.\textsuperscript{50}

There are significant implications of what Gil Hochberg, in reference to the Arab-Jewish imbrication, calls the "separatist imagination".\textsuperscript{51} What is the Heimat of Jews who live in Germany? Whether (other) Germans really consider them as co-nationals is revealed occasionally when gormless local politicians ask German Jews if their homeland is actually Israel. The German-Jewish relationship has become triangular because a state exists, Israel, which claims to represent the ancestral and authentic homeland of Jews everywhere—and particularly those who

\textsuperscript{45} Eva Hoffman, \textit{After Such Knowledge: Memory, History and the Legacy of the Holocaust}, New York 2004, p. III: "The gulf -- moral, political, affective -- between the victim and the perpetrator is almost absolute."


\textsuperscript{47} Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant, \textit{An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology}, Chicago 1992, p. 228.

\textsuperscript{48} Volkov, \textit{Germans, Jews, and Antisemites}, p. ix. An alternative to this zero-sum game imaginary is Michael Rothberg's concept of "multidirectional memory", see his \textit{Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization}, Stanford 2009.

\textsuperscript{49} Weissberg, 'Reflecting on the Past, Envisioning the Future', p. 2; Mohe Zimmerman, \textit{Die Deutsche Juden, 1914–1945}, Munich 1997; David Sorkin, \textit{The Transformation of German Jewry, 1780–1940}, Oxford–New York 1987. As a student of George L. Mosse, it is perhaps no surprise that Sorkin was sensitive to the complexities of cultural interaction.

\textsuperscript{50} Sam Moyn, 'German Jewry and the Question of Identity Historiography and Theory', \textit{LBI Year Book}, XLI (1996), pp. 291–308.

inexplicably live in the land of the perpetrators. Why does the German-Jewish leadership feel compelled to defend Israeli military action, however excessive it may be, against the criticism of non-Jewish Germans who, in turn, expect it to represent the Jewish-Israeli (these categories are significantly conflated) perspective for (other) Germans? The assumption that Jews are not really German nationals is reinforced by both “sides”.

Who or what, then, are the Jews of Germany and how does one write historically about this cultural formation? Can we transcend the separatist imagination? Over the past fifteen years, scholars of literature have turned to the tools of postcolonial theory to answer these questions. Diaspora theory, in particular, partly inspired by Jonathan and Daniel Boyarin, has yielded a cache of writing about hybrid identities, an approach that readily maps on to the well-worn “symbiosis” trope. Implicitly a- or post-Zionist, this trend has culminated in Jeffrey Peck’s Being Jewish in the New Germany (2006), which has taken the anti-essentialism of postmodernism to its logical conclusion; jettisoning authenticity and core-periphery spatial metaphors in the discourse of Jewish identity, Peck writes about Jewish life in contemporary Germany as vibrant, viable—and legitimate. He is interested in variegated praxes and performances rather than the vain search for elusive essences. Other scholars, like Leslie Adelson and Yasemin Yıldız, are likewise exploring the complexities of language-use and the interaction of Turkish-Jewish metaphors and frames in the “new Germany.” The German-Jewish-Israel nexus is now difficult to imagine without the Turkish one.

Although this approach of the “decentered subject”—Jewishness, Turkishness and Germanness as fluid containers of identity—has moved beyond the separatist imagination, it needs to be supplemented for historical research as opposed to literary research. The reason why becomes clear when we consider Edward Said’s claim in an Israeli newspaper interview that he was the “last Jewish Intellectual”, indeed “a Jewish Palestinian”. He was mourning the tradition of Jewish universalism that he associated with T.W. Adorno, to whom he felt an affinity, and which he

championed, in his own way, in his work. This now celebrated quotation has often been interpreted as an attack on Zionism and the associated marginalisation of non-national identities and subjectivities in the Jewish world. But we also know that Said appreciated that nationalism appealed to many, if not himself, and that, at least for a period of his career, he supported the so-called “two state solution” to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Historical agency was not an inexplicable notion. His advocacy for a bi-national Palestinian-Jewish state was thus tempered by concern for and uncertainty about the fate of Jews there, as well as for Palestinians. As he said in the same interview: “I worry about that. The history of minorities in the Middle East has not been as bad as in Europe, but I wonder what would happen. It worries me a great deal. The question of what is going to be the fate of the Jews is a very difficult for me, really don’t know. It worries me.”

These kinds of dilemmas are not going to be solved by a literature that mournfully recalls previous coexistences and hybridities—whether between Germans and Jews or Arabs and Jews—before the “fall” of nationalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Nor is the current almost singular focus on the legacy of the Holocaust likely to unlock the processes historians need to examine. Gershon Sholem’s conversion to Zionism occurred well before the Nazi persecution, after all. Its significance is his admission that he reclaimed—or constructed—his Jewishness against his German past. The nationalising project of Zionism preceded the Holocaust by half a century. Its psychic attractions need to be investigated.

Processes of nationalisation have been interesting historians of Germany since the constructivist turn in nationalism studies. Alon Confino’s study of the relationship between regional and incipient national identity in Imperial Germany is a classic in this genre. Studying these processes not only links personal identity projects to transnational trends; it also necessarily places those projects in imperial contexts in which the elites of subject peoples developed national consciousness—with the associated link between national self-assertion and decolonisation. And this frame raises the question once more of Heimat, imaginary and imagined homelands, and authentic belonging, but this time on a much broader canvass.

In doing so, it is insufficient to note that German was an imperial language in the Austro-Hungarian empire, and that Jews were its imperial people who were bound

58 Said, ‘My Right of Return’.
to be crushed by the wheels of separatist nationalisms in the second half of the nineteenth century. Such a perspective is still indentured to the “separatist imagination” and the implicit logic of ethnic struggle and survival whose outcome is Zionism and the importation of this logic to the fragile tangled skein of Palestine. Historians would do better to examine how the repertoire of images associated with Jews in Germany expands the German-Jewish-Israeli triangular relationship to a quadrangular one with an Arab, indeed “Asiatic”, “player”. For the fact is that, as Jonathan Hess has pointed out, the emancipation debates of the late eighteenth century imagined Jews as a “Semitic”, “eastern” people; Arabs and Jews as related. And those debates were the functional equivalent of later imperial discussions about granting equal rights to colonial subjects. The German states of the Enlightenment, then, were engaging in an internal colonial debate. Once this move is made, it is possible to creatively invoke postcolonial thinkers like Albert Memmi and Frantz Fanon to analyse the psychic dramas of German Jews, as Yiftat Weiss has for Jean Améry, and Michael Rothberg for Ruth Klüger.

But to argue on these grounds, as Susannah Heschel and Derek Penslar have, that Jews were an oppressed colonial minority in Germany, does not sufficiently distance the analysis from the constructions that are transpiring in the material they are investigating. Turning Zionism into an anti-colonial liberation movement, as Penslar does, to rebut scholars who denounce Zionism as a form of settler-colonialism (in which Palestinian Arabs are the oppressed indigenous people), ultimately participates in identity politics rather than analysis—as much as proposition he is contesting. A more consequent perspectivalism can disrupt the fixed ascriptions of belonging and reveal how exclusivist fantasies of Heimat can nationalise and denationalise people in complex ways. Thus while many Germans (and Europeans generally) regarded Jews as Oriental and thus not German, Palestinian Arabs viewed Zionist colonists as European and not Oriental. Zionist claims to indigenous status in Erez Israel was preposterous to them, although figures like Martin Buber thought that European Jews were both European and Oriental and

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were therefore uniquely placed to mediate between East and West, while Eugen Hoenlich proposed "Pan-Asianism" as an ideal encompassing Jews and many non-European people.67

And yet most Zionists, especially German ones, were proudly bürgerlich, as uncomfortable with immigrating eastern Jews to Germany as they were about, say, the Yemenite Jews they encountered in Palestine. Walter Laqueur’s viscerally negative reaction to Jerusalem’s “Oriental” character resembled those of previous Zionists leaders, as he notes in his memoirs. Parts of the city were like “a mixture of a Eastern Poland and deepest Anatolia... a medieval ghetto; and the Oriental Jewish markets and residential quarters... at best, fashioned out of a fascinating ugliness.”68 For Theodore Herzl, Jews were both natives and colonisers, the local Arab Jews as much natives as the Arabs. Their path to redemption lay in Europeanisation by expunging the Arab dimension.69 This paradox was reflected as well in the campaign of Herzl to hitch the horse of Jewish national liberation to the cart of imperial capital and power, securing a land grant somewhere, presumably without natives who might resist the colonisation.70

Given the constant presence of the “Orient” both in German and Ottoman Palestinian sites of German Jewish activity, it impossible to discuss the “German-Jewish” question without mentioning the Arab dimension, nor the Arab-Jewish sub-dimension. The intrinsic connection is illuminated in many ways. Nineteenth-century German Jewish scholars like the historian Heinrich Graetz and the theologian Abraham Geiger idealised the “renaissance of Jewish culture in the Muslim lands of the East and South as a prism through which to criticise Christian disparagement of the Jews as a race forsaken by history, and to offer an at times radical and decentred version of Jewish history, allowing for a multiplicity of Jewish subject positions.”71 Later, German Zionists participated in the civilising rhetoric of European colonialism generally in their plans to convert Arab Palestine into the Jewish homeland by uplifting the embarrassing Arab Jews, just as Christian Germans joined them in thinking Zionism would solve the “Jewish question” by repatriating Jews to their putative ancestral homeland. After the Holocaust, as Martin Braach-Maksytyt argues, West Germans could continue with this fantasy

67 Generally, see Hoenlich’s critique of Zionist attempts to recreate a Europe in Palestine: Die Pflege des Ostens (Das arabisch-jüdische Palästina vom panasiatischen Standpunkt aus), Berlin–Vienna 1923; idem, Tagebücher 1915 bis 1927, Vienna 1991.
71 Ned Curthoys, Diasporic Visions, Taboo Memories: Al-Andalus in the German-Jewish Imaginary, Archea Journal, no. 30 (2009).
by regarding Israel as a European outpost making a good fist of German-style colonial modernisation.\textsuperscript{72}

We know that such colonial fantasies and practices circulated transitionally. In our case, it is no accident that one of the most prominent early Zionists, the German Arthur Ruppin (1876–1943), consciously invoked Prussian colonisation policies on its Polish border as a model for achieving the Jewish demographic majority over the Arab population.\textsuperscript{73} Equally significant was Ruppin’s commitment to racial hygiene and his association with the Nazi eugenicist Eugen Fischer. Even if some commentators go too far in denouncing Ruppin as a fascist—a strong streak of liberalism tempered the authoritarian potential of his racial hygienic political imaginary—his belief that intermarriage between Jews and German Jews and non-Jews represented a greater threat than the Nazi Nuremberg laws is at once jarring and sobering.\textsuperscript{74} The significance lies in the project of nationalist modernisation pursued in Europe and now in the Middle East with the same fateful—and fatal—consequence for complex, multi-ethnic and non-ethnic communities. The German connection with the region persisted into the 1950s with the application of Walter Christaller’s “Central Place Theory”, which he had applied as a Nazi planner in the 1940s, in Israeli regional planning from the 1950s.\textsuperscript{75} It is now also possible to examine the impact of German völkisch thinkers on German Zionists without violating taboos.\textsuperscript{76}

As readers of this Year Book are well aware, however, German Jews left another legacy in Palestine, and later Israel; the humanistic nationalism of Brit Shalom (Covenant of Peace). Not for nothing has this legacy—supposedly institutionalised at the Hebrew University—been denounced by establishment academics for corroding the Zionist “soul” of Israel.\textsuperscript{77} Indeed, Christian Wiese’s and Steven E. Aschheim’s portraits of the group depict an ethically rigorous and highly-reflective assessment of Zionism-in-practice in the 1920s and 1930s, though they did not relinquish their hope that their version of Zionism might prevail. Hans Kohn eventually did leave the group, though, issuing dark warnings about chauvinism and colonial rule over the Palestinian Arabs. Derided as politically naive and removed from the

\textsuperscript{72}Martin Brauch-Maksyvtis, ‘Germany, Palestine, Israel and the (Post-) Colonial Imagination’ in Volker Langbehn and Mohammad Salama (eds), Colonial (Dis-)Continuities: Race, Holocaust, and Postwar Germany, New York forthcoming 2010.


\textsuperscript{76}Francis R. Nicosia, Zionism and Anti-Semitism in Nazi Germany, Cambridge 2008; Yoram Hotam, for instance, shows that Ludwig Klages influenced Zionist thinkers such as Jakob Klitzkin and Theodor Lessing, see Hotam, Moderne Gnosis und Zionismus: Kulturkrise, Lebensphilosophie und Nationalsozialistisches Denken, Göttingen and Leipzig forthcoming 2010.

\textsuperscript{77}Yoram Hazony, The Jewish State: The Struggle for Israel’s Soul, New York 2000.
Jewish masses, these thinkers have been largely forgotten until recently, when their binationalism and critique of Zionist answers to the "Arab Question" appears intellectually interesting and politically prescient.78

What, then, are the legacies of German Jewry and why are they worth studying? In a famous letter to Franz Rosenzweig in 1926, Sholem wrote that more threatening to Zionism than "the Arabs" was the Zionist enterprise itself. Modernising Hebrew to fashion a secular culture could not remove the "apocalyptic sting" and "explosive meaning" from the sacred language.79 Sholem did not elaborate what he feared the sting and explosion might be, but he was not alone in predicting the worst. Writing twenty years later to Jaspers, Arendt portended "further catastrophes" for Jewish immigrants to Palestine, "given the behaviour of other governments and our own suicidal tendencies in politics."80 Is it possible that, despite their well-known differences, Sholem and Arendt shared a particular German-Jewish sensibility about the danger of the politics? Answering this question and setting it against the alternative tradition of Zionists like Ruppin highlights the influential and contradictory legacies of Jews from Germany—the modernist project of nationalisation that has gripped the world generally, as well as those who have resisted or softened it in the name of cosmopolitan futures. It is to understand both legacies, rather than to prove or disprove the disputed German-Jewish "symbiosis", that makes the study of German-Jewish history as fascinating—indeed imperative—as ever.

THE GERMAN-JEWISH "ECONOMIC TURN"

BY GIDEON REUVENI

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Exactly eighty years ago, in the first issue of the revived Zeitschrift für die Geschichte der Juden in Deutschland (1929) historian Raphael Strauss called for a renewal of German-Jewish historiography by acknowledging all aspects of Jewish history in Germany ("allseitige Geschichte").81 His plan for a more comprehensive German-Jewish history was based on the observation that scholarship in this field was divided.


