GENOCIDE

Critical Concepts in Historical Studies

Edited by
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Volume I
The Discipline of Genocide Studies
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INTRODUCTION:
THE FIELD OF GENOCIDE STUDIES

The Discipline of genocide studies

Genocide, an age-old phenomenon in human history, was slow to make its appearance in scholarship. Only in the 1970s—decades after the Polish-Jewish lawyer Raphael Lemkin coined the term ‘genocide’ in 1944 and it was enshrined in the United Nations Convention on the Punishment and Prevention of Genocide four years later—did a number of North American social scientists begin to show sustained academic interest in genocide. Not that the word had fallen out of use. Besides some early legal analysis, leaders of national liberation movements, activists, intellectuals, and journalists routinely invoked genocide to draw attention to their cause, to denounce their opponents, or simply to express horror at massacres they had witnessed. Consider India and Pakistan’s mutual accusations during and after partition in 1948, the complaints by eastern European exiles in the United States that the USSR was destroying their nations, the Algerian National Front’s claims about French counter-insurgency in the 1950s, the Chinese crushing of Tibet in 1959, the reports of Hutu massacres of Tutsi in Rwanda in 1964, Jean-Paul Sartre’s excoriation of the US war in Vietnam, the unsuccessful Biafran secession from Nigeria in the late 1960s, the mass killings in East Pakistan–Bangladesh in 1971, those in Burundi during the next year, and the attacks on Indians in Paraguay soon thereafter: genocide was alleged in all these and other cases during this period. To a great extent, then, genocide was a rhetorical weapon wielded during decolonisation and the Cold War. Could such a polemically-loaded term be operationalised for serious academic investigation?

By 2010, this question has been answered positively. Genocide studies has now attained a level of intellectual sobriety, academic credibility and official recognition that was inconceivable forty years ago. It features in the curriculum of universities around the world, genocide studies centres proliferate, and three English-language journals and an online encyclopaedia serve to inform the scholarly community of the latest research. Monographs bearing the title genocide now occupy a prominent place in publishing houses’ lists, while two new and large anthologies—The Oxford Handbook on Genocide Studies and The Historiography of Genocide—take stock of the field.
On the political front, the United Nations, having apparently learned the 'lessons of Rwanda', appointed a Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide in 2004, flanked by a growing number of NGOs that campaign for 'humanitarian intervention' into some ongoing mass violence. The jurisprudence of genocide has also developed rapidly since the establishment of UN Ad Hoc Tribunals in 1994 to prosecute those accused of atrocities in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. With the adoption of genocide as a crime by the new International Criminal Court in 1998, its status in international law has never been more prominent. And in the wake of Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the field of post-genocide 'reconciliation' and transitional justice is also burgeoning. For better or worse, the field is in rude health.

How and why did this field come into being? We need to briefly consider its founders' biographies and the intellectual and cultural context of the 1970s. Leaving aside Lemkin, who died in 1959, the postwar genocides listed above occurred in their adult lifetime. Predominantly of Jewish and Armenian backgrounds, they thematized the genocidal victimisation of their own families as a motivation for their endeavours. Some, like Robert Melson, a child survivor of the Holocaust, first worked in postcolonial area studies—Nigerian labour movements, in his case—though even here the Holocaust loomed in the background. He comments: "As did so many of my generation growing up in the late 1950s and 1960s, I had hoped that Africa, the Third World, would avoid the recent horrors of Europe". The genocidal massacres and famine of the Ibo people in Nigeria in the late 1960s spurred his interest in genocide generally: "from then on I knew I had to return to the Holocaust to try to make sense of it both at the level of personal emotion and in some broader comparative intellectual perspective". Europe’s traumatic past, then, led to a commitment to postcolonial reconstruction, and then back to the Holocaust and comparative genocide after the genocidal failure of that optimism in these new nation-states. Others like Helen Fein moved into genocide studies after writing about the Holocaust. Jack Nusay Porter came to it from his work on Jewish radicalism. He claims to have taught the first course on genocide in 1978 'under the mentorship of a sociologist of the Armenian genocide, Levon Chorbajan.' Irving Horowitz also came out of the Jewish left and, like Porter, combined his growing attachment to Israel, as a survivor community, over the years with a broad concern for political violence and the persecution of minorities and small nations. As we will see below, this complex mixture of identifications could prove difficult to manage.

It is apparent, then, that, for many, the genocide concept expressed the moral impulse to universalise the lessons of the Holocaust in light of postwar history. Israel Cherny spoke from the heart when he stated that 'He is committed to the ideal that understanding the processes which brought about the unbearable evil of the Holocaust be joined with the age-old Jewish tradition of contributing to the greater ethical development of human civilization, and that a unique memorial to the Holocaust be forged in the development of new concepts of prevention of genocide to all peoples.' The humanistic generosity of this spirit can be best appreciated against the background of the debate in the 1970s in which some claimed that the terms Holocaust and genocide referred only to the Nazi destruction of Jews and could not be shared with others. To their immense credit, genocide scholars (as they called themselves) always opposed the proposition that the Holocaust was the only genocide in human history, though some regarded it as the most extreme genocide. But without the breakthrough of 'Holocaust memory' into North American popular culture in the 1970s—about which much has been written—it is uncertain whether genocide studies would have developed. It is, after all, an alternative to the singular focus on the Holocaust. Although 'genocide' actually preceded 'Holocaust' as the master concept of human destruction, Holocaust gradually supplanted genocide as the main signifier of evil, especially in North America. But because the Holocaust is also a genocide, it could not totally dominate a discursive terrain that had to name and respond to contemporary atrocities; the Holocaust was in the past, but genocides were all too current. At the very least, the two concepts co-exist in a complex—part enabling, part competitive—relationship.

For Armenians, genocide was well suited to associate their catastrophe of 1915 with the Holocaust and thereby gain academic respectability and attention. Not surprisingly, the laudable interest in comparative analyses was mostly concerned with the Holocaust and Armenian genocide, the latter then a concern largely confined to the Armenian diaspora community. And, as might be expected, these scholars were also concerned with 'genocide denial', especially as the Turkish state, in collusion with the Israeli state, attempted to silence them—attempts that they defied, often to their cost. The field articulated a victim perspective that opposed those who trivialised their suffering and memories. By expanding the purview of 'Holocaust memory'—then a growing phenomenon in the 1970s and 1980s—and by resisting the denials of the perpetrators and bystanders, genocide studies represented a movement with tremendous cosmopolitan potential.

An important landmark was Leo Kuper's Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century, published in 1981. Kuper (1908–94), a South African lawyer and sociologist who later directed the African Studies Centre at UCLA, was a liberal opponent of Apartheid and expert on racism and decolonisation. His Genocide, which can be still read with profit almost thirty years after its publication, displays these catholic interests and his profound knowledge of postcolonial affairs. For the first time since Lemkin's (unpublished) world history of genocide, a genuinely global and historical analysis of the subject was undertaken that incorporated the disasters of post-World War II decolonisation into a general account of genocide in the twentieth century. He also paid due regard to Lemkin as the pioneer of genocide studies. Appealed by the United Nations' lack of action to
interdict the genocides of the 1960s and 1970s, he wrote The Prevention of Genocide in 1985, channelling his understandable moral indignation into a sober assessment of the international system's Euro-centric imperatives. By cleanly distinguishing theivist impulse from his careful academic analysis, his work remains a model of how genocide studies can be successfully undertaken.  

Institutionalisation

Genocide studies crystallised into a tight-knit intellectual and moral community in the 1980s with the first academic gatherings and newsletters. The earliest conference was held on the Jewish and Armenian genocides at the University of Pennsylvania Conference Center at LaNapoule (Nice) in France in August 1980. The next took place in Tel Aviv in 1982, organised by Elie Wiesel and the physicians Israel Charny and Shmuel Davidson. With his new Institute on the Holocaust and Genocide in Jerusalem, Charny produced a newsletter forum for activists and researchers between 1985 and 1995 called Internet on the Holocaust and Genocide. At the same time, in 1982, Helen Fein founded the Institute for the Study of Genocide at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice of the City University of New York with a mission to ‘fill a gap in both the scholarly and the human rights communities which did not recognize the continued prevalence of genocide’. Its newsletter continues to this day. These scholars engaged in a whirlwind of activity, producing bibliographies, encyclopaedias, and other reference works. A notable contribution was Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn’s collection, The History and Sociology of Genocide (1990). Standing in the Kuperian tradition, this anthology of previously-published extracts included cases from antiquity and European imperial conquest. Melson’s Revolution and Genocide (1992), comparing mainly the Armenian and Jewish genocide, best expressed the consensus in the field. By highlighting the themes of revolutionary regime change, political myth and racial ideology, they set up the Holocaust as the ideal-type of genocide. What was implicit in Horowitz’s Genocide: State Power and Mass Murder became explicit in Barbara Harff’s statement that ‘The Jewish Holocaust…is employed as the yardstick, the ultimate criterion for assessing the scope, methods, targets, and victims of [other] genocides’.  

These hopeful beginnings were challenged by the implosion of Yugoslavia in the first half of the 1990s and the Rwandan genocide of 1994. Scholarship alone was powerless to stop these human catastrophes. Angry letters to the New York Times urging western intervention fell on deaf ears. Understandably, ‘genocide prevention’ now became the priority for this little academic community. In 1994, it crystallised into the Association of Genocide Scholars (later International Association of Genocide Scholars: IAGS), running a biannual conference attended mainly by North American-based academics. As might be expected, its members now began to evince irritation and impatience with the protocols of academic, as opposed to activist, discourse. Research was no longer a priority. The editorial in the first Newsletter of the Center for Comparative Genocide Studies at Macquarie University, Sydney, in 1994, exemplified the new tone.

The tragedies of Bosnia and Rwanda-Burundi make us even more strongly committed to informing students about comparative genocide. With knowledge they can advise and educate the political decision-makers in whose hands lie prevention of genocide.

The imperative to educate and advocate evincing a certain crusading quality. The Centre can and will act as your conscience. We have the experts. You have the ability to make possible the research and dissemination of this expertise. Please be with us. Genocide Studies was not to be an ordinary academic discipline.

If the field was changing direction, its internal contradictions were also becoming more apparent. What was the relationship between the Holocaust and genocide? The journal Holocaust and Genocide Studies, from the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, published articles overwhelmingly on the Holocaust. But if the Holocaust was a genocide—indeed, the archetype—why separate them conceptually? This distinction was challenged by Henry Huttenbach from the Center for the Study of Ethnonationalism at City College of New York. He founded The Genocide Forum newsletter in 1994, the same year that the English historian Mark Levene published an agenda-setting article called ‘Is the Holocaust simply another example of genocide?’ Like Levene, Huttenbach’s purpose was to end what he called the ‘parochialism’ of Holocaust scholarship by merging it with genocide studies. His manifesto appeared as the editorial in the first issue of The Genocide Forum.

As knowledge of other genocides expands, the arguments seeking to insulate the Holocaust from findings about other genocides, especially those after Auschwitz, no longer persuade. Investigations into recent genocidal massacres growing out of ethnic conflicts uncover categories of experiences and analytical problems not encountered in the study of the Holocaust. On the contrary, as investigators uncover new examples of genocidal experiences, it becomes increasingly evident that scholars of the Holocaust would learn little new of substance about the genocidal dimensions of the Holocaust without also thoroughly acquainting themselves with non-Holocaust studies.

Appearing several times a year until 2000, the Forum was replaced in 1999 by the new Journal of Genocide Research (JGR), the first fully-fledged
academic journal in the field. Huttenbach voiced his disappointment with the field in the debut editorial. The last few years had 'seen a proliferation of the "Holocaust and Genocide" programs in academe and Centers in local communities, thereby perpetuating the false assumption that the Holocaust is "more" than or something else from genocide, conceptually deserving a separate stature.' Although compelled to reprint his original manifesto in the debut number of the JGR, the news was not all bad, he said. The new Genocide Studies Program at Yale University, established in 1994 (the first such program or centre dedicated to genocide research) and the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, were models of the 'broad, multi-disciplinary approach to the study of genocide.' Ever scholarly, Huttenbach called for comparative and conceptually rigorous articles while also making room for 'policy experts' and 'analysts' (activists were not mentioned) on the prevention of genocide and early warning signs.

For all these differences, however, virtually all genocide scholars defined genocide as a crime of state entailing mass killing motivated by racist ideology, even though neither Lemkin nor the UN definition limited genocide in this way. To some extent, this 'liberal' incarnation of the discipline associated genocide with authoritarian and totalitarian regimes that were necessarily opposed by the non-genocidal, democratic west, a thesis exemplified by the work of Rudolph Rummel. If Huttenbach was concerned with the rising tide of ethnonationalism throughout the globe since the collapse of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the breakup of the Soviet Union itself in 1991, a handful of scholars on the left began to challenge the 'liberal' consensus. Those 'post-liberal' scholars emphasised social structures and pre-twentieth-century colonial cases rather than the state, racist ideology, and mass murder. The Australian historian, Tony Barta, for instance, drew attention to 'relations of genocide' in colonial cases where land-hungry settlers rather than the state were the primary actors. Chalk and Fein rejected Barta's insights for muddying the waters about state intention and genocidal ideology. Where Barta highlighted the moral ambiguity of settler colonialism, a phenomenon virtually ignored by genocide studies, his critics saw an unnecessary complication of a world they saw divided by the genocidal non-West and the non-genocidal West. The post-liberal approach was not to reappear for over a decade.

The intolerance of alternative perspectives continued at the IAGS conference in Minnesota in 2001. There, Fein attacked Levene's provocatively-titled paper 'A dissenting voice' as 'ideological' because it evinced scepticism about conventional humanitarian intervention by linking genocide to the global climate crisis. The agenda of the IAGS leadership was clear: its preoccupation with genocide prevention forced it to seek powerful agents to effect humanitarian (i.e. military) intervention into ongoing mass violence, and the US government, as the only super (indeed hyper) power after the Cold War was the obvious candidate. This message was reflected in Samantha Power's popular book, 'A Problem from Hell': America in the Age of Genocide (2002), which IAGS showered with praise.

Refoundation

This North American cast of genocide studies could not last when a new generation of researchers based in Europe, Britain, Australia, and Latin America entered the fray in the late 1990s. Inspired in part by Levene, whose unconventional but prescient global history approach appeared in important articles and the landmark Genocide in the Age of the Nation-State (2005), these younger scholars were predominantly historians rather than social scientists. Established academics from other fields also took up the interest in genocide. Interested in colonial and imperial history as well as the Holocaust, they began to fulfill Huttenbach's aim, though without necessarily having read his manifesto. On the whole, they worked comparatively and relationally, adroitly combining research with theoretical reflection. They did not necessarily take the Holocaust as the archetypal genocide, returning to Lemkin's capacious definition as the starting point for their research. They were therefore interested in non-lethal 'techniques of genocide' (Lemkin), such as cultural genocide, which had been so prevalent in the settler colonies. To a great degree, the new scholarship was fulfilling the genuinely comparative and cosmopolitan promise of the initial genocide studies paradigm.

An important crystallisation of this new cohort was the conference called 'Genocide and Colonialism' held at the University of Sydney in 2003. The research agenda announced by that conference manifested itself in two essay collections, Genocide and Settler Society and Empire, Colony, Genocide, as well as special issues of the Canberra-based Aboriginal History and the English journal Patterns of Prejudice. But this new history was barely registered in North America, where genocide scholars/activists were now up in arms about the Sudanese counter-insurgency in Darfur, which they denounced as genocidal. The advocacy of genocide prevention was the priority there. In response, many scholars outside the US asked how academics could enthusiastically welcome US intervention in Darfur after their predictions and hopes for such intervention in Iraq since 2003 had not been fulfilled.

These scholars felt it was time to return genocide studies to its roots in the work of Lemkin and Kuper. Leading the way was the rising star of German colonial history, Jurgen Zimmerer, who organised a major conference in Berlin in January 2005 that served as the foundation meeting of the European Network of Genocide Scholars (later International Network of Genocide Scholars; INOGS), a new organisation to foster academic research into genocide. INOGS was the product of several trends. In the first place, younger British scholars Dan Stone and Donald Bloxham, who had started out their careers writing about Holocaust-related topics, were joined by established ones like Martin Smith, who went on to publish the influential
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What is Genocide? Australians, like this author, also participated. Then there was the input of the French political scientist and author of influential work on massacres, Jacques Semelin. Before long, he had launched the Online Encyclopedia of Genocide and included members of INGOS on the editorial board. Crucially, a new generation of German historians, above all Zimmerer and Dominik Schaller, participated in these developments. They attracted other Europeans, such as the Dutch historian of colonial Africa, Jan-Bart Gewald, and the German Namibia specialist, Henning Melber, highlighting the expertise in imperial and postcolonial history. Senior German scholars, like the Norbert Finzsch, one of the very few Germans interested in genocide and colonial history, supported the new venture. Such support could not be taken for granted in Germany, where genocide scholarship stands in the shadow of the (understandable) focus on the Holocaust and the claim that it is ‘uniquely unique’.

Zimmerer had raised the profile of genocide studies in Germany with his book, Deutsche Herrschaft über Afrikander, a meticulously-researched study of colonial German rule in Southwest Africa, and a stream of articles and book chapters in both German and English. His co-edited anthology, Völkermond in Deutsch-Südwestafrika (2003), which was widely distributed by educational authorities in Germany, was a major contributing factor in the official apology of a German minister for the Herero and Nama genocide by German colonial troops in 1904–8. Schaller and collaborators also edited two major volumes of essays on comparative genocide, and Zimmerer sparked an at times fierce debate about the relationship between German colonialism and the Holocaust. A feature of this new genocide studies generally was not to take the concept for granted; it needed to be tested against alternatives, such as Christian Gerlach’s ‘extremely violent societies’.

Genocide studies emerged in Latin America in the late 1990s out of a number of indigenous developments. The human rights movements in Latin America, particularly in Argentina, always used the genocide label for domestic political crimes independently of the US genocide studies field, whose anthologies had not been translated into Spanish. In Guatemala, the ‘Comisión para el Esclarecimiento de la Verdad Histórica’ produced a report in 1996 that called the state crimes of the early 1980s ‘genocidal facts’, drawing on the UN Convention rather than genocide studies. And a year later, the Argentine Daniel Feierstein published his book on the Holocaust, Seis estudios sobre genocidio, which served as a model for scholars in other parts of Latin America working on local politics. In 2001, Feierstein established the Chair on Genocide Studies in the School of Social Sciences at the University of Buenos Aires, the first such chair in Latin America. Its aim is to develop the genocide studies field and to translate and disseminate the main works and ideas in Latin America. It is now a magnet for scholars from other Latin American countries. In 2007, he created the Center of Genocide Studies at the National University of Tres de Febrero where a team of researchers works on the Holocaust, the Ukrainian famine, and about different aspects of genocidal practices and/or state terrorism in Argentina, Uruguay and Chile. A new Center of Genocide Studies was established in the Universidad Popular de las Madres de Plaza de Mayo in Buenos Aires in 2009, led by Alberto Guliis. Plainly, Argentina is the centre of genocide research in Latin America where it plays a role in transitional justice. In 2006 and 2007, for instance, Feierstein’s work was used in Argentina in the murder, kidnapping and torture trials of Miguel Etchevelatz and Christian Von Wernich during which the court recognised that genocide had taken place in that country. The link to international genocide studies was made with large international conferences held in Buenos Aires in 2003 and 2007, the latter sponsored by INOGS.

Advocacy and scholarship

But what was the complexion of genocide studies now that it featured two organisations? INOGS’ mission is usefully contrasted with that of IAGS. The former declares itself to be ‘a non-profit and non-partisan organization to foster scholarly exchange and academic debate on all aspects of genocide’. Its membership is open to researchers, teachers and students from all academic disciplines working on genocide and mass violence. By contrast, IAGS casts its net beyond the academic community, seeking to gather ‘activists, artists, genocide survivors, journalists, jurists, public policy makers, and other colleagues into the interdisciplinary study of genocide, with the goal of prevention’. If the goals and memberships of the two organisations and journals overlap in part, they also differ in emphasis.

It was no surprise, then, that Henry Huttenbach decided to bequeath his legacy, the flagship Journal of Genocide Research (JGR), to INOGS rather than to IAGS, whose activism and Holocaust-centrism did not accord with his 1994 manifesto. Zimmerer and Schaller joined Huttenbach (who retired from the JGR in late 2009) as editors, taking over the journal’s daily business. Wanting to maintain its advocacy mission, IAGS then founded a journal of its own. Particularly revealing is the following statement in the association’s newsletter in 2005.

As we embarked on defining the identity of the journal we wish to create for IAGS, we realized that no journal to date provides an emphasis on intervention and the prevention of genocide which, for many of us, ultimately is what genocide studies is really about. We have, therefore, embarked on developing a new journal that will emphasize prevention of genocide, even as it also covers the full
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spectrum of scholarship of genocide. The choice of emphasis on prevention will make our journal uniquely different from *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* and from *Journal of Genocide Research*, and it also opens the door to the participation of many additional professionals from other disciplines who are concerned with a more peaceful world without being identified with genocide scholarship as such.64

The aptly-named *Genocide Studies and Prevention* was born in 2006, based at the Armenian-funded Zoryan Institute.65 The tension evident at the birth of genocide studies—between scholarship and activism—was now institutionalised in two associations and two journals. Differences in style and orientation were evident from the outset. Because condemning the denial of genocide—especially that of the Holocaust and the Armenian genocide—had always been a priority of IAGS, it now assumed the role of officially recognising genocide.66 Such an undertaking entailed approaching the hornets' nest of identity politics because many groups want their suffering to 'count' as genocide. Driven by the sympathy for the victim that led to the creation of genocide in the first place, IAGS deemed the massacre and deportation of all Ottoman Christians (not just Armenians) genocide.67 This was their answer to the Turkish government's attempt to silence them over the decades.

But it is a practice that INOGS and the JGR consciously eschew, regarding such partiality as incompatible with scholarly protocols.68 Likewise, they do not pronounce on current issues, a temptation that IAGS finds difficult to resist because of its commitment to prevention. For example, it has condemned the 'Iranian President Ahmadinejad's Statements Calling for the Destruction of Israel and Denying the Historical Reality of the Holocaust'. Here was a case, it said, of ringing the alarm bell about an oncoming genocide.

Early warning signs of genocide include open expressions of an exclusionary ideology (hate speech), denial of past genocide (Holocaust denial), authoritarian government that represses dissent (arrest of Iranian moderates), organization of fanatical militias (Revolutionary Guards) and construction of weapons of mass destruction (the Iranian nuclear weapons program). All of these early warning signs of genocide are evident in Iran today.69

Although a species of Charny's 'genocide early warning system', this listing is based on the eight-stage formula of genocidal escalation formulated by Greg Stanton, founder of *Genocide Watch* and president of IAGS at the time. A charter for genocide prevention, this formula is widely used in the intervention literature and NGOS.

Genocide is a process that develops in eight stages that are predictable but not inexorable. At each stage, preventive measures can stop it. The later stages must be preceded by the earlier stages, though earlier stages continue to operate throughout the process.

The stages are: classification, symbolisation, dehumanisation, organisation, polarisation, preparation, extermination, and denial.70 The middle to which IAGS positions can lead is evident by applying the Stanton model in the other direction. From the perspective of West Bank Palestinians enduring Israeli occupation, their situation is at stage five, perhaps even six, of the schema. Senior Israeli government ministers not only call for West Bank Palestinians to be deported to Jordan, but for Palestinian citizens of Israel to be deported as well (signs of racist ideology); the state cannot admit the deportation of Palestinians in 1948 (denial of ethnic cleansing); there are organisations of fanatical militias bent on expelling Palestinians (the settlers, tacitly supported by the state); and the state's possession of weapons of mass destruction ensures the expansion of settlements with impunity. For Palestinians, their viability as a people is not a future threat; it's an ongoing reality.71 Academic organisations need to distinguish between individual scholars expressing political views alongside their research, which is entirely legitimate, and adopting collective viewpoints on whether events constitute genocide, which replaces scholarly integrity with judgements based on political partisanship or compromise. In this case, IAGS 'cried wolf', confusing historical aggression and a real threat of genocide.

If the identification with the victim is a feature of the IAGS position, then the identification of the victim is eminently contestable. This tension is evident even within IAGS ranks. Thus during the Israeli attack on Gaza between December 2008 and January 2009, the organisation was racked by conflict about whether to condemn Israel. The sympathies of most IAGS leaders appeared to be on the Israeli side, which they saw as defending the Jewish state against the genocidal terror of Hamas, while some of the rank and file regarded the Israeli attack as excessive and criminal. The ensuring row was the predictable outcome of the risk-laden policy of moral intervention.72 Charny's parting words from the executive board summed up the atmosphere inevitably created by such a policy: 'IAGS particularly shocked me as some (not all) of our important active leaders created a cesspool of insults, invective, assault, and slander, and made repeated threats to resign if they could not have their way.'73

Ironically, the pioneers of genocide studies, who had tried to rescue the term from its political usage during the immediate postwar decades, presided over a return to these polemics. Consequently, historians outside genocide studies were loath to employ the word, regarding it as sensationalist and unanalytical.74 In fact, this reluctance stemmed from the fact that North American genocide studies had insisted upon the Holocaust as the 'gold
standard', thereby making it difficult for specialists to consider the concept for earlier cases in which industrial, mass killing perpetrated by a modern state motivated by a racist ideology obviously did not apply. The exceptions were the Australians Robert Cribb and Ben Kiernan, who had been producing empirical studies on Southeast Asia and genocide for decades.77

By 2000, though, the differences between the organisations were becoming more apparent than real in relation to research. As might be expected, the ethnic cleansings and genocides in Yugoslavia and Rwanda stimulated general interest, and graduate students began to devote their doctoral research to particular cases. Scholars with area-studies expertise turned to comparative analysis. Important milestones were Norman Naimark’s comparative study of ethnic cleansing, *Fires of Hatred* (2001), and Eric Weitz’s wide-ranging *A Century of Genocide* (2003), both notable for including Soviet case-studies.78 The English sociologists of war, Martin Shaw and Michael Mann, examined genocide’s relation to war and democratisation, respectively, in two important books.77 The anthropologist Alex Hinton also drew attention to his discipline’s implication in genocide with two anthologies, while presenting his own research on Cambodia in *Why Did They Kill? Cambodia in the Shadow of Genocide* (2005).78 Important dissertations found eager readerships, such as Benjamin Valentino’s *Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the Twentieth Century* (2004), and Scott Straus’s, *The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda* (2006).79 If, on the whole, the North American scholarship remained within the liberal paradigm, the field was now large enough to accommodate unconventional voices, such as Adam Jones’s highly original work on the gender-genocide relationship and his scepticism about the American ‘responsibility to protect’ that was invoked by the Bush administration in its Iraq invasion.80

This pluralism was a sign that the field was returning to its Lemkin and Kuperian roots. Most significantly, scholars produced outstanding scholarship on genocide as professional historians, political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists, or jurists, rather than as lobbyists and crusaders. The new generational consciousness was evident in Scott Straus’s critique of ‘first generation’ scholarship for methodological naïveté and isolation from mainstream political science, such as the extensive literature on violence in war.81 Donald Blochman’s *maxim was universalised*: of the Armenian genocide he wrote that ‘it may be said categorically that the killing did constitute genocide… but recognizing this fact should be a “by-product” of the historian’s work, not its ultimate aim or underpinning’.82 Now more than ever, scholars are using the tools recognisable by their colleagues in other fields.

With the retirement of the pioneers of genocide studies, no effective difference can be discerned between the academic members of the two organisations. Genocide studies had become more academically reputable than ever before. This professionalisation did not mean that scholars abandoned their concern for current events, however. On the contrary, Levene, for instance, campaigns passionately against the factors causing climate change, and others raise consciousness for ‘humanitarian intervention’ in Darfur and elsewhere.83 But with Weberian sobriety, such activity is now more grounded in careful scholarship rather than partisan positions on often contestable and highly-emotional issues, such as the Israeli occupation of Palestine.

The Collection

This intellectual professionalisation is a recent development. Consequently, as intimated above, the scholarship on the world history of genocide that I reproduce in these six volumes has been written mostly by experts in special fields rather than genocide scholars. That is as it should be. Genocide studies is not a discipline like, say, history or philosophy, with its own methodology, norms and protocols. It is an inter- or, rather, multidisciplinary field constituted by the core questions first posed by Raphael Lemkin in the 1940s and 1950s.84 What is genocide? Is it limited to mass killing or does group culture also play a central role for group survival? How and why has it occurred in the past? What are forms of societies particularly susceptible? Are particular periods of world history structurally vulnerable to mass violence? Why do people—elites and non-elites—plan or participate in it? How can it be prevented? How are post-genocidal societies reconstructed, let alone ‘reconciled’? Answering even these few questions demands that the researcher draw on diverse areas of knowledge: history, sociology, anthropology, international relations, law, and social psychology.85 These questions and disciplines are reflected in the choice of texts in this collection.

The first volume lays the intellectual and methodological foundations for the collection by establishing the context for the genocide concept’s crystallisation in the 1930s and 1940s. It goes without saying that we hear from Lemkin himself. Instead of reproducing the relevant chapter of his *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe* (1944), in which he first elaborated the concept in relation to the Nazi empire, I have chosen a shorter essay from the United Nations magazine *Free World* in which he generalises and explains his concept to a general audience.86 How his ideas became incarnated—some would say, distorted—in international law during UN deliberations between 1946 and 1948 is also the subject of a detailed chapter. One of the draft conventions and the final convention accompany this text so that readers can cross-reference the discussion.

Defining genocide has occupied almost as much intellectual energy as actual cases themselves. An ‘essentially contestable concept’ (W.B. Gallio), genocide has been tethered very closely to the Holocaust on the one hand, and associated with western settler colonialism on the other. Others have invented associated neologisms such as ‘democide’, ‘urbicide’,
and 'indigenocide'. Identity politics plagues the discussion, as different victim groups claim their persecution as unique and unprecedented or as akin to the Holocaust. Chapters 6 to 8 reprise these issues, also showcasing different methodological approaches. Readers will note how the philosophical imperative of conceptual distinction in Berel Lang's discussion contrasts with Wolfe's and Moses's historically-infused attempt to draw connections between events over time and space.

The question of definition is also the subject of the next section, 'Frameworks', although now in relation to explanatory models. Kuper is best-known for the thesis that deep ethnic and racial divisions in a polity—as was so often the case in postcolonial countries with their arbitrarily-drawn borders—predispose it to genocidal conflict. Mark Levene, by contrast, is interested in how the rise of the western nation-state restructured the international system such that neophyte regimes were (and are) compelled to engage in genocidal 'catch-up' measures when they identify internal minorities as security and developmental threats. Jacques Semelin, a political scientist, wants to distinguish between massacres for subjugation and eradication, paying particular attention to the latter's psychology of cleansing (rather than just of conquest) that he sees as characteristic of genocide. Such a psychology—and policy—Martin Shaw observes, is also a feature of so-called 'ethnic cleansing'. Can it and genocide be separated so cleanly as conventionally maintained, he asks? Violent population deportations and movements are a feature of the international system, deployed by the great powers as much as by marginal states trying to compete with them. Mahmood Mamdani draws attention to 'the politics of naming' conflicts as genocide or civil war or insurgency. As with 'terrorism', the perspective inherent in one's subject position can determine whether a government is engaging in counter-insurgency or genocide. Moreover, why are some counter-insurgencies denounced as genocide and others are not when they otherwise appear similar in important respects? Mamdani considers these issues in relation to Darfur.

The last section of Volume I presents four 'enablers' of genocide: the generative power of 'security dilemmas' in ethnic conflict, the gendered dimension of killing in which masculinity is mobilised but also in which men become the most numerous victims, the connections between transgressive violence and communal ecstasy, and 'extremely violent societies' in which civilians as well as states participate in mass violence. Needless to say, this broad range of structuring contexts does not exhaust the factors that are customarily associated with genocide. Some readers may expect a chapter on racism and race-thinking. However, ethnic or racial variety is not itself a cause of genocide. Most societies have been multi-ethnic or multinational; difference per se does not lead to inter-communal violence. It is important, therefore, to consider those developments that at once construct and then exacerbate such differences. As these chapters show, we must have recourse to the broad themes of global history: the rise and fall of empires, decolonisation and the establishment of nation-states, civil wars, and the attendant political (and gendered) subjectivities.

Having laid this groundwork, the next four volumes present case studies from pre-history to the present day. I shall spare the reader a summary of each volume, but a few comments are in order. Unfortunately, there are space limitations even with six generous volumes. In view of Shaw's thesis that ethnic cleansing is a component of genocide rather than a rival concept, I would have liked to include chapters on the partitions of India and Palestine in 1948. But doing so would have meant omitting cases that receive even less attention, such as the East Pakistan secession of 1971, Burundi in 1972, and the Aché in Paraguay. For these instances, I have reproduced hard-to-find reports so they are once again made available to a broader reading public. Likewise, I would have liked to reprint more on communist China as well as include material on stolen indigenous children in Australia, Canada, and the US. Even with 13 chapters, we are only scratching the surface with the Soviet and Nazi regimes.

The final volume is devoted to humanitarian intervention, the prosecution of genocide, and the question of post-genocide trauma and recovery. Again, the selection cannot be comprehensive. The chapters on humanitarian intervention present varying perspectives, including Mohammed Ayoob's 'subaltern realist' scepticism about its efficacy. The evolution of international law has become a major area of research, which shows the extent to which the trials of Nazi perpetrators were formative for the postwar legal regime, as Donald Bloxham's two contributions demonstrate. Whether the development is always as positive as teleological accounts suggest is open to question, which is the thesis of the next chapter by Alexander Zahar and Goran Sluiter. The gender dimension of genocide prosecution is explored by Catherine MacKinnon in her analysis of rape's criminalisation by the Ad Hoc Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.

The collection ends with chapters on how genocidal trauma is conducted through memory, whether it is private or publicly-institutionalised (and instrumentalised) by nationalising states. These instances show how differing modalities of commemoration can both challenge and reproduce a genocidal subjectivity. The maxim 'never again' can mean that never again shall people suffer genocide; it can also mean that never again shall my people suffer genocide—even if it entails inflicting considerable violence to prevent it. Trauma—the rupturing of received categories and consequent elision of past and present—stalks victims as much as perpetrators, haunting the desired liberal politics of reconciliation with images of never-ending victimisation. The 'catastrophisation' of politics, domestic and international, is at once a cause and consequence of genocide. A hope of studying it scientifically is the prospect that the politics of paranoia and hyper-vigilance may be tempered and tamed. It may be a vain hope—how often have scholars changed the world?—but it is as good a place to start as anywhere.
Acknowledgement

Thanks are due to Rebecca Sheehan for expediting the copyright paperwork for these chapters with efficiency and grace. Numerous friends and colleagues gave me sage advice in compiling the list and in writing this introduction. I am grateful to them as well. The usual disclaimers about errors and responsibility apply.

Notes


4 Genocide Studies Program at Yale University: www.yale.edu. Typically, they combine genocide with research in the Holocaust, human rights, or peace and conflict studies, e.g. The Centre for the Study of Genocide and Mass Violence at the University of Sheffield: www.genocidecentre.dept.shef.ac.uk; The Center for the Study of Genocide and Human Rights at Rutgers University: http://cghr.newark.rutgers.edu/index.html; or The Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies at the University of Minnesota: www.chgs.umn.edu. Or they are dedicated to genocide prevention, like the Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect at the University of Queensland: http://www.r2pap.org. The relevant journals are the Journal of Genocide Research (since 1999) and Genocide Studies and Prevention (since 2006), though Holocaust and Genocide Studies (since 1986) does occasionally cover other genocides besides the Holocaust. There is a German journal, the Zeitschrift für Genozidforschung (since 1999) and the Argentine Revista de Estudios sobre Genocidio (since 2007), which share articles with the two English-language journals. Then there is new Online Encyclopedia on Mass Violence: www.massviolence.org run by Jacques Semelin in Paris.


14 Irving Louis Horowitz, 'Gauging genocide: social science dimensions and dilemmas', Totten and Jacobs, Pioneers of Genocide Studies, 256–57.


16 See the brilliant analysis of Irving Horowitz, 'Many genocides, one Holocaust? The limits of the rights of states and the obligations of individuals', Modern Judaism, 1: 1 (1981), 74–89.


19 For example, Vahagn N. Dadrian, 'The convergent aspects of the Armenian and Jewish cases of genocide', Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 3: 2 (1988), 151–69; Dadrian, 'The historical and legal interconnections between the Armenian genocide and the Jewish Holocaust', Yale Journal of International Law, 23: 2 (1998), 303–9; Levon Chorbajian and George Shirinian (eds), Studies in...

20 ‘Armenians to take part in Tel Aviv Seminar’, \textit{New York Times}, 16 June 1982. This short article reports the efforts of the Turkish and Israeli states to shut down Charny’s genocide studies conference in Tel Aviv in 1982. It notes that his defiance of the Tel Aviv University president probably cost him tenure there: Charny, ‘A passion for life and rage at the wasting of life’, in Totten and Jacobs, \textit{Pioneers of Genocide Studies}, 441–42.


26 Irving Horowitz notes this conference in ‘Many genocides, one Holocaust?’, p. 74.


32 Thus Charny complained that ‘even more regrettable are those scholars who, patently, are more concerned with their ideas and with their political standing in academia or the community than with a commitment to all human lives, although he also participated in these debates: Charny, ‘Foreword’, in Alan S. Rosenbaum (ed.), \textit{Is the Holocaust Unique? Perspectives on Comparative Genocide} (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), xi.


34 Needless to say, this point does not apply to proponents of ‘Holocaust Studies’ for whom the differences between the Holocaust and genocide are all too obvious, namely, the former is unique, singular and unprecedented, while the other is not. See, for example, Yehuda Bauer, ‘Comparison of genocides’, in Chorbajian and Shirinian, \textit{Studies in Comparative Genocide}, 31–43.


44 See the interview with Australian scholars Ann Curthoys and John Donohue: \textit{www.australianhumanitiesreview.org/archive/Issue-September-2002/veracini.html}.

45 There are a number of conference reports: \textit{www.australianhumanitiesreview.org/archive/Issue-October-2003/veracini.html}; \textit{http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/ tagungsberichte/id/281}.

THE DISCIPLINE OF GENOCIDE STUDIES


This article is critically analysed by Mahmood Mamdani, Survivors and Saviors: Darfur, Politics and the War on Terror, New York: Pantheon, 2009. For conference announcements, see http://hseokult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/termine/id=53462; www.lrt-net.org/announce/show.cgi?ID=139610.

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They constitute the executive of INOGS.

51 Norbert Finzsch, 'Genocides against American Indians between individualist agenda and state-implemented program', in Stig Förster and Gerhard Hirschfeld (eds), Genocide in der modernen Geschichte (vol. 7, Jahrbuch für Historische Friedensforschung, 1999), pp. 48–59.


55 Hans-Lukas Kieser and Dominik J. Schaller (eds), Der Völkermord an den Armeniern und die Shoah, Zürich: Chronos, 2002; Schaller, Rupen Boyadjian, and Vivianne Berg (eds), Enteignet, Vertrieben, Ernordet. Beiträge zur Genozidforschung, Zürich: Chronos Verlag, 2004; Schaller and Jürgen Zimmerer (eds), Late Ottoman Genocides: The Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and Young Turk变迁: Deportation and Extermination Policies, Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2009.


58 This article is reprinted in Volume I here.


61 This was part of INOGS' own conference series. The first two were held in the UK. In Sheffield in 2008 and in Brighton in 2010.


63 www.genocide scholars.org/aboutus.html.


65 www.upjournals.com/esp/gpp.html#ou.


69 www.genocide scholars.org/images/Resolution of the International Association of Genocide Scholars_Condemning_Iranian_President_Ahmadinejad.pdf.


71 See the literature cited in A. Dirk Moses, 'Why the discipline of "Genocide Studies" has trouble explaining how genocides ends', Social Science Research Council: http://howgenocidesends.ssrc.org/Moses.

72 See the documentation collected by Adam Joces: www.genocidetext.net/israel_genocide1948.php.

73 Israel W. Charny, 'Farnwell to IAGS Executive Board', IAGS Newsletter, 8 (Spring-Winter 2008), 14. To be sure, these words were uttered before the attack on Gaza, but capture the atmosphere well.

74 For pedagogical purposes, genocide scholars edited compilations rather than wrote monographs, e.g., Samuel Totten, William S. Parsons, and Israel W. Charny (eds), Century of Genocide: Eyewitness Accounts and Critical Views, New York: Garland, 1997, a valuable collection that has appeared in several editions.


83 Crisis Forum: http://www.crisis-forum.org.uk


85 The work of Jens Meierhenrich ambitiously tries to combine all these approaches: Meierhenrich, Landfare: Gacaca Jurisdicctions in Rwanda (forthcoming), and Genocide: A Very Short Introduction (forthcoming), as well as numerous articles.

86 Some of Lemkin's writings can be found at www.preventgenocide.org/genocide.


Part 1

CONCEPTUAL ORIGINS AND
THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION