

BACK II

Published by Black Inc,
an imprint of Schwartz Media Pty Ltd
37-39 Langridge Street
Collingwood Vic 3066 Australia
email: enquires@blackincbooks.com
www.blackincbooks.com

This collection © Black Inc. and La Trobe University, 2013
Copyright © in the introduction, prologue and individual essays is retained by the
authors, who assert their rights to be known as the author of their work.

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or
transmitted in any form by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying,
recording or otherwise without the prior consent of the publishers.

National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry:

State of the nation : essays for Robert Manne / edited by Gwenda Tavan.
9781863956291 (paperback)

Australians—Attitudes. Social movements—Australia. Social justice—Australia.

Australia—Social conditions—21st century. Australia—Emigration and immigration.


Australia—Economic conditions—21st century. Australia—Politics and
government—21st century.

Tavan, Gwenda, editor.
994.07

Book design by Peter Long

Typeset by J&M Typesetting

Cover photograph courtesy of La Trobe University



Printed in Australia by Griffin Press. The paper this book
is printed on is certified against the Forest Stewardship
Council* Standards. Griffin Press holds FSC chain of
custody certification SGS-COC-005088. FSC promotes
environmentally responsible, socially beneficial and
economically viable management of the world's forests.

CONTENTS

| | |
|--|-----|
| Introduction / <i>Gwenda Tavan</i> | vii |
| Prologue: By way of explanation / <i>Robert Manne</i> | xi |
| ON FRIENDSHIP | |
| A Tribute to Robert Manne / <i>Raimond Gaita</i> | 3 |
| AUSTRALIAN POLITICS | |
| The Purpose of War / <i>Hugh White</i> | 23 |
| The Republic of Australia: A forgotten ideal? / <i>Mark McKenna</i> | 30 |
| Rudd, Gillard and Westminster / <i>John Hirst</i> | 44 |
| The Renewal of Social Democracy / <i>David McKnight</i> | 50 |
| CULTURE AND CLIMATE CHANGE | |
| Political Utopianism in the Anthropocene / <i>Clive Hamilton</i> | 61 |
| Turning the Sky White / <i>Anne Manne</i> | 67 |
| The New Politics of Freedom / <i>David Ritter</i> | 82 |
| CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL DEMOCRACY | |
| Egalitarianism, Social Democracy and Rudd/Gillard Labor / <i>Nicholas Barry</i> | 93 |
| Exposing the Truth about Equal Opportunity in Public Education / <i>Carmen Lawrence</i> | 105 |
| Building an Alliance to Achieve Major Disability Reform / <i>Rhonda Galbally</i> | 117 |
| THE PUBLIC SPHERE AND THE UNIVERSITY | |
| The Individual, the State, Mr Manne and Me / <i>Raimona Koval</i> | 129 |
| Talking Back: Balancing power in the new public sphere / <i>Morry Schwartz</i> | 136 |
| To Serve and Protect: Australia's public sphere / <i>Chris Feik</i> | 142 |
| Halls of Uselessness? / <i>Raimond Gaita</i> | 147 |
| Contrast and Continuity, Resistance and Acquiescence: Robert Manne and Australian universities / <i>Russell Marks</i> | 156 |

IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURALISM

- The Return of Multiculturalism? / *Tim Souphommassane* 167
The Australian Multiculturalism Debate Today /
Geoffrey Brahm Levey 176
A Dark Underbelly or an Undercurrent of Decency? / *David Corlett* 189
'Fair Dinkum' Politics or the End of Politics? / *Aurelien Mondon* 198

INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS AND POSTCOLONIALISM

- An Indigenous Doctrine of Discovery Post Terra Nullius /
Patrick Dodson 211
From Central Europe to Australia: Civilisational ideals and
minority survival / *A. Dirk Moses* 220
Is Humanism Eurocentric? / *Sanjay Seth* 231

THE COLD WAR AND THE HOLOCAUST

- Intellectuals and Communism: A peculiar obsession /
Martin Krygier 247
Two Models of Anti-Communism: Populism, public intellectual
engagement and lessons for the future / *William Maley* 263
Cold War Thinking: Dealing with our shibboleths / *Mark Aarons* 273
Cold War Intellectuals and the Impasse in Social-Democratic
Thought / *Jean Curthoys* 284
From the Holocaust to Communism and Universalism: A triptych
for Rob Manne / *Peter Beilharz* 295
The Holocaust as Fiction: From Andrzej Wajda's *Korczak* to
Quentin Tarantino's *Inglorious Bastards* / *Stefan Auer* 301

Contributors

311

INTRODUCTION

GWENDA TAVAN

In February 2013 a conference was held at La Trobe University, in Melbourne's northern suburbs, to honour the work of one of Australia's most eminent public intellectuals, Professor Robert Manne, who retired from his academic post at the end of 2012. The conference brought together many of Australia's finest scholars, public intellectuals and social commentators. Some were close friends of Robert's; some had worked alongside or been taught by him; some had crossed paths with him in public forums over the years. They represented a wide variety of disciplinary training and political and ideological beliefs. What they all had in common, and what was the basis for their invitation to the conference, was Robert's belief that, individually, they had made an important contribution to Australian public and intellectual life, and that their work had in some way shaped his own thinking. They, in turn, were keen to celebrate Robert's enormous influence on Australian social, political and intellectual life throughout a career of some forty years.

As Robert explains in his prologue, the title of the conference, 'Thinking for Yourself', was chosen as an appropriate summary of his opinion about the values that should guide the participation of scholars and intellectuals in the public sphere – critical thinking, independence and fearlessness. Participants were invited to present papers on topics of interest to them, but which also related to the broad themes and concerns that have shaped Robert's work over the course of his career: Australian politics, culture and climate change, contemporary social

FROM CENTRAL EUROPE TO AUSTRALIA: CIVILISATIONAL IDEALS AND MINORITY SURVIVAL

A. DIRK MOSES

A good judge of any civilisation are its minorities. To what extent can their members ascend to high posts in the bureaucracy and army, flourish in civil society and participate in public life? In short, are careers open to their talents? Do they require assimilation for full participation or subservience in return for cultural autonomy? Empires have answered these questions in different ways for their constituent peoples, depending on factors like the degree of their cultural difference, utility as a 'martial race' or perceived loyalty to rival powers, and of course their size – the larger, the more threatening. On the whole, empires have tolerated cultural diversity out of necessity: they were invariably multi-ethnic and multilingual polities ruled by a governing people, with the collaborating elites of conquered peoples in a mutually beneficial, if inevitably hierarchical bargain, underwritten by violence. The majority peasant populations did not usually think in national categories anyway, often speaking a number of languages, as did the residents of polygot cities such as Vilnius and Salonika.

By contrast, twentieth-century nation-states conflated *demnos* and *ethnos*, prizing and cultivating cultural homogeneity through a combination of assimilation, restrictive immigration and targeted settlement policies. Forging national cultures out of their disparate populations was the priority for those states that emerged from the wreckage of the

Russian, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires after the First World War. About a third of Poland's citizens were not Roman Catholic Polish-speakers, and many of them were subjected to 'Polonisation' efforts. Polish elites, like Zionists, also hoped that Jews would leave for Palestine, thereby solving their 'Jewish problem'. National culture was cultivated to negate the imperial multicultural, while licensing its own imperial-like expansion.

For their part, Australian elites sought to construct a homogeneous national culture, while remaining within the British Empire as a white dominion. The White Australia policy excluded non-whites, and 'absorption' policies were directed towards Indigenous peoples. Both measures tried to prevent a 'minority problem' from developing, because there should only be one English-speaking white people in Australia. Australian governments consistently resisted Britain's entreaties to liberalise its restrictive immigration policies, while expanding in an imperial way by taking over neighbouring German colonies after the First World War.

The experiences of various 'ethnic' minorities would tell us much about Australian civilisation at this time: the Christian Arabs of what is now Lebanon were classed as 'Asian' and barred from citizenship, Italian cane-cutter families and indentured Pacific Island labourers in north Queensland endured racism and exploitation, and of course East Asian people were the White Australia policy's principal target. Their memoirs and diaries attest to creative ruses to circumvent the restrictive migration policies; Christian Arabs, for instance, might claim birth in the Ottoman Empire's 'European' lands to avert the Asian categorisation. All too often, though, such ruses failed, with families consequently sundering, or the pressure to assimilate rupturing the continuity of languages and cultures.

★

Two other sets of experiences are particularly revealing, because they intersected with European events and concerned group survival itself: Jewish and, as already intimated, Indigenous. Notoriously, the Australian government refused to take Jewish refugees at the Evian conference convened in 1938 to address their plight. An Australian government

representative declared: 'It will no doubt be appreciated also that as we have no real racial problem, we are not desirous of importing one by encouraging any scheme of large-scale foreign migration.' That year, an Indigenous delegation led by William Cooper (c. 1860-1941) tried to present its letter of protest against the German government's treatment of Jews to the German consul in Melbourne. One oppressed minority could recognise the persecution of another.

While the Australian policies occasioned much suffering, they did not ultimately eradicate cultural diversity altogether. Jewish refugees were eventually permitted into Australia, and Indigenous peoples endured to successfully mount campaigns for civil and political rights after the war. What were their civilisational ideals about minority survival? Notwithstanding the solidarity between a small number of leftist Jews and Indigenous activists like Charles Perkins (1936-2000) in the 1960s, the interests of most Jews and Indigenous people diverged for the simple reason that, like Christian Arabs, the former became increasingly 'white', privatising their communal commitments and joining mainstream society. For all its parochialism and isolation, and despite residual antisemitism, Australia was a safe haven from persecution and a comparatively liberal place. Jewish Holocaust survivors have reported similar experiences in other Anglophone countries, such as Canada, New Zealand and the United States.

The Whitlam government's replacement of the White Australia ideal with multiculturalism in the 1970s thus met with some ambivalence among a number of Jewish-Australian academics. Multiculturalism traduced Australia's British political heritage, they thought, and overemphasised ethnic identity by threatening to import the nationality problems that had plagued Europe and culminated in the Holocaust. Whereas postwar Australia had permitted Jews freedom of religion and the safety of invisibility, multiculturalism suddenly seemed to ask them to be a visible minority.

In a strident chapter in Robert Manne's 1982 anthology *The New Conservatism in Australia*, Frank Knopfmacher (1923-1995) - a University of Melbourne psychologist who had fled Nazi Vienna as a Czech Jew in 1939 - denounced multiculturalism for encouraging ethnic civil war in Australia. Indeed, its supposed ideal of 'cultural autonomy', he warned

darkly, was reminiscent of separatist demands by the Czechoslovak German minority that sided with the Nazi occupation of the country. In the 1980s, one of Knopfmacher's students, Manne (1947-), whose parents were Jewish refugees from Berlin and Vienna, agreed that multiculturalism could threaten Australia's 'Anglomorph' social and political fabric, although, unlike the conservative historian Geoffrey Blainey, both he and Knopfmacher supported the entry of refugees fleeing the communist victory in Vietnam. Like Blainey, however, they thought that the Australian intelligentsia's embrace of multiculturalism foolishly entailed rejecting British political culture. Assimilation to this progressive culture was not such a great price to pay, given the century's totalitarian violence; indeed, it was a way of avoiding it.

The famous German-Jewish political thinker Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) was a hero for many anti-communist intellectuals like Manne, who were suspicious of the Australian intelligentsia's leftist orientation. Her theories about the origins of totalitarianism provided a framework for understanding Nazism and the Holocaust, as well as the continuing challenge of genocidal communism, exemplified by the contemporaneous mass crimes of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. At the same time, Arendt offered diagnoses for liberal democracy's weaknesses, whether the atrophy of vibrant political debate or their vulnerability to populism. It was no coincidence that she admired Britain, its dominions and the United States: their obdurate resistance to totalitarianism showed that their institutions and political culture incarnated the virtues of the Greek *polis* and republican Rome. Knopfmacher summarised this sympathy when he explained the Jewish attraction to Anglomorph societies:

They are the only ones in which extensive freedom and order, individualism and respect for tradition, technical progress and modernity without excessive cruelty, tolerance and more morality than elsewhere in public life, fortitude in war without militarism and, indeed, tolerance of ethnic diversity have been combined and maximized. Intelligent public debate illuminates emotive issues and internal conflicts are solved mostly (*pace* Ulster) by negotiations and compact, rather than by civil war and the concentration camp.

This statement probably reflects the views of most Australians. Whatever the virtues of British political institutions and culture, it omits the foundational violence – I would say genocides – against Indigenous peoples and in the bloody civil wars in England and the United States. Where were the negotiations with Aboriginal owners here and the tolerance of their diversity? Their children were then stolen in the name of progress and modernity – and hardly without excessive cruelty. Knopfmacher was blind to the Aboriginal question, which is curious, given the prominence of land rights debates in the 1970s. Arendt shared this blindness, writing of 'those isolated tribes who were vegetating their lives away when first discovered on new continents by European explorers, tribes that the Europeans then either drew into the human world or eradicated without ever being aware that they too were human beings'. This callous view was inconsistent with her own professed opposition to genocide and commitment to human pluralism.

Robert Manne was younger than Arendt and Knopfmacher, and his commitment to pluralism came to trump his qualified support of assimilation. The end of the Cold War in 1990 meant that other threats to liberality became apparent: like Hansonism, the general conservative hostility to multiculturalism – which had not sparked the feared ethnic civil war after all – and Indigenous rights. As editor of *Quadrant* between 1989 and 1997, he wrote and hosted articles on these and other progressive issues, so annoying the magazine's conservative board that it eventually deposed him. His book of essays from 1977 to 2005 is aptly called *Left, Right, Left*.

Manne came to sympathise with a young Indigenous lawyer called Noel Pearson (1965–), who cofounded the Cape York Land Council in 1990, fought land rights claims and participated in the negotiation over the Native Title Act 1993 after the Mabo High Court case. Just as Manne is not representative of the Jewish community – he lasted but two weeks in a Zionist youth movement, he recalls – neither is Pearson representative of the Indigenous intelligentsia. But both are prominent thinkers who shape public debate about Australian civilisation.

Pearson has been criticised for supporting the conservative political parties' agenda for Indigenous peoples because it is consistent with his attempt to end their dependence on state welfare. In fact, he is as scathing

as ever of Australian settler racism, and resists the assimilation it desires. 'We Aboriginal Australians have lost most of our land, our sovereignty and most that once was ours,' he tells white Australians. 'There is much sorrow in human life; minorities face the additional grief of not being in charge of their people's destiny and the prospect of their cultural obliteration from history's page.' As a consequence, they face oblivion – a genocide-like fate: their 'continued existence ... is threatened by our status as unrecognised minorities in our own land, our apparent inability to maintain our Australian languages in the face of such adversity and the extremity, numerically speaking, of our minority status.' Whites find it difficult to appreciate the 'existential torment', as he puts it, suffered by Indigenous people because English has become the world's hegemonic language; they are not in danger of disappearing.

For all that, like Arendt, Knopfmacher and Manne, Pearson appreciates the British legacy: 'Anglophone culture is in a remarkable way intertwined with the growth of liberty, democracy and the rule of law, and its perpetual flourishing is therefore guaranteed.' That is why he supports Aboriginal children learning good English, and why he is attacked for collaborating with conservative Australian politics. Indigenous individuals' adaptation to mainstream Australia does not exhaust his cultural vision, however: the conservative coalition parties' agenda is deaf to the imperative of minority psychological and cultural *group* survival. Indigenous languages, Pearson argues, provide consolation for historical Aboriginal sufferings: reviving them will ensure their cultural survival. His words are moving and worth quoting at length:

The necessary solace in this grief is to speak with my children in my ancestral and historical tongues. The necessary solace is to speak my Australian languages, to read and sing the old texts from classical times and from the mission days that have been written down, and to build a living literature by writing more.

We do need economically and socially sustainable lives; but it is our cultural link with the past – a link that would break without language – that makes our lives spiritually sustainable as members of a conquered people. What we need more than anything else is to see that our tongues are not dying languages

spoken only in a few homes but languages with a future: growing, officially recognised languages of Australia.

Pearson's reasoning is noteworthy in light of the dichotomy between imperial and national cultures. He wants to revive the multilingualism of the former: while 'Anglophone culture may be history's greatest ... there are some ideas that have been better comprehended by other cultures; the importance of multilingualism, and how multilingualism is preserved, is one of them.' Unlike Knopfmacher, Arendt and the younger Manne, he does not think it will sunder the country, still less lead to ethnic civil war.

The imperative of cultural survival via the multi-ethnic/linguistic ideal recalls another formative East-Central European Jewish thinker, Raphael Lemkin (1900-1959), who formulated the genocide concept during the Second World War. Genocide for Lemkin was a special form of foreign conquest and occupation that entailed settling a territory with the nationals of the occupier. It aimed to permanently tip the demographic balance in favour of the occupier by destroying the indigenous group in various ways in addition to mass murder: for example, with attacks on a group's culture. In the event, he did not consider cultural destruction in isolation from attacks on the physical and biological elements of a group: attacks on culture were inextricably interwoven with a broader assault, encompassing the totality of group existence. Genocide comprised various techniques of group destruction. Lemkin outlined eight techniques used by the Nazis: political, social, cultural, economic, biological, physical, religious and moral.

The congruence of these techniques with those of many instances of European colonial rule is striking. Food rationing, forced conversion, inculcation of the new ruling culture, marriage and reproduction restrictions, sequestration of economic resources, and introduction of European additions have visited terrible cultural and physical devastation on indigenous peoples. Not for nothing do the perceptions of Aborigines about their experiences accord with Lemkin's phenomenology of genocide. Consider this summary by Patrick Dodson:

While the 1788 invasion was unjust, the real injustice was the denial by [Governor] Phillip and subsequent governments of

our right to participate equally in the future of a land we had managed successfully for millenniums. Instead, the land was stolen, not shared. Our political sovereignty was replaced by a virulent form of serfdom; our spiritual beliefs denied and ridiculed; our system of education undermined. We were no longer able to inculcate our young with the complex knowledge that is acquired from intimate engagement with the land and its waterways. The introduction of superior weapons, alien diseases, a policy of racism and enforced biogenetic practices created dispossession, a cycle of slavery and attempted destruction of our society. The 1997 report *Bringing Them Home* highlighted the infringement of the UN definition on genocide and called for a national apology and compensation of those Aborigines who had suffered under laws that destroyed indigenous societies and sanctioned biogenetic modification of the Aboriginal people.

This Indigenous-Lemkinian perspective corrects the blind spots in Knopfmacher's and Arendt's rosy views of Anglomorphic societies and their foundations. In his support of Dodson, Pearson and the *Bringing Them Home* report, Manne has come to share it as well. What now of the future?

Like Knopfmacher, Pearson admires the adaptive capacities of diaspora Jews; so much so that Pearson thinks they offer Aborigines the model of survival and flourishing in modern conditions. His version of the Jewish model has various elements:

- Their 'ancient commitment to education and high learning'.
- Their 'resilience and seriousness as a people' born of 'persecution and oppression'.
- Their relationship to history: they have 'never forgotten history and they never allow anybody else to forget history; they fight staunchly in defence of the truths of history'. At the same time, they do not cultivate or nurture victimhood.
- Jews do not internalise racism directed towards them; they do not 'succumb to its psychological effects'.
- Jews have endured in diaspora communities and maintained their traditions while engaging with modernity. They have achieved this

balance by maintaining an 'orthodox heart', around which the rest of their community orbits, while individual members engage 'according to their own choices with the rest of the world'. This is the most important lesson.

Adapting this model, Pearson sees Cape York as his people's cultural centre, a point of orientation for individual Aboriginal people who, thus anchored, can enjoy the opportunities offered by Australian society. This approach, he thinks, would emancipate Indigenous individuals from 'the stultifying communalism of Aboriginal communities', while also providing a bulwark against assimilation. Like Jews, Indigenous people need 'to reconcile self-interest and individualism with our common identity with our fellow members of our tribe'.

It is unclear what Pearson means by an 'orthodox heart': a religious-cultural orthodoxy or a cultural-political centre in a specific geographical location? The absence of Zionism or Israel in his article on the subject indicates that Pearson's concern is communal life after the disaster of expulsion and dispossession, rather than a redemptive return or restoration. Like Lemkin, he is more interested in cultural autonomy than separatist self-determination and sovereignty. But Pearson's improbable hope that Cape York becomes the cultural heart for all Australian Aborigines also suggests a parallel with Ahad Ha'am's (1856-1927) cultural Zionism - *Eretz Israel* as the spiritual heart of the Jewish diaspora - to which Arendt was attracted. If so, he might be unwittingly endorsing the settler colonialism in Israel/Palestine that he decries in Australia. Or he is caught on the horns of dilemma entailed by regarding Anglomorph societies as history's most progressive force while defending Indigenous interests. He seems blind to the implications of what he is saying.

Pearson's remarkable claim that formerly oppressed groups like Jews do not nurture victimhood or internalise the racism directed against them would also be a product of this blindness. Many such groups - especially from the former Ottoman Empire - carefully nurture memories of persecution to shore up group membership, while brandishing them to outsiders to secure their sympathy and political indulgence. Has Pearson never heard of Jewish self-hatred, a term now used by some Zionists to

stigmatised Jews who decide not to be Zionists? Many nationalists unconsciously buy into the stereotypes about their group as the foil for their regeneration projects; some commentators might accuse Pearson of doing so himself. He would be on firmer ground if he meant that Jews were his model for Aborigines because, as a group, they have not let their victimhood or sense of it thwart their striving; indeed, they may perhaps have channelled it into successful endeavours.

*

Whatever one makes of Pearson's synthesis of individualism and communalism, the evidence suggests that some of Knipfelmacher's observations were not completely wide of the mark. True, the ethnic civil war he feared has not come to divide the country, notwithstanding the pogrom against 'Arab-looking' Australians in Cronulla in 2005 or some tensions between Muslims about the Syrian civil war today. Although regrettable, they pale in comparison with the violence in various imagined homelands abroad. Shia and Sunni Muslim Australians face one another in Syria; Jewish, Palestinian and Lebanese ones in that contested region; Serb, Croat and Bosnian Australians did so in the former Yugoslavia, while some Muslim Australians signed up for al-Qaeda's terroristic resistance to American empire. Australians' non-Anglomorph affective nationality does indeed persist - as multiculturalism intended and the ability to hold dual nationalities enables - but has been largely displaced to imagined homelands beyond our shores. Knipfelmacher's civil war is occurring in those places.

The connection between imaginary homeland and Australia is also constituted by the social vitality those Australians vicariously experience via the prestige of their imaginary homeland or nationalist-separatist cause. The traffic between them comprises pilgrimages and remittances as well as military service - often to secure the ethnically nation-state there that they (rightly) deny Anglomorph Australians here. Multiculturalism is thus implicated in a splitting, in which many Australians privatise their non-Australian nationalist affects in the name of domestic harmony while seeking cultural homogeneity or hegemony in their imagined homeland abroad.

Most Australian volunteering for nationalist causes overseas is relatively uncontroversial because it respects this implicit social contract. Ben Zygier (1976-2010), from Melbourne, broke this contract by identifying so strongly with Zionism that he moved to Israel, took up citizenship and collected Australian passports as a member of its secret service to use in clandestine operations. This fact was lost on those Jewish spokespersons and academics who resented any implication of Jews' 'divided loyalties' because it is a longstanding antisemitic trope. 'Transnational identities' were normal in an age of globalisation and dual citizenship, wrote Kim Rubenstein and Danny Ben Moshe: for Jews, 'identification with Israel as their cultural and spiritual homeland is part of being a Jew'. Be that as it may, by arguing for 'multiple identities that coexist and are balanced', they missed the point that such balancing acts are difficult to pull off when the interests of the foreign state conflict with Australia's, or if one works for a foreign state at Australia's expense.

The other challenge for settler Australians is to accept Aborigines' affective loyalties, because they cannot be displaced overseas. These loyalties concern this place - Australia. Can settler Australians share their sense of home with Aborigines? Superficially, it seems they can, given the presence of the Aboriginal flag on public buildings and the like. But will they support a constitutional provision for Indigenous Australians as the country's first owners and as a recognised minority? Whether the major political parties can convince their supporters to vote for this constitutional amendment will tell us much about Australian civilisation.

IS HUMANISM EUROCENTRIC?

SANJAY SETH

Among the many justifications for colonial conquest and rule, one of the most important was the claim that European values and institutions were superior to those of conquered peoples, and that colonial rule functioned to transplant these values and institutions, to the benefit of the colonised. Liberty, equality, the dignity and rights of man, and institutions that were premised on these values and functioned to enshrine them - more generally, many of the values we associate with humanism, loosely defined - were to be the gift of the coloniser to the colonised. These ideals were avidly embraced by some of the elites of colonised societies, and especially by those elites who were products of the colonial encounter, educated in newly established schools and universities, and/or employed as junior functionaries in the colonial administration. Many accepted the idea that they needed to be 'civilised'. However, these elites were also well aware that these ideals, the supposed 'gift' of Europe, were systematically violated in the colonies and denied to colonised peoples. It thus became standard amongst emergent nationalist movements to draw attention to the yawning gap between Europe's self-image and the reality of its rule in the colonies - between Europe's protestations and its actions. This opened the space to invoke European values against colonial rule, and to demand that Europe live up to its professed ideals.

Soon, a more contestatory position emerged within the ranks of nationalists. This did not appeal to the coloniser to live up to his principles,

Aurélien Mondon is Lecturer in French Politics at the University of Bath. His research interests lie primarily in the recent mainstreaming of the extreme right, and the impact of neo-fascist and right-wing populist discourse on liberal democracies. His first book, *Mainstreaming the Extreme Right in France and Australia: A populist hegemony?*, was published in February 2013.

A. Dirk Moses is Professor of Global and Colonial History at the European University Institute, Florence, and Associate Professor of History at the University of Sydney. He is the author of *German Intellectuals and the Nazi Past* (2007) and many works on genocide and empire, including, as editor, *Genocide and Settler Society: Frontier violence and stolen Indigenous children in Australian history* (2004) and, as co-editor, *The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies* (2010).

David Ritter is a graduate of the University of Western Australia and the London School of Economics. Currently chief executive officer of Greenpeace Australia Pacific, he is also an Honorary Fellow of the Faculty of Law at the University of Western Australia. Formerly one of Australia's leading native title lawyers, David has written several books, including *Contesting Native Title* and *The Native Title Market*. David is a regular contributor of op eds to public debate in Australia and is a columnist for the London journal *Global Policy*. David is married with two daughters and lives in Sydney.

Morry Schwartz has been a book publisher for forty years and a property developer for thirty-nine. He was involved with the establishment of Outback Press in 1973, and has been publishing under various imprints since. He is currently the owner of Black Inc., *Quarterly Essay* and *The Monthly*.

Sanjay Seth is Professor of Politics at Goldsmiths, University of London, where he is also Director of the Centre for Postcolonial Studies. Prior to this, he taught for many years at La Trobe University, where he was a colleague of Robert Manné. He has written extensively on postcolonial theory, social and political theory, and modern Indian history. His books include *Marxist Theory and Nationalist Politics: Colonial India, Subject Lessons: The Western education of Colonial India* and (as editor) *Postcolonial Theory and International Relations: A critical introduction*. He is a founding co-editor of the journal *Postcolonial Studies*.

Tim Soutphommasane is Race Discrimination Commissioner at the Australian Human Rights Commission. He is the author of three books: *The Virtuous Citizen: Patriotism in a multicultural society*, *Don't Go Back To Where You Came From: Why multiculturalism works and Reclaiming Patriotism: Nation-building for Australian progressives*. He also co-edited (with Nick Dyrenfurth) *All That's Left: What Labor should stand for*.

Gwenda Tavan is a Senior Lecturer in the Politics Program at La Trobe University, Melbourne. Her research interests include Australian political culture, the politics and history of Australian migration, and leadership studies. She has published various articles on aspects of Australian immigration history, and is the author of the prize-winning book *The Long, Slow Death of White Australia*. She is currently completing a biography of Arthur Calwell, Australia's first immigration minister.

Hugh White is Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University. In the 1970s he studied philosophy at Melbourne and Oxford universities, and since 1980 he has worked in various roles on Australian strategic, defence and foreign policy issues. He was the principal author of Australia's 2000 Defence White Paper; his recent publications include the Quarterly Essay *Power Shift: Australia's future between Washington and Beijing* and *The China Choice: Why America should share power*.