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of superseding loss, a way of living as if in exile even when at home, as Maulana Azad felt he did, given his particular background and education and relationship to “Muslim” and nationalist politics in his time. Modern Urdu writing, having displaced the relationship of language and self to place as Mufti tells us, is a vehicle for exilic thinking, an awareness, wherever one happens to be, that modern history has been a history of marginalization and uprooting on a massive scale; that split selfhoods are typical, in South Asia, but also in Germany, the Balkans, Cyprus, Palestine/Israel, Ireland, and elsewhere, as this volume testifies. Indeed, the 2016 “Brexit” vote and the Scottish referendum have forced even Britons to contemplate such experience. Urdu was a language cultivated diasporically from the start; its poets have names like Dehlavi, Moradabadi, Mohani, Ludhianvi and so on because they were far from home. These names identified them by the places they left or moved to, as they became immersed in cosmopolitan and mobile networks that made identification of roots necessary; loss of homeland was intrinsic to their meditations.

What is the poet’s role in history? Of course the question is romantic. Byron was Romantic; Thompson was Romantic; Faiz was romantic; Punjabis are romantic; land is romantic. And Romanticism has its dangers: the British were Romantic; Nehru was Romantic; Silicon Valley is a Romance. Dams and drones are romantic. The Hindu right and the Islamic right offer their own romances. There is a marketplace of Romance, but the Romance of the left has too long been out of stock. Bollywood can’t do it alone, and it too, after all, is bound up in the worship of profit, god, and nation.

WHEREEVER CULTURALLY, religiously, or nationally motivated intergroup violence is thought to be endemic and intractable, partition of territory and populations looms as a possible solution. To use the United Nations (UN) jargon, partition is advanced as an “atrocity prevention” measure. There is talk today of partitioning Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Ukraine due to civil war and foreign intervention, and even Spain faces partition in part because of state violence against the Catalonian independent movement. Cyprus has been de facto partitioned since 1974, while most recently, Sudan has been officially split into two entities to end armed conflict. We know that the UN decided to partition Palestine in 1947 after the British government gave up brokering an agreement in the wake of contrapuntal Arab and Zionist resistance to various plans, including partition in 1937. Likewise, large-scale communal rioting across India in the second half of 1946 prompted the British to partition the country the next year.

Ethno-religious violence gave rise to partition to prevent further such violence. Paradoxically, ironically, and tragically, partition begat still more violence in the form of genocidal massacres and massive ethnic cleansings whose consequences blight the Middle East and South Asia to this day. What is more, the past seventy years reveal that anxieties about disloyal minorities continue, because partitions are never surgically
“clean” and complete: the “wrong” people remain caught on the wrong side of the new border, becoming effectively foreign nationals, aliens in an aspirationally pure state. To compound matters, diasporic life is increasing with migration and refugee flows, dissolving the demographic homogeneity that partition was meant to effect, while globalization enables the imagination of worldwide spectral entities like “the Muslims” and “the Jews.”

In this epilogue, I explore the dynamic relationship between partition and modalities of constructing security, whether in producing homogeneity or guaranteeing ethnic dominance over minorities: either population “transfer” or, when this is not an option, “communal hostage taking.” Alternatively, where states cannot control crises, sectarian militias and even highly motivated individuals can take matters into their own hands in the form of retributive violence: calculated murders, massacres, and expulsions carried out by nonstate actors—from below—based on cycles of revenge and retaliation. Imagining and realizing partition engages these modalities in messy conjunctures as contending parties prosecute the case for, and try to effect, their imagined security. In view of the terrorism, communal riots, further partitions like that of Pakistan and Bangladesh in 1971, and threats of still more “transfers” of Palestinians, the question of violence and minority protection presses itself upon us. Partition does not so much solve minority issues as deposit them into different containers as minority issues reappear in partitioned units.

I examine these modalities not by reconstructing the local mechanisms of mobilization and interaction but by tracing the intersecting and divergent imaginings of national belonging, state borders, and minority loyalty. Our context is the convergence of decolonization struggles in India and Palestine against the horizon of imperial dissolutions and expansions in Europe from the 1920s to the 1940s: the breakup of the continental land empires after the First World War and foundation of new states, including the Greek-Turkish population exchange of 1923; Nazi Germany’s extensive border changes of allied and enemy nation-states; and its defeat, resulting in massive expulsions of ethnic Germans from Central and Eastern Europe. I am less interested in the details of these well-studied events and processes than in the arguments advanced to justify new states, their ethno-religious substances, and the question of minorities.

Sociologists have linked ethno-religious violence since the 1990s to globalization crises in which minorities become scapegoats for displaced frustrations about unrealizable ideals of pure nation-states and uncertainties about otherness. A political history of ideas can show that this sort of violence was inscribed into the foundation of nation-states during decolonization in the 1940s. How to relate the immediate postwar cases? Edward Said theorized a linear notion of mobile theory: “ideas and theories travel—from person to person, from situation to situation, from one period to another”—via the “circulation of ideas,” including “acknowledged or unconscious influence, creative borrowing, or wholesale appropriation.” Historians of empire have long noted what they call a “competitive politics of comparison that accelerated circuits of knowledge production and imperial exchange,” practices of mutual observation and borrowing in relation to governance and security. More recently, a global intellectual history posits circulation, diffusion, and adaptation in the study of ideas and texts “across geographical parameters far larger than usual.” Whether a global entanglement or global conjuncture, a ubiquitous practice from the 1920s to the 1940s was the mutual observation, analogizing, comparison, and distinguishing of subject positions not only by imperial elites, but by their subalterns waiting impatiently to found their own states. These mental operations were necessarily global in projection and meta-reflective in practice, as leaders of states-in-waiting not only studied political dramas in other parts of the world, but also scrutinized the lessons that their rivals drew from them.

PARTITIONS, MINORITIES, EXPULSIONS

Partitions are usually studied in isolation as one side of a simplistic unity/division binary of nation/partition, when in fact they are related to empire, federation, and commonwealth along a disaggregation-aggregation continuum. Imperial governors often advanced federalism as a form of minority protection. Federations could restrain refractory white settlers, as in the case of the (ultimately unsuccessful) “closer union” proposals in the late 1920s to extend the native protection provisions of Britain's
Tanganyikan League of Nations mandate to Kenya and Uganda. If the settlers would not submit to incorporation, they could be subject to “administrative separation,” the functional equivalent of partition. For the most part, however, “native” majorities were distrusted to justify govern those less numerous minority population groups on whose collaboration empires had long depended in their divide-and-rule tactics. Such was the aim of the Cabinet Mission option the British presented to the All India Congress and All India Muslim League in 1946: a united India of grouped Hindu- and Muslim-majority provinces with a weak center to ensure that the majority Hindus could not dominate the minority Muslims. Similarly, the Anglo-American Committee of British and American delegates who toured Palestine in the same year concluded diplomatically that any political solution had to be based on three principles: “I. That Jew shall not dominate Arab and Arab shall not dominate Jew in Palestine. II. That Palestine shall be neither a Jewish state nor an Arab state. III. That the form of government ultimately to be established, shall, under international guarantees, fully protect and preserve the interests of the Holy Land of Christendom and of the Moslem and Jewish faiths.” Its recommendations led to the Morrison-Grady plan of Arab and Jewish provincial self-rule under federal UN-British trusteeship that bore some resemblance to the Cabinet Mission plan in India. Like the Indian parties, Zionists and Arabs rejected this option—accurately discerning the continuing imperial logic of external enforcement and intervention—as did US president Harry Truman, who inclined toward it but was under electoral pressure to lean to the Zionist viewpoint.

In general, the metropole preferred to bundle territory and societies in empire-lite or postimperial arrangements, like federations and commonwealths, if they could be managed with local elites whom they often created and empowered with new positions and governance structures. Partition made sense if this could not be done, or only with difficulty. Britain’s partition of Bengal in 1905 was a divide-and-rule measure to that end, although it was reversed only six years later after vehement protest. It is no accident that federative arrangements were canvassed in the British, French, and Dutch empires after the Second World War: the Malay Federation (predecessor of Malaysia and Singapore) between 1948 and 1963, the Central African Federation of 1953–1963, the West Indies Federation between 1958 and 1962, the Federation of South Arabia (forerunner of South Yemen) of 1962–1967, French West African federative ideas, the United States of Indonesia (preferred by the Netherlands to a unified state), and the Dutch-Indonesian Union. To be sure, federal ideas were also attractive to some African leaders of national movements who saw the political benefit of strength in numbers and economic advantage of continued relationships with a metropole. On the whole, though, the drive for sovereignty in a unitary state predominated as decolonization’s political model. The UN’s imposed federation of Eritrea and Ethiopia in 1952 lasted only until 1962, when the latter annexed the former, precipitating decades of war and ultimately two nation-states.

The chapters in this book focus on the British imperial partitions of Ireland, Palestine, and India. If the British Empire’s motivations in considering partition were to control the outcome of the Irish and later partitions, then the context of continental European imperial breakup after the First World War is relevant, in part because the British redefined the postwar architecture, in part because Indian leaders in particular studied these developments for possible lessons. Partition and minority protection dramas were not just British questions but affected millions of Europeans. To understand the partitions of the 1940s, we need to explore their various linkages and bundle them as international conjuncture of nation- and people-construction.

The creation of new states in Europe after World War I pressed territorial disputes with partition potential onto the agenda, creating minority “problems” and thereby questions of protection and population transfer. Within Europe, the redrawing of borders to reward the Entente’s allies and punish the war’s losers resulted in the creation of large national minorities in the new states of Poland and Czechoslovakia. Hungarians decried the partition of their country in the Treaty of Trianon (1920) because of its drastic territorial losses and because ethnic Hungarians became minorities in neighboring states, especially Romania. To ensure stability, the League imposed minority protection treaties on these newcomers, thereby delineating hierarchies of sovereignty that those newcomers found humiliating. Having been created from the territory
of previous states, these states then squabbled among themselves. In 1919, Poland and Czechoslovakia fought and negotiated over the Teschen/Cieszyn province of Silesia, which was eventually split between them without consulting the local population. Next door, the League of Nations insisted on a plebiscite in Upper Silesia in 1920 in the dispute between Poland and Germany. To ensure that the respective minorities were well treated, they signed a convention that included the portentous phrase “equitable reciprocity,” based on the League’s recommendation: mutual observation of the convention would guarantee the welfare of German and Polish co-nationals across the border. Then, most dramatically, the League condoned the Turkish-Greek population exchange in the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) after the brutal warfare between Turkish and Greek forces following the latter’s invasion in 1919, hoping thereby to bring peace on the basis of religious homogeneity.

These interwar settlements, largely conducted at the expense of World War I’s losers, were eventually overturned by revisionist powers. Beginning with Germany’s annexation of the Czechoslovak Sudetenland, with its preponderance of irredentist ethnic Germans, Czechoslovakia was effectively partitioned in 1938 with the reluctant consent of the very Western powers that had conferred it after the First World War. Poland took little time in opportunistically swallowing Czechoslovak Teschen/Cieszyn, thereby recovering what it regarded as previously partitioned Polish territory. A year later, the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany partitioned Poland between them and assigned parts of Romania to the Soviets. During the war, Germany further partitioned Romania by returning to its Hungarian and Bulgarian allies those lands they lost in the Trianon palace at Versailles. The German vision was of a minority-free Europe, especially of German ones, which should be (re)patriated heim ins Reich.

Given the role of Sudeten Germans in destabilizing Czechoslovakia, the war’s victors thought European minorities should be transferred where possible. Referring to the 1923 Lausanne agreement on the Turkish-Greek population exchange, British prime minister Winston Churchill called for a clean sweep of Germans from Poland in late 1944, and the British Foreign Office insisted that all ethnic Germans, not just the “guilty” ones, be expelled from Czechoslovakia. They agreed with Edvard Beneš, the leader of the Czechoslovak government in exile, who wanted to drive out the three million Germans and exchange ethnic Hungarians with Slovaks living in Hungary. All told, about twelve million ethnic Germans were expelled from Eastern and Central Europe. The rump of Germany was divided into the four occupation zones that, after the commencement of the Cold War, congealed into partitioned East and West Germany. In this way, the Nazi ideal of a minority-free Europe underlay the postwar order.

Driving the irredentism and anxiety about minorities was—and remains—the construction of primordial consciousness of emplacement, group belonging, and collective fate. As the anthropologist Liisa Malkki has observed, homeland is invested with ontological significance, as in phrases like “the land rose in rebellion” or in the belief about the sacredness of “national soil,” thereby naturalizing the relationship between people and land. Botanical metaphors commonly express the link, suggested by the language of “uprooting” from native lands in which people live. Nationality thus constructs refugees as “displaced” from their indigenous settings. Ubiquitous familial terms also gesture to a tribal imaginary of nationalists. The image of a “family of nations,” so central to the liberal nationalism of Giuseppe Mazzini in the nineteenth century, echoes this notion. Together, they posit “divine cartographies” that neatly map peoples as naturally emplaced in their homelands, dangerously effacing the heterogeneity and overlapping borders that obtain in the real world. The drama of the “geo-body” can thus endure for millennia, as this declaration about Nagorno-Karabakh by the Armenian National Committee of Australia indicates:

Historically Armenian, Nagorno Karabakh constituted a part of larger Armenian political entities as early as the 6th century B.C. until the partition of the Kingdom Armenian by Romans and Sassanid Persians at the beginning of the 5th century A.D. Thereafter Nagorno Karabakh was no longer in political union with the Armenian lands to the west and subsequently fell under the rule of the Persians, the now extinct Caucasian Albanians, Mongols,
Seljuk and Ottoman Turks, the Persians again before being conquered by the Russian Empire in the 19th century A.D. Throughout this period, Nagorno Karabakh remained a bastion of Christendom where Armenia's culture and civilization resisted the ruling alien pressures. Consequently, fantasized co-nationals are imagined as "stranded" in historically indigenous territories temporarily occupied by aliens. On the basis of these assumptions, the "occupier" can also imagine them as potential hostages, objects of possible reprisal for perceived mistreatment of their own nationals likewise "stranded" across the border.

The violent potential in such ultranationalist assumptions was elaborated by the anthropologist Peter Loizos: the notion of vicarious punishment is based on a "totalizing doctrine of collective passive solidarity [that] allows the nationalist to treat all members of an enemy group as dangerously active. If they are fertile women they will reproduce and nurture children who will grow into fighting men, or reproducers in turn. Older men and women are givers of advice and succour, and children are simply potential adults. To the ultra-nationalist there can be neither non-combatants nor innocents." These assumptions gain popularity during communal crises. Historian Taylor Sherman observes a "moral economy" of retribution in Indian partition violence, whereby a symmetry of suffering was required for communal justice. This economy was based on the assumption of subcontinental, indeed global Muslim homogeneity: Muslims had more in common with Muslims in other parts of India, even the world, than with their non-Muslim neighbors. Because of the confessionalist and nationalization of Indian politics over preceding decades, this balancing was now a subcontinental calculation, meaning that innocent Muslims could be made to atone for violence that Muslim militants had perpetrated against innocent Hindus in, say, Hyderabad.

Fatally, this assumption was also shared by Muslim communalists like the All India Muslim League in its "two-nations theory" that South Asian Muslims constituted a nation in every respect like the Hindu nation, rather than a religious minority submerged within a Hindu-dominated India. In fact, notions of a uniform, essentialized, or even interrelated "Muslim world" were late-nineteenth-century constructions that effaced immense cultural and political diversity. These posited ontologies, like the notion of "Hindu-ness" (Hindutva), are forms of epistemological violence that contain potential for physical violence. Abstractions and analogies can kill.

INDIA AND INTERWAR EUROPE

European affairs served as a screen for various analogical appropriations as Indians imagined post-British futures. Because of Zionism and Britain's Palestine Mandate, the continent was co-imagined with the Middle East and British Empire, offering still more objects for identification and distinction. The German–Czechoslovak confrontation in 1938 in particular was a rich mine for projection possibilities. On one side, a Hindu journalist could write that the creation of an independent Pakistan in the northwest "would place the rest of India at the mercy of an aggressor even more decisively than the loss of the Sudetenland put Czech territory at the mercy of the Nazis." On the other, two Aligarh Muslim University academics drew a different conclusion: "the Muslims of India are a nation by themselves—they have a distinct national entity wholly different from the Hindus and other non-Muslim groups; indeed, they are more different from the Hindus than the Sudeten Germans were from the Czechs." Given the prominence of the German–Czechoslovak conflict in India, this was a statement about the intensity of feeling there.

Vinayak Damodar Savarkar (1883–1966), leader of the ultranationalist Hindu Mahasabha revivalist movement in the 1930s and 1940s, readily agreed that Muslims were utterly distinct from Indians. His Hindutva: Who Is a Hindu? (1923) articulated "Hindu-ness" as the authentically indigenous Indian identity that coded Muslims in South Asia as alien conquerors and cultural usurpers; their mass conversion of Hindus should be reversed as part of the Hindu renaissance. He consequently opposed the secular Indian National Congress, founded in 1885, which comprised Indians of all confessions. His notions of national purity and regeneration intersected with foreign national dramas in rigorously consistent ways. In Hindutva, he welcomed "Zionist dreams" in Palestine, observing that only Jews approached Hindus in possessing the "conditions under which
a nation can attain perfect solidarity and cohesion," namely "people who inhabit the land they adore, the land of whose forefathers is also the land of their Gods and Angels, of Seers and Prophets"—that is, "if ever the Jews can succeed in founding their state there [in Palestine]."

The intensive identification with Jewish nationalism also came from a perception of virtually simultaneous genocidal Muslim invasions of their respective homelands: "The Arabian Moslems invaded Palestine only a few decades before they invaded our Sindh and just as their fanatical fury exterminated the ancient Egyptians or Persians, they attempted to wipe out with fire and sword the Jewish people too." 

Savarkar thus applauded the UN's decision in November 1947 to partition Palestine and create a Jewish state: "After centuries of sufferings, sacrifices and struggle the Jews will soon recover their national Home in Palestine which has undoubtedly been their Fatherland and Holyland." 

Opposed to British partitions of the sacred Indian motherlands until the last minute when it meant saving Hindu-majority areas from Pakistan, he regretted that Jews were not granted the entirety of the Palestine Mandate.

With brutal consistency, Savarkar supported Germany's right to choose National Socialism and to expel Jews. Germans could legitimately choose Nazism because nations were constituted by ethnic homogeneities. After all, Jews and Muslims, he said in 1939, identified more with coreligionists abroad than with fellow citizens of the majority population. Such policies were a model for India in relation to the minority Muslim population. He also supported Nazi Germany's policy toward the German minority in the Sudeten region of neighboring Czechoslovakia on the grounds of ethnic democratic self-determination, an argument Hindu nationalists would later make about princely states ruled by Muslims whose majority population was Hindu:

[A]s far as the Czechoslovakia question was concerned the Hindu Sanghatanists [Mahasabhaits] in India hold that Germany was perfectly justified in uniting the Austrian and Sudeten Germans under the German flag. Democracy itself demanded that the will of the people must prevail in choosing their own government. Germany demanded plebiscite, the Germans under the Czechs wanted to join their kith and kin in Germany. It was the Czechs who were acting against the principle of democracy in holding the Germans under a foreign sway against their will. Now that Germany is strong why should she not strike to unite all Germans and consolidate them into a Pan-German state and realise the political dream which generations of German people cherished.

Identifying now with Germans rather than Jews, Savarkar hoped that India was so strong as to politically unify Hindus spread across multiple polities on the Indian subcontinent.

Ironically, the Muslim League reasoned in similar terms even if with different signs. The Sindh League leader Abdullah Haroon praised Hitler for liberating ethnic Germans from Czechoslovak domination in the same way that League-dominated areas should come to the aid of endangered Muslims if persecuted by Hindus. Muhammad Ali Jinnah even invoked British practices of humanitarian intervention: "if Britain in Gladstone's time could intervene in Armenia in the name of protection of minorities, why should it not be right for us to do so in the case of our minorities in Hindustan—if they are oppressed." In his address to the Sindh Muslim League conference in October 1938, he elaborated the identification:

It was because the Sudeten Germans who were forced under the heel of the majority of Czechoslovakia who oppressed them, suppressed them, maltreated them and showed a brutal and callous disregard for their rights and interests for two decades, hence the inevitable result that the Republic of Czechoslovakia is now broken up and a new map will have to be drawn. Just as the Sudeten Germans were not defenceless and survived the oppression and persecution for two decades, so also the Mussalmans are not defenceless and cannot give you their national entity and aspirations in this great continent.

Like their mortal enemies the Hindu Mahasabha, the Muslim League identified with the Germans, although with opposite intentions: the former regarded Germans as akin to Hindus striving to unite against a despotic ruler (the princely states, the British, and the Czechoslovak state as the villains), while the latter sought partition against a tyrannical majority
(with Slavs and Hindus as villains). The Muslim League thereby sided with the British in its infamous Munich Agreement with Hitler to partition Czechoslovakia. If the lessons of new postwar states had taught the League anything, it was that minority status was untenable. Majorities could not be expected to treat them well, and unlike raw power, League of Nations treaties and constitutional protections counted for little.

As might be expected, Indian National Congress leaders rejected these analogies. Rajendra Prasad (1884–1963), a lawyer from Bihar who later became the country’s first president, sounded a warning about false humanitarian interventions: “Since the authors [the Aligarh Muslim University academics] have compared Hindus and Muslims to Czechs and Sudeten Germans . . . one can only hope that it is not intended that history should repeat itself and India see a war for the conquest of the Czechs (the Hindus) and of Hindustan (Czecho Slovakia) on the pretext of the Indian Czechs—the Hindus—ill-treatment of the Indian Sudetens the Muslims.” His colleague, Jawaharal Nehru (1889–1964), also sympathized with Czechoslovakia as a new, democratic, left-leaning, postimperial, and multinational state, albeit with a fractious, indeed irredentist German minority. With his daughter, he visited the country in 1938 as a mark of solidarity before the Munich conference, declining an official invitation to Nazi Germany. An Indo-Czechoslovak Society in Bombay was founded in 1938 to the same end. The Indian national independence movement attracted great attention and sympathy in Czechoslovakia. Already in 1934, Czechoslovak–Indian commercial and cultural relations were institutionalized in university positions and an Oriental Institute in Prague. After his tour of the country, which was preceded by a visit to Republican forces in Spain’s civil war, Nehru wrote a series of articles in the English and Indian press denouncing German aggression and Western acquiescence, which he saw as more sinister than appeasement:

As events have shown they [the Czechoslovaks] have prepared to go to extraordinary length to satisfy every minority claim and preserve peace but everybody knows that the question at issue is not a minority one. If it was the love of minority rights that moved people why do we not hear of the German minority in Italy or the minority in Poland? The question is one of power politics and the Nazi desire to break up the Czecho-Soviet alliance, to put an end to the democratic state in central Europe, to reach the Rumanian oil fields and wheat, and thus to dominate Europe. British policy has encouraged this and tried to weaken that democratic state.”

Like European leftists and many anticolonial nationalists, he associated fascism and imperialism, placing Nazi Germany and the British Empire in the same camp as disavowed allies opposing the Soviet Union, with which he also sympathized although he himself was not a communist. Unlike Savarkar and the Muslim League, he was dismayed, if not surprised, by the British and French betrayal of Czechoslovakia.

The Congress followed Nehru’s line, passing a resolution in March 1939 that condemned British foreign policy toward Germany, Italy, and Spain, including Germany’s persecution of its Jewish citizens, again in contrast to Savarkar: “International morality has sunk so low in Central and South-Western Europe that the world has witnessed with horror the organized terrorism of the Nazi Government against people of the Jewish race and the continuous bombing from the air by rebel forces of cities and civilian inhabitants and helpless refugees [in Spain].” How German imperialism and pan-Germanism—a cypher for pan-Islamism in Congress eyes—played out in Czechoslovakia confirmed its fears. Not only did the Sudeten–German leader Konrad Henlein claim parity with the Slav majority, but the Nazis detached Slovakia from the Bohemian lands when they occupied the country. The fragmentary implications of pan-Islamic communalism in India for a united country seemed portended in Central Europe. “The entire course of events was fully reported and closely observed in India,” noted Beni Prasad (1895–1945), the inaugural professor of politics at Allahabad University.

The Dalit lawyer, political thinker, and drafter of India’s first independent constitution, B. R. Ambedkar (1891–1956), also used the Czechoslovak drama to draw lessons for India in *Thoughts on Pakistan* (1941), which he augmented in *Pakistan or the Partition of India* (1945). Speaking as a member of a low-status minority, he was acutely conscious of the demographic preponderance of Hindus, whose caste hierarchies he wished to “annihilate” in a new social order, as he wrote in 1936. His distrust
of majorities—and consequent favoring of national homogeneity—thus had two sources: caste and religion. He noted the Muslim League's enthusiastic identification with Germany's intervention for their Sudeten co-nationals and did not dispute the power of the lesson. It was less the Sudeten Germans that interested him, however, than the Slovak nationalists, who used the Sudeten precedent to win constitutional and administrative autonomy within the state. No sooner had they extracted these concessions then they used the threat of German invasion to secede altogether and form a separate state. On the basis of this experience, and the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, Ambedkar instructed his readers on the power of nationalism: "Really speaking the destruction of Czechoslovakia was brought about by an enemy within her own borders. That enemy was the intransigent nationalism of the Slovaks who were out to break up the unity of the state and secure the independence of Slovakia."  

The poisoned fruit of such nationalism was terrible violence. In a remarkable section of Pakistan or the Partition of India, Ambedkar graphically detailed communal conflict between 1920 and 1940 based on official reports. They made "most painful and heart-rending reading" and indicated "twenty years of civil war between the Hindus and the Muslims in India, interrupted by brief intervals of armed peace." Violence against women in particular showed "the depth of the antagonism which divided the two communities." What is more, violent acts were not condemned by communal authorities "but were treated as legitimate acts of warfare for which no apology was necessary." In the circumstances, "Hindu-Muslim unity" was less a mirage than "out of sight and also out of mind." The two could not be one nation irrespective of united government administrations. Contemporary European history and local experience also taught him this cold reality. Addressing Hindus, he asked them to ponder the viability of an independent India with such internal national conflict:

This is a lesson which the Hindus will do well to grasp. They should ask themselves: if the Greek, Balkan and Arab nationalism has blown up the Turkish State and if Slovak nationalism has caused the dismantling of Czechoslovakia, what is there to prevent Muslim nationalism from disrupting the Indian State? If experience of other countries teaches that this is the inevitable consequence of pent-up nationalism, why not profit by their experience and avoid the catastrophe by agreeing to divide India into Pakistan and Hindustan?"  

In view of irreconcilable nationality conflicts and consequent violence, Ambedkar concluded that states were left with no alternative but to strive for demographic homogeneity. To that end, he supported partition and an independent Pakistan already in 1941, only a year after the landmark Lahore Resolution of the Muslim League, writing, "It is obvious that if Pakistan has the demerit of cutting away parts of India it has also one merit namely of introducing homogeneity."  

MINORITIES: HOSTAGES OR TRANSFER?  
The problem for Indian partitionists was that schemes devised in the 1930s and 1940s left large minorities in the new territories. Should they be protected, kept as hostages, or exchanged? The Muslim League's Lahore Resolution was an exercise in studied ambiguity in order to assuage Muslim-majority provinces that wanted to guard their autonomy from a strong central government. The resolution mentioned neither partition nor Pakistan, instead calling for areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the North-Western and Eastern Zones of India to constitute "autonomous and sovereign," indeed "Independent States" within a constitutional framework. It thus implied a decentralized Indian union of extant provinces, in which the issue of sovereignty was deferred.  

As the resolution also implied that the Muslim-majority provinces of the northwest and Bengal would contain large non-Muslim minorities, they should be protected by "adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards," just as Muslim minorities in India should be similarly protected by constitutional provisions. Commenting later on the resolution, Jinnah was characteristically vague, telling minority Muslims to demand safeguards "known to any civilized government" while reminding them that they would be no better off in a united India in which all Muslims, including the "Muslim homeland," remained minority subjects to the Hindu majority. "The division of India will throw a great responsibility upon the majority in its respective zones to create a real sense of
security amongst the minorities and win their complete trust and confidence," he said hopefully.59

As Sikh leaders never tired of pointing out, why should Sikh collective security in their Punjab homeland not be guaranteed with their local sovereignty in the same way as Muslim security? They were not reassured by Muslim League arguments about effective Sikh influence in Punjab under Pakistan, which bore a striking resemblance to Congress arguments about effective Muslim influence in a united India. When partition finally became a reality in early 1947, Sikhs, the Hindu Mahasabha, and Congress insisted that non-Muslim areas of Punjab and Bengal become part of India in any partition demarcation; they could not become minorities in Pakistan. Ambedkar was also adamant on this point.60

This logic was shared by Muslim League leaders even from Muslim-minority areas like Uttar Pradesh: the main priority was self-government of Muslim-majority areas so they could not be intimidated by the national Hindu majority. How, then, could Muslim security in non-Muslim areas be guaranteed? Were Jinnah's and the Lahore Resolution’s anodyne references to minority protection sufficient? They could be if backed by power. The well-known breakthrough to the notion of a separate Muslim polity was the speech of the lawyer, poet, and politician Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938) at a Muslim League meeting in 1930. There he demanded “the formation of a consolidated Muslim State in the best interests of India and Islam.” The interests of both parties, he suggested obliquely, were served by a system of mutual deterrence: “For India, it means security and peace resulting from an internal balance of power.”61

Muslim League figures made explicit what remained implicit in Iqbal’s hint, namely, a “hostage theory” guarantee of communal peace based on a simple proposition: if you mistreat our minorities, we’ll mistreat yours. For that reason, League politicians from Muslim-minority areas, like Choudhry Khaliquzzaman (1889–1973) of United Provinces, wanted all minorities to remain in situ to guarantee mutual deterrence, as he made clear in a letter to Jinnah in 1942: “one of the basic principles lying behind the Pakistan idea is that of keeping hostages in Muslim Provinces as against the Muslims in the Hindu Provinces. If we allow millions of Hindus to go out of our orbit of influence, the security of the Muslims in the minority Provinces will greatly be minimised."62 There could be no equitable reciprocity if Pakistan was homogenous.

British leaders were well aware of the theory. Secretary to the governor of the Punjab, Penderel Moon, recalled hostage theory calculations among League leaders in the late 1930s: “there would be so many Muslims in Hindustan and so many Hindus in Pakistan that both sides would hesitate to harass their minorities for fear of reprisals.”63 Choudhry Khaliquzzaman shared these views with the British Cabinet Mission in April 1946 when asked how Muslims remaining in India would benefit from the establishment of Pakistan. “It was not so much that Muslims in Hindu-majority Provinces would be benefited directly,” he was reported as saying, “but that the advantages would be indirect because the Government of Hindustan would not be so ready to ill-treat Muslims if they knew that the Government of Pakistan would retaliate. Some sort of balance of power was essential.”64 Hossain Imam, a Muslim League lawyer from Bihar, where Muslims were also a minority, likewise told the British secretary of state that “if there were a Pakistan in being, the Muslims in the minority Provinces would be assured that the Hindus could not treat them badly with impunity” because of the fear of reprisals, even if they were not enacted.65

Whether Imam really believed this scheme would work was indicated by his frank admission that minority Muslims would suffer for a redemptive purpose: they “were in effect prepared to sacrifice the interests of 25 million Muslims in Hindustan for the benefit of the rest of the community in Pakistan.” Loyally following Jinnah’s line, he continued: “The Muslims in the minority Provinces would rather face whatever was in store for them than allow the whole Muslim population to be maltreated.”66 The few, nonetheless tens of millions of Muslims, would suffer to secure Iqbal and Jinnah’s vision of a Muslim homeland—as Jinnah put it, the “opportunity [for Muslims] to development their spiritual, cultural, economic, and political life in accordance with their own genius and shape their own future destiny.”67

The British listeners were unconvinced by the hostage theory. One of them suggested, presciently, that the retaliatory logic, far from dampening violence, might result in “a crescendo of ill-treatment of minorities
on both sides of the border. E A memo from a British administrator in United Provinces to the viceroy in January 1946 about a conversation with Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman registered the skepticism: "He was very naive about this [the hostage theory] and almost smacked his lips at the thought of the fun the Pakistan Government(s) would have in protecting—vicariously—the interests of their coreligionists in Hindus-

tani. E Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman migrated to Pakistan at partition and succeeded Jinnah as leader of the Muslim League. He also knew that Muslims stranded in India were effectively left high and dry because the establishment of Pakistan would mean the absence of an effective Muslim voice at the center of Indian politics. E

Accordingly, Jinnah hoped that the League would inherit an unpartitioned Punjab and Bengal with its large Hindu (and in Punjab, also Sikh) minorities, as he made clear in the Cabinet Mission negotiations in 1946. E Until the catastrophic population exchanges from below of 1947 and 1948, Jinnah apparently continued to believe in the hostage theory, telling an English journalist that Muslims in India were "fortunate that there would be a corresponding minority of 25,000,000 Hindus in Pakistan." On partition, he was reported as saying, "The minorities are in effect hostages to the requirement of mutual cooperation and good neighbourliness between the Governments of Pakistan and the Indian Union." E However, while a sizable Muslim minority remained in India, very few Hindus, Sikhs, and other non-Muslims were left in Pakistan, leading to considerable hand-wringing there. There were even calls for Hindus to return. E

Hindu observers were registering this security logic of Muslim communal leaders already in 1931. Sanat Kumar Roy-Chaudhuri, mayor of Calcutta and senior member the Hindu Mahasabha, predictably de-

rided the hostage theory as yet another Muslim strategy to dominate Hindus because more non-Muslims would be under Muslim control than the reverse. Iqbal's speech the year before, he continued, implied a pan-Muslim federation in the northwest to overawe India, a fear also shared by Ambedkar. On the eve of partition, Savarkar predictably vowed that any Muslim mistreatment of Hindus would be met in kind. E By contrast, senior Congress figures were appalled by the hostage theory, which was catching on within their ranks. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad (1888–1958), a Muslim Congress leader, recalls that during the partition decision, members reassured Hindu delegates from Sindh, where Hindus were a minority, by saying "the Hindus in Pakistan need have no fear as there would be 45 millions of Muslims in India and if there was any oppression of Hindus in Pakistan, the Muslims in India would have to bear the consequences." He felt that the notion of "retaliation as a method of assuring the rights of minorities seemed . . . barbarous." E Rajendra Prasad agreed: "The very idea of ill-treating people who have done nothing wrong and may for all practical purposes be the best of citizens in their own State, because some other independent Government with which they have no concern has misbehaved, is so repugnant to our sense of natural justice that it is inconceivable that either Pakistan or Hindustan will resort to reprisal against its own subjects for the act of an independent Government." E

Ambedkar was also appalled by "a scheme of communal peace through a system of communal hostages." E He drew on his broad study of European affairs to come to startling conclusions based on arresting analogies. Hindu stuck in Pakistan would be in the "position of the Armenians under the Turks or of the Jews in Tsarist Russia or in Nazi Germany," in this case "as a helpless prey to the fanaticism of a Muslim National State." E What is more, India's sovereignty would be threatened by the theory. After all, were Muslims incorrect to observe that "Hitler's bull-

lying tactics" in the German-Czechoslovakia confrontation were "better able to protect the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia than the Sudeten were able to do themselves?" E For these reasons, Ambedkar urged a dramatic and drastic alternative: population exchange. The Balkans pro-

vided a precedent, in part because of their dreadful record of minority protection, in part because those states successfully transferred minorities. Anticipating skepticism about logistics, he noted the magnitude of the challenge they faced: "It involved the transfer of some 20 million people from one habitat to another. But undaunted, the three [Turkey, Greece, and Bulgaria] shouldered the task and carried it to a successful end be-

cause they felt that the considerations of communal peace must outweigh every other consideration." Sounding like the British Peel Commission's
invocation of the Turkish-Greek population exchange, Ambedkar concluded that "there is no reason to suppose that what they did cannot be accomplished by Indians." That was the only way to make Hindustan homogeneous, he averred.

Ambedkar was not alone in this line of thinking. Syed Abdul Latif, an English literature university academic in Hyderabad, suggested the same from the Muslim perspective in The Muslim Problem in India in 1939. He too was well aware of the difficulties, indeed sacrifices that a population exchange would entail, but better that this generation made them for the peace of subsequent generations. He proposed that the League and Congress collaborate on a mutually agreeable scheme, for which European history gave plenty of precedents, and that should commence with voluntary migration.61 The idea comes up occasionally in Jinnah's speeches. Population exchange, he declared, "as far as practicable will have to be considered."62

While the Muslim League toyed with the hostage theory and population exchange, the Congress rejected them for minority protection, although this commitment was tested by communal violence. Rajendra Prasad criticized population exchange as utterly impractical because it would be too costly, the suffering too immense, and the affected populations in India too intermingled, too far from likely borders, and vastly larger than in the Turkish-Greek case. He was, in any event, against the proposition of homogeneous states; they always had minorities.63 But by the time he signed off on the third edition of India Divided in July 1947, after the failed Cabinet Mission and ensuing communal violence in and after August 1946, he had changed his mind. He amended the addendum that supplemented the second edition, now supporting the idea: "The wisest course might therefore be to bring about an exchange of populations and squares between Muslims and non-Muslims, all the Muslims going over to the districts which may be assigned to the Muslim zone, all non-Muslims from those districts being transferred to a district assigned to the non-Muslim zone."64 The scheme would have to focus on Punjab, the Sikh homeland, transferring Sikhs into a non-Muslim zone.

In the event, the partition plan agreed to by all parties in June 1947 did not include population exchanges, in contrast to the Peel Commis-
observer noted at the time. Ultra-nationalist retributive violence was destructive by homogenizing national demography and political culture so that reality would more closely accord to the abstraction of the imagined collective. Hossain Imam, the Bihar Muslim League representative who told the British that he "would rather face whatever was in store for them [Muslims] than allow the whole Muslim population to be maltreated," now complained that he expected to be treated as a citizen of India and not as a hostage.

MUSLIM ZION?
Were the projections of identity between India, Europe, and the Middle East so intense as to make Pakistan a "Muslim Zion"? Certainly, the two movements shared the notions of a cultural homeland and elaboration of a nation that, though posited as an abstraction of imagined homogeneity, did not yet exist, and indeed was supposed to be made in and by the future state. If British authorities hesitated to equate the partitions of India and of Palestine, that was because they could not analogize between largely European Jewish settlers whom they regarded as civilizationally superior to the indigenous Arabs, and Indian Muslims whom they orientalized like Arabs. They would have agreed with Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, who rejected the "analogy of the Jewish demand for a national home" in April 1946:

One can sympathize with the aspiration of the Jews for such a national home, as they are scattered all over the world and cannot in any region have any effective voice in the administration. The condition of Indian Muslims is quite otherwise. Over 90 millions in number they are in quantity and quality a sufficiently important element in Indian life to influence decisively all questions of administration and policy. Nature has further helped them by concentrating them in certain areas.

Like the Muslim League, the Congress decried the Balfour Declaration and British imperialism in general. Unlike the League, the Congress perceived Zionism since the 1930s as a secessionist movement like the Muslim League, both collaborating illegitimately with the British, and so found it easy to reject Palestine's partition. The League's opposition was predictable: it supported the majority-Muslim Palestinian Arabs in their quest for self-determination and would not equate itself with Zionists. A League resolution in 1938 went so far as to warn the British that its "pro-Jewish policy in Palestine" would make them appear as an "enemy of Islam." The Congress also identified with an independent and united Palestine. As the Zionist demographer and historian Joseph B. Schechtman lamented, it was Mohandas Gandhi (1869-1948) who set the Congress against Zionism by declaring Palestine an Arab country.

Although both parties agreed to partition in South Asia—Congress most reluctantly—both Pakistan and India opposed it for Palestine. India was a member of the UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) and, with Iran and Yugoslavia, submitted the minority report supporting a federalization of Palestine, a solution that the Congress had rejected for India because it wanted a strong central state. Pakistan, which led the UN subcommittee to study the Arab proposal for a united Palestine, joined other Islamic countries in contesting partition and failing that, seeking to limit Jewish control to the small amount of Jewish-owned land (6 percent). When the Arab unitary state proposal was rejected, both Pakistan and India supported the federal idea, which foresaw a binational state. In his memoirs, Pakistan UN representative Sir Chaudhry Zafarullah Khan—himself a member of the Ahmadi minority—said he had been attracted to the binational idea of Judah Magnus, president of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, whom he had met in 1945. Magnus had impressed upon him the necessity of securing bipartisan support for any solution.

How was one to avoid the implication of hypocrisy by denying Jews national sovereignty when the Muslim League had argued that Muslims constituted a distinct nationality and therefore deserved their own state? The difference, Khan said at the UN, was that both sides had consented to partition in India whereas in Palestine it was being imposed against the will of the majority; that Muslims were a part of India in a way that could not be said of Jews in Palestine, most of whom had arrived in recent years, thereby artificially creating a nationality conflict; and that Muslims in India claimed only majority population areas whereas in Palestine Jews were a minority in virtually all the land they were to be granted by
the UN. Besides, he added, would the Americans take Pakistan refugees just because they wanted to go to the United States? For India, partition violated the sacred principle of self-determination. After the failure of the federal plan, which was also dismissed by the Arab bloc, India supported the latter in opposing partition. From the Indian perspective, partition in South Asia was not a concession to secession but a recognition of its right to self-determination. Distinguished in this way, India and Pakistan could oppose the partition of Palestine but reluctantly support the partitions of the Muslim majority provinces of Punjab and Bengal.

Despite the scattered references to population exchange, there was no Pakistan expectation or commitment to an ingathering of all Muslims from India. The League and Pakistan leadership did not envisage the large-scale immigration of Indian Muslims to a historic homeland in the manner that Zionists hoped and anticipated Jews would eventually settle in Eretz Israel. In fact, amid partition violence in October 1947, Jinnah told Pakistan armed forces officers that the flight of Hindus from Sindh in particular harmed the economy and the state; the exodus "was part of a well-organized plan to cripple Pakistan." These are hardly the sorts of sentiments one would have heard from David Ben-Gurion regarding Palestinian Arabs. Nor, later, did Jinnah think that Indian Muslims had an a priori right to settle in Pakistan; the state had no Law of Return like Israel's. He advised Muslims in India to swear "unflinching loyalty to the State." Treating minorities well was the policy as stated in the Lahore Resolution. There was no talk of hostages.

However, because some in India were "bent upon the eviction and extermination of Muslims in India by brutal and inhuman means," Jinnah placed population exchange on the table: "If the ultimate solution to the minority problem is to be mass exchanges of population, let it be taken up at the Governmental palace" rather than "sorted out by bloodthirsty elements." Such a scheme was never seriously considered; neither state had the capacity to cope with more refugees or the will power to exchange minorities for the reasons Rajendra Prasad had given in *India Divided*. India resisted pressure from the far-right Hindus for population exchange and war for more territory to settle migrants. Talk of population exchange was an expression of desperation and hopelessness in the face of seemingly intractable violence from below. Latif seems to have recanted his views as impractical already by 1946.

Instead, Jinnah took rhetorical responsibility for Muslims in India, who thereby became what Willem van Schendel calls "proxy citizens." This was not a new idea in South Asian discourse, as the Lahore Resolution indicated. If the two-nations theory were to be taken seriously, Indian Muslims were in fact culturally Pakistani. To that extent, partition had sedimented into the new states the minority question that was on the table in the All-India discussions. The practice of dealing with the 197 remnant enclaves in one another's countries exemplified this approach. Both sides behaved as if they were responsible for coreligionists/co-nationals in enclaves across the border. The issue was pressing because majority militias demanded enclave loyalty to the surrounding state, which they attacked when it was not forthcoming. In the interests of stemming further refugee flows—in opposite fashion to the situation in Israel and its neighbors at the same time—the states started meeting at interdominion conferences in January 1948 to manage the situation.

It took until 1950 for the two new states to stabilize the situation. Like the League of Nations minority protection regime, the "Agreement Between the Governments of India and Pakistan Regarding Security and Rights of Minorities" (the Nehru–Liaquat Agreement) provided minority protection as an alternative to population expulsion and/or exchange, though without the supervisory oversight of an international organization: "The Governments of India and Pakistan solemnly agree that each shall ensure, to the minorities throughout its territory, complete equality of citizenship, irrespective of religion, a full sense of security in respect of life, culture, property and personal honour, freedom of movement within each country and freedom of occupation, speech and worship, subject to law and morality."

Joint minority commissions were established for Assam and East and West Bengal, where Hindus remained, to oversee minority rights. Each state's incentive to act against the egregious persecution of minorities at the local level was to forestall the other state becoming the minority's "protector." Likely without realizing the precedent, the India and Pakistan agreement partially replicated the 1930 Greek–Turkish treaty that
made each country responsible for the compensation of those who arrived as part of the Lausanne agreement, ending the mixed commissions supervised by the League.\textsuperscript{110} For all the theorizing about hostages and population exchanges, the parties settled on the minority protection option they had disparaged in the lead-up to partition because of its failure in Europe. The League seemed to share a Zionist sense of proprietary interest in proxy citizens abroad, but as a permanent rather than a transitional arrangement, as Zionists conceived it at the time. Indian Muslims were to stay put; Pakistan was not their home irrespective of what the Hindu Mahasabha thought. And yet, as we will see, the Muslim-Zion connection was apparent in another, more fatal way.

PALESTINE, ISRAEL, AND MINORITIES
In the British Mandate of Palestine, leaders of the large Arab majority urged the British Mandate authorities to limit, if not cease, Jewish immigration from the outset. For their part, Zionists, who could not foresee an independent Jewish state in the 1920s and 1930s, sought to build up the Jewish national home by having the British enable a Jewish majority over time via immigration. Already in 1937, Jewish leaders reluctantly accepted the Peel Commission’s partition recommendation, which included Arab population transfers, because a truncated state with a demographic majority was preferable to long-term struggle with a hostile Arab population with no guarantee of eventual sovereignty.\textsuperscript{111} As might be expected, Arab leaders resisted the partition recommendation. Throughout the Mandate, they insisted that Palestine be granted independence according to the strictures of Class A Mandates—like Iraq, for instance—as a democratic polity in which Jewish minority rights were respected. As noted in the introduction, the idea that non-European majorities could not be trusted to protect the rights of a “minority,” particularly a white European one, long predated the British Mandate. However, the massacre of Assyrians after Iraqi independence in 1933 and violence between Jews and Arabs in Palestine in 1929 gave the British a convenient pretext not to entrust the state to the Arab majority; that is why they considered partition and transferring Arabs from the Jewish territory.\textsuperscript{112} Both parties advocated minority rights in the state they wanted to govern. Unlike India, there was no official discussion of equitable reciprocity or hostages, although that did not preclude retributive violence at the local level. Even so, as we will see below, hostage and population logics were discernible in regional perspective.

In 1947, UNSCOP determined to partition the British Mandate after the British had referred the matter to the UN. The committee’s majority report, which awarded most of the Mandate to the Zionists, who constituted a third of Palestine’s population, was supported by the General Assembly after considerable arm-twisting of allies by the United States, and in the face of vehement opposition by the majority Arab population.\textsuperscript{113} The generous award was designed for future population growth, whose immediate sources were Jewish displaced persons languishing in camps in Germany, although the aim to demographically prevail in Palestine long preceded the Holocaust and was reflected in the Peel Commission’s dramatic redistribution of territory to the Zionists, coupled with population transfer, ten years before. Refugee pressures that Europe, the United States, Canada, or Australia were unwilling to accommodate in their own countries were transferred to the Middle East.

The Arab states supported Palestinian leaders in rejecting both the federal state and partition plans of the minority UNSCOP report and majority reports.\textsuperscript{114} They sought the termination of the Mandate and establishment of an independent Palestinian state; Jewish minority rights would be safeguarded “in accordance with international law and the United Nations Charter.”\textsuperscript{115} This was an enduring Arab demand, made recently by Arab representatives to the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry of 1946. The most articulate representative was the British-Lebanese civil servant and historian Albert Hourani (1915–1993), then working for the Arab Office in Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{116} The question of minorities and violence underlay his presentation. Arabs did not want to be converted into a minority via Jewish immigration; if Jews supported partition to avoid ruling over Arabs, the problem was not solved by a Jewish state because it too would inevitably contain a large Arab minority, an argument advanced by Sikhs in India.

Partition was not a solution, Hourani declared. A Jewish neighbor-state in a partitioned Palestine would lead to instability, because it would
seek to expand: "I can imagine [that] the pressures of population in the Jewish State would be so great [that] it would turn the thoughts of the governing body to expansion, either in order to settle Jewish immigrants outside the Jewish State, or else in order to evacuate their Arab minority." Arabs, he reminded the committee, had been listening to the Jewish talk of an "evacuation" of Arabs, although he thought, incorrectly as it turned out, that in practice "this Arab minority could not be transferred forcibly because you can't transfer peasants forcibly." Indeed, an intense Zionist discussion about "transferring" Palestinians had been under way for a decade. Although it did not constitute official policy, the preferences of the Zionist high command were readily apparent by 1947. Golda Meir (Meir) (1898–1978), as acting head of the Jewish Agency Political Department, declared that "we are interested in less Arabs who will be citizens of the Jewish state." Yitzhak Gruenbaum (1879–1970) of the Jewish Agency Executive said that Arabs remaining in the postpartition Jewish state who were citizens of its Arab neighbor would represent "a permanent irredenta." Irrespective of citizenship status, such Arabs, Ben-Gurion maintained, would become a "Fifth Column" in time of war. He feared Arabs would take citizenship in the Jewish state, meaning that they could not be legally expelled.

Even so, continued Hourani, Arabs were willing to share citizenship with Jews who had arrived legally and wanted to be "full members of the political unity," adding ironically, "to try the dangerous experiment of people of different races and ideals living together." He thought the offer generous. Addressing the minority question in a united state, he struck the pose of Indian Congress leaders:

... what the Jews could expect would be full civil and political rights, control of their own communal affairs, municipal autonomy in districts in which they are mainly concentrated, the use of Hebrew as an additional official language in those districts, and an adequate share in the administration. It should be clear from this that there is no question of the Jews being under Arab rule in the bad sense of being thrust into a ghetto, or being cut off from the mainstream of life of the community, always shunned and sometimes oppressed. The Arabs are offering not this ghetto status in the bad sense, but member-

ship of the Palestinian community. If that community has an Arab character, if the Palestinian state is to be an Arab state, that is not because of racial prejudice or fanaticism but because of two inescapable facts: the first that Palestine has an Arab indigenous population, and the second that Palestine by geography and history is an essential part of the Arab world.

The question for the Arab leadership, he continued, was between "goodwill and force": Were Jews "to live in Palestine with the goodwill of the Arabs," or were they "to rely on force, their own or [that of] others"?

These are the terms that the Muslim League rejected from the Congress because of the fear that permanent minority status could not guarantee security and national development. Similarly, Jews did not want to live in an Arab country, however defined, nor share equal citizenship with Palestinians—again, long before the Holocaust. They felt they were in Palestine by right, not by Arab sufferance, and the British agreed. Hourani was naive. He did not understand that Zionists could stand firm for three reasons. First, they understood their overwhelming military superiority to the Palestinians after the revolt between 1936 and 1939 had been brutally quashed and the Palestinian leadership imprisoned or exiled. Second, the British and Zionist leadership shared the belief of the Yishuv's essential civilizational superiority to the Arabs, one also held by the majority of League and UN officials and delegates. Arab leaders failed to recognize that the political rights of liberal internationalism were not meant to apply to them, meaning that they continued to send petitions and deputations despite the fact that they had little chance of a hearing.

Tellingly, it was obdurate Palestinian resistance, as in the revolt, that led to policy changes in their favor, like the White Paper of 1939. Third, no nationalist movement like Zionism or the Muslim League would rely on its adversaries' goodwill. Ambedkar had highlighted twenty years of violence to underline the lack of goodwill in India. In the Palestine case, it was similarly difficult to imagine goodwill in light of the violent Palestinian resistance of the 1930s and Zionist terror campaign at the time.

The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry doubted some of Hourani's propositions as well. Its report struck an artful balance between the sides, including the American pressure to allow in one hundred
thousand Jewish refugees. Palestine was neither purely Arab, nor Jewish. Neither side should control the other; minority protection declarations and provisions inevitably would prove inadequate. Consequently, to avoid the inevitable "civil strife" that would ensue from "the determination of each to achieve domination" and to establish an independent state, an international mandate should continue, with local self-government to be worked out. As Arie Dubnov notes in his chapter in this book, the British historian who largely drafted the Peel Commission report, Reginald Coupland, wrote to the London Times to criticize the Anglo-American Committee report and to readvocate his partition plan. Jews had been ripe for proper self-government for a long time, he insisted. His intervention was anything but prescient, assuring readers—contra Hourani—that "it was impossible to suppose that the Jewish State . . . would be so mad as to violate it [the frontier] and to seek to occupy Arab land beyond it." Coupland could not know that Zionists would assure UNSCOP that they would accept partition on the condition of future expansion.

Hourani's reply in the Times rightly pointed out that Coupland was prepared to consign Arabs to minority status in a Jewish state, but not the reverse. But his vague statement that it was dangerous for minorities to rely on foreign powers for protection for "refusing to accept the duties of citizenship" ignored the fact that Zionists had been able to rely on great power backing for much of the Mandate, even if they had felt betrayed by the 1939 White Paper that rejected partition and restricted Jewish migration. The fact remained that a British military presence enabled the development of the Yishuv whatever the latter felt about the former. Nor did Hourani foresee that Israelis could rely on military hardware and support from European states until 1967 and especially the Americans thereafter. Power, not justice and the avoidance of violence, mattered in the end.

Like the British partition plan in India a few months earlier, the UNSCOP plan did not foresee population exchanges but minority protection. And as in India, force prevailed on the ground. Security concerns about the loyalty of remnant enclaves governed the expulsion (and prevention of the return of) Palestinian Arabs by Israeli forces in 1948 and 1949 and territorial expansion well beyond the borders of the 1947 UN partition plan. Take the case of the expulsion of Palestinians from Lydda in July 1948, which the Israeli historian Anita Shapira describes in terms of Hourani's predictions:

A brief uprising by the residents of Lydda (Lod) exposed the danger inherent in leaving a large bloc containing a hostile population behind the advancing army midway between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. The commanders Allon and Yitzhak Rabin, who were considering a large-scale population evacuation, went to consult with [Prime Minister] Ben-Gurion. Ben-Gurion listened to them and did not react; he had an uncanny ability to keep silent when he needed to. It was only at the end of the discussion, as the commanders were about to leave for the battlefield, that, according to Rabin, Ben-Gurion waved his hand and said: "Expel them...[Like most of his ministers, he saw the Arabs' exodus as a great miracle, one of the most important in that year of miracles, since the presence of a hostile population constituting some forty percent of the new state's total populace did not augur well for the future."

This operation, which included a massacre of about 250 townspeople, was the outcome of plans to secure territory by destroying Palestinian Arab militias and the villages from which they operated. The outcome, writes historian Benny Morris, was a "war of conquest," even if it unfolded in piecemeal fashion, with local commanders often taking the initiative to expel Palestinians from towns and villages. There was retaliatory violence on both sides. The massacre of the villagers of Deir Yassin in April 1948 by Irgun auxiliaries was avenged by the murder of Jewish academic and medical personnel in a ten-vehicle convoy in Jerusalem by Arab militias.

After the guns fell silent, approximately 700,000 Palestinians had fled or been expelled, while 160,000 Palestinian Arabs were left behind Israeli lines as internal refugees or, if they were lucky, in their own homes. They were then subject to a military occupation until 1966, during which they suffered extensive land expropriation and mobility restrictions and were generally closely monitored. The possibility of expulsion lay open in the case of further conflict with Arab states.
“the Arab inhabitants of the State of Israel . . . on the basis of full and equal citizenship,” much like Hourani’s offer. The Israeli Proclamation of Independence from May 1948 mentioned “complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex.” A minorities ministry headed by the first Israeli government’s only Sephardic minister, who had liberal views toward the Arab minority, was quickly shut down by Prime Minister Ben-Gurion in 1949. He was effectively replaced by Yehoshua Palmon (1913–1995), advisor to the prime minister on Arab affairs, to oversee Muslim religious institutions with a ministry of religious affairs, thereby casting Palestinians as a religious rather than a national minority. A security hawk who coordinated the martial law regime of the military government of Palestinians, Palmon did not believe in democratic Arab self-administration and “personified the quest for control of the minority and the suspicion of its inherent disloyalty to the state,” as one scholar puts it.

At the same time, Jews from Arab countries began arriving in Israel. Now there was talk of an informal population exchange. Joseph B. Schechtman wrote about the European, Indian, and Middle Eastern cases in real time. Early in the 1940s, he was employed by the Institute for Jewish Affairs in New York to study the German expulsions and colonization in Europe. Subsequently, in 1949, he was engaged by the State of Israel to justify the expulsion of Palestinian Arabs and its refusal to allow their return. Schechtman regretted that Pakistani and Indian leaders did not respond in the same way. Instead, they “stubbornly refused to accept the exchange of population as a bitter but inevitable necessity and to conduct it in a constructive way.” For partition by itself was insufficient: “The minority problem, which is a question of life and death for the success of any constructive scheme for Palestine cannot be solved without resorting to what the last President Eduard Beneš of Czechoslovakia called ‘the grim necessity of transfer.’” Schechtman was effectively saying that the Arabs were an irredentist majority for their inexplicably stubborn refusal to be reduced to minority status in a majority Jewish Palestine.

Schechtman noted the South Asian hostage theory in his short book Population Transfers in Asia, published that year. Unlike Muslim League leaders, however, he came to the opposite conclusion. Because Jews were treated as hostages in Arab countries, they should be brought to Israel. “As a result of the growing anti-Zionist policy on the part of the Arab and Moslem states,” he wrote, “the situation of the Jewish minorities in those countries is unbearable. They are considered and treated as hostages.” He quoted Arab leaders linking the establishment of Israel to the fate of Jews in their countries. They now faced a “very real threat of physical extermination,” and so their “speedy evacuation” was “a matter of utmost urgency.” Reflecting a moral economy of symmetry in the Middle East, “such a scheme,” he declared, would represent the “fundamentally essential counterpart to the movement of Arabs from Palestine.” The Arab-Jewish migration was part of a grand demographic bargain, the Jews’ maltreatment the result of hostage thinking that would impel their evacuation and compensate the flight (as he conceived it) of Palestinian Arabs.

Schechtman was also giving voice to Ben-Gurion’s public position that made the expelled Palestinian Arabs extraterritorial hostages, implying that they could not return if Jews in Arab countries were mistreated: “the ultimate position of the 300,000-odd Arab refugees from Palestine,” the new state leader was reported as stating, “would depend on the treatment meted out to Jewish populations in the Arab lands.” In reality, he had no intention of permitting their return and worked to encourage the immigration of Jews in general.

Such notions of effective reciprocity had been voiced before, notably at the World Jewish Congress meeting in 1937 when “population exchange” was the term to refer to Arab Jews while “transfer” applied to Palestinian Arabs, though the idea gained no traction until the realization dawned that the Holocaust had robbed Zionism of its favored migration source. By 1942, Arab Jews were recognized as necessary to populate a future Jewish state, and by the early 1950s the Israeli state realized that their mass migration to Israel could be used as a diplomatic weight to offset the Palestinian refugee problem. This campaign continues to this day. The terms of this migration are thus fraught and contested. The position of the state and advocacy groups for Jews from Arab countries paints a picture of enduring and intense anti-Semitic discrimination that culminated in riots and other measures that drove Jews from their
millennia-long homes to Israel; they do not compare this experience to the military occupation endured by Palestinian Citizens of Israel between 1948 and 1966, which was more severe. Arab ultranationalists, by contrast, paint these communities as economically exploitative and Zionist, disloyally supporting the enemy Israel with whom many Arab states were at war in 1948; this argument evinces a retaliatory logic.

Scholarship on the question depicts an uneven process of push and pull factors that resulted in the punctual departure of Arab Jews to many countries. These factors include intense Zionist activism to induce migration, ranging from competition with communists to win the hearts and minds of Iraqi Jews from the early 1940s—mostly unsuccessfully—to the terrorist plot Operation Susannah in Egypt in 1954. In class term, Jews were associated with cosmopolitan commercial elites who had close ties to colonial powers though few to Zionism. Well integrated into these societies, Jews had little incentive to migrate, even impoverished Yemeni Jews, more than forty thousand of whom were induced to leave for Israel under the auspices of a deal cut between Israeli authorities, Jewish organizations, and the rulers of Aden and Yemen.

At the same time, other geopolitical forces were impinging on these communities from the interwar period onward, with the simultaneous rise of Zionism in Palestine, which was reliant on British power, and Arab nationalism, which was anti-imperial in orientation. The notorious Farhud riot in Baghdad in June 1941, during which between 150 and 180 Jews were murdered and their property destroyed, was the result of collaboration charges with the British who defeated a short-lived pro-Axis, independent Iraqi regime and reoccupied the country. In fact, these communities were loyal and saw their futures in Arab states. Israel's defeat of their armies in 1948 discredited these elitist, pro-Western, and conservative regimes with which Jewish communities were associated. In response, they licensed retaliatory violence against these communities to shore up their crumbling position. As a consequence, some 123,000 Iraqi Jews left for Israel between 1949 and 1950. But even with the replacement of these regimes by nationalist revolutionaries in coups during the 1950s, most Jews remained in Egypt, for example, and those who left did not choose Israel as their destination. It was further military defeat to Israel, in 1956 and 1967, that entrenched ultranationalist conceptions of Arab nationhood and intensified legal and economic pressure on Jews to leave. Upon Algerian independence in 1962, most Algerian Jews, who had held French citizenship since 1870, migrated to France. As Joel Beinin's summary of the Egyptian pattern could be generalized, "Between 1912 and 1956, the entire Egyptian Jewish community... was transformed from a national asset to a fifth column." Postcolonial Arab nationalism had no place for Jews in its conception of the Arab polity.

RETRIBUTIVE VIOLENCE AND SECURITY TODAY?
What can we conclude about the relationship between partitions, minorities, and national security and the logic of communal hostage taking, population transfer, and retributive violence? The history of Central Europe in the first half of the twentieth century has been taken as evidence for the proposition that ethnic or national groups with hardened identities cannot live together in compacted zones of cominged settlement. Because of elite mobilization and the fatal logic of "security dilemmas"—the cycle of violence unleashed when the maintenance of security for one group is interpreted as aggression by the other—they are vulnerable to internecine conflicts. The peaceful history of the Federal Republic of Germany is the poster child: partition worked because the minority problem was solved. In fact, hundreds of thousands of ethnic Germans continued to live in the Soviet Union after the war. The reason for stability was that the Federal Republic did not conduct business with the USSR on the basis of the hostage theory. Even though West Germany regarded itself as an ethnically conceived nation-state and enabled migration in specific circumstances, it no longer understood the state as the global headquarters of "Germandom" (Deutschum). The modalities of national homogeneity and domination persist where states are conceived in ethnocentric terms, with splinters of their nation in others', and others' in theirs. This logic manifests itself in various modalities today. In one form, the Republic of Armenia supports the self-determination of Nagorno-Karabakh, which it regards as "an integral part of historic Armenia." Because ethnic Armenians control this unrecognized entity within Azerbaijan, Armenian policy is to proceed along
diplomatic channels in having Nagorno-Karabakh's self-determination legally realized, with the option of unification with the Armenian homeland as the unstated aspiration. Since Armenia has prevailed militarily, violence is no longer necessary.

Various modalities are observable in the case of Israel's external and internal domains. For sixty years, Jews, including Israelis, have lived outside Israel, where they sometimes experience hostagelike treatment, provoking anxiety in Israel. For example, Israeli immigration officialdom and the Knesset Committee on Immigration are as concerned as they are perplexed by Persian Jews' determination to stay put in Tehran. These foreign citizens are accused of being "wealthy Jewish hostages" to Iran despite their own proclaimed sense of well-being. In turn, the only Jewish Iranian in the national parliament internalizes the Iranian state's hostage logic: "My view is that the actions of Netanyahu and his government, the way they behave towards the Palestinians, cause problems for Jews everywhere."

Without doubt, some Jewish communities outside Israel are treated according to the hostage theory—as local objects for retaliation for the actions of the Israeli state. The Algemeiner newspaper reported in 2014 that Turkish leaders declared "Turkish Jews will pay dearly" for the Israeli attack on the Turkish ship Mavi Marmara, during which Israeli soldiers kills Turkish citizens. In an open letter to the country's chief rabbi that mixed anti-Semitism with the attribution of vicarious responsibility for Israeli policy, a Turkish newspaper wrote, "You have lived comfortably among us for 500 years and gotten rich at our expense. Is this your gratitude—killing Muslims? Erdoğan, demand that the community leader apologize!" In the subsequent exchange of letters between the US Anti-Defamation League and Turkish president Erdoğan about these matters, the latter diplomatically affirmed the equal rights of Jewish citizens and welcomed the fact that they agreed with him regarding the legitimacy of criticizing Israeli actions in Gaza. One wonders whether they had any choice in the matter. That Erdoğan thinks in terms of hostage logics is not surprising when a major American Jewish organization wrote to him as an advocate of Israeli interests. The American Jewish Congress demanded the return of an award it had bestowed on Erdoğan because of his denunciations of the Israeli bombing of Gaza, which, with characteristic hyperbole, he said "surpassed Hitler in barbarism." The Congress's president lamented that the Turkish leader had become "arguably the most virulent anti-Israel leader in the world."

By coming to terms with the fact that not all Jews will migrate to Israel and by encouraging Israel-diaspora solidarity, the State of Israel has effectively adopted the position of the Muslim League in the 1930s and 1940s: Jewish minorities can be sacrificed to ensure Jewish sovereignty in Israel by having to bear the consequences of its security policies. After all, in the Zionist imaginary, persecution is a logical consequence of living among non-Jews. Until relatively recently, this sacrificial logic existed more by accident than design. The largest attack on Jews abroad was in Argentina in 1994, when the Buenos Aires headquarters of a Jewish organization was blown up by Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollah agents in retaliation for Israel's assassination of Hezbollah secretary general Abbas Musawi and his family in 1992. An Israeli defense ministry official who later worked for the Jewish Agency reported that at the time "nobody thought for a minute to consider that it might affect Jews outside Israel. But it did." In response to such attacks, the Jewish Agency for Israel established a think tank in Jerusalem to seek input into state policy that could affect Jewish communities elsewhere. Now Jewish intelligence agencies well understand that their state's actions reverberate globally.

The moral economy of retributive violence is discernible within Israel itself. When three Israeli settler teenagers were murdered on the West Bank in 2014, three ultra-Orthodox young males kidnapped, tortured, and murdered an East Jerusalem Palestinian boy in retaliation. Two of them were charged with the attempted kidnapping of a seven-year-old boy, assaulting his mother, and setting fire to a Palestinian shop the night before. There was less a casual than a reflective relationship between these crimes and the prime minister's emotive revenge tweets that parsed Hayyim Nahman Bialik's famous poem "On the Slaughter" written after the Kishinev pogrom of 1903: "Vengeance for the blood of a small child, Satan has not yet created. Neither has vengeance for the blood of 3 pure youths who were on their way home to their parents who will not see them anymore." He and the political class instantly distanced
themselves from the perpetrators when their "nationalistic" motivations became apparent. So did they: "We're not like the sons of Ishmael [meaning Arabs]... We're Jews. We have a heart... We were wrong. We are merciful Jews. We are human beings."156

The retaliatory logic extends to all domains. In response to international pressure and the Israeli Supreme Court's decision that the Jewish West Bank settlement (or "outpost") of Amona is illegal and must be evacuated, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared that West Bank Palestinians and Arab citizens of Israel who have constructed buildings without permits will also have theirs demolished. Naturally, like Erdoğan, he will not publicly admit to retaliation, but the hostage logic is unmistakably at work—for Palestinians almost never receive building permits, and West Bank Palestinians and Jewish Israelis are subject to different jurisdictions because the former are under military occupation (at least in Areas B and C).157 The fact that the prime minister can say "The same law that obligates the evacuation of Amona, obligates as well the evacuation of other illegal construction in other parts of the country" indicates hisRevisionist-settler conception of the West Bank—as Samaria and Judea, parts of Greater Israel, the historic homeland that he thinks was illegitimately partitioned after the British resolved in 1922 to create Transjordan from 76 percent of the original Palestine Mandate envisaged in the Balfour Declaration and its blessing by the great powers at the San Remo conference.158 The position of US president Donald Trump to support the settler leaders' annexationist aims suggests that reversing this partition is partisan policy despite what the rest of the world thinks. But what about the Palestinians there, who would increase the Arab minority in Israel? Should they be "transferred" as Hourani predicted, or confined to autonomous zones without Israeli citizenship?159 Whatever the solution, conferring equal political rights on all Palestinians between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean is inconceivable for the counterpartitionist nation-state that seeks to expand territorially while maintaining the security of ethnic homogeneity.

The modalities of partition violence are all too evident in South Asia as well, whether in the reciprocal violence occasioned by the destruction of the Babri Masjid by Hindu ultranationalists in 1992 or their massacre of Muslims in Gujarat in 2002. In both cases, political capital was to be made by targeting Indian Muslims.160 Everywhere, ultranationalism is stimulated by globalizations's relentless undermining of national sovereignty; insecurity and uncertainty find their compensation in national homogeneity.161 In India, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) sounds like the Armenian National Committee of Australia in its positing of essential religious-national culture that endures through the ages: "It weathered the storms of invaders, from the Greeks to the Huns, from the Shakas to the Islamic armies of Turks and Afghans. It fought and resisted external oppression and its essential civilization and culture survived great challenges and attempts at effacement. The glory of Vijayanagara and the heroism of Maharana Pratap, of a Shivaji and of a Guru Govind Singh are testimony to the Indian spirit."162 Having posited this entity, which many scholars think was invented or at least unified by British orientalists and missionaries in the late nineteenth century, the BJP then attempts to force Indians to live by its fantasy of resilient homogeneity.163 Faisal Devji's brilliant argument in Muslim Zion about the radicalizing consequences of institutionalizing an abstraction like a religious or ethnic definition of a nation can be generalized.164 The violence of the concept produces the violence on the body. Assimilation into Hebrew culture was not a homecoming for Iraqi Jews, observes Orit Bashkin: "The adoption of Israeli citizenship was a painful, violent and traumatic transformation."165 The conflict between the Mohajir refugee descendants from India and the people of those places where they settled in Pakistan today belies the notion of the Muslim League's two-nation theory.166 The homogeneous identity that ultranationalists cultivate must grapple with the hard facts of multiple human differences that their ontologies efface, and the suffering body pays the price.

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70. I thank Hamida Chopra for sharing this story.

71. Much scholarly work on Partition likewise diagnoses the two new states’ complicity in appropriating Partition violence against women within an ideology of community and nation. See the work of Urvashi Butalia, Ritu Menon, Kanla Bhaisan, and Veena Das.

72. For more on Loona, see Sa Soza, S Ghost of the Bay (New Delhi: Sahyati Akademii, 2001), 58–90.

73. This phrase is the title of a song recently penned by Ishrath Kamil, a Muslim poet from Malerkotla in Indian Punjab, sung by Jyoti and Sultana Nooran (Punjabi Muslims from Jalandher) and composed by A. R. Rahman for Imtiaz Ali’s film Highway (2014).

74. On Azad, see Mujit, Enlightenment in the Colony, 179. Certainly, it is also a luxury of class.

75. Mujit, Enlightenment in the Colony, 243–244, 257. In Pakistan today the Punjabi language movement has ties to the Maudoodi-Kissan party and claims Marxist commitments.

**EPILOGUE**


8. It is understood that constructing the formally equivalent citizen who comprised these nation-states generated minoritization processes in heterogeneous imperial societies and that these nation-states were indirect products of homogenization processes driven by the market’s imperative for functionally equivalent units. Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993); David Lloyd, “Ethnic Cultures, Minority Discourse, and the State,” in Colonial Discourse/Postcolonial/Theory, ed. Francis Barker, Peter Hulme, and Margaret Iversen (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), 221–238.


18. See Penny Simons on this chapter in this volume.


29. Malkki calls this mode of thinking the heroinization or romanticization of the indigenious, which she regards suspiciously as a sedentarism that "directly enables a vision of territorial displacement as pathological." Malkki, "National Geographic," 31.


41. I cannot determine whether Savarkar was aware of the European Enlightenment debates about Jewish assimilation and citizenship that resulted in the Jews' construction as a minority and that Aamir R. Mufti argues provided the paradigm for minoritization processes in the imperial possessions like India; Aamir R. Mufti, *Enlightenment in the Colony: The Jewish Question and the Crisis of Postcolonial Culture* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).

42. Casolari, "Hindutva's Foreign Tie-up," 224.

43. Ibid., 223.

44. Venkat Dhalapala, *Creating a New Medina: State Power, Islam, and the Quest for Pakistan in Late Colonial North India* (Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 19.


53. Ambedkar, Pakistan or the Partition of India, 203.

54. Ibid., 175-178.

55. Ibid., 209.

56. Ambedkar, Thoughts on Pakistan, 217.


65. Ibid., 246.

66. Ibid., 245-246; Dhulipsia, Creating a New Medina, 172.


70. Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, Pathways to Pakistan (Lahore: Longmans, 1961).


76. Prasad, India Divided, 232, 328.

77. Ambedkar, Pakistan or the Partition of India, 96.

78. Ibid., 98.

79. Ibid., 103.

80. Ibid., 102.


83. Prasad, India Divided, 27, 188-193, 324-327.

84. Ibid., 400.


86. Ibid., 122.


92. See Lucy Chester's chapter in this volume.
103. Ibid., 420.
104. Ibid.
107. Ibid., 123, 131.
111. See Arie Dubnov’s and Penny Sinanoglu’s chapters in this volume.
119. Morris, 1948, 52.
120. Hourani, "The Case Against a Jewish State in Palestine," 82.
121. Ibid., 87.
122. Ibid.


131. Ibid., 125–128.


139. Schechtmann, Population Transfers, 10.

140. Ibid., 115.


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