

Memo

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Blindness and Bourgeois Coldness

Response to Philipp Lenhard, «Mit Adorno gegen Israel?», Berlin Review No 16

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“The societal pressure still bears down, although the danger remains invisible nowadays. It drives people toward the unspeakable, which culminated on a world-historical scale in Auschwitz. Among the insights of Freud that truly extend even into culture and sociology, one of the most profound seems to me to be that civilization itself produces and increasingly reinforces anti-civilization.”

Late last year, I wrote [an article](#) for this review about the Frankfurt School legacy, Auschwitz, and Gaza. Its wager was a thought experiment: if the philosopher Theodor W. Adorno were still alive, what would he make of Israel’s destruction of Gaza after 7 October, and the German government’s support of it?

I was led to this question by re-reading his classic essay from 1966, “Education after Auschwitz,” after spending the summer months of 2025 in Frankfurt, where he lived and taught after his return from exile. In the essay, Adorno excoriated *Staatsräson*, bourgeois coldness (about which Henrike Kohpeiß [has written](#), martial masculinity, and the mania for order, organization and obedience—in other words, the authoritarian personality—as elements of the West German society that he thought would once again incline its citizens to fascism. Hence my question about “Education after Gaza.”

The essay elicited responses from the historians [Philipp Lenhard](#) (also published by *Berlin Review*) and Volker Weiss.¹ Their reaction to my wager about Adorno and his arguments, I think, demonstrates a point I made almost five years earlier: that members of the German political, media, and academic classes [have developed a “catechism”](#)—a state ideology—about Holocaust memory and the

“protection of Jewish life” in Germany and in Israel that they attempt to impose on a skeptical or indifferent population. I respond to them and other managers of the catechism, like the journalists Jürgen Kaube and Katja Iken, in the following.

Adorno and Historical Catastrophe

The problem for these managers in posing the question of “Education after Gaza” is daring to associate the Israeli destruction of the Strip with Auschwitz. Lenhard identifies the stakes: “If Gaza is similar to Auschwitz, then the IDF are similar to the SS.”² At issue is what Adorno meant when he wrote his famous maxim about “never again”:

“Every debate about the ideals of education is trivial and inconsequential compared to this single ideal: never again Auschwitz. It was the barbarism all education strives against. One speaks of the threat of a relapse into barbarism. But it is not a threat—Auschwitz was this relapse, and barbarism continues as long as the fundamental conditions that favoured that relapse continue largely unchanged. That is the whole horror.”

For Lenhard, Weiss, and most German commentators, “never again” means never again shall Jewish life be threatened as it was by the Nazis—whether in Germany or in Israel: the famous German *Staatsräson*. But does this imperative accurately express Adorno’s intention?

In his lectures from the mid-1960s, he cast Auschwitz, Hiroshima, and Vietnam as a “hellish unity,” as manifestations of a single catastrophic historical process. His contemporary Günther Anders also connected Auschwitz to Vietnam, arguing that the former embodied a classical genocide—destroying a group as an end itself—while in the latter, genocide was a means to an end, to winning a war.³ That distinction could well apply to Israel’s destruction of Gaza today. Those who follow the German catechism would find this style of subtle thinking, which *relates but does not equate* catastrophes, “perplexing,” as Lenhard writes. It is only perplexing if one is blind to Adorno’s warnings in “Education after Auschwitz.”

As is well known, Adorno took the motif of catastrophic history from his friend Walter Benjamin’s famous “Theses on the Philosophy of History.” For Benjamin, who killed himself while attempting to flee to Spain in 1940, consciousness of the human cost of historical “progress” was the basis of an anamnestic approach to memory, a theme taken up much later by Jürgen Habermas in his elaboration of post-Holocaust, post-war memory culture. As Henrike Kohpeiß reminded readers of *Berlin Review* last year, it was Benjamin who declared “that things just ‘go on’ is the catastrophe.” Adorno elaborated this idea thus in *Negative Dialectics*:

“No universal history leads from savagery to humanitarianism, but there is one leading from the slingshot to the megaton bomb. It ends in the total menace which organized mankind poses to organized men, in the epitome of discontinuity. It is the horror that verifies Hegel and stands him on his head.”⁴

Any right-minded person would agree that German authorities and citizens have a duty to protect and enable Jewish life there. But in view of Adorno’s sensitivity to the “horror” (a term he commonly used) of past and present catastrophe more generally, the conceit proffered by managers of the German state ideology—that they and German memory culture instantiate the correct lessons of the Nazi past—seems difficult to source in Adorno. Yet figures like Bundestag President Julia Klöckner seem to believe that they embody Habermas’s notion of a moral learning process, indeed a version of Hegel’s world spirit, not riding on horseback but impugning migrants from the floor of parliament. If so, they are *inverting* Adorno’s 1966 plea against *Staatsräson* and his call to resist it, because “in placing the right of the state over that of its members, the horror is potentially already posited.”

Let us be reminded that this state ideology entails a dogmatic political-religious orientation to historical (in)justice by insisting on untenable absolutes. In the name of rehabilitating the German nation after its invalidation by committing the most evil crime of all time—the proverbial “civilizational rupture” (*Zivilisationsbruch*)—it insists on the absolute uniqueness of the Holocaust, the absolute distinction between antisemitism and racism, the Nazis as the absolute evil, and the absolute innocence of their victims and their descendants.

In my view, the Holocaust is indeed an event of world-historical significance: it is the most extreme case of permanent security paranoia I have studied, namely the preemptive elimination of those believed to be a perpetrator’s most threatening enemies, in this case, Jews. Remembering and atoning for this crime is a necessary and salutary endeavor, especially for Germans. However, there is no reason doing so should obstruct the reckoning with other permanent security crimes, and indeed preventing them. I think that this is what Adorno had in mind. But the managers of state ideology want instead to turn Adorno into a prophet of Holocaust uniqueness, indeed of the *Staatsräson* as they understand it: namely, the unqualified support of the State of Israel, regardless of its violations of international law.

By contrast, my wager concluded that, although Adorno was no anti-Zionist and certainly no proponent of anti-colonial struggles, he would probably have been appalled both by Israel’s destruction of Gaza and by the German political class’s stubborn underwriting of the campaign—in other words, the lessons of “Education after Auschwitz” could easily be applied to Gaza. After all, the elements he outlined there are apparent in Germany today: bourgeois coldness in the face of Palestinian death and suffering, the return of martial masculinity,

merciless police beating of peaceful protestors as they did in the 1960s, courts that declare lawsuits against licenses for arms shipments as inadmissible, authorities breaking laws and violating political freedoms in clamping down on Palestine solidarity—all in the name of *Staatsräson*, an ideal, we recall, that in 1966 Adorno associated with “barbarism.” Today, as in the 1960s, the spectre of authoritarianism haunts German society.

Benjamin would have likely been appalled too. Not mentioned by Lenhard is that in the 1930s Gershom Scholem reported Benjamin as rejecting Scholem’s cultural Zionism because of its “agricultural fixation,” “racial ideology,” and Martin Buber’s “‘blood and experience’ arguments.” By 1931, Scholem would himself come to be dismayed by “the purely reactionary forces of Zionism” that “in recent years ... have asserted themselves.”⁵ In short, the intellectual and political positions of the heroes of Critical Theory are much more complex, differentiated, and even mutually antagonistic than their *Staatsräson*-faithful German followers would have it. In many ways, the German political class embodies Buber’s position that Benjamin rejected as racist and reactionary.

Neither Philipp Lenhard nor Volker Weiss contest the conclusions of “Education after Gaza.” How could they? It is difficult to imagine Adorno, Benjamin, and their Critical Theory comrades Max Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse justifying the IDF bombing classrooms and tents, the starving of civilians to the cries of destroying Amalek, the wanton flattening of hospitals, and the exultation at these deeds in selfies and videos. Not only is there no mention of these many outrages in Lenhard and Weiss’s essays, they also omit the attempted crushing of political freedom in Germany regarding Palestine advocacy. Presumably, this is merely the legitimate suppression of antisemitism “in any form,” as the German phrase goes.

I understand the impulse to stand with Jewish friends and colleagues who feel alienated by the protest movement, though I don’t understand the analytical slippage in conflating outrage about mass killing and actual antisemitism—quite apart from the blindness to the creeping authoritarianism overtaking the country. Outside Germany, this new authoritarianism has become a scandal. Following Benjamin, one could say that the scandal is that it has not become a scandal in Germany, apart from some journalists, and of course among those affected by the crackdown and its chilling effects.⁶ It is impossible to recognize the proposition that Adorno would oppose the destruction of Gaza if one embodies the very problem he was highlighting.

Instead of confronting the wager of “Education after Gaza,” Philipp Lenhard and Volker Weiss go to great lengths to demonstrate that the Frankfurt School theorists were not “against Israel.” This is, frankly, a pathetic straw man argument. They clearly were not. It goes without saying that Adorno would have opposed Hamas’s Islamist brand of national liberation, and likely also been alienated from the protest movement today as he was from the student protests

in the late 1960s. Even so, Lenhard exaggerates his Zionism: Adorno never accepted Scholem's repeated invitations to visit Israel. Part of his aversion to fascism was a visceral suspicion of all crowds, collectives, and nationalisms. Lenhard is also well aware of Marcuse's reservations about Israeli treatment of Palestinians, which seems to bother him. Given their missed target, refuting these and other beside-the-point claims is neither necessary nor interesting.

Defending the State Ideology

It is useful, however, to focus on their argumentation as symptoms, elaborations, and manifestations of the catechism's continuing hold on German elites. For the point of their articles is to defend German memory culture and Germany's *Staatsräson*-driven support for Israel from Palestinian and "postcolonial" critiques. One of those critiques that irks Weiss is the slogan that Palestine be set free from German guilt, which he equates with the Alternative for Germany's (AfD) *Schuldskult* slogan. This lazy totalitarianism-theory inspired conflation is common in the German feuilletons. They cannot see that, while the AfD is indeed trying to destroy German memory culture, Palestine advocates take its ethical consequences seriously—universally recognized human dignity, human rights, and international law—applying them to contemporary circumstances in a Benjaminian spirit. This spirit sides with the victims of history, whatever their religious, national or cultural background. These advocates interpret "never again" as a universal maxim that includes not only Jewish festival goers near the Gaza fence on 7 October, but also Palestinians in Gaza before and after that date. Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, let it not be forgotten, are subject to a criminal mode of warfare and/or occupation that a preponderance of experts considers genocidal and apartheid respectively. But for managers of the state ideology, these humanistic aspirations to civic equality—which are shared by Israeli philosopher Omri Boehm—are nothing but a genocidal attack on Jewish self-determination: a true dialectic of Enlightenment.

Weiss also complains about graffiti on World War II monuments and Holocaust memorial sites that associate the genocide in Gaza with Nazi criminality; again, he conflates the far right and pro-Palestine advocates. I don't approve of such acts either, but they are best understood as political statements rather than expressions of anti-Jewish animus. Any authentic critical theory would ask what lies behind the recourse to such graffiti. Might it have something to do with the exclusion of Palestinian perspectives from mainstream discourse?

Lenhard and Weiss, writing from the mainstream, imply that this exclusion is a healthy outcome of German memory culture. But when tens of millions of their fellow citizens—and, yes, migrants are their fellow citizens as well—are aghast at the butchery and starvation in Gaza, protest cannot be fully silenced. No critical theory worthy of its name can sanction the repression that occurred in Germany since 7 October 2023—and indeed before then as well.

But public opinion is the problem for the academics and journalists trying to impose the catechism. When Israeli academic Amos Goldberg **pointed out** to *Spiegel* journalist Katja Iken that most Germans think Israel is committing genocide in Gaza, she retorted this was a “juridical question” and “not a majority judgment in a country where one third of the population doesn’t refute antisemitic claims such as ‘the Jews hold too much influence.’” In a similar vein, Weiss claims that memory culture had to be imposed from above on an unwilling majority. In fact, memory culture in Germany developed from various strands, including grassroots movements, over decades, and only became state ideology after 2000. By then, many Germans had internalized the only tenable—universal—lesson of the Nazi past: respect for international law, and ‘never again’ to genocidal warfare and mass crimes in general. It goes without saying that this includes the protection of Jewish life in Germany.

For that reason, most Germans initially supported the Israeli reprisal after 7 October and their government’s solidarity with Israel. But they have increasingly turned against both after seeing the subsequent destruction of Gaza despite the best efforts of the German media to trivialize or justify it.⁷ Ultimately, German political elites, like all elites, think they know better than the general public. Their task is to immunize state ideology from critical scrutiny and public opinion. In this case, I believe public opinion is aligned with universal values and international law.

Flawed Analogies

Another critique Philipp Lenhard and Volker Weiss fear is analogizing Palestinian suffering with the Holocaust. Weiss is especially troubled when Palestinians honor Jewish victims of the Holocaust—because the parallel would, in this view, turn Palestinians into Jews and Israeli armed forces into the SS. A critically-inspired theory could ask why such an inversion fear seems to be almost inevitable in the German context today, and what that might reveal about the flawed premises of its memory culture to begin with. I would suggest that Germany’s fixation on the Nazi regime as the framing drama of world history and the absolute continuity of the victim-perpetrator binary locks actors into catastrophic analogies. In this rigid binary, we can find only Jews or Nazis, thereby trading exclusively in the currency of absolute innocence and absolute evil, which are ultimately theological categories.

Coming to terms with the Nazi past cannot mean adopting its categorization of the world by simply inverting the value signs. Doing so is embarrassingly provincial and a cultural dead end. Frantz Fanon’s theory of overcoming colonialism by transcending the settler-native binary to create a new non-racialized citizenry could be useful to translate into this context. But for many German writers, virtually all theorists of color are ontologically antisemitic, as

the attacks on Achille Mbembe in 2020 demonstrated. Instead, they prefer to keep fighting World War II—like Putin and Netanyahu.

Israelis and Nazis?

The seductive power of Nazi analogizing is not confined to Germans. In June 2024, the former Israeli member of the Knesset Moshe Feiglin echoed Hitler's declaration that "I can't live if one Jew is left," [telling](#) the Israeli Channel 14 that "We can't live in this land if one Islamo-Nazi remains in Gaza." If this sounds like the implacable genocidal energy that Philipp Lenhard states that the Nazis uniquely possessed, the point for Feiglin is that the Nazis offer inspiration for Israelis like him. He is not some outlier. In a [2014 manifesto](#), he laid out in stunning accuracy the course of Israel's attack on Gaza since October 2023.

Progressive Israelis, such as the historian Moshe Zimmermann, openly worry about people like Feiglin. Some of them are running the country, and he takes them at their word as akin to Nazis. Speaking at the Fritz Bauer Institute in Frankfurt in December 2025, Zimmermann told its stunned director, the historian Sybille Steinbacher, and discussant, the editor of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Jürgen Kaube, that these government figures reasoned about Palestinians in the same way as Heinrich Himmler reasoned about Jews in his notorious Posen speech of 4 October 1943: as security threats who needed to be killed "prophylactically"—even the women and children. If the comparison held, he concluded, then Israelis on the right are doing "the same" as the Nazis. ⁸

Moshe Zimmermann made these remarkable comments in response to Jürgen Kaube's standard catechism argument that, while the Israeli campaign may be excessive, it was not eliminatory like the Holocaust because it was not characterized by the Nazi-like attempt to exterminate Palestinians for being Palestinians. A war was going on, after all, which differs from the Holocaust, in which "millions [of Jews] were murdered... who had not done anything." The conflict with Palestinians was about land, by contrast. And, he was implying, they were not absolutely innocent. Ergo: the Israelis were not like Nazi Germans, and Anne Frank is absolutely innocent but not Hind Rajab.

Kaube's core argument is, on the one hand, hard to refute—historical contexts cannot be transferred in absolute congruence—but the point of analogies is never absolute congruence. A critical history of the genocide concept, which I attempted in *The Problems of Genocide* (2021) and in a short German version, *Nach dem Genozid* (2023), shows how dichotomies like Kaube's have repeatedly trivialized genocidal warfare, like Israel's, as less shocking. Instead of trying to account for the tens of thousands of killed Palestinian children, Kaube thus engaged in a diversionary exercise about genocidal intent, insisting that the Israelis are not conducting themselves like the Nazis.

This is a version of the bourgeois coldness about which Adorno warned. Zimmermann had to set him straight by noting that Israeli leaders were reasoning pre-emptively (and thereby, we may add, applying the logic of “permanent security”): killing the children before they could grow up and become terrorists. Zimmermann could have also mentioned Otto Ohlendorf, the SS officer who infamously justified killing Jewish children in the name of preemptively interdicting partisan resistance to German occupation. Some Israelis were indeed behaving or reasoning like Nazis, Moshe Zimmermann was telling Germans.⁹ In doing so, he was of course violating the precepts of the state-favored International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) definition of antisemitism, which proscribes comparisons between Israel and the Nazi regime. So far, no-one seems to have noticed Zimmermann’s flagrant breach of the memory rules. But he fell afoul of Germany’s antisemitism monitoring apparatus in 2020, when remarks from his address on the “Twisted Road to Auschwitz,” delivered at the Saxony-Anhalt parliament’s Holocaust Memorial Day commemoration, were classified as an antisemitic incident in a Research and Information on Antisemitism (RIAS) report. His suggestion that “ubiquitous human behavior and universal history” were generally applicable, including to Israel “not only from a victim perspective,” was listed as an antisemitic incident in a RIAS report, though without naming him and thus obfuscating the fact that he is the son of German Holocaust survivors.¹⁰

The famous Israeli professor thereby became the author of an antisemitic incident—in Germany. It is this kind of idiocy that allows clerical commentators to count Palestine advocacy and academic “postcolonial” research as antisemitic, and thus to conclude that German universities are hotbeds of antisemitism when in fact, [research](#) suggests they are among the least antisemitic spaces in the country. The fixation on “postcolonial” and “imported” antisemitism (or “Israel hatred”) displaces the real problem of far-right antisemitism in the same manner as in the police investigation into the notorious NSU murders. Authorities then blamed “clan” violence in the victims’ communities despite the evidence of a neo-Nazi network staring them in the face.

Connecting the Dots

Contrary to the spirit of the Frankfurt School’s attempt to connect dots between social phenomena, Philipp Lenhard scoffs at my suggestion of material connections between German industry, the climate crisis, and Palestine. His impulse is inconsistent with any critical theory. Again, one can look to Adorno with profit. “The societal pressure still bears down, although the danger remains invisible nowadays. It drives people toward the unspeakable,” reads the first page of “Education after Auschwitz.” The unspeakable need not only culminate “on a world-historical scale in Auschwitz,” as he wrote in concluding the

sentence. It can also culminate in Gaza, which possesses its own world-historical significance. Commentators are now explaining how and why.

The Palestinian scholar Jamil Khader theorizes Gaza “not as an exception but as the paradigm of imperial reproduction.” Palestinians are “a disposable surplus population” that can be profitably eliminated: “their life and death alike monetized through weapons testing, surveillance industries, and crowd-control markets that sustain Israeli, US, and transnational capital”—like, say, the North Vietnamese population in the 1960s and 1970s.¹¹ Similarly, as the philosopher Elad Lapidot wrote in December 2025 [in these pages](#), Gaza is at the center of a global ideological war in the same way as the Spanish Civil War was in the 1930s: “a struggle for the future of the world.” In the current case, the issue is the “technological mass killing of civilians and the industrial destruction of neighborhoods and infrastructure” belonging to occupied non-citizens. The Israeli violence is “part of an engineering project” to have Palestinians “disappear from the face of the earth” because, as non-citizens, they “have no place on this earth.”

This scenario, Lapidot continues, encapsulates the tension between Global North and South, because the former has habitually excluded Southern humanity in its colonies and increasingly in its metropolises, where migrants live.¹² Pankaj Mishra, in *The World After Gaza*, makes a similar point about the grief experienced by former colonial subjects outside Europe and North America in witnessing Gaza’s destruction: it reminds them of their previous abjection under imperial rule, and of their vulnerability in the new global disorder. Palestinians, not Jews, are the canary in the coalmine.

A full account of mass violence against civilians would require the inclusion of other cases, like Sudan and Ukraine: not in the manner of an unethical whataboutism, but to trace the material investments of the external actors seeking geopolitical advantage in a civil conflict. But that is a different point from explaining Gaza’s representative function. Either way, such a debate is not happening in the German mainstream. Khader and Lapidot’s intellectual and ethical range exceeds the capacities of the German political and even academic classes, notwithstanding some critical voices. When the Palestinian political scientist, Bashir Bashir, [interviewed](#) alongside Amos Goldberg in *Der Spiegel*, told Katja Iken the patently obvious facts that certain people in Germany set themselves up as arbiters of who good and bad Jews are, and that antisemitism charges are used to silence critics of Israel, Iken responded: “that is a very generalizing and polemical critique.”

I sense an air of desperation in Iken’s insolent retort, in Philipp Lenhard’s and Volker Weiss’s cold responses to my essay, and in Jürgen Kaube’s helplessness before Moshe Zimmerman’s calm explication of German and Israeli history and politics. Their catechism is buckling under the reality that the German public—including even some functionaries of the German state—can clearly see. They

are scrambling to set the tone and government policy in order to resist an “Education after Gaza”; an authentic re-education program that corrects the wrong lessons drawn from Adorno’s 1966 classic, that implements his maxim that nothing like Auschwitz recur. Its target would be opposition to the *Staatsräson* and the fossil fuel economy. I am not optimistic about this prospect, because we can see the elements of an authoritarian state apparatus being winched into place before our eyes. That state apparatus is a belligerent party in the global civil war about which Lapidot writes.

Despite these developments from above, German civil society continues to evolve a vibrant memory culture, which is genuinely inclusive, from below. Indeed, if Adorno was bleak about the capacity of democratic culture to resist the administered society and worried that the anti-authoritarianism movement of the 1960s would morph into its opposite—his famed resignation—he also marched against the proposed emergency laws. “A practice indefinitely delayed is no longer the forum for appeals against self-satisfied speculation,” he wrote on the first page of *Negative Dialectics*; “it is mostly the pretext used by executive authorities to choke, as vain, whatever critical thoughts the practical change would require.”¹³

- fn.:
- 1 Volker Weiss, “Von Gaza nach Neuengamme,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 7 November 2025. ↑
 - 2 “Wenn Gaza ähnlich wie Auschwitz sein soll, folgt daraus, dass die israelischen Streitkräfte auch Wiedergänger der SS wären. Das scheint, zumindest implizit, Moses’ Beweisziel zu sein.” ↑
 - 3 “Günther Anders an die internationale Vietnamkonferenz in Berlin,” *Int. Vietnam-Kongreß 17./18. Februar 1968*, Westberlin. ([Link](#)) ↑
 - 4 Theodor W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, p. 320. ↑
 - 5 Gershom Scholem, *Walter Benjamin: The Story of a Friendship*, pp. 38, 217. ↑
 - 6 See Robin Celikates, “Staatsräson as State Racism: Notes on the Authoritarian Turn in Contemporary Germany,” *New German Critique*, forthcoming, February 2026 ([Link](#)) ↑
 - 7 According to recent polls, only 10 % fully agree with the *Staatsräson* meaning that Germany guarantee Israel’s security, 59 % think Israel has committed genocide in Gaza, and 54 % support recognition of the State of Palestine (Sources 1, 2, 3, 4). ↑
 - 8 Moshe Zimmermann, “Der Gazakrieg: Wie das Shoah-Erinnerungskapital verspielt wird”, 17 December 2025, see his statements after 1:17:25 in [this recording](#) (retrieved on 1 February 2026). ↑
 - 9 The former Israeli defense minister, Moshe “Boogie” Ya’alon, was making similar points about settler terror in the West Bank to his followers on X when he posted that “The ideology of ‘Jewish supremacy,’ which has become dominant in the Israeli government,

- reminds one of the Nazi racial theory.” In making such connections, he too was violating the IHRA definition of antisemitism. ↑
- 10 Itay Mishiach, *An Incident of Bias Antisemitism-Monitoring in Germany under Scrutiny: A Report on the Department for Research and Information on Antisemitism (RIAS)*, [Diaspora Alliance](#), January 2024, 9 and 13. ↑
- 11 Jamil Khader, “Universalizing Capital, Foreclosing Necro-Imperialism: Žižek’s Liberal-Zionist Response to the Gaza Genocide,” *Middle East Critique*, 1 January 2026. ↑
- 12 Lapidot, “Gaza as World War,” *Berlin Review* No 16, December 2025 ↑
- 13 Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, p. 3. ↑

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