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Review: The Forty-Fivers: A Generation Between Fascism and Democracy

Reviewed Work(s): Auf der Such nach Demokratie. Britische und deutsche Jugendinitiativen in Niedersachsen nach 1945 by Friedhelm Boll: Deutsche Karrieren. Lebenskonstruktionen soziale Aufsteiger aus der Flakhelfer-Generation by Heinz Bude: Loyalität und Verblendung. Hitlers Garanten der Zukunft als Träger der zweiten deutschen Demokratie by Sibylle Hübner-Funk: Erziehung unter der Nazi-Diktatur. Kriegsvorbereitung, Krieg und Holocaust by Wolfgang Keim: Jugend im Dritten Reich. Die Hitler-Jugend und ihre Gegner by Arno Klönne: Die Hitler-Jugend Generation: Biographische Thematisierung als Vergangenheitsbewältigung by Gabriele Rosenthal: Das Erbe der NAPOLA. Versuch einer Generationengeschichte des Nationalsozialismus by Christian Schneider, Cordelia Stillke and Bernd Leinweber: Jugend 1945. Politisches Denken und Lebensgeschichte by Rolf Schörken: Politik und Schuld. Die zerstörerische Macht des Schweigens by Gesine Schwan

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# The Forty-Fivers

A Generation Between Fascism and Democracy

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Friedhelm Boll, *Auf der Such nach Demokratie. Britische und deutsche Jugendinitiativen in Niedersachsen nach 1945* (Bonn: Dietz, 1995)

Heinz Bude, *Deutsche Karrieren. Lebenskonstruktionen soziale Aufsteiger aus der Flakhelfer-Generation* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1987)

Sibylle Hübner-Funk, *Loyalität und Verblendung. Hitlers Garanten der Zukunft als Träger der zweiten deutschen Demokratie* (Potsdam: Verlag für Berlin-Brandenburg, 1998)

Wolfgang Keim, *Erziehung unter der Nazi-Diktatur. Kriegsvorbereitung, Krieg und Holocaust* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1997)

Arno Klönne, *Jugend im Dritten Reich. Die Hitler-Jugend und ihre Gegner* (Munich: Piper, 1995)

Gabriele Rosenthal, *Die Hitler-Jugend Generation: Biographische Thematisierung als Vergangenheitsbewältigung* (Essen: Blaue Eule, 1986)

Christian Schneider, Cordelia Stillke, Bernd Leinweber, *Das Erbe der NAPOLA. Versuch einer Generationengeschichte des Nationalsozialismus* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1996)

Rolf Schörken, *Jugend 1945. Politisches Denken und Lebensgeschichte* (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1990)

Gesine Schwan, *Politik und Schuld. Die zerstörerische Macht des Schweigens* (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1997)

In 1999, Germans celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the Federal Republic. Unlike the fiftieth anniversary of other events in the recent national past—the Nazi seizure of power in 1933, the anti-Jewish pogrom of November 1938, and the unconditional surrender in 1945—this is not an awkward occasion for the country's elites.<sup>1</sup> On the contrary, the Federal Republic is indisputably Germany's most

successful state, and its record of stability and prosperity compares favorably with that of two prominent neighbors, France and Italy. This anniversary gives us pause to pose the basic questions about West Germany. How was it possible to construct an enduring democracy for a population that, exceptions notwithstanding, had enthusiastically supported Hitler and waged world war to the bitter end? What hope was there for a political culture that had rejected parliamentary democracy once before for an authoritarian, indeed totalitarian, solution to the problems of modernity? And what moral expectations could one have for a nation that, at the very least, had stood by idly while vulnerable minorities were carted off to concentration camps, and that subsequently had resisted the prosecution of the perpetrators afterwards?<sup>2</sup>

The year 1998 brought the thirtieth anniversary of the student movement's celebrated year of rebellion, which was remembered in Germany in numerous television documentaries, exhibitions, and monographs.<sup>3</sup> This anniversary raises the question of the generational factor in the success of the Federal Republic, because the claim made on behalf of "1968" is that the generation born between 1938 and 1948 (the so-called "sixty-eighters") corrected the political and moral deficiencies of German public and private life. In the words of one observer, "it was only in 1968 that the Federal Republic became a Western, liberal country. In Germany ... the 1968 generation is seen not just as a cultural avant-garde but as Germany's saviour from its National Socialist past."<sup>4</sup> As this generation ages and the events of its youth pass into "history," this claim is being assessed with greater distance by historians and social scientists.<sup>5</sup>

The heuristic value of the generational approach for the study of German history cannot be denied, given that its many ruptures produced new and influential political generations, as Karl Mannheim observed in the wake of World War I.<sup>6</sup> That the mid- to late-1960s constituted a rupture of sorts for the sixty-eighters is well known, but what about the catastrophe of 1945?<sup>7</sup> For the past decade or so, a growing but barely noticed body of research has focused on those Germans born during the 1920s. A variety of names (such as "Hitler Youth," "skeptical," "reconstruction," "searching," "betrayed") have been used to characterize this generation, reflecting its indeterminate and contested identity. I shall follow the example of Joachim Kaiser

(born 1928) and refer to these Germans as the “forty-fivers,” inasmuch as that year marked the turning point of their lives.<sup>8</sup> As Oskar Negt (born 1934) wrote of his slightly older compatriots, the end of the war and Nazism “was the end of all security, and whoever searched for answers that pointed to the future had to win distance from the destroyed world of his dreams and ideals that lively critique and reflection releases.”<sup>9</sup>

Scholars have shown particular interest in this generation because it presents us with a paradox as puzzling as it is profound. On the one hand, this generation rebuilt Germany, both east and west, after the war. It ran the Federal Republic from the 1970s until the election of the Social Democratic–Green coalition in September 1998: its birth years lie roughly between those of Helmut Schmidt (born 1918) and Helmut Kohl (born 1930).<sup>10</sup> On the other hand, this generation’s members were also the most indoctrinated under National Socialism. Resolving this paradox is, as Sibylle Hübner-Funk points out, “ultimately a *political controversy*,” because it bears directly on the claim and self-understanding of the sixty-eighters.<sup>11</sup> The deeper the long-term effects of the Nazi socialization, the greater the legitimacy for the project of radical *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* (“mastering the past”) of the late 1960s, and vice versa. “The political dimension is current today,” notes Rolf Schörken. “In the final analysis, the question is whether those young Germans [in 1945] became democrats and whether National Socialism really did disappear from their minds.”<sup>12</sup>

This question is indeed as topical as ever. In 1984, Helmut Kohl caused a stir when he used Günther Gaus’s formulation of “the grace of late birth” to refer to those born in the late 1920s and early 1930s as having been too young to have committed war crimes. In relation to the Historians’ Dispute of the mid-1980s, Hans Mommsen (born 1930) identified its subtext as “the unclarified political identity of the members of that generation who were still socialized in the Third Reich.”<sup>13</sup> The historian Ernst Schulz (born 1929) criticized a recent book by Ernst Nolte (born 1923) with the words that the author expresses “much bitterness and resentment of an unhappy, damaged younger generation of participants in the Second World War.”<sup>14</sup> A leftist commentator has claimed recently that German historians’ criticisms of Daniel J. Goldhagen’s *Hitler’s Willing Executioners* was an expression of their socialization in the Hitler Youth.<sup>15</sup> At the bian-

nual conference of German historians in Frankfurt in September 1998, an already legendary confrontation took place between younger historians and several prominent forty-fivers—principally Hans-Ulrich Wehler (born 1931) and Wolfgang J. Mommsen (born 1930)—over the forty-fiver’s apprehended failure to confront their own teachers about their dubious wartime activities.<sup>16</sup> The generational factor was evident again in the dispute between the writer Martin Walser (born 1927) and the leader of German Jewry Ignatz Bubis (born 1927) in late 1998. In a widely publicized speech, Walser made the vague claim that Holocaust memory was being “instrumentalized” and used as a “moral weapon” (*Moralpistole*), prompting Bubis to accuse him and the former Social Democratic mayor of Hamburg, Klaus von Dohnanyi (born 1928), who had intervened on behalf of the writer, of “latent anti-Semitism.”<sup>17</sup>

Clearly, the forty-fiver generation is anything but an ideologically neutral field of inquiry. Indeed, this has always been the case. The two pioneering works, Helmut Schelsky’s *Die skeptische Generation* (1957) and Alexander and Margarethe Mitscherliches’ *The Inability to Mourn* (1967) presented more or less homogeneous pictures of the generation with specific cultural-political agendas.<sup>18</sup> Has recent literature reproduced these ideological projects and generalizations, or has it complicated the picture of this generation with close analyses and microstudies? If politicization rests on reductionism, essentialism, and labeling, its opposite is differentiation and historicization. What does the latest research tell us about the paradox of the forty-fivers and the claim of the sixty-eighters? Before turning to recent work, I will recall briefly the Schelsky and Mitscherlich positions.

### **The Traditional View: Schelsky and the Mitscherliches**

The books by Schelsky and the Mitscherliches are probably among the most cited and little read works in the history of the Federal Republic. They are classics and can still be read with profit today, but their enormous impact may lie in their slogan-like titles into which contemporaries could read their own meanings.<sup>19</sup> Schelsky wrote *Die skeptische Generation* as a synthetic overview of the empiri-

cal literature on German youth in the 1950s. Although he professed sociological distance to the subject, his own ideological baggage and biography clearly played a decisive role in his interpretation. Schelsky (1912-1984) had been an enthusiastic Nazi in his youth, appearing in SA uniform to disrupt the lectures of disliked professors in the early 1930s.<sup>20</sup> Like many who were attracted initially by National Socialism's antibourgeois and anticapitalist pretensions to a "third way," Schelsky eventually became disenchanted with the regime and "ideologies" in general. After the war, he devoted his long and influential academic career to the new Federal Republic, which he hoped to disabuse of all utopian alternatives to the "reality" of industrial society.<sup>21</sup>

For that reason, Schelsky championed (and to a large extent created) the reputation of the forty-fivers, whom he called "skeptical." He defended this generation against the criticisms of older educationalists, such as Eduard Spranger, who felt that postwar youth lacked idealism, missionary zeal, and a pioneering spirit.<sup>22</sup> He construed this vice as a virtue by highlighting the epochal significance of the forty-fivers' apprehended "skepticism." Unlike preceding German generations—the "youth movement" at the turn of the century (to which Spranger had belonged), and the "political youth" of the interwar years (of which Schelsky had been a member)—postwar youth had responded to the disappointment of the Nazi defeat, the sobering realization of its ideological manipulation, and the considerable material hardship of the postwar years, by abjuring a "special social role." Its rejection of those utopian ideals ("community," "wholeness") that prevented a reconciliation with modern civilization ended the dangerous *Sonderweg* of bourgeois youth rebellion and, so Schelsky contended, had normalized German society.<sup>23</sup> Moreover, the "skeptical" and apolitical concentration on the private world of work and family was precisely what was needed to reconstruct a shattered country. Yet, what he wrote about German adolescents of the late 1940s and 1950s could be applied to most Germans at the time. As Friedrich Tenbruck has shown, most Germans withdrew into the private spheres of family and work. Schelsky, it appears, was projecting onto the forty-fivers his positive assessment of the 1950s and the "end of ideology."<sup>24</sup>

Where Schelsky praised the absence of idealism and a generational mission to change the world, the psychoanalysts Alexander and Margarethe Mitscherlich viewed this absence as a symptom of individual and collective mental illness. West Germans, they thought, were gripped by a “psychic immobilism” and “political apathy” that hindered urgently needed reforms. “Our hypothesis views the political and social sterility of present-day Germany as being brought about by a denial of past.” And this was necessarily the case, at least in the immediate postwar years. The enormity of the German crime was such, so the argument went, that its “working through” would call forth feelings of guilt and shame that were incommensurable with “the self-esteem needed for continued living.” In order to avoid melancholia (that is, depression), Germans “de-realized” their memories of the war and their narcissistic attachment to Hitler and his ideology by viewing themselves as victims and by investing their psychic energies in the rebuilding of the economy.

The Mitscherliches argued that the cost of this understandable repression was high: the retention of the personality structure that had been vulnerable to Hitler’s overtures in the first place. The psychological rivalry with the father remained unresolved and could be projected again onto imaginary enemies.<sup>25</sup> West Germany, the Mitscherliches feared, threatened to act out its collective pathology in fits of compulsive behavior, particularly in the realm of foreign policy, where it possessed “brutally aggressive proclivities” and was susceptible to “unbridled aggressive adventures.” By the mid-1960s, they held that the time had come for Germans to admit their guilt and mourn their lost ideals in a process the couple referred to as “*Trauerarbeit*.” Facing the Nazi past was at once a cure for the crippled German ego, which remained stunted by a childish reliance on authoritarian individuals and collectives, and the path to social renewal, because autonomous citizens were by definition oriented to reform and the humanization of their environment.

No discussion of *The Inability to Mourn* can overlook its recent treatment by Tilman Moser. In a widely read critique, the former student of the Mitscherliches assailed their conflation of psychological and moral categories.<sup>26</sup> Moser argues that, on the one hand, the Mitscherliches explained convincingly why Germans could not detach themselves from an authoritarian collective and feel for their



victims; but on the other hand, they condemned Germans for just this inability. Moser contends that a consistent approach to what he calls this “poisonous mental underground” would entail empathizing with the subjects. In this way, one could recognize that their self-pitying posture possessed an existential basis: archaic feelings of guilt for causing the war and the Holocaust, and archaic feelings of punishment in the form of civilian bombing, millions of German refugees, casualties, and destroyed life narratives. With this historicizing insight, it would have been possible to “create space” for the exhausted German psyche to recognize gradually the reality of the suffering that Germans had inflicted on others.

The Mitscherliches were prevented from taking this approach, Moser suggests, by the unrealistically high hopes they entertained for postwar political renewal. The massive damage could be redeemed, it almost appeared, were it taken as the occasion for the admission of guilt, expression of contrition, and resolution to take the high road to socialist democracy. “We all still remain under the influence of the deep disappointment,” they wrote of themselves, “that the immeasurable suffering of the Second World War, and the indescribable murderous fury that accompanied it, not only did not have a cathartic effect, but in fact led to a metastasization of the war odium.”<sup>27</sup> Hoping that a sense of guilt would lead to a psychological catharsis and political creativity, they were dismayed, even enraged, when their patients dissembled with the usual strategies of self-justification. Moreover, the sixty-eighters (Moser’s own generation) seized the book as a means of avoiding an empathetic engagement with their parents, which would have entailed assuming the burden of the tainted familial and national legacy. Moser goes so far as to claim that the escapist and moralistic accusations of the younger generation, far from breaking the silence about the Nazi past in German families, in fact prolonged the self-exculpating mechanisms of parents by a decade or two.<sup>28</sup> Another consequence of the conflation of the clinical and political sphere is a destructive ad hominem discourse of accusation and denial, since those who disagree with the political dimension of the argument are seen necessarily to be repressing the past.<sup>29</sup> And indeed it was precisely such a criticism that Moser encountered from the Mitscherlich camp.<sup>30</sup>

Significantly, Schelsky and the Mitscherliches agreed implicitly about the meaning of youth movements and their relation to politics.



Betraying a characteristically German romantic bias, all three authors framed youth movements as rebellions against bourgeois society and as sources of cultural renewal.<sup>31</sup> And although they evaluated the situation from opposite standpoints, they considered politics as a radical, totalistic, and transformative project of collective will formation. Clearly, a very continental conception of politics is implicit in the hope for, and fear of, the catalytic role of youth movements. These are the culturally specific background assumptions on the basis of which the forty-fivers have been judged. The failure of the antifascist project in Trizonia in the early postwar years delighted Schelsky as much as it dismayed the Mitcherliches, and on this basis, they all concluded that the forty-fivers were an apolitical generation. Does the most recent literature on the subject bear out this assessment?

### **The Recent Literature: New Direction or Continued Cliché?**

In the immediate postwar years, the view of German youth was colored by Allied fears that the Nazi regime's indoctrination had been successful. Howard Becker warned darkly in 1946 of "the substantial numbers of State Youth who, in spite of defeat, will cling desperately to their faith in the Nazi system and all of its works. Harmless looking lads will zealously serve as agents for the Nazi underground, and girls with braids and bland faces will help to lead unwary sentries to sudden death."<sup>32</sup> Manfred Gregor's novel *Die Brücke*, which was popularized in the 1960 film of the same name by Bernhard Wicki, continued the theme of fanaticized Hitler Youth. This one-dimensional representation was soon being redrawn by the forty-fivers themselves. Arno Klönne (born 1931), professor of sociology at the University of Paderborn, was one of the first to write about the Hitler Youth. He argued that the organization had been enormously enticing in the early years of the regime because it offered the only organized youth activities for certain groups of the population, especially girls and the poor, who had been excluded by the elitist movements of the Weimar Republic.<sup>33</sup> The Nazi slogan "youth must be led by youth" attracted the best and brightest of the generation, who also saw in the Hitler Youth's leadership positions a means of emancipating them-

selves from the constraints of family and stifling milieus. With considerable idealism and under the auspices of the Hitler Youth, the scattered organizations of the German youth movement largely cooperated in the mid-1930s to unify and extend its ethos to all German children between the ages of ten and eighteen.

And yet, Klönne continues, the totalistic ambitions of the party were ultimately self-defeating. The more the Hitler Youth developed into a state-controlled instrument of policy, especially after the outbreak of war in 1939, the less attractive it became. Endless military drills, constant competition, and the caprice of the leadership (which increasingly attracted aspiring party apparatchiks who often abused their considerable powers) all served to rob the compulsory activities of their romance and “neutralize” the effects of Nazi indoctrination. The constant invasion of privacy even provoked some “resistance” in the remnants of Roman Catholic, leftist, and proletarian counterculture milieus, although the valorization of the ideals of the pre-Nazi youth movement did not necessarily issue in political opposition. Against Schelsky, Klönne argues that only a minority of the youth was ever actually “true believers.”<sup>34</sup> Nevertheless, the Nazis were inadvertently victorious, for they largely destroyed the milieus of pre-Nazi Germany—popular confessionality, the labor movement, and the humanism of the educated middle class—that hitherto had served as sources of competing social utopias.

The effect of the Hitler Youth education was less the production of a larger group of fanatical-activist young National Socialists than much more in the training of the youths in system-conformity, in the renunciation of political and social will-formation and spontaneity, and in the prevention of political experience, including the formation of social utopias: put briefly, in the political-social incapacitation (*Entmündigung*) of youth.<sup>35</sup>

Klönne endorses explicitly Schelsky’s observation of an apolitical postwar youth, although he shares the disappointment of the Mitscherliches, which, as he has confessed recently, stemmed from his romantic hopes for “other social arrangements than the ... bourgeois” restoration of the late 1940s and early 1950s.<sup>36</sup> He became a student of the socialist political theorist Wolfgang Abendroth (1905-1985) in Marburg, who encouraged Klönne to write about youth opposition to the Nazi state. His interest in protest had an obvious

personal and contemporary significance: Klönne joined the Social Democrats and the peace movement, and was active in the Easter March opposition against the atomic armament of the Federal Republic in the late 1950s. He saw in the “resistance” of youth counterculture milieus under Hitler, themselves underground continuities from the pre-Nazi youth movement, a tradition of protest through which he could gain his bearings at the time. Klönne’s judgment of his own generation must be understood against this background of postwar political idealism and youthful romanticism.<sup>37</sup>

Not surprisingly, Klönne’s view that the Hitler Youth experience negated the utopian potential inherent in youthful romanticism became the standard criticism of sixty-eighters against forty-fivers, whom they considered to be careerist opportunists and “operators” (*Macher*).<sup>38</sup> The Berlin sociologist Gabriele Rosenthal comes to basically the same conclusion in her team interview project with twenty-eight people born between 1923 and 1929, even citing Klönne’s pessimistic judgment quoted above. Although her subjects left explicit Nazi ideology behind, she argues, they continued to interpret the world in essentially Nazi terms: the survival of the fittest and the belief that “great men” make history. True, they were loyal members of the Federal Republic, but theirs was an obeisance to the new order, rather than a critical and principled consent, possessing as they did underdeveloped egos (*ich Identitäten*) due to the need to conform in the Hitler Youth.<sup>39</sup> The conclusions reached by this branch of the literature are that the forty-fivers were politically docile or passive, that they could not be relied upon to defend democracy, and that they did not develop a political answer to National Socialism. Alexander von Plato sums up the common view this way: “The lesson the HJ generation drew from the past ... was *Pflichtbewußtsein*, a willingness to do one’s duty, or better *Leistungsbereitschaft*, a willingness to give it everything one had, largely irrespective of whatever state form or political system happened to be in operation at the time.”<sup>40</sup>

This cliché has been continued by Heinz Bude (born 1954) in his much-cited 1984 dissertation, *Deutsche Karrieren. Lebenskonstruktionen sozialer Aufsteiger aus der Flakhelfer-Generation*.<sup>41</sup> What Rosenthal identifies as underdeveloped egos, Bude calls “ontological insecurity,” which he embellishes with a literary touch by invoking T.S. Eliot’s

“Hollow Men” and Robert Musil’s “Man without Qualities.” This insecurity is a product of the forty-fivers’ war and postwar socialization, which robbed them of the faith to “challenge history” in the name of a better world. With their “inner vacuum,” the forty-fivers devoted themselves to the functional efficiency of German capitalism, which the next generation, the sixty-eighters, contemptuously rejected. To make his case, Bude conducts a number of interviews and presents three of them as “portraits” of the generation. Endearingly honest, he admits that they are not representative, and that he has chosen subjects who bear out his thesis that social climbing was the generational ideal. Nevertheless, he insists that these cases are typical “insofar as theirs were possible life constructions,” thereby begging the question of their true significance. Clearly, Bude does not strive for empirical verification of his hypothesis. He seeks to render in scholarly terms the viewpoint of many younger Germans about their elders in the 1970s and 1980s when the alternative lifestyle and peace movements were at their heights: materialistic, ungreen, unimaginative, conservative.

There are two problems with the Schelsky-Mitscherlich view that Klönne, Rosenthal, and Bude have continued. In the first place, it avoids posing obvious comparative questions. Do the forty-fivers have a monopoly on social climbing? Much the same has been said of the sixty-eighters in the 1990s. Was not the same generation in other countries just as upwardly mobile and “apolitical”? If so, then the Hitler Youth background appears less significant. The assumption also exists that a real political answer to National Socialism could only have been an antifascist youth rebellion against the Nazi generation in the late 1940s and 1950s, and that in its absence, the forty-fivers developed no answer at all. The intergenerational political struggle is most obvious in this accusation. A historicizing approach might recognize that the experience of compulsion and politicization in the Hitler Youth until 1945, and of civil society and the rule of law thereafter, afforded the forty-fivers a unique perspective on the virtues of the Federal Republic. The new order was patently superior, humane, and liberal because it safeguarded the private sphere from state violation. This is the nascent or “*Ur*” experience of liberalism. The forty-fivers did produce an answer to the Nazi past: the Federal Republic, to which they have remained loyal. Why reject a system

that was such a vast improvement on the last one and that saved one from life under totalitarianism? It sorely needed reform, some of them thought, but even the generation's left liberal intellectuals (such as Horst Ehmke, Ludwig von Friedeburg, Jürgen Habermas, Werner Hoffmann, Kurt Lenk, Peter von Oertzen, and Jürgen Seifert) were reformers rather than revolutionaries.

It was, to be sure, a conservative democracy. As Martin Greiffenhagen writes in his memoirs *Jahrgang 1928*, his generation supported completely the *Rechtsstaat*, but at the cost of radical or participatory democracy, which was one of the projects of the sixty-eighters.<sup>42</sup> Such generational tensions became evident in the forty-fivers' rejection of the youth rebellion of the late 1960s, with the provocative reproach that they knew the dangers of utopianism and youthful romanticism because they had experienced them personally in the Hitler Youth. Günter Gaus (born 1929) articulated this notion well when he told Rudi Dutschke in 1967: "The difference between your generation and those who are today between forty and fifty appears to me to lie in the fact that you, the younger ones, do not possess the understanding of the redundancy of ideologies that we have gained over the past decades."<sup>43</sup>

In response, sixty-eighters accused their fathers and mothers of being the Nazis that the Hitler Youth had trained them to be. Rolf Schörken (born 1928) has responded by making this accusation the leading question of his research: did the Nazi regime succeed in producing the fascist personality for which it strove? And how deep did Nazism sit in German youth in and after 1945? The first question he answered in a semi-autobiographical work on the sixteen and seventeen year olds who staffed the anti-aircraft batteries after 1943 (*Flakhelfer*).<sup>44</sup> As Klönne, Schörken sees a wide spectrum of reactions in his cohort, only a small minority of whom were convinced Nazis. The special experience of the Flakhelfer—who lived fairly militarized lives, separated from school, family, and Hitler Youth groups—actually reduced the direct influence of the party at the expense of the army, which remained for the boys the incarnation of the "good Germany." He concludes that the specific group dynamics that developed in these units resulted in an inner distancing from Nazi ideology and its hyperbolic propaganda. Schörken even speaks of "blockages" that thwarted the Nazi project, although he concedes that slightly

older boys, for whom the foreign policy successes of Hitler until 1941 was the point of reference, rather than the saturation bombings of German civilians, were more vulnerable to Nazi overtures.

In a later investigation, Schörken argues that the remnants of explicit Nazi ideology disappeared almost overnight in the summer of 1945, except for those unlucky enough to languish in POW camps dominated by fanatical officers. This is not to say that there were no problematic continuities for which the forty-fivers were responsible. The mental “base” on which the Nazi “superstructure” rested survived the rupture largely intact, namely in the form of what he calls the *Kultur von Rechts* (right-wing culture): patriarchal and hierarchical thinking, and the widespread “we identification” that made the 1950s the “authoritarian society” that it is remembered as today.<sup>45</sup> This last gasp of the culture of imperial Germany overlapped considerably with National Socialism, so that it was possible for many Germans to be Nazis without changing any of their convictions. Later, this culture would be called “fascistoid.”

The legacy of fascism in the Federal Republic is the target of the most radical and theoretically ambitious recent publication: Sibylle Hübner-Funk's *Loyalität und Verblendung*.<sup>46</sup> This book reveals so much about the problems of intergenerational dialogue in postwar Germany that it is worth considering in greater detail. Currently a researcher at the *Deutsche Jugendinstitut* in Munich, Hübner-Funk was born in 1943 and participated in the West Berlin student movement. In this very personal habilitation thesis, she foregrounds her subjectivity as a woman and sixty-eight-year-old (an “outsider,” as she puts it), claiming that this background gives her privileged access to the subject matter and an epistemologically secure, “ideology critical” perspective (67, 105).<sup>47</sup> Her first aim is to explode the founding myth of the forty-fivers, namely that they were “misused idealists,” able to “start again” afresh after the war without any traces of their socialization in National Socialism. The second target is Hermann Lübke's (born 1926) now well-known hypothesis that the “particular silence” about the Nazi past in the 1950s was not a “repression,” as the Mitscherliches postulated, but a functionally necessary practice to integrate a nation of ardent Nazis into the new democracy. A thorough antifascist cleansing, as the Mitscherliches and Klönne wanted, might have turned the majority of West Germans against the new

state and reproduced one of the major problems of the Weimar Republic.<sup>48</sup> Finally, she wants to demonstrate that the distinction between “political” attachment to Nazism and “apolitical” service in the *Wehrmacht* is as false as it is pernicious.

Hübner-Funk holds these to be typically male constructions insofar as they ignore the more important dimension of the Nazi experience for this generation, namely the powerful *emotional* bond between German youth and Hitler. This irrational attachment has been overlooked because West Germany managed to survive for fifty years and best its rival, the German Democratic Republic. The forty-fivers’ ability to move beyond their youthful commitments was simply taken for granted, an assumption that has since become a “taboo.” They may have detached intellectually from the ideology of National Socialism, as Lübke argues, but did they break free emotionally? Hübner-Funk thinks that the emotional aspect cannot be taken for granted, since it accounts for the persistence of the *Kultur von Rechts* that alienated the sixty-eighters from the Federal Republic, and that passed on a nefarious psychological legacy to the second and third generations (332).<sup>49</sup> The forty-fivers violated their emotional obligations to the sixty-eighters by not speaking openly and honestly about their youthful loyalty, and to this extent they are the bearers of the “second guilt,” as the title of Ralph Giordano’s controversial book puts it.<sup>50</sup>

Is the emotional attachment to a regime over half a century ago accessible to the researcher today? Hübner-Funk notes that, for want of evidence, it is impossible to reconstruct historically the mentality of young Germans during and immediately after the war (388). But it is possible to “decode” their emotional state by means of the “socio-phenomenological” method that focuses on the “we-feeling” [*wir-Gefühl*] which they all must have possessed. If I understand her correctly, this method entails relating to the reader what it must have been like to be a young German at the time through a process of inference: the feeling of having been totally indoctrinated by the party, of relishing the prospect of becoming a “political soldier,” vanquishing the enemy, and even dying a “hero’s death” for the Führer and the Fatherland. To this end, she enlists the civilizational theory of Norbert Elias, especially as it appears in his late collection, *The Germans*.<sup>51</sup> The Hitler Youth is cast as the agent of decivilization



because it glorified violence and demonized minorities. Such traditions, however, were deeply rooted in the German national ideal and were not invented by the Nazis: no significant distinction exists between “political” Nazis and “apolitical” nationalists in the Wilhelminian tradition. This is an important point, which Schörken also thematizes. Many forty-fivers remember their school lessons as not particularly “ideological,” and their teachers as having taught a “non-ideological” curriculum. Yet, on a second look, as Wolfgang Keim points out in his valuable new survey, *Erziehung unter der Nazi-Diktatur*, seemingly “apolitical” teachers were also fervent nationalists whose political orientation overlapped considerably with that of National Socialism. They might not have subscribed to biological racism, but they defended martial virtues, the superiority of the German people, and its “right” to invade and occupy eastern territories. German normality at the time was hardly innocuously apolitical.<sup>52</sup>

Young Germans experienced this “barbarism” as a quasi-religious ecstasy in which the isonomic unity with Hitler dovetailed at mass rallies and Hitler Youth events with the narcissistic and cultish “we-feeling” of the youthful community. But when the love object committed suicide and German youth learned of the regime’s criminal character, the painful deconversion process had to commence. The task of the Allies was to civilize these disturbed young people. Hübner-Funk thinks that this process was rarely concluded successfully because the western occupying powers opportunistically rushed the integration process at the onset of the Cold War. The youth amnesty of 1946 that excused those born after 1919 from denazification measures permitted the forty-fivers to feel that they did not need to identify and root out the Hitler inside them. Older Germans, like Klaus von Bismarck (1912-1997) assured them that they were innocent and that their youthful idealism had been exploited.<sup>53</sup> Virtually overnight, they were transformed from guarantors of the thousand year German Reich to guarantors of the democratic and anticommunist west. Following the Mitscherliches, Hübner-Funk claims that they “de-realized” rather than worked through their earlier euphoric enthusiasm for the regime, and consequently the open wound caused by its collapse never healed. True, they learned to adapt to the new system and became bearers of the West German “success.” But they were and remain superficial “conformist (*angepasste*) democ-

rats,” suffering from the “fascistogene neurosis,” a psychological illness that affects those who were “irredeemably deformed” by National Socialism.<sup>54</sup> Emotional blockages prevent the subject from assessing critically his or her political and social circumstances, so that forty-fivers tend to protect the memory of their youth as “apolitical” and distinguish between honorable, ordinary Germans and Nazi zealots.<sup>55</sup> Hübner-Funk sees the neurosis at work in the scandals that periodically rock the country, like the Historians’ Debate of the mid-1980s, but above all in the reaction of the forty-fivers to the democratic radicalism and questioning of the student movement in the late 1960s. By seeing it as a form of right-wing youth radicalism from the left, they were perversely projecting their “open wound” onto the first truly democratic generation of Germans who had not been socialized under National Socialism (114f.).<sup>56</sup> No doubt, she would consider the recent Bubis-Walser clash as a manifestation of this syndrome.

Hübner-Funk is to be commended for attempting the difficult task of recovering, or rather inferring, the experience of the forty-fivers during and after the war, especially as the only evidence we have are autobiographical accounts of the forty-fivers themselves, most of which were written decades after Nazism’s end. The author examines these personal reflections in search of successful deconversion narratives, and finding few, she concludes that the generation is still in thrall to its early formation.<sup>57</sup> What kind of knowledge is this? “As an empirical project of contemporary history, [the reconstruction of emotional conversion and deconversion] ... is hardly achievable, because it is far too complex. For the empirical always means differentiation, and has as its goal the demonstration of distinctions. Theory, by contrast, synthesizes; that is, it forms general overviews from which the structures and ‘logics’ of a phenomenon become clear” (78f.). *Loyalität und Verblendung* offers a theory. It is a legitimate, indeed necessary, enterprise to develop categories for, and to impose order on, the chaotic manifold of phenomena in a given field of inquiry. Hypotheses and theory, however, cannot license factual-like statements. Hübner-Funk tends to conflate the two approaches by claiming that the forty-fivers were all traumatized by (and never recovered from) Germany’s defeat. Such claims need to be corroborated by some kind of evidence. In this regard, unfortunately, the

author's use of source material is less than convincing. For example, she cites Martin Greiffenhagen's reminiscence that "his heart" is still touched when he hears the "old songs" as evidence for the proposition that he and his generation glorify the "old days" and therefore suffer from the fascistogene neurosis and its corresponding hostility to the sixty-eighters (110f.). But the citation enters no such stipulation. Greiffenhagen is a prominent left liberal who was highly sympathetic to the student movement and has devoted his life to making Germany a more tolerant place. The majority of the biographies used by Hübner-Funk are by ex-Hitler Youth leaders or the youth resistance fighters (or "werewolves"), such as Melita Maschmann and Carola Stern—that is, fanaticized enthusiasts who constituted a minority of their cohort.<sup>58</sup> Their experiences are hardly representative. Hübner-Funk rightly demolishes the illusion that one could serve apolitically as a soldier, as Helmut Schmidt still appears to be believe, but she does not mention that he had a Jewish grandmother and that he knew this during the war.<sup>59</sup>

There is no doubt that many of the forty-fivers were emotionally bound to Hitler, and that the defeat of Germany was a personal collapse of sorts. Günter Grass (born 1927) is a good example of a "true believer" in the "final victory" (*Endsieg*).<sup>60</sup> One and a half million of his generation died in the war; 60,000 of those born between 1927 and 1929 died in its last year.<sup>61</sup> No doubt "true believers" were among them, but to claim as Hübner-Funk does that they were all clamoring to die a hero's death is an absurd caricature.<sup>62</sup> Even the subjects about whom the Mitscherliches wrote had not been fanatical Nazis.<sup>63</sup> In these matters, the author falls behind the insights of Klönne, von Plato, and Schörken. So that the handles will not fall off the argument, she studiously avoids referring to the biographies of those who do not fit her model of trauma. Consider the leftist educationalist Wolfgang Klafki (born 1927), whose work, judging by her bibliography, Hübner-Funk knows well. In an autobiographical essay, he traces the course his emotional loyalty to Hitler, to whom he remained faithful until the end. Like many of his contemporaries, he actually disliked the Nazi party and did his best to avoid the clutches of the *Waffen SS*, who actively canvassed among sixteen- and seventeen-year-old boys after 1943. All the dissonance of the time he attributed to corrupt party officials, distinguishing them from

the benevolent Führer and the respected Wehrmacht. The deconversion process was rapid and non-traumatic.

When, soon after May 9, 1945, information and trustworthy evidence about the actual goals of National Socialism and Hitler as its leading representative became accessible, and as I learned about the gruesome proportions of the perpetrated crimes, the “superstructure” of the idealized Hitler-image collapsed and with that the central element of the identification pattern .... I experienced this process not as a crisis, but as a liberation from a false orientation and as the opening of newer, more positive horizons.<sup>64</sup>

Schörken confirms the feeling of relief felt by many Hitler Youths that the war was finally over, and that it was possible to “come to oneself.” Helmut Schmidt said the same in his farewell speech to the West German parliament in 1986.<sup>65</sup> But Hübner-Funk will have none of this. The figures who stalk through her pages were crazed “150 percenters,” frothing at the mouth, and lusting for death. How does she know this? The “socio-phenomenological method” tells her so. But all this method can deliver is a “logic” of conversion and deconversion that may apply only to the most politicized of this cohort. Those who attempt to differentiate, like Schörken, are accused of suffering from the “fascistogene neurosis,” in the same ad hominem manner that Moser was dismissed by the Mitscherlich school.<sup>66</sup>

The “mourning thesis” of Hübner-Funk and the Mitscherliches cannot explain entirely the reaction of the professors among the forty-fivers to the student movement of the late 1960s. Some of them were reminded of their misspent youth and viewed the sixty-eighters as dangerously totalitarian. But a Hitler Youth formation was not decisive. Consider the rectors of three of the key universities during “1968”: Walter Rüegg at Frankfurt, Nikolaus Lobkowitz at Munich, and Hans-Joachim Lieber at the Free University in Berlin. Rüegg (born 1918) is Swiss and half-Jewish. Lobkowitz (born 1931) grew up among the Czech aristocracy and is a Roman Catholic intellectual. Lieber (born 1923) moved in Social Democratic and Communist circles and distributed resistance pamphlets during the war. All these men were well disposed to the student movement until it escalated into violence and attempted to instrumentalize scholarship for explicit political purposes.<sup>67</sup>

To understand the real continuities that persisted in the Federal Republic and to which “1968” was a reaction requires careful differ-

entiation. I have referred already to Schörken's hypothesis that the continuity into the Federal Republic is not necessarily National Socialism itself, as the student movement contended, but the Wilhelminian *Kultur von Rechts*. This culture precedes National Socialism and made it possible in the first place, but it could serve also as source of resistance to Nazism, as with the failed military coup of July 20, 1944. Gabriele Rosenthal shows also that most of the forty-fivers she interviewed had given up the belief in "final victory" by late 1944. Paradoxically, it was the true believers, like Günther Grass, who made the cleanest break with the regime after 1945 because the collapse of their world demanded a systematic, critical reflection on their prior commitments. By contrast, those who were not traumatized nor forced to scrutinize their loyalties retained elements of the right-wing socialization.<sup>68</sup>

This legacy had particular consequences for the next generation. "With which social group should I identify myself?" asked one sixty-eightier.

With the social-strata to which my "home" belonged—a conglomerate of anti-Semitic, nationalistic, money-hungry tendencies? With the lower middle class in a working class town that kept its distance from the workers and whose life goals were a house in the country and an annual ski holiday in Switzerland? With the captains of industry or politicians who hovered unquestioned as models above the frenzy of reconstruction? With the ambitious strata of functionaries of the Social Democrats, the *Falken*, or the young socialists, with whom I was officially forbidden from having contact as a youth?<sup>69</sup>

There is no denying the emotional problems that post-Nazi society posed for itself. Another recent treatment of the subject is Gesine Schwan's *Politik und Schuld: Die zerstörerische Macht des Schweigens*.<sup>70</sup> Schwan, professor of politics at the Free University in Berlin, focuses on the same problems as Hübner-Funk: the destructive effect of the silence about the past, and the impact on generational relations of the persistence of a right-wing subculture. Her target, too, is the Lübke thesis, which, she argues, ignores the emotional and psychological requirements of democratic citizenship. The West German population may have passed Lübke's test by remaining loyal to the new political system. But the political culture was (and to some extent remains) underdeveloped because the capacity for human solidarity, cooperation, and intimacy—all requirements of active democ-

ratic citizenship—fail to evolve in family life where the “perpetrator generation” (born before 1925) is unable to admit its guilt, even if only its sins of omission. This inability resulted in a destructive dichotomy between public and private morality that confused and lamed the sixty-eighters. For while the “common sense” of universal values had been restored at the public level, an emotional and political attachment to the *Kultur von Rechts* continued among many Germans in the private sphere.<sup>71</sup> In May 1964, nearly one-third of West Germans still believed that Hitler would have been one of the great statesmen had it not been for the war!

As Hübner-Funk, Schwan seems to valorize the 1968 rebellion. In fact, she maintains that its radicalism and fantasy of total revolution were symptoms of socialization in morally disturbed milieus, in which mutual trust and honesty were lacking.<sup>72</sup> The occasionally brutal tactics of accusation and humiliation used by the sixty-eighters were, she suggests, an unconscious effort to force unified moral agency upon their parents and bring about an intergenerational dialogue. In doing so, however, the sixty-eighters often acted out the coldness of their parents, thereby continuing rather than overcoming the emotional damage in an unconscious identification. 1968 is a symptom of, rather than the conclusive answer to, the Nazi past. In this recognition, *Politik und Schuld* transcends the negative generational dialectic that one sees in *Loyalität und Verblendung*, which continues the accusational tone of the sixty-eighters. Still, Schwan is inclined to see the 1960s as a positive way station on the road to the evolution of a new, democratic, and morally universal “common sense,” and this is surely right. The relations between the generations have been improved immeasurably by the openness about the behavior of older Germans during the war. The cradle of democracy is the family, as Critical Theory always postulated.<sup>73</sup> Schwan’s book is one of the best new works on the subject and should be translated to increase its exposure in the English-speaking world.

Where *Politik und Schuld* is a psychologically-informed political reflection, a recent work by a team of psychoanalysts of the sixty-eight generation working in the Mitscherlich tradition is a politically-informed psychological project. The book’s title (*Das Erbe der NAPOLA. Versuch einer Generationengeschichte des Nationalsozialismus*), however, is misleading.<sup>74</sup> This is not a generational history of Nazism

in the Federal Republic. Rather, it is a close analysis of a number of cases from which an ideal-type is constructed. This quibble aside, the book is a valuable contribution because it incorporates tactfully the Moser critique of the *Inability to Mourn* into its terms of inquiry. The authors recognize that the sixty-eightier “tribunals of judgment” hindered rather than facilitated “communicative rationality” between the generations, although understandably they place the greater share of the blame on the war generation. The yearning of the sixty-eighters for origins untainted by the Nazi stain played a role in this difficult relationship, culminating in the hubristic desire for a radically new, solipsistic social and political beginning in the late 1960s, cut off from all traditions associated with their parents. The authors also thematize explicitly their own biases and the psychological damage they may have suffered by the generational transfer of Nazi pathologies. The sensitivity with which they proceed with their subjects is evident in the respect accorded (rather than accusations made against) their interlocutors—the erstwhile students of the elite Nazi schools, the *nationalpolitische Erziehungsanstalten* (*Napolas*) and their children, the former of whom are recognized as having undergone a trauma in these institutions. This unconsciously experienced trauma was the secret fear of not measuring up to the expectations of the *Napola* and landing on the side of victims. The interviews with both generations, which are commentated in the engaging and candid manner of David Bar-On, demonstrate clearly the bequeathal from one generation to the next of unresolved psychological baggage.<sup>75</sup> It may be possible to crystallize an ideal-type from the experiences of these boys and young men (who were considered dangerous “super Nazis” in 1945) if this model is recognized, in accordance with the theory of ideal-types, as extreme and atypical.

In many of these analyses, the problem of generalizing on the basis of little evidence is compounded by a tendency to define a generation in simplistic terms—an approach that licenses one-dimensional and reductionist statements. In fact, as Mannheim pointed out and others have confirmed, generations are complex entities that comprise “generational units” which compete with one another to answer the pressing “generational question.”<sup>76</sup> A nuanced appreciation of the generational phenomenon draws attention to this tension, which has two dimensions. First, there is the distinction between small groups of



opinion-shapers and the “disinterested masses,” which actually comprise the majority of any cohort. Numbering some several hundred thousand of those born between 1938 and 1948, the sixty-eighters were a minority within their cohort.<sup>77</sup> Second, one must consider the competition between members of each generation. For example, the Social Democratic intellectuals, H.A. Winkler, Peter Glotz, and Gesine Schwan are part of the same cohort as the sixty-eighters (born respectively in 1938, 1939, and 1943) but they do not regard themselves (nor are they regarded) as sixty-eighters.

Such distinctions apply naturally also to the forty-fivers, within whose ranks a struggle for “cultural hegemony” has been waged since the late 1950s.<sup>78</sup> This generation, derided as apolitical, ontologically insecure, and substanceless has in fact produced the country’s most famous and important scholars and public intellectuals. In addition to those names mentioned above, this group includes, for example: Hans Albert (1921), Rüdiger Altmann (1922), Karl-Otto Apel (1922), Rudolf Augstein (1923), Arnulf Baring (1932), Karl Dietrich Bracher (1922), Martin Broszat (1926-1989), Ralf Dahrendorf (1929), Erhard Eppler (1926), Iring Fetscher (1922), Joachim Fest (1926), Andreas Flitner (1922), Helga Grebing (1930), Hildegard Hamm-Brücher (1921), Wilhelm Hennis (1923), Hartmut von Hentig (1925), Eberhard Jäckel (1929), Walter Jens (1923), M. Rainer Lespsius (1928), Reinhart Koselleck (1923), Christian Graf von Krockow (1927), Martin Kriele (1927), Niklas Luhmann (1927-1998), Hans Maier (1931), Thomas Nipperdey (1927-1992), Gerhard A. Ritter (1929), Günter Rohrmoser (1927), Alexander Schwan (1931-1989), Erwin Scheuch (1928), Robert Spaemann (1927), and Kurt Sontheimer (1928). Anyone interested in German cultural politics will recognize immediately the range of viewpoints and positions represented by these figures. Their existence makes nonsense out of the essentialism that has plagued the scholarly literature on this generation.

The impulse to differentiate is, as Hübner-Funk neatly puts it, the penchant of historians. So it is no surprise that Friedhelm Boll, a historian at the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, has produced the most convincing debunking of the conventional categories in the field. Schelsky, he points out, was referring explicitly to one portion of the generation, namely working-class youth, on which the sociologist had conducted empirical work, and which he considered the tone-

setter and bearer of the intergenerational peace.<sup>79</sup> This was an innovative move, given that bourgeois youth, especially students, had been regarded hitherto as the cultural heralds. But this shift of focus meant that Schelsky ignored the socialization and development of students, who, after all, joined the elites, and who were the subject of important studies a few years later, in Jürgen Habermas's *Student und Politik*, for example.<sup>80</sup>

In his archivally based and carefully argued book, *Auf der Suche nach Demokratie*, Boll studies the youth policies of the occupying British forces in Lower Saxony. The virtue of British youth work was its "hands off" character, guided as it was by the belief that democracy was not learned by indoctrination or by rote, but by active participation in group life, in which the political virtues of discussion, pluralism, and compromise were cultivated. To that end, the British took thousands of young Germans, including a young Ralf Dahrendorf, to Wilson Park in England for encounters with young British officers.<sup>81</sup> As his former teacher, Karl Dietrich Bracher, Boll sympathizes with the Anglo-Saxon conception of pragmatic politics because it enables him to class the massive youth and interest group involvement of young Germans in the 1940s and 1950s as training grounds for democratic civic culture. To be sure, the generation was suspicious of grand politics and ideologies, but it was by no means passive or uninterested. Student sociability was also a sign of a different political style that Schelsky and the Mitscherliches were unable to appreciate.<sup>82</sup> These often informal groups were of enormous importance in providing time and space for reorientation after the war years, and about 40 percent of young Germans were members of one. "In probably no other period in German history did such discussion-circles and solidarity-communities play such a great role as in the postwar years."<sup>83</sup>

Boll also reconstructs the experience of postwar youth in Göttingen, Hanover, and Brunswick, particularly of that in the Social Democratic milieu, in which he identifies a spectrum of responses to the postwar situation that had important consequences in the 1960s.<sup>84</sup> There were undeniable nationalist and authoritarian continuities from the Wilhelminian past. Another group turned to other prewar traditions, especially Roman Catholic, Protestant, and leftist. In the late 1940s, over one million young Germans took part in Christian

youth groups. Finally, there were the “searching” youth who experienced the immediate postwar years as a cultural renaissance and who, like Klönne, were disappointed with the stuffy conservatism of the 1950s. This generational unit, associated with the Hanover SDS, became the bearer of the extra-parliamentary opposition to the “Adenauer State” in the 1950s and paved the way for the sixty-eighters. Indeed, many of them joined the students on the streets after 1965, seeing in their activism the chance to make good on the missed opportunity over a decade earlier. Historical reconstructions such as Boll’s and those conducted by the *Arbeitskreis Historische Jugendforschung*, directed by Jürgen Reulecke and Ulrich Hermann, will help trace the continuities and discontinuities between the generations and their units, and end the hermetically sealed distance between 1968 and its pre-history.<sup>85</sup> Having seen long and distinguished service, the idea of the skeptical generation has acquired the air of an idea whose time has passed.

## Conclusion

What is one to make of the paradox of the forty-fivers and the claims of the sixty-eighters? The paradox can be explained by the variety of responses of the forty-fivers to the Nazi past. The majority of forty-fivers were as “apolitical” as any other generation. They supported the new system because it produced tangible benefits, and because the alternatives had been thoroughly discredited by personal experience. Of all Germans by the late 1950s, they were the most favorably disposed to the new democracy.<sup>86</sup> Their political representatives Helmut Schmidt and Helmut Kohl may not have been popular chancellors with sixty-eighter intellectuals, but their liberal-democratic commitments can be hardly doubted. At the same time, the generation also continued the *Kultur von Rechts* and produced its most vociferous critics, such as Bracher, Dahrendorf, Habermas, and Hennis, and writers like Grass, Walser, and Rolf Hochhuth (born 1931). Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the forty-fivers did generate a political answer to National Socialism: the Federal Republic as a project of consolidation and reform. This is something very new in German history and should not be discounted.

The question of which direction reform should take, however, was a source of bitter, intragenerational competition. Habermas and the left wing of the forty-fivers favored a radical democratic, pacifist, and anti-NATO solution, while liberals and conservatives entertained different visions altogether. This variety meant that, by the early 1960s, no single approach had imposed itself on the political culture. This pluralism was a sign of a healthy liberalism, but it also meant that enough of the *Kultur von Rechts* could survive to alienate the first generation of Germans raised in purely democratic conditions from the first, otherwise successful democratic experiment.

To understand this dynamic, is necessary to distinguish between public and private spheres of West German life. Hermann Lübke is well aware that in the immediate postwar years there was “much mute narrow-mindedness and unchanged identification with the ideological orientations that enabled one to participate” in the Nazi regime. But he thinks that the restoration of public morality was decisive because it initiated a long-term learning process: the point is not that there were scandals about ex-Nazis—post-totalitarian societies always have continuities from the past—but that scandals were possible in the first place.<sup>87</sup> In order to integrate a Nazified population into the new democracy, however, it was necessary to maintain a “particular stillness” about personal continuities with the past regime, except, of course, regarding direct perpetrators.<sup>88</sup> As Lübke wrote: “Not a single university, local government, private factory, or business could have been reconstructed if the dominant tone between colleagues, who had to cooperate with one another, had been an accusational ‘how could you have ...’”<sup>89</sup>

This state of affairs did not exclude a generational struggle. It took place, however, at the level of intellectual traditions rather than personal continuity. *Traditionskritik* was the strategy of the forty-fivers, not individual denunciation. The extent of the complicity of their university teachers in the Nazi regime was often unknown. The picture is becoming clearer with the availability of documents uncovered in the east after 1990. In any event, it was more or less impossible to openly or even privately challenge a German university professor in the 1950s and even early 1960s, such was their power and prestige. Instead, the forty-fivers conducted what Wolfgang J. Mommsen has described as their “revolution” against the

intellectual roots of fascism, seeking to rupture the conservative continuities that led to 1933, and by and large their teachers gave them the room to do so.<sup>90</sup> The nature of this deal permitted men who had served the Nazi regime, like Schelsky and the historian Theodor Schieder (1908-1984), who were still relatively young in 1945, to contribute to their respective disciplines after the war.

Successful as this accommodation proved to be, however, it was limited to the public world of politics and work, and not surprisingly Lübke restricts his examples to these realms. Habermas, by contrast, recalls that in the subpolitical niches of the family and *Stammtisch*, the silent majority “remembered the sufferings of their own rather than those of their victims.”<sup>91</sup> Morality was anything but restored in the private sphere. It is not difficult to see how the sixty-eighter generation, which was raised by this silent majority, and which was not a party to the unwritten contract of discretion between the forty-fivers and the older generations, deduced that West Germany was an immoral place. Lübke does not acknowledge that the cost of the functionally necessary silence in the 1950s was the intergenerational transfer of the psychological consequences of guilt, as Schwan and Hübner-Funk point out. To dismiss the sixty-eighters as merely confused middle-class revolutionaries fails to consider the reasons for their disorientation.<sup>92</sup>

And yet it cannot be denied that, in confusing the private realm of their adolescent experience with the public realm (where forty-fiver intellectuals and journalists had been thematizing the Nazi past for some time), the sixty-eighters concluded erroneously that West Germany was a fascist state.<sup>93</sup> To this extent, their self-understanding is unsustainable.<sup>94</sup> They reflected rather than solved West Germany’s problems with the Nazi past. The primitive theory of fascism to which the sixty-eighters subscribed is this syndrome’s intellectual manifestation.<sup>95</sup> But theirs was a misperception rooted in the moral and psychological deformations of large parts of German society. The best new scholarship on the intergenerational dimension of postwar Germany replaces the asperity of censure with the emollient historicizing insight that the generations are related to one another by intricate webs of psychological interdependence.

## Notes

1. Konrad Jarausch, "1945 and the Continuities of German History: Reflections on Memory, Historiography, and Politics," in Geoffrey J. Giles, ed., *Stunde Null: The End and the Beginning Fifty Years Ago* (Washington, D.C., 1997), 9.
2. Ulrich Herbert, "Als die Nazis wieder gesellschaftsfähig wurden," *Die Zeit* (January 10, 1997), 34; Norbert Frei, *Vergangenheitspolitik. Die Anfänge der Bundesrepublik und die NS-Vergangenheit* (Munich, 1996).
3. See, for example, "Protest! Literatur um 1968." An exhibition of the German Literature Archive, Marbach am Neckar. Exhibition and catalogue by Ralf Bentz et al. (Marbach am Neckar, 1998); Oskar Negt, *Achtundsechzig. Politische Intellektuelle und die Macht* (Frankfurt, 1998); see the essays collected in *Leviathan*, 4 (December 1998).
4. Heinz Bude, "The German *Kriegskinder*: Origins and Impact of the Generation of 1968," in Mark Roseman, ed., *Generations in Conflict: Youth Revolt and Generation Formation in Germany, 1770-1968* (Cambridge, England, 1995), 293. See also his *Das Altern einer Generation: Die Jahrgänge 1938 bis 1948* (Frankfurt, 1995).
5. Gerald J. DeGroot, ed., *Student Protest. The Sixties and After* (London and New York, 1998); Carole Fink, Philipp Gassert, Detlef Junker, eds., *1968. The World Transformed* (New York, 1998); Dagmar Herzog, "Pleasure, Sex, and Politics Belong Together: Post-Holocaust Memory and the Sexual Revolution in West Germany," *Critical Inquiry*, 24 (Winter 1998), 393-444; Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey, ed., *1968. Vom Ereignis zum Gegenstand der Geschichtswissenschaft* (Göttingen, 1998); Joyce Marie Mushaben, *From Post-War to Post-Wall Generations: Changing Attitudes Toward the National Question and NATO in the Federal Republic of Germany* (Boulder, Colo., 1998).
6. Karl Mannheim, "The Problem of Generations," in his *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge*, ed., Paul Kecskemeti (London, 1952), 276-320; Ulrich Herbert, "'Generation der Sachlichkeit': Die völkische Studentenbewegung der frühen zwanziger Jahre," in his *Arbeit, Volkstum, Weltanschauung. Über Fremde und Deutsche im 20. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt: 1995), 11-30.
7. There is a good discussion of the "rupture theory" of generations in relation to the sixty-eighters in Helmut Fogt, *Politische Generationen. Empirische Bedeutung und theoretisches Modell* (Opladen, 1982).
8. Joachim Kaiser, "Phasenverschiebungen und Einschnitte in der Kulturellen Entwicklung," in Martin Broszat, ed., *Zäsuren nach 1945: Essays zur Periodisierung der deutschen Nachkriegsgeschichte* (Munich, 1990), 69-74.
9. Oskar Negt, "Radikalität und Augenmaß. Zur Denkweise eines sozialistischen Grenzgängers zwischen Politik und Wissenschaft," in Jürgen Seifert, Heinz Thörmer, Klaus Wettig, eds., *Soziale oder sozialistische Demokratie? Beiträge zur Geschichte der Linken in der Bundesrepublik* (Marburg, 1989), 42.
10. Gerhard Schröder was born in 1944, Oskar Lafontaine in 1943, and Joschka Fischer in 1948. An analysis of this generational changing of the guard can be found in Albrecht von Lucke's, "68er an der Macht. Glanz und Elend einer politischen Generation," *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik*, 11 (November 1998), 1331-8.

11. Sibylle Hübner-Funk, "Zeitgeschichtliche Jugendforschung im gesamt-deutschen Kontext," *Zeitschrift für Soziologie der Erziehung und Sozialisation*, 1 (1998), 126. Italics in the original.
12. Rolf Schörken, *Jugend 1945: Politisches Denken und Lebensgeschichte* (Frankfurt, 1990), 16.
13. Hans Mommsen, "Aufarbeitung und Verdrängung. Das Dritte Reich im west-deutschen Geschichtsbewußtsein," in Dan Diner, ed., *Ist der Nationalsozialismus Geschichte? Zu Historisierung und Historikerstreit* (Frankfurt, 1987), 87. Others agree: Norbert Frei, "Farewell to the Era of Contemporaries. National Socialism and its Historical Examination en route into History," *History and Memory*, 9 (1997), 59-79; Omer Bartov, *Murder in Our Midst. The Holocaust, Industrial Killing, and Representation* (Oxford and London, 1996), 120.
14. Ernst Schulin, "Ratlos und Unsicher. Ernst Nolte stellt das Geschichtsdnken des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts dar," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (October 8, 1991), L23.
15. Fred Kautz, *Goldhagen und die "Hürnen Sewfriedte"* (Berlin, 1998). For an analysis of the "Goldhagen Debate," see A. D. Moses, "Structure and Agency in the Holocaust: Daniel J. Goldhagen and his Critics," *History and Theory*, 37:2 (1998), 194-219.
16. Franziska Augstein, "Schlangen in der Grube," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (September 14, 1998), 49; Volker Ullrich, "Späte Reue der Zunft," *Die Zeit* (September 17, 1998), 53; Hans-Ulrich Wehler, "In den Fußtapfen der kämpfenden Wissenschaft," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (January 4, 1999), 48; Götz Aly, "Stakkato der Vertreibung, Pizzikato der Entlastung," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (February 3, 1999), 46. There is a good discussion of the substantive historical issues in Willi Oberkrome's "Historiker im 'Dritten Reich': Zum Stellenwert volkshistorischer Ansätze zwischen klassischer Politik- und neuer Sozialgeschichte," *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht*, 2 (1999), 74-99.
17. Martin Walser, "Die Banalität des Guten," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (October 12, 1998), 15; Ignatz Bubis, "Wer von der Schander spricht," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (November 10, 1998), 47; Klaus Dohnanyi, "Eine Friedensrede," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (November 14, 1998), 33. Bubis' accusation was made in an interview in *Der Spiegel* (November 30, 1998), but he withdrew it two weeks later after Walser clarified his position. See *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (December 14, 1998), 1. For a commentary, see Ulrich Herbert, "Walser benutzt die Codes der Rechtsextremen," *Badische Zeitung* (December 12, 1998), 5.
18. Helmut Schelsky, *Die skeptische Generation: eine Soziologie der deutschen Jugend* (Düsseldorf and Cologne, 1957); Alexander and Margarethe Mitscherlich, *The Inability to Mourn: Principles of Collective Behavior*, trans. Beverly R. Placzek (New York, 1975).
19. Two prominent political scientists, Martin Greiffenhagen (born 1928) and Christian Graf von Krockow (born 1927) agree that their's was a skeptical generation, but come to differing conclusions about what that means. Greiffenhagen thinks the term should be read as the Greeks would have used it, i.e., as seaching and intellectually curious. See his *Jahrgang 1928: aus einem unruhigen Leben* (Munich, 1988), 55. Krockow regards it as a synonym for "anti-idealism," which is probably closer to Schelsky's intention. See his "Das Mißverhältnis der Erfahrungen," in Claus Richter, ed., *Die überflüssige Generation. Jugend zwischen Apathie und Aggression* (Königstein, 1979), 207.



20. Franz-Werner Kersting's forthcoming biography of Schelsky presumably will cover these years. For German students and Nazism, see Geoffrey J. Giles, *Students and National Socialism in Germany* (Princeton, N.J., 1985), and Michael Grüttner, *Studenten im Dritten Reich* (Paderborn and Munich, 1995).
21. Helmut Schelsky, *Auf der Suche nach Wirklichkeit: Gesammelte Aufsätze* (Düsseldorf and Cologne, 1965); Horst Baier, ed., *Helmut Schelsky—ein Soziologe in der Bundesrepublik* (Stuttgart, 1986); Axel Schildt, "Ende der Ideologien? Politische-ideologische Strömungen in den 50er Jahren," in Axel Schildt and Arnold Sywottek, eds., *Modernisierung im Wiederaufbau. Die Westdeutsche Gesellschaft der 50er Jahre* (Bonn, 1998), 627-35.
22. Schelsky, (see note 18), 115ff. His other target was educationalists, who insisted that youth culture was an autonomous and not transitional stage of human development.
23. Schelsky, (see note 18), 84ff., 493.
24. Friedrich Tenbruck, "Alltagsnormen und Lebensgefühle in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," in Richard Löwenthal and Hans-Peter Schwarz, eds., *25 Jahre Bundesrepublik Deutschland—eine Bilanz* (Stuttgart, 1974), 289-310; Hans Braun, "Das Streben nach 'Sicherheit' in den 50er Jahren. Soziale und politische Ursachen und Erscheinungen," *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*, 18 (1978), 279-306.
25. The Mitscherliches believed that East Germany's fears of a West German invasion were "not entirely unfounded." (See note 18), 23.
26. Tilman Moser, "Die Unfähigkeit zu trauern: Hält die These einer Überprüfung stand?" *Psyche*, 46 (May 1992), also in his *Vorsicht Berührung. Über Sexualisierung, Spaltung, NS-Erbe und Stasi-Angst* (Frankfurt, 1992), 203-20.
27. Mitscherlich, (see note 18), 351.
28. Michael Schneider, "Fathers and Sons, Retrospectively: The Damaged Relationship Between Two Generations," *New German Critique*, 31 (Winter 1984), 3-52.
29. Michael Schwab-Trapp, *Konflikt, Kultur und Interpretation. Eine Diskursanalyse des öffentlichen Umgangs mit dem Nationalsozialismus* (Opladen, 1996), 22-24. Hauke Brunkhorst writes that breaking of the "communicative silence" about the Nazi past is "a moral achievement, for which this generation alone would have every reason to be proud." See his "The Tenacity of Utopia: The Role of Intellectuals in Cultural Shifts within the Federal Republic of Germany," *New German Critique*, 55 (Winter 1992), 131.
30. The responses to Moser are: Margarethe Mitscherlich-Nielsen, "Was können wir aus der Vergangenheit lernen?" *Psyche*, 47 (August 1993), 743-53; Christian Schneider, "Jenseits der Schuld? Die Unfähigkeit zu trauern in der zweiten Generation," *ibid.*, 754-74; Dieter Rudolf Knoell, "Die doppelte als einseitige Vergangenheit," *ibid.*, 775-94. Moser replies to his critics in "Nachwort zur Kritik an der Unfähigkeit zu trauern," in his *Politik und seelischer Untergrund* (Frankfurt, 1993), 198-203.
31. Frank Trommler, "Mission ohne Ziel. Über den Kult der Jugend im modernen Deutschland," in Thomas Koebner et al., *Mit uns zieht die neue Zeit. Der Mythos Jugend* (Frankfurt, 1985).
32. Howard Becker, *German Youth: Bond or Free?* (London, 1946), 217.
33. Arno Klönne, *Hitlerjugend. Die Jugend und ihre Organisation im Dritten Reich* (Hanover and Frankfurt, 1959); *idem.*, 'Gegen den Strom'. Ein Bericht über die Jugendopposition im Dritten Reich (Hanover and Frankfurt, 1956); *idem.*, *Jugend im Dritten Reich. Die Hitler-Jugend und ihre Gegner* (Munich, 1995).

34. Alexander von Plato, "The Hitler Youth generation and its roles in the two post-war German states," in Roseman, (see note 4), 210: the old view is "a crude caricature [that] tells us little about the real experiences of the millions of boys and girls who were members of the HJ or about the significance of those experiences for shaping social behaviour and attitudes in the two post-war Germany states." On the counterculture milieus, see also Alfons Kenkmann, *Wilde Jugend: Lebenswelt großstädtischer Jugendlicher zwischen Weltwirtschaftskrise, Nationalsozialismus und Währungsreform* (Essen, 1996).
35. Mattias von Hellfeld and Arno Klönne, *Die betrogene Generation. Jugend in Deutschland unter dem Faschismus. Quellen und Dokumente* (Cologne, 1985), 345.
36. Arno Klönne and Jürgen Reulecke, "'Restgeschichte' und 'neue Romantik': Ein Gespräch über Bündische-Jugend in der Nachkriegszeit," in Franz-Werner Kersting, ed., *Jugend vor einer Welt in Trümmern* (Weinheim and Munich, 1998), 87-106.
37. Arno Klönne, "Zum Problem der ideologischen Orientierung der Jugend in der Bundesrepublik," *Marxistische Blätter*, 3 (November/December 1965), 11-15
38. Tilman Fichter and Siegwald Lönnendonker, "Von der APO nach TUNIX," in Richter, (see note 19), 139-41: "The generation of the first phase, which was born in the Weimar Republic, experienced the crisis of the depression, was socialized in the Hitler Youth during the 'Third Reich,' and later in the trenches and anti-aircraft batteries. After the collapse, the first priority was eating (*Fressen!*) and only then morality. But they were acutely conscious that the Nazis had lost the war. That did not by any means turn them into anti-fascists ... The first postwar generation was generally opportunistic, and did not produce a political answer to National Socialism."
39. Gabriele Rosenthal, ed., *Die Hitlerjugend-Generation: Biographische Thematisierung als Vergangenheitsbewältigung* (Essen, 1986), 101f.; idem., "Wenn alles in Scherben fällt ..." *Von Leben und Sinnwelt der Kriegsgeneration* (Opladen, 1987).
40. Alexander von Plato, (see note 34), 218.
41. Heinz Bude, *Deutsche Karrieren. Lebenskonstruktionen sozialer Aufsteiger aus der Flakhelfer-Generation* (Frankfurt, 1987).
42. Greiffenhagen, (see note 19), 59f.
43. Cited in Rudi Dutschke, *Geschichte ist machbar. Texte über das herrschende Falsche und die Radikalität des Friedens* (Berlin, 1980), 49. Symptomatic is Sibylle Hübner-Funk, "Hitler's Grandchildren in the Shadow of the Past. The Burden of a Difficult Heritage," *Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte*, 19 (1990), 110.
44. Rolf Schörken, *Luftwaffenhelfer und Drittes Reich. Die Entstehung eines politischen Bewußtseins* (Stuttgart, 1984).
45. Rolf Schörken, (see note 12).
46. Sibylle Hübner-Funk, *Loyalität und Verblendung. Hitlers Garanten der Zukunft als Träger der zweiten deutschen Demokratie* (Potsdam, 1998). Page references to this book appear in parenthesis in the text.
47. Christel Hopf, "Das Faschismusthema in der Studentenbewegung und in der Soziologie," in Heinz Bude and Martin Kohli, eds., *Radikalisierte Aufklärung. Studentenbewegung und Soziologie in Berlin 1965 bis 1970* (Weinheim and Munich, 1989), 80. See also Hübner-Funk's semi-autobiographical "Aufwachsen mit Nationalsozialismus und NATO. Politische Bewußtseinsbildung im Generationenvergleich," *Die Neue Sammlung*, 23 (1983), 432-48.
48. Herman Lübke, "Die Nationalsozialismus im deutschen Nachkriegsbewußtsein," *Historische Zeitschrift*, 236 (1983), 579-99.

49. Helm Stierlin, "Der Dialog zwischen den Generationen über die Nazi-Zeit," *Familiendynamik*, 7 (1982), 31-48; Jürgen Müller-Hoghagen, *Verleugnet, Verdrängt, Verschwiegen. Die seelischen Auswirkungen der Nazizeit* (Munich, 1988).
50. Ralph Giordano, *Die zweite Schuld oder Von der Last Deutscher zu sein* (Hamburg, 1987), 362; Hans-Jochen Gamm, *Pädagogische Ethik: Versuch zur Analyse der erzieherischen Verhältnisse* (Wenheim, 1988), 140.
51. Norbert Elias, *The Germans. Power Struggles and the Development of Habitus in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, trans. Eric Dunning and Stephen Mennell (New York, 1996).
52. Wolfgang Keim, *Erziehung unter der Nazi-Diktatur. Kriegsvorbereitung, Krieg und Holocaust* (Darmstadt, 1997).
53. Klaus von Bismarck, "Die Geschichte von den mißbrauchten Idealisten," *Frankfurter Hefte*, 1 (1949), 749-57.
54. Hübner-Funk, (see note 46), 104, 114ff., 289, 325ff.
55. Hans-Jochen Gamm, *Pädagogische Studien zum Problem der Judenfeindschaft* (Newied and Berlin, 1966), 44, 82. The Mitscherliches write in similar terms (see note 18), 19.
56. See also her "Die 'Hitlerjugend Generation': Umstritenes Objekt und streitbares Subjekt der deutschen Zeitgeschichte," *Prokla. Zeitschrift für politische Ökonomie und sozialistische Politik*, 80 (1990), 84-98.
57. Hübner-Funk, (see note 46), 29ff., 39, 48, 388.
58. Melita Maschmann, *Account Rendered. A Dossier on My Former Self*, trans. Geoffrey Stachan (New York, 1964); Carola Stern, *In den Netzen der Erinnerung. Lebensgeschichten zweier Menschen* (Reinbeck, 1986). Christopher Hausmann, "Heranwachsen im 'Dritten Reich': Möglichkeiten und Besonderheiten jugendlicher Sozialisation im Spiegel autobiographischer Zeugnisse," *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht*, 12 (1990), 607-18.
59. Helmut Schmidt, "Politischer Rückblick auf eine unpolitische Jugend," in Helmut Schmidt, ed., *Kindheit und Jugend unter Hitler* (Berlin, 1992), 188-254. Sibylle Hübner-Funk, "Aufgewachsen unter Hitler: Eine 'unpolitische' Jugendzeit?" *Jahrbuch für Pädagogik* (1995), 53-72.
60. Heinrich Vormweg, *Günther Grass* (Hamburg, 1986).
61. Karl-Heinz Jahnke, *Hitlers letztes Aufgebot. Deutsche Jugend im sechsten Kriegsjahr, 1944/45* (Essen, 1993), 35.
62. Waldtraut Rath recounts that the boys in her class feared military service because it meant a near certain death: "Kindheit und Mädchenjahre im Dritten Reich," in Wolfgang Klafki, ed., *Verführung, Distanzierung, Ernüchterung. Kindheit und Jugend im Nationalsozialismus* (Weinheim and Basel, 1988), 193.
63. Mitscherlich, (see note 18), 252-62.
64. Wolfgang Klafki, "Politische Identitätsbildung und frühe pädagogische Berufsorientierung in Kindheit und Jugend unter dem Nationalsozialismus—Autobiographische Rekonstruktion," in Klafki, (see note 62), 168.
65. Rolf Schörken, "Singen und Maschieren. Erinnerung an vier Jahre Jungvolk 1939 bis 1943," *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht*, 7 (July/August, 1998), 447-61. There is a criticism of this article by Eva Gehrken, "Singen und Maschieren—das war doch nicht alles!," *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht*, 2 (1999), 118f.
66. Sibylle Hübner-Funk, review in *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialsoziologie*, 40 (1988), 601.

67. Hans-Joachim Lieber, "Autobiographische Bemerkungen zur Entwicklung der Soziologie im Nachkriegsdeutschland (1946-1965)," in Christian Fleck, ed., *Wege zur Soziologie nach 1945. Autobiographische Notizen* (Opladen, 1996), 77-98. Nikolaus Lobkowicz, "Reflections on Eleven Years as a President of a German University," *Minerva*, 22:3-4 (Autumn/Winter, 1984), 365-87. It was also possible to become a right-wing intellectual without a Hitler Youth background, such as the Swiss Armin Mohler (born 1920).
68. Rosenthal, (see note 39), 54, 97ff., 317, 370. These findings corroborate those of the Mitscherliches, (see note 18), 252.
69. Jürgen Horlemann, "Zwischen Soziologie und Politik: Rekonstruktion eines Werdeganges," in Bude and Kohle, (see note 47), 217.
70. Gesine Schwan, *Politik und Schuld. Die zerstörerische Macht des Schweigens* (Frankfurt, 1997).
71. Jürgen Habermas, "On how Postwar Germany has Faced its Recent Past," *Common Knowledge*, 5 (Fall 1996), 6.
72. This view is shared by Wolfgang Kraushaar, "Ich bin froh, daß keine SDS-Idee Wirklichkeit wurde," *Die Neue Gesellschaft - Frankfurter Hefte* (November 1998), 1022-9.
73. Schwan, (see note 70), 148ff., 248. Most recently: Gabriele Rosenthal, *Der Holocaust im Leben von drei Generationen: Familien von Überlebenden der Shoah und von nazi Tätern* (Gießen, 1997).
74. Christian Schneider, Cordelia Stillke, and Bernd Leinweber, *Das Erbe der NAPOLA. Versuch einer Generationengeschichte des Nationalsozialismus* (Hamburg, 1996). See also, Johannes Leeb, "Wir waren Hitlers Eliteschüler": *Ehemalige Zöglinge der NS-Ausleseschulen brechen ihr Schweigen* (Hamburg, 1998).
75. Dan Bar-On, *The Legacy of Silence. Encounters with Children of the Third Reich* (Cambridge, Mass., 1989).
76. Mannheim, (see note 6); Fogt, (see note 7); Hans Jaeger, "Generationen in der Geschichte. Überlegungen zu einer umstrittenen Konzept," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 3 (1977), 444.
77. Heinz Westphal, "Junge Menschen 1945—Am Anfang einer neuer Zeit," in Kersting, (see note 36), 283-9. Uwe Schlicht, "Von der skeptischen Generation bis zur Protestjugend. Jugendbewußtsein im Wandel von 1945 bis 1981," in Uwe Schlicht, ed., *Trotz und Träume. Jugend lehnt sich auf* (Berlin, 1982), 190-252.
78. Hans-Ulrich Wehler cited in Imanuel Geiss, *Die Habermas-Kontroverse. Ein deutscher Streit* (Berlin, 1988), 23. Originally in *Frankfurter Rundschau* (February 11, 1987), 7.
79. Schelsky, (see note 18), 463.
80. Friedhelm Boll, "Jugend im Umbruch vom Nationalsozialismus zur Nachkriegsdemokratie," *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*, 37 (1997), 482-520; Jürgen Habermas, Ludwig von Friedeburg, Christoph Oehler, Friedrich Welz, *Student und Politik. Eine soziologische Untersuchung zum politischen Bewußtsein Frankfurter Studenten* (Neuwied and Berlin, 1961).
81. Friedhelm Boll, *Auf der Suche nach Demokratie. Britische und deutsche Jugendinitiativen in Niedersachsen nach 1945* (Bonn: Dietz, 1995). Alan L. Smith, *The War for the German Mind. Re-Educating Hitler's Soldiers* (Providence and Oxford, 1996).
82. Andreas Flitner, *Soziologische Jugendforschung* (Heidelberg, 1963), 69-88.
83. Friedhelm Boll, "Hitler-Jugend und skeptische Generation. Sozialdemokratie und Jugend nach 1945," in Dieter Dowe, ed., *Partei und soziale Bewegung. Kritische*

- Beiträge zur Entwicklung der SPD seit 1945* (Bonn, 1993), 33-58; idem., "Zwischen Hitlerjugend und nationalsozialistischen Terror," in A. Gestrich, ed., *Gewalt im Krieg. Ausübung, Erfahrung und Verweigerung von Gewalt in Kriegen des 20. Jahrhunderts*, Jahrbuch für Historische Friedensforschung, 4 (Münster, 1995), 193-215.
84. Beate Wagner, *Jugendliche Lebenswelten nach 1945* (Opladen, 1995); Everhard Holtman, "Die neue Lasalleaner. SPD und HJ Generation nach 1945," in Martin Broszat, Klaus-Dietmar Henke, Hans Weller, eds., *Von Stalingrad zur Währungsreform. Zur Sozialgeschichte des Umbruchs in Deutschland* (Munich, 1988), 169-210.
  85. Dieter Baacke et al., eds., *Jugend 1900-1970. Zwischen Selbstverfügung und Deutung* (Opladen, 1991), Ulrich Hermann, ed., *Jugendpolitik in der Nachkriegszeit* (Weinheim and Munich, 1993); and Kersting, (see note 36).
  86. G. R. Boynton and Gerhard Loewenberg, "The Development of Public Support for Parliament in Germany, 1951-59," *British Journal of Political Science*, 3 (1973), 169-89.
  87. Hermann Lübke, "Verdrängung? Über eine Kategorie zur Kritik des deutschen Vergangenheitsverhältnisses," in Bad Homburg Forum für Philosophie, ed., *Zerstörung des moralischen Selbstbewußtseins: Chance oder Gefährdung?* (Frankfurt, 1988), 220f.
  88. See the essays collected in Wilfried Loth and Bernd-A. Rusinek, eds., *Verwandlungspolitik. NS-Eliten in der westdeutschen Nachkriegsgesellschaft* (Frankfurt and New York, 1998).
  89. Hermann Lübke, "Deutschland nach dem Nationalsozialismus, 1945-1990. Zum politischen und akademischen Kontext des Falles Schneider alias Schwerte," in Helmut König, Wolfgang Kühlmann, Klaus Schwabe, eds., *Vertuschte Vergangenheit. Der Fall Schwerte und die NS-Vergangenheit der deutschen Hochschulen* (Munich, 1997), 202.
  90. Wolfgang J. Mommsen, "Gegenwärtige Tendenzen in der Geschichtsschreibung der Bundesrepublik," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 8 (1981), 162.
  91. Habermas, (see note 71), 6.
  92. Michael Burleigh, "Habitus Corpus," *Times Literary Supplement* (March 29, 1996), 5f.
  93. Joachim Fest, "Die Vergangenheit wurde nicht verdrängt," in Hermann Rudolph, ed., *Den Staat denken. Theodor Eschenburg zum Fünfundachtzigsten* (Berlin, 1986), 118-21.
  94. Franz Walter, "Eine deprimierende Bilanz," *Die Woche* (May 22, 1998), 10; Wolfgang Eßbach, "Protestbewegung, Scheinrevolution, postmoderne Revolte? Nachdenken über '68.'" Paper delivered at the Albert-Ludwigs-University Freiburg, November 19, 1997; Claus Leggewie, "Vergeßt '68! Denkt gefährlich!: Verat am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts," *Kursbuch*, 116 (1994), 148; Detlev Claussen, "Chiffre 1968," in Jan Assmann et al, ed., *Revolution und Mythos* (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1992), 219-29.
  95. Anson G. Rabinbach, "Toward a Marxist Theory of Fascism and National Socialism," *New German Critique*, 3 (Fall 1974), 127-53; Wolfgang Wipperman, "The Post-War German Left and Fascism," *Journal of Contemporary History*, 11 (1976), 185-219; idem., "Faschismus—nur ein Schlagwort?" *Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte*, 16 (1987), 356f.