

1916 to 1918 seems to have been mainly directed at middle-ranking and rear area officers, not battalion leadership. Unlike the British army, which pragmatically opened officers' messes to "temporary officers"—men who demonstrated leadership ability or potential, regardless of social background—the German army was careful to restrict entry to the officer corps. As Watson argues, this had the effect of piling responsibility on frontline officers and reducing the time they could devote to the welfare of their men. In spite of this, the relationship between soldiers and their junior officers survived. Thus the prewar German army and the middle-ranking officers emerge as the villains of the piece in failing to adjust to the conditions of industrialized mass warfare on the Western Front. Watson's carefully constructed rehabilitation of junior leaders in the German army is convincing, and forms a central plank in his most distinctive contribution to the debate, a fundamental reassessment of the factors that brought about the end of the fighting in 1918.

During the final Hundred Days of the war in the West the German army was decisively beaten in the field and effective Allied strategy, tactics, and operational techniques clearly played a substantial part in this. So did the mistakes of German high command, but the state of the German army was also critical. Contemporary British observers commented that the German army in the second half of 1918 was not up to the same standard as the force that had fought in earlier campaigns. Previous historians have pointed out how few men could be fielded by hollowed-out German formations during the Hundred Days, and Wilhelm Deist's notion of large-scale "shirking" in the last months of the war that amounted to a "covert strike" by German soldiers has been particularly influential. Watson revises Deist's thesis by arguing that physical and mental exhaustion of German soldiers, combined with the conviction that they had lost the war, led to mass surrenders "in which officers led their weary men into Allied captivity" (p. 235). Thus inter-rank solidarity had a final twist. Loyalty to each other superseded loyalty to the army or the state. Watson's argument is bold and persuasive, but since his thesis overturns the existing orthodoxy and may well become the new one, this reviewer was left wishing that he had supplied further details and examples of such orderly surrenders. His insight could be tested by examining other armies in defeat. The Austro-Hungarian army in 1918 and, to move forward a war, the British Empire forces in Malaya and Singapore in 1942 are obvious candidates for this treatment.

This is an important book. Watson's arguments have profound implications for our understanding of morale and combat motivation on the Western Front, and his provocative thesis about ordered surrenders at the end of the war means the nature of the Allied victory in November 1918 needs to be reassessed.

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MARK MAZOWER. *Hitler's Empire: How the Nazis Ruled Europe*. Paperback edition. New York: Penguin. 2009. Pp. xl, 725. \$20.00.

This book is magnificently and seductively subversive. Writing in the narrative mode for a general audience, Mark Mazower's lucid prose and preference for straightforward presentation over historiographical debate means that readers may find themselves following his broader—and more radical—arguments despite themselves. The feat of this book is not only its sweeping coverage and vast erudition; it is to mainstream a thesis that hitherto has existed on the margins of scholarship on Nazi Germany.

Since the early 2000s, members of a younger generation of historians, like Jürgen Zimmerer, Wendy Lower in *Nazi Empire-Building and the Holocaust in Ukraine* (2005), and the present writer have been drawing links between German and European imperialism and the Nazi empire and the Holocaust. But most Holocaust historians reject the connection and insist upon the centrality of antisemitism in the Nazi project, a perspective that culminated in Saul Friedländer's feted *The Years of Extermination: Nazi Germany and the Jews, 1939–1945* (2007). Mazower foreshadowed the imperialism thesis earlier in his well-known study of twentieth-century Europe, *Dark Continent* (1998), where he suggested—following Aimé Césaire—that the real transgression of National Socialism was not genocide per se but the importation into Europe of brutal colonial rule over non-Europeans. Moreover, this traumatic experience, rather than a Manichean struggle between "civilization and barbarism," was for Europeans *the* defining experience of the twentieth century. For many of them found liberalism and democracy attractive only after the shock of being treated like "the natives." Mazower seems to be implying that, *pace* the conventional wisdom, the Holocaust is not that defining an experience after all.

This latest book expands and immeasurably deepens his hypothesis by telling the story of the rise and fall of "Greater Germany." It began with the pan-German demographic arm wrestle on the Prussian-Polish borderlands in the late nineteenth century and culminated in the dream of a Central and East European empire encompassing the millions of far-flung ethnic Germans and ruling over the inferior Slavs. Adolf Hitler combined it with geopolitics and an apocalyptic world-historical perspective on rival English, Russian/Soviet, and American empires to envisage a continental autarky based on ruthless exploitation and the expulsion and eventually extermination of dangerous and enemy peoples, above all the Jews.

As Mazower shows, though, intense debate raged among German elites about how the empire should govern its subject peoples, in part because the incredible speed of the military expansion outstripped their administrative and intellectual preparation. Intelligent and pragmatic officers, as well as Italian and Japanese allies, soon realized that Hermann Göring's economic

policies of plunder and Heinrich Himmler's and Reinhard Heydrich's genocidal security imperatives alienated those nationalities likely to collaborate with the occupying Germans. Here was a missed opportunity, as all too many Europeans were prepared to cooperate with the Germans if it meant vanquishing hated parliamentarism and Jews, generating profit, redrawing Versailles borders, gaining statehood, and expelling unwanted minorities. This never applied to Poland, which bore the brunt of German invasion, partition, annexation, and exploitation. Preferring military occupation to collaborative arrangements with independent states, Hitler never appreciated the British tradition of "indirect rule" or civilizational uplift, which he derided as callow sentimentality or a fig leaf for the racial arrogance and outright violence that he thought actually guaranteed the British Empire's greatness. For an ethnonationalist like Hitler, only Germans mattered.

And yet harnessing the revisionist resentments of other states was vital to the Nazi project. In the chapter entitled "The Final Solution: The Jewish Question"—the only one dedicated to the Holocaust—Mazower shows that the geopolitical gains to be made in cooperating with the Germans, rather than antisemitic sentiment, was the decisive factor in the inclination of other nations to yield up their Jews to the German death camps. As soon as the war looked to be lost—as of late 1942—they were far less willing to do so. In this subtle way, the author again challenges the common view about the role of ideology in the unfolding of the Holocaust.

Equally controversial is the narrative denouement. Where *Dark Continent* targeted post-communist capitalist triumphalism by showing that European freedom depended on the Soviet victory over Nazism, this work ends with the transfer of ethnonationalism, the European curse, from the Prussian-Polish borderlands to Palestine courtesy of German Zionists. The forced population movement they envisaged—and achieved—was a familiar and current European lesson. While the destruction of the Nazi empire ultimately brought down the so-called liberal European empires in its wake after the war, the ethnically homogeneous nation-state lived on in Europe and, with concomitant decolonization, was exported around the world. This book, then, is far more than a survey of the Nazi empire; it is a fresh and provocative reinterpretation of global history. If skeptics will continue to insist on the uniqueness of the Holocaust because the Nazi empire was infinitely more ruthless and violent than its western rivals, Mazower has firmly planted the question of Nazi imperialism and consequences of ethnonationalism at the center of these historiographical debates.

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JOHANNA RICKMAN, *Love, Lust, and License in Early Modern England: Illicit Sex and the Nobility*. (Women and Gender in the Early Modern World.) Burlington,

Vt.: Ashgate Publishing Company. 2008. Pp. 236. \$99.95.

What happened to members of the nobility who engaged in illicit sex in later sixteenth and early seventeenth-century England? This is the central question posed by Johanna Rickman's book, with the further goal of illuminating the place of noblewomen in aristocratic culture. The sexual behavior of the lower ranks of society in this period, both men and women, was supervised by the church courts, justices of the peace, and town magistrates. In London, culprits could be sent to Bridewell Hospital to experience the harsh "medicine" of whipping and hard labor. We know also that in the north of England even some of the gentry were hauled before the High Commission to answer for their sexual transgressions. But the individuals whom Rickman discusses were not mere gentry. They were mostly titled and conversant with the court, moving in the highest circles and often related to one another. Indeed, she suggests that the major scandals of the time were particularly associated with a few prominent families, including the Howards and the Devereux—an intriguing idea that would bear further investigation.

Rickman emphasizes that people at this elevated social level mostly enjoyed immunity from ordinary legal procedures, although in the early seventeenth century some of them, notably Robert Howard and Frances Villiers, were indeed brought before the High Commission. Moreover, others did not escape completely. Queen Elizabeth—herself a skillful player of courtly love games, yet touchy about the marriages of her favorites and highly sensitive to the threats that sexual scandals among her maids of honor and ladies of the bedchamber posed to her authority and reputation—took exemplary action whenever necessary, banishing the culprits from court and sometimes imprisoning them. Predictably women got the worst treatment but men could suffer, too. James I—a paterfamilias married to Anna of Denmark, who had her own household—was in a different position and could afford to be somewhat less stringent. A feature of the notorious scandals of his reign was that usually punishment followed only when sexual transgression was associated with other crimes, as when Robert Carr and Frances Howard were convicted for the murder of Sir Thomas Overbury.

Those who escaped public punishment were nonetheless subject to gossip, ridicule, and vituperative abuse. Yet one of Rickman's main findings is that the extent of such censure, even for women, was less than contemporary moral prescriptions might have led us to expect. The centerpiece of the book is an account of the illicit relationship between Penelope Rich, *née* Devereux, wife of Robert Rich, and Charles Blount, Lord Mountjoy and eventually earl of Devonshire. The affair began in the early 1590s and produced five children, and it can be inferred that the couple were tacitly supported by a small, close-knit circle of people "in the know." The matter only became scandalous when in 1605 Rich