Stigma and Sacrifice in the Federal Republic of Germany

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Historians are dumb witnesses to a culture wrangling with itself about its criminal past if they only narrate the sequence of historical controversies such as those that have dotted the German public landscape since the Holocaust. They need to be alive to the subterranean biblical themes flowing beneath the surface froth of events, linking past and present through the continuity of German political emotions that are necessarily collective and therefore sensitive to anxieties about accusations of collective, inherited sin. This article argues that the guilt/shame couplet so common both in public German and academic discourses about post-war Germany cannot account for the intergenerational transmission of moral pollution signified by Holocaust memory. In order to understand the dynamics of German political emotions, it is more useful to employ an alternative couplet: stigma and sacrifice.

Cain said to the Lord, “My punishment is too great to bear! Since you have banished me this day from the soil, and I must avoid Your presence and become a restless wanderer on earth—anyone who meets me may kill me!” The Lord said to him, “I promise, if anyone kills Cain, sevenfold vengeance shall be taken on him.” And the Lord put a mark on Cain, lest anyone who met him should kill him. Cain left the presence of the Lord and settled in the land of Nod, east of Eden.¹

INTRODUCTION

Many Germans and foreign observers regarded the (re)unification of Germany in 1990 as more or less a natural development, as if the breach-
ing of the Berlin Wall late the year before had ended an artificial national division in the heart of Europe. Finally, it seemed, the Germans had their nation-state back and could devote themselves to their national interests like any “normal” people. The celebrations were as heady in Berlin as they were further east when the iron curtain was pulled down after decades of Soviet domination. But concern accompanied euphoria from the outset. Some commentators worried that the breakup of the Soviet empire might herald ethnic chauvinism because the newly liberated nations would revert to nineteenth-century modes of identification to determine their boundaries and citizenship. And sure enough, the spirit of peaceful revolution did not long outlast the posing of the democratic question about the constitution of “the people.” The Czechs and Slovaks, for instance, soon decided on amicable divorce, while corruption and economic stagnation belied the promise of capitalist prosperity that Thatcher and Bush Sr. had proclaimed in triumphant tones for post-communist regimes at the end of history.

For Germany, the defining of a national people over the past sixteen years has proven to be a Sisyphean task. The country’s pretensions to cultural uniformity were challenged in three ways. First, West Germans were stunned by the alien mentality of their eastern compatriots, in particular regarding their attitude to work, money and state entitlements. Many “Wessies” muttered whether unification was such a good idea after all, especially in view of the new tax levied to pay for the massive transfers eastwards. They seemed to feel more at home in the piazzas of Italy, amid the bucolic charm of Greek islands and surrounded by the pastoral splendor of southern France than in the shabby towns of Saxony, Thuringia or Pomerania with their high unemployment, sullen inhabitants and decidedly un-Mediterranean flair. Second, heated debates raged over refugees, naturalization laws, multiculturalism, the stalled integration of “guest workers,” as well as the periodic violence against them by neo-Nazis and disaffected youths. What was the status, for instance, of third-generation descendants of Turkish guestworkers from the 1950s? Neither German nor Turkish, their hybridized identities did not fit the rigid categories of central European national affiliation and citizenship.

These are not new types of questions. They have been debated for over two hundred years in the context of Jewish emancipation. And since 1990, they have been raised anew in relation to a third set of identity-
related issues, namely, the numerous controversies about remembrance of the Nazi past (such as the Goldhagen Debate, the Exhibition of Crimes of the German Army in World War II, assistance of German historians in Nazi imperialism, and the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe in Berlin). Which Germans are being addressed and in whose name are politicians speaking when they express contrition for what happened? Only the descendants of what is called “the perpetrator generation”? Germans and Jews are invariably juxtaposed as if they do not mix, like oil and water, although Germany is home for tens of thousands of Jews for whom German is their mother tongue.  

Of course, despite similarities, there is an important difference between the Turkish and Jewish cases. In the latter, the question of historical justice interposes itself at the site of national self-articulation. A “negative symbiosis” (Hannah Arendt) both unites and divides Germans and Jews. Here the vocabulary of victims, perpetrators and bystanders permeates the discussion, dividing the population into distinct lineages connected to the lives of parents and grandparents in the 1930s and 1940s. For this reason, public discussion about the common past is rooted in the intimate sphere of the family, through kitchen table conversations between the generations in which memories and experiences are transmitted, whether accurately or not. Collective identity is formed with the necessary corollary: on whose side were “my people” all those years ago?  

As might be expected, the vast majority of such conversations are conducted by those Germans whom National Socialism was supposed to benefit. But what about those whom it was supposed to exterminate? Many of their descendants live in Germany as well, and occasionally remind the majority of the impossibility of presuming a seamless national identity and homogenous collective “we/us.” Similarly, the rest of the world not only judges Germany by its treatment of Jews and other minorities, but also by how it remembers World War II. In newspapers and learned journals, reporters and scholars from around the world keep careful watch on the German public sphere for signs of self-pity, lest its solemn duty to remember the Holocaust be downplayed and nationalist feeling return. And yet, is there not a tension between demanding in the name of multiculturalism that Germany today is too diverse to admit of national modes of identification (i.e., Germany as a community of descent or fate) and also insisting
that the supposedly ontologically stable entity called “the Germans” must confess guilt, express contrition and atone for the Holocaust.\(^\text{10}\)

The tortuous construction of collective identity in Germany after Nazism and the Holocaust takes place within this tension. How do non-Jewish Germans recreate an identity in view of this aporia, especially if younger Germans are somehow held indirectly responsible—whether in the vocabulary of guilt or shame—for the Nazi murder of European Jewry? The case of postwar Germany’s reckoning with the Holocaust shows that secular vocabulary exhausts itself when approaching what is routinely called “evil,” itself a word from moral philosophy with a religious connotation. For this reason, the German philosopher Karl Jaspers confessed the limitations of his own finely grained moral distinctions in his famous 1947 book, *The Question of German Guilt*: “language fails” when a people’s guilt brings it “face to face with nothingness.”\(^\text{11}\)

Historians are dumb witnesses to a culture, a society, a people, wrangling with itself about the criminality of its past if they rest content with narrating the sequence of historical controversies such as those that have dotted the German public sphere since the war. They need to be alive to the subterranean biblical themes flowing beneath the surface froth of events, linking past and present through the continuity of German political emotions that are necessarily collective and therefore sensitive to anxieties about accusations of collective, inherited sin. This article argues that the guilt/shame couplet so common both in public German and academic discourses about postwar Germany cannot account for the intergenerational transmission of moral pollution signified by Holocaust memory. In order to understand the dynamics of German political emotions, we ought to employ the concepts that better capture the nexus of individual and collective identity in the regeneration of the German community: stigma and sacrifice.

“DIALOGUE” ACROSS THE DIVIDE?

The “dialogue” between “Germans” and “Jews” demonstrates the dilemmas of post-Holocaust German identity creation. A hitherto ignored example occurred in late 1998, at the height of the debate about the proposed Berlin Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe, as well as
the dispute between the writer Martin Walser and the leader of German Jewry Ignatz Bubis about the public commemoration of the Holocaust. In this overheated public sphere, the weekly magazine *Der Spiegel* asked three Jewish students about their feelings regarding Holocaust memory in Germany. Mark Jaffé, Hilda Joffe and Igor Gulko gave their answers in an interview-article entitled “Condemned to Watch.” Hilda mourned the fact that her large extended family, once numbering over 90, had been decimated. “Today, we sit at a small table,” she lamented. Mark said that it would be good if more people were personally conscious of what had happened then, but—addressing Walser’s complaint about the institutionalization of Holocaust memory—he would prefer ritualized remembrance to none at all. Igor reported that he had non-Jewish friends who confessed that they found it difficult to be reminded daily of the Holocaust. One even felt molested by it. He could understand that they did not want to feel guilty for what their ancestors had done, but the alternative of forgetting and looking away was unacceptable. After all, he said, as a Jew he thought about it every day. Hilda added that all Germans were implicated. Members of the younger generation did not want to accept that their grandparents may have participated in the exploitation and expulsion of Jews. Although they did not identify themselves as non-German or as citizens of another nation-state, these three Jewish students equated “Germans” with the people who had perpetrated the Holocaust against their relatives.

How would non-Jewish Germans react to this notion? Stirring the pot of identity politics, *Der Spiegel* published a reply three weeks later by a non-Jewish student, Kathi-Gesa Klafke, under the revealing title “So Inherited Sin, After All?” Kathi-Gesa, born in 1975, said she resented being made to feel guilty by the three Jewish students. Reality was too messy, she insisted, for human collectives, if they existed at all, to be absolutized or categorized neatly under terms like “victims” and “perpetrators”: members of her own family had been persecuted, not all Jews had been angels and, what is more, many other nationalities had participated in their murder. Pointing to her own Christianity, she said that only religion divided her from the Jewish students. To distinguish radically between Germans and Jews, as Hilda, Mark and Igor had, was in fact racist. It was time, Kathi-Gesa declared, to confine “the Holocaust to history with the extermination of the Indians, the slave trade, serfdom,
the gulag, colonization, the persecution of the Christians, the Inquisition, the Crusades … so that everyone can learn from them.” What upset her was that “non-Germans are content to demonize the Germans, since something like that [the Holocaust] can only happen there.” Germany was being victimized, she suggested. “No other country has so little national identity as the Germans, and cares so much about what their neighbors think of them.” The discrimination against Germans abroad was “absurd and is a form of racism. It is nothing other than the instrumentalization of Auschwitz.”

Kathi-Gesa reflected many of the anxieties that non-Jewish Germans have about Holocaust memory. Anticipating the argument that, as a German, she was responsible for the memory of Nazism and the Holocaust, she said that to link her closely to “what occurred then” amounted to an accusation of “inherited sin” (Erbsünde). She dismissed this accusation by pointing out that if Jews are no longer collectively accused for crucifying Jesus why are Germans still called perpetrators? “I have a right to be held responsible only for my own actions,” she insisted. Moreover, not all Germans had been guilty. Her grandmother had not stolen Jewish furniture. “On the contrary, her own [furniture] was burned, together with her house and family [referring to the bombing of German cities]. Neither you nor anyone else has the right to judge in this way,” she said to Hilda. In fact, to call “my generation” perpetrators, Kathi-Gesa concluded, would “achieve the opposite of contrition and awakening: rage and truculence.”

This exchange is remarkable not only for the vehemence of Kathi-Gesa’s reply, but also for its continuities with the reactions of Germans to their occupation in the immediate postwar period. Germans then had been indignant about the accusation of “collective guilt” leveled at them by the American authorities in particular. “These Disgraces: Your Fault! You observed quietly and silently tolerated it…. That is your great guilt. You all are co-responsible for these gruesome crimes,” the posters shouted in large print, accompanied by pictures of piled remains of murdered camp victims. The subsequent denazification campaign, prohibition on fraternization with Germans, and rhetoric of a regressed national character that needed “reeducation,” with its suggestion that the national culture was fatally flawed, emphasized further the impression of a collective guilt accusation.14
The reaction to it was similar to that of Kathi-Gesa: recourse to Christian universalism, a lack of empathy for the victims of Germans, a reluctance to name the crimes (the vague references to “what occurred then”), an insistence on personal victim status and, above all, a rejection of collective guilt. There was even talk of Germany being treated like the Jews, as a pariah nation; indeed—with reference to the dire food situation in 1946/47 and to Morgenthau’s plans to de-industrialize the country—that Germany’s national existence was imperiled.¹⁵ The participants in the intense discussion about collective guilt immediately after the war—a debate in which all German commentators, irrespective of ideology or religion, flatly rejected the concept—insisted that the accusation was as invalid as blaming Jews collectively for putative crimes—just as Kathi-Gesa Klakfe had repeated in 1998.¹⁶

THE EXHAUSTION OF SECULAR VOCABULARY

The exchange between these students and recent research on the social psychology of members of groups that have committed transgressions show that the guilt/shame couplet cannot account for the biblical notion of an “inherited sin” that supposedly affects entire groups.¹⁷ The concept of guilt is of limited use because it is linked to individual responsibility. Whether individuals feels guilt for a violation committed by a member of their group depends on whether they regard the violation as ascribable to particular acts over which they had some control. How can later generations be held guilty for events that occurred before they were born or when they were children? Indeed, how can collectives and groups be held guilty or innocent for mass crimes at all? The literature may be correct in pointing out that those ridden with guilt want to repair the damage, but its analyses are synchronic and do not account for the historical transmission of trauma.¹⁸

That the vocabulary of guilt and shame is insufficient, especially for transgenerational questions, is evident in Michael Schneider’s observation that in Germany the relation “between the guilty and their offspring remains fixed as inexplicable, imprescriptible guilt, comparable to Biblical guilt within the framework of history.”¹⁹ Kathi’s innovation was to introduce a temporal dimension to the anxiety about collective guilt: inherited
sin (or guilt). This is indeed a biblical notion: I will visit “the iniquities of the fathers on the children, and on the third and the fourth generations of those who hate Me,” God declares (Exodus 20:5, 34:6–7, and Deuteronomy 5:9). “Inherited sin” circulates in a field of discourse with an ensemble of other biblical and religious terms about the German past: taboo, heresy, orthodoxy, sacrality, “thorn in the flesh” (Stachel im Fleisch). Not for nothing do journalists habitually resort to theological rhetoric in depicting the relationship between Germans and their past. Only by remembering the Holocaust with contrition, wrote one, “can [Germans] again find their spiritual balance (seelisches Gleichgewicht).”

The notion of biblical guilt suggests a transgenerational curse or communal pollution, an insight of the sociologist Norbert Elias who thought that Germans “have to struggle again and again with the fact that the we-image of the Germans is soiled by the memory of the excesses perpetrated by the Nazis, and that others, and perhaps even their own consciences, blame them for what Hitler and his followers did.” Moreover, for the German ear, as Ralf Dahrendorf has pointed out, the term Kollektivschuld signifies more than collective guilt in English. “‘Guilt’ (Schuld) in German always has the undertone of the irredeemable, incapable of being canceled by metaphysical torment; Kollektivschuld binds every individual as such for all time.”

In order to address the transgenerational aspects of guilt and shame, it is necessary to theorize more deeply what Elias means by “soiled”: the “contamination,” “pollution,” “stain,” and “taint” that is often said to mark postwar Germany. According to the anthropologist Ghassan Hage, we need to understand such notions in the context of kinship and giftgiving. Feelings connected to group life, such as pride, guilt and shame, can only be generated and then circulate because of family life; it is in the family that parents pass on the gift of social viability to their children. The gift of social life presupposes mutual obligations. The greater the gift’s social viability, the more likely it is that the children will be naturally inclined to participate constructively in the community. That is why recent research has found that memories of the war and interpretations of the Holocaust are mediated above all by family conversation rather than by the education system. The private sphere, more than the public sphere, is the site and first source of social memory. Socially viable identities are impaired if
parents are difficult to identify with because they were implicated in crimes or refused to acknowledge the criminality of the Nazi regime.\textsuperscript{26}

But the feelings of ambivalence that many younger postwar Germans had toward their parents were not just based on the flawed social identity they transmitted; it is that parents were also sources of nurturing. The intense feelings of pollution stem from the fact that it was difficult to reject the gift out of hand. Referring to Adolf Eichmann’s son, Hage explains:

Paradoxically, but more probably, it is because he inherited his father’s evil through the love and protection that the latter gave him that he experienced such a form of oppressive pollution. It came with the gift of social life itself. The pollution defines one of the “we”s that constitute his social viability, and he was forced to relate to it.\textsuperscript{27}

There is no doubt that many German children felt polluted, and even saw themselves as victims of their parents. A number of Germans described themselves as “the Jew of [the] family.”\textsuperscript{28} “Monika” made plain the consequences of having a Nazi father hanged as a war criminal: “That people would despise me, find me detestable, because of him.” As might be expected, the relationship with her mother, who persisted in idealizing her disgraced husband, was fraught with ambiguity. “Monika” both pitied her and was frustrated by her obtuse unwillingness to recognize the criminality of her husband and the regime.\textsuperscript{29} “Rudolf” felt so tainted that he believed he “must not have any children. This line must come to an end with me. What should I tell the little ones about Grandpa?”\textsuperscript{30} Helga Mueller was haunted by her Nazi father’s past: “I feel his guilt on me—I’ve carried this burden ever since…. I have sensed (genocide victims) walking through my bedroom.”\textsuperscript{31}

Powerful as this individual sense of pollution might be, however, it does not account for the anxieties about the collective self that are biblical in nature, namely that Germans as a whole would be a cursed or pariah people. The exhaustion of the secular vocabulary of guilt, shame and pollution is evident in the pronouncements of German political and cultural elites about Germany’s international image. German foreign policy mandarins have always been acutely conscious of the observation by US occupation authority chief John McCloy that “[t]he world will carefully watch the new Germany and one of the tests by which it will be judged
will be its attitude towards the Jews and how it treats them.” Consequently, the first chancellor of the Federal Republic, Konrad Adenauer, insisted on a treaty of reparations with Israel in the face of bitter resistance in his own party because German reputation was at stake: “The name of our Fatherland must once again have a value which corresponds to the historical achievement of the German people in culture and economics.” His colleague Eugen Gerstenmaier noted in the early 1950s that Germany lived in a ghetto surrounded by antipathy, but that “this treaty has the goal to bring Germany out of the ghetto completely and forever.” “It seems to me,” he added, that “it is time, it is high time, that we no longer let ourselves be ashamed. The honor of Germany requires it!”

This imperative endured over the decades. Leah Rosh, the initiator of the Berlin Holocaust memorial, told the colloquium deliberating on its design in 1997 that their discussions were being registered “very closely” in Israel and the USA. In fact, she had come up with the idea of the memorial after visiting the Yad Vashem Holocaust museum in Jerusalem and learning about the plans for a memorial museum in Washington, DC. Why was there no central memorial in Berlin? she had asked then. The resentment about expectations from abroad—interpreted as effectively violating German sovereignty—led the editor of the weekly magazine *Der Spiegel*, Rudolf Augstein, to remark about the wretched imperative to please US “east coast” elites with the memorial. The right-wing Christian Democrat parliamentarian Martin Hohmann objected to the proposed Berlin memorial with similar language:

> What do our voters say? Many only speak about the issue under their breath (*hinter vogehtaten Hand*). That is not a good sign in a democracy. Overwhelmingly, the Holocaust Memorial is rejected, also by many intellectuals as well as many Jewish fellow citizens. Not a few find the planned memorial to be a mark of Cain (*Kainsmal*), an expression of self-contempt.

Even Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, who welcomed the memorial, defended it in terms that referred to external marks.

> This barbaric crime will always be part of German history. For my country it signifies the absolute moral abomination, a denial of all
things civilized without precedent or parallel. The new, democratic Germany has drawn its conclusions. The historic and moral responsibility for Auschwitz has left an indelible mark on us.\textsuperscript{37}

The customary rhetoric of guilt that dominates the public discourse and scholarly literature on postwar German political emotions about collective identity and the Nazi past misses such voices mentioning inherited collective sin, national honor and disgrace, Cain and Abel, and indelible marks.\textsuperscript{38} The inability of the guilt concept, including hybrids like “inherited guilt,” to capture the nuances of collective political emotions indicated by the recourse to religious and biblical language points to the need for alternatives.

**Stigma**

The conceptual work done by terms like pollution plainly adds to our understanding of the moral-emotional dilemmas faced by postwar Germans. But even such language is unsatisfactory because it invests pollution with ontological status: it simply exists, with the implication that those who recognize it as a challenge to transformation are brave souls, and those who disavow it in order to guard their nation’s honor are craven and immoral. This is not a proposition that can withstand social scientific scrutiny because it overlooks the well-known fact, made famous by Mary Douglas’s observation that pollution is “matter out of place,” that a cultural system of meaning determines the polluting potential of any person or thing.\textsuperscript{39} In accusing Germans of seeking to ignore the stain of the Nazi past—in effect, their crippled group self—commentators are blind to their own participation in the construction of the stain.\textsuperscript{40} After all, “[o]nly he is defiled who is regarded as defiled.”\textsuperscript{41}

For this reason, it is useful to think of postwar German memory in terms of stigma. In its Greek origins, stigma meant a bodily sign of inferior social status, a brand on a criminal or outcast. It is logically and causally prior to pollution because the stigmatized group self pollutes its members’ generations after the crime. As the sociologist Erving Goffman observed, “tribal stigma of race, nation and religion … can be transmitted through lineage and equally contaminate all members of a family.”\textsuperscript{42}
Stigma also has the advantage of a greater array of meanings than pollution. For many within the cultural system, of course, it is a mark of actual, not constructed inferiority. But some of those subject to stigma regard themselves as victims of persecution rather than as justifiably outcast. And for the outside observer, the term highlights its socially bound meaning: stigma as a flawed social identity, an identity that is only stigmatized in a specific cultural system. In other words, stigma is a status that is eminently contestable.

For all that, evidence of stigma is not readily apparent in the confessions of Germans in autobiographical statements or interviews because stigma is not an emotion one experiences like guilt. If a person says, “I feel stigmatized,” he or she is referring to an externally imposed marker of social inferiority rather than an interior experience. This distinction means the clues to the existence of stigma must be sought in the biblical vocabulary mentioned above, as well as in philosophically incoherent concepts like collective guilt. The prevalence of such terms indicates that anxiety about the stigma of the Nazi past is palpable in German memory discourse. The right-wing parliamentarian quoted above, Martin Hohmann, signaled it when he expressed his concern that the Berlin memorial would be a Kainsmal, a mark of Cain. Writing in 1998, Rudolf Augstein, rejected the memorial project because its effect would be to stigmatize Germans in terms of the Cain and Abel story.

If we did not proceed with the Eisenman plan, which would be sensible, we get bashed in the world press only once. If we do, I fear that we will create anti-Semites out of those who would perhaps otherwise not be anti-Semites, and then we get bashed in the world press every year, for life, until the seventh generation.

The writer Martin Walser also argued that the memorial was a provocation that would create anti-Semites and ensure that bad news about Germany would forever plague the country. Augstein, who had become increasingly nationalist throughout the 1990s—he was an early and vehement critic of Daniel J. Goldhagen’s Hitler’s Willing Executioners (1996), which he read as an indictment of Germans collectively as biological anti-Semites—continued by asking whether “we can force our descendants to carry our personal shame.” Like Walser, he was also suspicious of Jews who
advocated the institutionalization of this shame in the memorial, which he called a “monstrosity.” Rejecting the “somewhat superior” (*etwas überheblich*) suggestion of the German-Jewish conservative politician and media personality, Michel Friedman, to force German youth to take co-responsibility for Auschwitz, Augstein concluded that it was impossible to do more than ensure that the facts were taught at schools and universities. Germans ought not be stigmatized forever.46

The question of stigma arises in foreign policy, as well. Helmut Schmidt, the West German chancellor in 1981, attempted to reject a stigmatized German identity when he told Israelis—after Prime Minister Menachem Begin had raised the collective guilt accusation following the Federal Republic’s agreement to sell Leopard tanks to Saudi Arabia—that his foreign policy would not be held hostage to Auschwitz. Three years later, the next chancellor, Helmut Kohl, showed that guilt and collective guilt were effectively synonyms for stigma when he told Israelis on a visit to their country that he was blessed “by the grace of late birth” (unlike Schmidt, who, born in 1918, had been a soldier in the war), with the implication that he, and Germans generally, could not be stigmatized by the Holocaust.47 He also ventured to shield subsequent generations: “The young German generation does not regard Germany’s history as a burden but as a challenge for the future. They are prepared to shoulder their responsibility. But they refuse to acknowledge a collective guilt for the deeds of their fathers.”48

Germans like Kohl felt the Holocaust was being instrumentalized to persecute or victimize all Germans, even younger ones born long after the war. Stigma was also the underlying bone of contention in the celebrated “Historians’ Dispute” of the mid-1980s. It was concern about the growing intensity of Holocaust discourse in West Germany that led the historian Ernst Nolte to give a controversial lecture on the “past that will not fade away.”49 His target was the stigma implicit in the belief that the Holocaust was unique and that the German people/nation and its history were consequently abnormal, i.e., permanently set off in horror from the traditions of other nations. The writer Günter Grass exemplified Nolte’s concern when, during the unification debates in 1990, he wrote that the civilizational rupture of the Holocaust amounted to an ineffable evil, even a negative sublime that forever marked his country: it “will never cease to be present; our disgrace will never be repressed or mastered.”50
The prominent leftist journalist Erich Kuby wrote at the same time of Auschwitz as Germany’s *Kainsmal* and followed Grass in disqualifying Germany from the right of unification because of its abnormal history. To “regard the German people as a people like any other leads, in the last instance, to see even the ‘successes’ of its criminal energy as totally normal.”51 A philosophically reflective version of this belief was proffered by the philosopher Jürgen Habermas, who argued that national memory needed to be regarded in terms of a “dialectic of normalization.” To continue to resemble a “normal” Western country, Germany needed to think of itself as abnormal, in other words, as stigmatized: “following the break in civilization from which the Federal Republic emerged, the situation was so utterly abnormal that it was only the painful avoidance of a purely self-deceptive consciousness of ‘normalcy’ that allowed the rebirth of halfway normal conditions in this country.”52 Germans ought to embrace the Holocaust, he thought, as an “element of a broken national identity” that is “branded (*eingebraunnt*) as a persistent disturbance and warning.”53 These are some examples of stigma in public life, but its effects were also apparent in the intimate sphere of the family.

**STIGMA AND GERMAN FAMILY LIFE**

The qualitative interview research on family life in postwar Germany reveals that the international construction of the Nazi past as stigma—as secular metaphor for evil, especially in the West—is incompatible with a positive German national subjectivity. Such an identity, like all national identities, is based on the affirmative continuity of ethnic traditions.54 The *Schicksalgemeinschaft* (community of destiny) that constitutes the nation, as Karl Deutsch observed long ago, is reproduced through intragroup communication, above all via family socialization.55 Positively loaded childhood emotions connected with the intergenerational transmission of these traditions cannot be reconciled with consciousness of these crimes unless they are displaced beyond the ingroup. To have real empathy with victims of the Holocaust entails a less affective relationship to the family, community and nation because to acknowledge the implication—and thus the pollution—of these entities destroys basic trust in them. To live with pollution as a constituent part of one’s core identity is impossible, or
at least tortuous, as the nightmares about the Holocaust of some young Germans attests.\(^{56}\)

These crimes are, literally, unbearable for patriotic Germans. The chasm between victims and perpetrator, therefore, is impossible to bridge without doing violence to traditional patterns of national subjectivity.\(^{57}\) It is a zero-sum game. Surveys conducted in the Federal Republic over the decades confirm this conclusion. While by the 1990s about 60 percent of Germans said they felt ashamed by the crimes committed by Germans against Jews, only a minority had “morally confronted and internalized both the perspective of the victim and the guilt of their fellow Germans.” That is to say, only those with “low identification with their national background” evinced “empathy for Holocaust victims.”\(^{58}\)

These reactions show that the stigma of the Holocaust results in “psychological dissonance” among Germans, that is, discomfort caused by the violation of one’s self-conception because of the conflict between two emotionally salient beliefs\(^{59}\)—in this case, the incommensurability between the view of oneself as moral and socially respected and the fact of belonging to a group that is stigmatized as having committed the worst of all genocides, and within living memory. There appear to be two options for Germans. On the one hand, what one writer calls “the problem of their parents’ moral degradation” is so great that children must disassociate their family from the Nazi contamination about which they know so much from public education.\(^{60}\) Probably the most common reaction in German families, this avoidance maneuver continues to this day in the relationship of children to their grandparents, the war generation that is passing from the scene. In fact, as Harald Welzer and his collaborators found in their many interviews, the imperative to insulate the family unit from the Nazi contamination is so strong that a process of “cumulative heroization” takes place in which grandchildren imagine their grandparents as resisters and/or anti-Nazis despite evidence to the contrary.

This phenomenon is by no means the same as the much discussed silence about the Holocaust said to have characterized the 1950s.\(^{61}\) On the contrary, the children study the Holocaust intensively at school, and the more they know about it, the greater the need to ensure that their family was not involved.\(^{62}\) They are engaging in what Gabrielle Rosenthal calls “repair strategies” to exonerate their family as people uninvolved in the undeniable Nazi criminality, perhaps even as victims of the regime and its
consequences. The need to absolve the family from Nazi crimes leads to absolving the nation of the crimes because the nation is thought of in familial terms—as a community of descent. For the majority of Germans, talk of German guilt is experienced as a constant presentation of the national disgrace, that is, as a stigma. Their dissonance-reduction strategy is to maintain the conventional core self and its attachment to parents and Germany by denying that the group self ought to be stigmatized. Its rhetoric of normality, then, reflects a desire for national innocence—the end of stigma—so that the collective self (“we Germans”) can become a non-traumatized component of the self. The writer Monika Maron expressed this desire when she wrote that Germans abroad were victims of racism and that younger Germans were not responsible for the Holocaust; there was no such thing as “inherited guilt” (Erbschuld).

On the other hand, those children of Nazi parents who found that their gift of social life was unviable engaged in various strategies to invent new identities in order to escape the stigma of their collective identity. One option was to cut off all contact with the polluted generation and try to “make a fresh start,” as did one young couple that did not invite their parents to their wedding. More extreme still was to renounce one’s national identity altogether by joining the people that one’s people had persecuted, such as “Menachem” who became a rabbi and moved to Jerusalem. Or Liesel Appel who, also a convert, recounted, “As soon as I could, I moved away ... I felt compelled to get as far away from my people as possible. I changed my identity, name, and religion.” Gottfried Wagner, a descendant of Richard Wagner, likewise left the country. Repelled by his family’s perceived inability to critically deal with the past, he moved to Italy where, conscious of belonging to a “prominent family of Nazi perpetrators,” he experiences his “identities as a multicultural and social involvement for which I have to exert myself daily with the intensive consciousness of a German who was born after the Holocaust.” Analogously, the most drastic reaction short of suicide for members of the perpetrator generation was literally to invent a new identity altogether, like Hans Schwerte and Hans-Robert Jauß, who had been SS officers and made prominent careers for themselves after the war as left-leaning literature professors.

The problem of stigma and the psychological dissonance it causes for Germans who feel they cannot relinquish their German identity is
solved by inventing a new German identity—a “non-German German identity.” The dominant emotion here besides guilt or shame is indignation. Indignation impels them not simply to make amends in the manner of historical justice, which tries to ameliorate some of the consequences of the crime and, as much as possible, restore relations that had obtained as if the crime had not been committed. Indignation also demands the moral rehabilitation of the group. For example, Anna Rosmus, after whom the protagonist in Michael Verhoeven’s film *The Nasty Girl* (1990) is modeled, chose to morally regenerate her social environment by campaigning to rename streets, to have survivors visit from abroad and to erect memorials about their experiences. Similarly, the writer Carola Stern, who had been a Nazi youth leader, founded Amnesty International in Germany after the war. Championing non-national values like universal human rights allowed her to assume the role of the reformed sinner. She had, in the words of Goffman, engaged in “a transformation of self from someone with a particular blemish into someone with a record of having corrected a particular blemish.”

Such transformations are not limited to the individual. With personal change comes a “concern with in-group purification,” an imperative to rehabilitate or regulate members of a community exhibiting the stereotypically stigmatized attribute, behavior that induces shame in the eyes of those who regard it stigmatized. “Stigma management” becomes the main occupation for those who feel they have developed a new German group self. This phenomenon seems ubiquitous when cultural elites wish to gain acceptance for their group in the eyes of “civilized opinion.” The observations of sociologist Zygmunt Bauman about the group emotions of emancipated German Jews regarding eastern European Jews who had come to Germany at the end of the nineteenth century are particularly apposite because both groups were stigmatized and their elites were striving to overcome the social handicap of stigma. By incarnating the stigmatized Jewish identity, the *Ostjuden* induced feelings of shame and even provoked disavowal of “uncivilized kinsmen,” leading to campaigns of stigma management by emancipated German Jews.

Since the end of the war, much of the German intelligentsia has been scrutinizing the population in a similar manner, especially when intellectuals are embarrassed in the eyes of the world by “typically German” behavior. To represent themselves to the international public sphere as
untypically German—as “non-German Germans”—they must transform the disadvantage of the stigma into a moral advantage. This transformation necessarily enlists the victims of the Holocaust into a historical drama in which their murder by the Nazis becomes the occasion for the founding moment of a new polity and a new German subjectivity.

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If the intelligentsia and sections of the political class, as well as the international society whose approval they crave, have participated in constructing stigma, they must transform it into a socially viable collective identity for themselves. The only way such a German subjectivity can remember the murdered Jews of Europe is to cast them as sacrificial victims. Remembering the Holocaust redeems those Germans prepared to identify with the victims rather than the perpetrators. By seeking forgiveness from the world public sphere and demonstrating that they have atoned for the Holocaust and changed for the better, these Germans cast Jews in the role of the sacrificed Jesus in a secularized christomimesis, only now the Christ killers are not the Jews but the Nazis. Such Germans have left their sinful selves behind and walk in grace.

Of course, non-German Germans do not regard themselves as having killed the Jews so that a redeemed Germany could be born. The chronological unfolding of the Holocaust is inconsistent with the redemptive logic of this modality of German remembrance. Regardless, despite this temporal aporia, this memory is based on a substitutionary theology in which the Jews were killed so that a new Germany can be born. For non-German Germans, the Berlin memorial thus works as stigmata, the divine sign of grace and of Jesus’ sacrifice, rather than as a stigma, a source of shame. Moreover, the sinful but repentant community needs to keep resacrificing the Jews in regular, national rituals in the same way as Christians regularly celebrate the Eucharist. The memory of the murdered Jews thereby serves as a permanent resource for collective regeneration. So where Christians are redeemed by identifying with the sacrifice of Jesus rather than with the figure of Pilate or the ancient Jews who called for his execution—the so-called Christ killers who have been the staple of anti-Jewish prejudice through the ages—the post-Holocaust German community is redeemed
by remembering the death of the Jews and excoriating their killers, the Nazis. The sacrifice is, in the words of Bruce Lincoln, a “transformative negation” because one entity is given up for the benefit of another. 

The link between the victims of the Holocaust and the crucified Jesus has recurred in postwar Germany. Eugon Kogon, in his famous book Der SS-Staat (1946), cited a poem, “Die letzte Epiphanie—aus dem Zyklus Dies Irae,” by Werner Bergengruen that makes this equation. And it was made by the premier intellectual defender of the Berlin memorial, Jürgen Habermas, in reference to the crucifixion scene depicted in the famous Isenheim altarpiece by Matthias Grünewald (c. 1513–15): Jesus is on the cross, at his feet is the lamb holding a cross, the symbol of the sacrifice for humanity’s sins, and John stands behind the lamb, Bible in hand, pointing to Jesus. Explaining the contemporary meaning of the scene, Habermas wrote: “The [accusatory] pointed finger of a museum or memorial pedagogy is different from that of John in the altar picture of Matthias Grünewald.” Germans were not being collectively accused by the memorial, Habermas wanted to convey, because John is not pointing at those who executed Jesus but at Jesus himself. Germans need not feel the memorial is an embodiment of their disgrace, a Schandmal, as Hohmann and Augstein contended. Rather, Germans could build a tolerant, diverse—that is, less German—society if they identified with the Jews of the Holocaust in the same way as Christians identified with the victimized Jesus. The US-based German historian Michael Geyer also entreated Germans to regard the Holocaust in this manner.

What do Germans need (now that it is entirely in their hands), in view of the war and genocide they caused, in order to live with themselves and the world in the future? That is the problem of self-realization in historical consciousness today. My response is that this renewal of civilization requires a national history that in the historical reflection on war and annihilation will do justice to the need for self-recognition among later generations.

German memory had to make the murdered Jews the center of its historical consciousness; “remembrance of the dead” was essential to its social transformation. Like the Zionist interpretation of the meaning of Israel’s foundation, Germany was moving “from destruction to rebirth.”
This enlistment of the Holocaust has social consequences if we conceive of sacrifice as an exchange between a deity and a sacrificer, and communication between sacred and profane, as Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss did in their groundbreaking essay on the subject in 1898. Like their contemporary Emile Durkheim, with whom they collaborated, Hubert and Mauss saw society as the hidden God to whom sacrifice was made. Not only was the sacrificer transported momentarily into a sacred realm, but social solidarity was fostered by the sacralization of altruistic, communal norms that transcended the egoistical interests of the bourgeois self. This line of argument has been continued by the sociologist of religion Hans Mol, who regarded religion as sacralized group identity. By objectifying the sacred into a system of symbols, focusing emotional attachments on this system through sacrifice, and institutionalizing the sacred in rituals and rites, collective identities were anchored and lent a sacral aura.

Discursive taboos—identifiable when questions are prohibited and cannot be answered by rational argument—accompany such a sacralized identity. Since the Historians’ Dispute, an important taboo in non-German German circles has been to compare Nazi and Communist crimes. Those who have, like Ernst Nolte, were effectively purged from much of intellectual life, and even stigmatized. To be accused of arguing “like Nolte” has been a knockout argument in sections of the German intelligentsia since the mid-1980s. This taboo was challenged from the outset by conservative writers, but more recently also from within leftist circles in the debate about the Black Book of Communism, which appeared in Europe in 1998. Thus the editor of the taz newspaper Stefan Reinecke mocked the Marxist historian Wolfgang Wippermann’s “prayer-wheel like” insistence that the Holocaust was unique compared to Stalinist crimes. Another leftist journalist Reinhard Mohr decried the “taboo guards” protecting the record of communist regimes, while social democratic historian Heinrich August Winkler also said the time had come to end the taboo on associating communism and fascism. All three critics also noted how the taboo sacralized a certain type of anti-German identity. The Holocaust was used for the “negative creation of meaning” (Sinnstiftung), Reinecke observed in an article tellingly entitled “Don’t touch my Holocaust.” Winkler followed him in ascribing the prohibition on comparison to the left’s “negative nationalism,” which he thought was “no less pseudo-
religious than ‘real’ nationalism.”\textsuperscript{90} For Mohr, the taboo was part of a “catechism” of the “leftist petit-bourgeois” (\textit{linken deutschen Spießers}): “The only remaining issue we are dealing with is the sulking intellectual ego, the very last stage of a gradually fading, inner-worldly redemptive religion: the negative utopia of Furor teutonicus.”\textsuperscript{91}

But who is the god to whom non-German Germans are making a sacrifice? It is the world public sphere, whose recognition of a non-stigmatized identity they seek. The variety of sacrificial practices worldwide, however, indicates that they need not be directed only to a god; they can also be addressed to ancestors. The impulse to engage in expatiation—to propitiate gods or ancestors—derives from the need to conceal from the community the fact that its existence is based on a founding act of violence which needs to be commuted and ascribed to another source. This concealing function of sacrifice is likewise evident in Germany. The belief that the Jews died for “our” sins is only possible for non-German Germans because they no longer identify with the “perpetrator generation,” their own ancestors.\textsuperscript{92} Political emotions and political theology are enmeshed to release religious-like energies of identity reconstruction enabled by the hyper-identification with the terrible fate of the Jews. The sacrificial modality of memory inheres in the fact that it conceals to non-German Germans that they are effectively engaging in a form of ancestor worship—the murdered Jews become their functional ancestors. And the ancestors—and Jews today—are bidden to accept the sacrifice and sanctify the sacrificer.

The proposition that non-German Germans have made victims of the Holocaust their ancestors is supported by Freud’s commentary in his \textit{Moses and Monotheism}. In Freud’s retelling of the biblical story, after the Israelites murdered Moses, they reverted to their old polytheistic religion until finally turning to Moses’ monotheism. The perpetrator collective experienced a trauma of its own, but only much later, when the descendants of the killers realized what their ancestors had done. They responded by devoting themselves to Moses’ law.\textsuperscript{93} In fact, this train of events can be interpreted in sacrificial terms. Because the sacralization process takes time to unfold, a sacrificial rendering of events may only occur generations later, as was the case with Jesus’ execution.\textsuperscript{94} Certainly, the sacrificial memorialization of the murdered took over forty years to develop in West Germany, and it has produced a new self in a regenerated and sanctified
non-German German community committed to human rights. The German participation in NATO’s attacks on Serbia in Kosovo in 1999 was justified by reference to Auschwitz.  

Ancestor worship entailing veneration and homage is linked to yet another dimension of sacrifice: the consumption of the offering. It is with a certain bewilderment that foreign observers of Germany note “a sort of Jewish chic among non-Jewish Germans that manifests itself in the massive proliferation of klezmer bands featuring non-Jewish Germans as producers and consumers to a degree that exists nowhere else in the world, including the United States and Israel.” These energies are also evident in efforts to revive Jewish culture in Germany, an exemplary act of anamnesis like the Christian Eucharist. Just as Christ is re-presented to the community of believers so it may be redeemed, so German culture after the Holocaust is regenerated after its moral bankruptcy by re-presenting the Jewish body in regular public commemorative rituals. Thus former Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer saw the redemption of Germany in the revival of Jewish life there. It was all the more necessary to ensure that Jews could live in safety in Germany again. Germany today possessed a “second chance” for the German-Jewish symbiosis even if the return of the Jewish soul to Germany was impossible. “Today there is once again Jewish life in Germany and this is certainly one of the most important victories won over Hitler and National Socialism.”

The community is regenerated not only by expiation but also by cleansing. Anyone who reminds non-German Germans of their inescapable membership of the perpetrator collective disturbs the sacrificial logic of their identity and must be expelled. Whereas for the Nazis the Jews were stigmatized and considered unclean, polluting German blood, for non-German Germans it is the former Nazis and nationalists who are stigmatized and who contaminate the new republic. Whereas the Jews were sacrificed by Nazis after 1933 so that Germany could be reborn, now Germany can emerge phoenix-like from the ashes of another defeat by its ritual purification through cathartic expulsion or banishment of ex- and neo-Nazis and garden-variety nationalists who do not share their view of Holocaust memory. If René Girard was right to identify the purgative function of sacrificial rites—they enable communal purification by casting out defiling elements—he was wrong in claiming that modern societies
were unstable because they no longer possessed sacrificial rites: Germany certainly does. 99

Consider the case of the speaker of the West German Bundestag, Philip Jenninger, who in 1988 was forced to resign his post after delivering what was considered a taboo-breaking speech on the fiftieth anniversary of the 9 November 1938 pogrom. Rather than focus on the suffering of the Jews, he attempted to explain (though not excuse) the racist behavior of his compatriots, thereby distinguishing clearly between “we Germans” and Jews in contemporary Germany. Many of the Green and Social Democratic deputies of the ’68-er generation felt increasingly uncomfortable during the speech, and even left the chamber in protest. When the dust settled after Jenninger tendered his resignation and his speech was read in the cold light of day, many wondered what the fuss had been about. Jenninger’s ideas were based on the latest research but had been delivered in such a clumsy manner that he was interpreted as sympathizing with the anti-Semitic views he was explaining. For some, he was seen as having broken a taboo, but actually he had not properly played his priestly role in the sacrificial drama. In fact, he had reversed its meaning by reminding the younger parliamentarians that they were still members of a stigmatized people rather than of a redeemed community. 100

Observers of the leftist scene, like the writer Peter Schneider, are not blind to the purgatory logic inherent in the constitution of its non-stigmatized identity.

A cathartic exercise takes place: a competition for the true, the most radical anti-fascism in which the victor is awarded the crown of innocence. The best way of achieving a clear conscience is to detect elements of fascist ideas in others. The way to avoid accusations of misusing the Auschwitz is to accuse others of misusing it. 101

The rage against the “perpetrator generation” and the stigmatized collective self it bequeathed younger leftists was split off and projected onto others who represented “bad” Germans and the sinful nation, which act as reservoirs or containers that could serve as enduring objects of scorn. 102 This mechanism of projective identification allows non-German Germans simultaneously to disavow their own national selves and excoriate the national selves of their compatriots, while converting the stigma into
stigmata. Once again, Bauman’s observations of the social-psychological pressures on German Jews in relation to immigrants from the east in late-nineteenth-century Germany could be made about contemporary non-German Germans:

They would forever remain on guard against those hidden aspects or their own selves which they now regarded as outmoded, disgraceful and therefore shameful. And they would be eager to displace, project and exteriorize again the harrowing experience of ambivalence: they would forever obsessively scrutinize and censure other bearers of the hereditary stigma they wished to obliterate.\(^\text{103}\)

As Victor Turner observed of the social purpose of sacrifice, it is an important means of unblocking the “great circulation of thoughts, feelings and goods,” because it destroys “that part of the self which impedes the flow” in an act of “social surgery.”\(^\text{104}\)

CONTESTING A SACRIFICE

A number of German-Jewish commentators have expressed ambivalence about the redemptive dimension of the non-German German crypto-theology. Iconoclastic German Jewish commentator Henryk M. Broder observed of the Berlin memorial that it was a gesture of (non-German) Germans who wanted to clear their consciences. He doubted whether the memorial had anything really to do with Jews: “And the murdered Jews for whom the memorial is erected can rest content that they have made a substantial contribution to the new German conscience culture.”\(^\text{105}\)

Had Germans been truly contrite, they would have built one decades earlier when former Nazis were still prominent in society.\(^\text{106}\) Now it was easy to memorialize dead Jews. In fact, remembrance was profitable: “The Germanization of the Holocaust has been a successful experiment in transforming historical liability into moral capital—the interest on the investment alone far exceeds what has been paid out to victims in ‘compensation’.” All the while, he lamented that no one seemed interested in compensating the other surviving victims: homosexuals, Roma, so-called euthanasia victims and those soldiers sentenced as deserters.\(^\text{107}\) Not sur-
prisingly, he had little time for the likes of Anna Rosmus, who had written that “[a]s a second generation German I felt not only terribly ashamed, but also guilty…. I considered it my responsibility to stand up and speak out against it.” She also profited from her good conscience.\textsuperscript{108}

Members of that leftist sect, the “Anti-Germans,” like Eike Geisel, were predictably uneasy about the motives of non-German Germans in advocating the memorial. He also saw a profit motive at work: “Auschwitz had a good ending, after all.” And a new German collective could celebrate its good rebirth: “The Ashes [of the dead] Are the Stuff for a Good Conscience,” was the title of one of his typically polemical articles.\textsuperscript{109} The German arrogation of murdered Jews went so far as a “spiritual cannibalism not unlike the behavior of members of a wild tribe that consumes the brain or other body parts of a killed enemy in order to assume its perceived quality.” Geisel saw the exemplar of this disturbing trend in Leah Rosh because she had changed her name from the “Aryan” Edith to Leah in order to transform herself into a “pseudo-Jewess” (\textit{Neigungsjüdin}) who reserved the right to speak on behalf of dead Jews while marginalizing the participation of living ones.\textsuperscript{110}

If Geisel’s rhetoric seemed excessive, Rosh made herself an easy target. “In the name of the dead and the survivors, I now call for the creation of these memorials,” she declared in 1988.\textsuperscript{111} Seven years later, she told the leader of German-Jewry Heinz Galinski to “keep out of this, the descendants of the perpetrators are building the memorial, not the Jews.”\textsuperscript{112} If she thereby counted herself as a member of the perpetrator collective, she did so in the capacity as Germany’s foremost stigma manager: “We Germans have to make a clearly visible sign (\textit{ein weithin sichtbares Zeichen}) in order to document publicly that we accept the burden of our history, that we are pondering a new chapter in our history.”\textsuperscript{113} Her extraordinary gesture in 2005 of placing the tooth of a Holocaust victim on a steles at the Berlin memorial was regarded by the German-Jewish commentator Rafael Seligman as symptomatic of a broader problem: “I am concerned not about the spiritual condition of a Ms. Rosh but rather about a society that blindly follows this woman and her actionism.”\textsuperscript{114} He was uncomfortable with the embracing of the Jews by the likes of Rosh and her collaborator, the historian Eberhard Jäckel, who treated Jews only as victims. This attention was suffocating, and denuded Jews of vitality while allowing German politicians to decline to erect local, event-specific
memorials because they could point to the big, abstract one in Berlin. Seligman urged Germans and Jews to reject a sacrificial interpretation of the Holocaust in the Berlin memorial. “The Jews must not allow themselves to be stamped as sacrificial lambs again!”  

Like Broder, Seligman thought the memorial was a means of avoiding stigma. “The bad conscience of the perpetrator people determines that the Germans attempt to buy themselves free with money and the preparedness for a certain chutzpah.”  

Broder was astonished at how the stigma of the memorial could be rendered as stigmata.  

Once, years ago on a journey abroad, I spoke with a German consul. This man said to me that we need this memorial. I asked him, who was this “we”? And he said the Foreign Ministry. For our work abroad. Great, I said, a pity my mother does not live any longer. She would have been delighted that she was not in the camp for nothing.  

The consul bore out the observation of the political scientist Peter Reichel that “coming to terms with the past” had become a German “export business,” indeed, that some Germans thought of themselves as the “world champions” in this event, despite Habermas’s warning that “[m]aybe this is something that someone else can say.”  

Not surprisingly, even conservative politicians sometimes also hail the stigmata as the basis of a renewed national identity and share the view of left-wing historian Lutz Niethammer that Germany’s compensation payments to the Jews meant “we could be thoroughly proud in a national sense.”  

Not for nothing has journalist Arno Widdmann noted that Germans no longer bow their heads before the memorial: “it is our pride.”  

CONCLUSION

But who or what is the entity that experiences “pride in sin” (Sündenstolz)? Surely not the entire citizenry of the Federal Republic that includes, in the words of Habermas, “German/German and German/Jewish citizens.”  

One could add Turkish/German citizens. So while wanting Germans to extend citizenship rights to every resident irrespective of ethnicity, he insists that the sin only pertains to ethnic Germans because they stand
“in a link of tradition that they share with the perpetrator generation,” namely, “one’s own parents and grandparents who made [Jews] strangers, excluded them as enemies, humiliated them as subhumans, and excoriated and exterminated them as people who should not be people.” For this reason, he thought that the Germans “can’t sneak out of the perpetrator role.”

In arguing in these terms, he and others like the Jewish-German academic and intellectual Micha Brumlik opened themselves to the criticisms of nationalists such as Augstein and Walser that an accusation of inherited sin was implicit in the Berlin memorial, indeed that it was in fact a Schandmal (memorial of disgrace) that had been imposed on the country by the burden of shame, that is, by foreign expectations. In order to escape this particularist rendering of the Holocaust—the Germans as an object of scorn—Habermas argued that Germans ought not to worry about what others think of them. Instead, they should erect the memorial as a radical gesture of German self-determination, an “act of taking responsibility for one’s own life history,” a notion he borrows from Søren Kierkegaard.

Does this recourse to existentialist philosophy allow Habermas to answer the skeptics and avoid the problem of thinking in terms of collectives? In fact, he himself doubted Kierkegaard’s decisionistic belief that one could “dispose over his identity as property,” because identity was always intersubjectively constructed. Since identity entails the gaze of the other, there was no avoiding what non-Germans think of Germans and their memory politics after all. In other words, the viability of any German identity was in part dependent of its affirmation by foreigners. The memorial must be recognized by them, too, for it to perform a commemorative function. Indeed, it was erected with the approval of world opinion in mind, as Hohmann and Augstein understood.

The philosopher Agnes Heller was more consistent on this point than Habermas. She understood that “the pangs of conscience” resulting from the violation of self-legislated norms were “not signals of any debt we owe to others but of one we owe to ourselves.” That experience was interior and therefore not publicly externalizable. The experience of shame—and stigma—had different consequences. “We can only ritually mitigate the pangs of conscience if we transform them into shame via confession when the Others will tell us how the debt can and must be
repaid.” By erecting a memorial, non-German Germans were signaling to the world that Germany was cleansing itself of sin and that a new country had been born.

Karl Jaspers encountered these dilemmas in *The Question of German Guilt*. Forty years before Habermas, he told Germans to interpret their predicament less as the punishment of the victors than as an opportunity for German self-purification and regeneration. He wanted, in the words of Paul Ricoeur, to convert “vengeful expiation to educative expiation—in short, to amendment.” And yet, as much as Jaspers tried to avoid collective categories—“A people as a whole can be neither guilty nor innocent, neither in the criminal nor in the political … nor in the moral sense”—he too found the question of collective reputation intruding. “There remains shame for something that is always present, that may be discussed in general terms, if at all, but can never by concretely revealed.” He rejected the collective-guilt accusations, but ultimately held, as Habermas was to argue decades later, that “[t]here is a sort of collective moral guilt in a people’s way of life which I share as an individual, and from which grow political realities.”

Unlike Habermas, however, Jaspers made an elementary distinction, also drawn by contemporaries such as the leftist Roman Catholic publicist Eugen Kogon, between political guilt for permitting the Nazis to come to power, and moral and metaphysical guilt for their crimes. Collective guilt only inhered in the former. There was no collective guilt for the Holocaust, as Seligman and others persist in maintaining. The conflation of the two types of guilt has converted the accusation of collective political guilt into one of biblical proportions in view of the Holocaust’s status as the ultimate symbol of secular evil. It leads predictably to the defensive posture typified by Germans in the late 1940s and Kathi-Gesa in 1998 who do not want to feel vicariously liable for the Holocaust. The purpose of Jaspers’ book was to show Germans how to “talk with each other” by distinguishing between different types of guilt; because Germans had been implicated in the regime in different ways, different types of guilt and responsibility needed to be identified and distinguished. The subsequent, acrimonious, public discussion of the Nazi past characterized by accusation and innuendo, moral righteousness and finger-pointing, indicates that the advice of Jaspers and Kogon has not been heeded.
Moreover, they were addressing Germans who had experienced the Nazi regime, not their grandchildren and great-grandchildren. Are they to bear the “mark of Cain,” as some nationalists fear? Referring to other cases in world history, the philosopher Hermann Lübbe argued that the accusation of collective guilt of a people did not persist indefinitely through the generations. Nonetheless, some German-Jewish commentators seem to lean in that direction. Micha Brumlik rejected collective guilt for a collective shame to which he saw no end, while Seligman happily referred to Germans in the 1990s as a perpetrator people.

At the same time, Ignatz Bubis regarded the relationship between Germans and Jews as that between debtor and creditor. “A creditor approaches a debtor and gives him a repayment notice. The debtor does not react. The creditor gives him notice again. The debtor does not react again. After the third time, the debtor becomes exasperated. He says, as long as you demand payment, I won’t pay. But when he was given notice, he did not pay either.” Plainly, this analogy is inappropriate. Bubis would not have regarded the debt as dischargeable in any straightforward manner, as if a line could be drawn in a historical ledger. He too was caught in the dilemma of demanding that Germans experience their nationality only in negative terms while other ethnicities could gain German citizenship but retain and enjoy hyphenated identities.

For three generations, Germans have had to wrestle with the dilemmas of regenerating their collective life after the Holocaust. How were they supposed to relate to Jews, for instance? On the one hand, survivors like Eva Hoffman insisted that no reconciliation or accommodation was possible between them. Foreign observers have followed this intuition in seeing the persistence of Nazi ideology even in the non-German German identification with Jews; the “[Jewish] survivors are expropriated once more, only now not their property or citizenship but the struggles and memories of their survivorship.” In this reading, Germans and Jews ought to respect the rupture wrought by the Holocaust, even though the ontological distinction between Germans and Jews had been intrinsic to the radical nationalist project of German anti-Semites. On the other hand, Germans have been equally criticized for not accepting the victim’s perspective as their own. Non-German Germans consistently expressed dismay that German Germans did not sufficiently come to terms with their past by incorporating Jews into the collective “we,” thereby continuing
to regard them as a non-German other. An associated dilemma was the question of whose sensitivities—Jews’ or Germans’—ought to be respected in public discourse? Augstein and others proclaimed how vulnerable German Germans were to stigmatization, while Bubis and Habermas pleaded with all Germans to show proper regard for the feelings of the victims’ descendants.

Will the Berlin memorial help Germans work through their “perpetrator trauma”? The psychologist Vamik Volkan writes that memorials can foster “the successful externalization of resolved aspects of grief” by embodying a community’s “unresolved affects.” But since memorials are conventionally built for one’s own dead, not those murdered by one’s near ancestors, what role can it play? The likelihood is that it will continue to represent a stigma for German Germans like Hohmann, who wrote that there have been “nearly three generations of penance-time (Bußzeit) until now. It should not become six or seven. To that extent, the monument would be a monumental expression of our inability to forgive ourselves.” As might be expected, German Germans advocate the parable of the prodigal son who was accepted back into the family and whose errors were never mentioned again, while non-German Germans continue to cast the national story in terms of Cain and Abel. These are positions that cannot be reconciled. Some have observed that these debates have been dominated by the forty-fiver generation (born in the 1920s) to which Walser, Habermas, Lübbe and Grass belong. Formed under National Socialism, they expressed particularly strong affects regarding the “nation,” whether in its defense or sublation. When the likes of Walser pass away, Germans will remain with national identities that are not so religiously loaded.

The biblical stories give us clues about the future of the German stigma. The Cain and Abel tale has been misunderstood. God placed Cain under his protection, whereupon he thrived and founded cities. God also said he limits inherited sin to the third or fourth generation. That is the current and next generation of young Germans since the so-called “year zero.” It has come sooner than the some 80–100 years posited by Jan Assmann as the time needed for communicative memory to become cultural memory, but it makes sense. Three to four generations need to pass before oral tradition becomes institutionalized objectively in high culture.
By the second decade of the twenty-first century, the fourth generation since 1945 will have grown up in families without a living member who experienced the Nazi regime. The oral transmission of cultural memory of the Nazi period will then cease. The intensity of feelings of pollution will likely subside just as the traditions of Federal Republican life will offer more as sources of identification. The Berlin memorial may become less a stigma or stigmata than a lucrative tourist attraction, an object of indifference, or de facto playground for school children.\textsuperscript{142} The fact that foreign journalists and academics were no longer alarmed by flag-waving German soccer supporters during the 2006 World Cup indicates that they may have ceased participating in the construction of the German stigma.\textsuperscript{143} And at that point, its sacrificial function may lessen in intensity. For all that, people living in Germany will have to continue to negotiate their identity dilemmas around the axes of ethnicity and immigration—just like any other country.

\textbf{Notes}

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2. As Willy Brandt put it, “What belongs together, now grows together.”

7. For analyses of Jews in Germany, see Jeffrey M. Peck, Being Jewish in the New Germany (New Brunswick, 2006); Hans Erler, ed., Erinnern und Verstehen: Der Völkermord an den Juden im politischen Gedächtnis der Deutschen (Frankfurt and New York, 2003); Lynn Rapaport, Jews in Germany after the Holocaust: Memory, Identity, and Jewish–German Relations (Cambridge, 1997).


17. Aleida Assmann and Ute Frevert, *Geschichtsvergessenheit: Vom Umgang mit deutschen Vergangenheiten nach 1945* (Stuttgart, 1999), is a thoughtful book that limits itself to this dichotomy.


23. Eric L. Santner, *Stranded Objects: Mourning, Memory, and Film in Postwar Germany* (Ithaca, 1990), asserts that Germany’s “cultural reservoir has been poisoned” without explaining exactly how (45). More helpfully, Dan Diner, *Beyond the Conceivable: Studies on Germany, Nazism, and the Holocaust* (Berkeley, 2000), explains that because the Holocaust was directed at the group existence of Jews “it intuitively invites a presumption of collective guilt,” that is, that the German group self is tainted because every member of the group is affected by a common memory of this past (221). Cf. Konrad H. Jarausch, “Removing the Nazi Stain? The Quarrel of the German Historians,” *German Studies Review* 11, no. 2 (May 1988): 285–301.


36. “Wer ist Martin Hohmann?” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 31 Oct. 2003. Four years later, Hohmann was expelled from his party for an anti-Semitic speech accusing Jews of being (also) a perpetrator people. Most voters and supporters of the Christian Democrats, however, did not regard the speech as anti-Semitic. Fritz Schenk, *Der Fall Hohmann: Die Dokumentation* (Munich, 2004).

38. Following Paul Ricoeur, Gesine Schwan relegates group emotions like defilement to the cultures of antiquity, thereby missing the point that they reappear with the Holocaust. See her Politics and Guilt: The Destructive Power of Silence, trans. Thomas Dunlap (Lincoln, NE, and London, 2001).


40. Representative here is Michael Geyer, who is the only commentator beside Elias I have found who has attempted to conceptualize, even if briefly, the problem of stigma in postwar Germany; see his “The Stigma of Violence, Nationalism, and War in Twentieth-Century Germany,” German Studies Review 15 (winter 1992): 75–110. Geyer implies that the stigma exists apart from his positing of it: “the mark of Cain for the murder of a people is stamped on German history alone. This is the stigma of violence in Germany history.” See Geyer, “The Place of the Second World War in German Memory and History,” New German Critique, no. 71 (spring–summer 1997): 37.


44. Augstein, “Wir sind alle verletzbar” (emphasis added).


56. Lutz Rosenkötter, “The Formation of Ideals in the Succession of Generations,” in Martin S. Bergmann and Milton E. Jucovy, eds., *Generations of the Holocaust* (New York, 1982), notes that: “The adolescent children of such parents can either share their right-wing ideals and, thus, openly oppose present-day society; or they may break with their parents, who, in their rigor, cannot bear to be questioned; or they may leave the matter open and go on living with conflicting ideals” (182).


66. Sichrovksy, Born Guilty, 27.


75. Ibid., 131–32, 155.


77. Giesen notes the elements of christomimesis in the German and indeed developing international “politics of apology,” but does not identify the sacrificial


80. Habermas, “Der Zeigefinger.”


84. Hans Mol, *Identity and the Sacred* (Oxford 1976), 206–46. Mol also stipulates myth and theology as the fourth element of sacralization, but notes that they are less common in modern societies.


89. Reinecke, “Don’t touch my Holocaust.”


91. Mohr, “Die Wirklichkeit ausgepfiffen.”


98. It goes without saying that the similarity to which I point here indicates a formal symmetry rather than a substantive equation.


116. Ibid.

117. “Das ist die Fortsetzung des Dritten Reichs’: Was soll, was kann, was hilft das Berliner Holocaust-Mahnmal? Ein Streitgespräch mit Henryk M. Broder und Wolfgang Menge” Der Tagesspiegel, 6 June 2005.


121. Jürgen Habermas, “Brief an Peter Eisenman,” in Heimrod, Schlüsse and Seferens, eds., Der Denkmalstreit, 1185.

122. Habermas, “Der Zeigefinger.”


137. “Wer ist Martin Hohmann?” (see n. 36 above).


