THE PUBLIC RELEVANCE OF HISTORICAL STUDIES:
A REJOINDER TO HAYDEN WHITE

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ABSTRACT

Hayden White wants history to serve life by having it inspire an ethical consciousness, by which he means that in facing the existential questions of life, death, trauma, and suffering posed by human history, people are moved to formulate answers to them rather than to feel that they have no power to choose how they live. The ethical historian should craft narratives that inspire people to live meaningfully rather than try to provide explanations or reconstructions of past events that make them feel as if they cannot control their destiny. This Nietzschean-inspired vision of history is inadequate because it cannot gainsay that a genocidal vision of history is immoral. White may be right that cultural relativism results in cultural pluralism and toleration, but what if most people are not cultural relativists, and believe fervently in their right to specific lands at the expense of other peoples? White does not think historiography or perhaps any moral system can provide an answer. Is he right? This rejoinder argues that the communicative rationality implicit in the human sciences does provide norms about the moral use of history because it institutionalizes an intersubjectivity in which the use of the past is governed by norms of impartiality and fair-mindedness, and protocols of evidence based on honest research. Max Weber, equally influenced by Nietzsche, developed an alternative vision of teaching and research that is still relevant today.

Little did I imagine, on October 13, 1995, when I sat on the floor in a crowded seminar room in Dwinelle Hall at the University of California at Berkeley, that one day I would be crossing swords on these pages with the guest speaker, Hayden White. He was, and remains, after all, the most influential critic of the discipline of history over the past forty years, a thinker whose dissections of its conceits, as elegant as they are erudite, have forced historians to reflect critically on what they do. If they have often responded defensively, literary scholars and philosophers have welcomed his apparent skepticism, a pattern of reaction that recurred with his talk, “The First Historical Event: A Rhetorical Exercise,” hosted by the Department of Rhetoric. While we few interlopers from the Department of History squirmed uncomfortably, the sophisticated graduate students in comparative literature and rhetoric chortled as they learned that historians believed they “find” the past ready-made in the archives. Had we not heard the news that reality, past and present, was a “construction”? It is fascinating to learn what colleagues down the corridor really think of what you do. The disci-

1. I thank Neil Levi and Geoffrey Brahm Levey for critical comments on an earlier draft.
plenary gulf separating us was made all the more apparent when one student sug-
gested breathlessly that death too was merely a construct, although it should be
noted that, with Weberian sobriety, White doubted the correctness of this con-
tention. Regardless, the gauntlet had been thrown down, and I had to justify to
myself that I had made the right decision in seeking a doctoral qualification and
career in the discipline of history.

That was ten years ago. Now I find myself much more enamored of White’s
basic intention. I am grateful to him for his characteristically gracious response,
and to this journal for allowing us to air political and moral issues that we believe
are central to history and to theory. It is to his enduring credit that he has always
fought against the parlor-game tendency in the discipline, a tendency regrettably
evident in some journals of modern intellectual history. There is no doubt about
it: he thinks the historical profession already has become a parlor game. So
divorced has it become from those “great existential questions posed by time,
aging, absence, loss, violence, and death,” he writes here, that the public has to
resort to sources like the History Channel and the military and biography sec-
tions of bookshops to gain its historical bearings (338). His solution, as he has
urged for forty years, is to recapture history’s practical rather than theoretical
application by posing and answering these kinds of questions. The solution
would entail returning “to the intimate relationship [history] had with art, poetry,
rhetoric, and ethical reflection prior to professionalization and embarkation
on the impossible task of becoming ‘scientific’ in the modern sense of the term”
(335). Sympathetic as I am to the aim of making history part of the solution,
rather than a source of the problem, in many current crises, I am nervous about
relinquishing the gains in knowledge that systematic research has produced. I try
to explain why here.

How does a problem as seemingly intractable as the conflict in Palestine/Israel
appear under this aspect? The historian has nothing to of fer, White contends,
because the narratives of victimization that underwrite the entrenched positions
there are unquantifiable and are therefore not amenable to challenge on factual
grounds. Victimization is not a claim that can be adjudicated scientifically. He has
recourse to aesthetics and psychology: “The best counter to a narrative that is sup-
posed to have misused historical memory is a better narrative, by which I mean a
narrative, not with more historical facts, but a narrative with greater artistic
integrity and poetic force of meaning” (336). In other words, “appeal should be
made to ethically rich traditions of literary expression” (338). As Charles Taylor
argued in Sources of the Self, our axiological commitments (“hypergoods”) are
concealed in stories to which we cleave, ultimately, because they move us.2

How far does the appeal to “ethically rich traditions of literary expression” really
get us? I do not share White’s confidence that this approach will yield the fruit
he hopes because it separates ethics from morality and thereby licenses the indul-
gence of ethnic narcissism. For many, ethical duty entails ruthlessly asserting the
interests of one’s “own people.” Radovan Karadzic, for example, thinks he was
ethically responsible in trying to save Bosnian Serbs from permanent minority

status in Bosnia by “ethnically cleansing” Muslims from much of the country. The Bible advocates genocide and love for one’s enemies in equal measure.\(^3\)

White does not appear to approve of ethnic absolutism, proposing cultural relativism as its negation. It “leads more often to tolerance and efforts to understand the other, rather than to intolerance, xenophobia, and fascism” (337). This seems a plausible assertion only if you confine your view to the intelligentsia. For this group, the Nietzschean “genealogy of morals” on which White’s narrative is based—truth as a “mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms”—is an attractive story of the contingent appearance of people in history who realize and appreciate the conventional nature of truth so that they are free to choose their own values.\(^4\) As White writes in *Metahistory*, “we are free to conceive ‘history’ as we please, just as we are free to make of it what we will.”\(^5\) But for the mass of people, I think, such a narrative of increasing freedom in a world after the death of God hardly offers a redemptive answer to the suffering they experience or witness. Only a minority are cultural relativists. Nietzsche knew this, of course. Not for nothing did he think that only the special few could look into the abyss and affirm life nonetheless.

Given the religiously-inspired chiliastic nationalism driving events around the world, and not just in Islamic countries or in the Balkans, Weber’s observations take up this Nietzschean insight: those “who cannot bear the fate of the times” can return to the “arms of the old churches.”\(^6\) They have done so, as in the heartland of the USA, for instance, but Weber did not condemn them. The “unconditional religious devotion” of such a choice, which he termed “the ethic of ultimate ends” (sometimes translated as the “ethic of conviction”) was worthy of respect because its adherents committed themselves honestly and consistently to its values irrespective of the political consequences. For that reason, this ethic could not be shared by the politician whose ethic was “responsibility.” Dangerous was the conflation of value spheres, as in the case of politicians in thrall to an ethic of ultimate ends, as we witness all too depressingly in world affairs today. Dangerous, too, was the academic who confused the values of religious commitment with the “value neutrality” ethic of scholarship. Weber condemned the “academic prophecy” he witnessed among colleagues. They were betraying their “intellectual integrity.”

But does Weber really have anything to say to us any longer, positivist and modernist that he supposedly was? I contend that he does because his concerns are ours. This is the same man who told a student that “The relevance [Redllichkeit] of an academic today, and above all of a philosopher, can be measured by how he stands in relation to Nietzsche and Marx.”\(^7\) Weber’s debt to

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Nietzsche has been known to continental scholars for some time—for Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin, it was among the reasons to regard him as a dangerous theorist of “decisionism”—but in the Anglophone world his reputation as a founder of sociology, the proponent of methodological individualism, and the theorist of rationalization, spread by Talcott Parsons, Edward Shils, Reinhard Bendix, Guenther Roth, and others has been remarkably resilient. With the translation from the German of Wilhelm Hennis’s *Max Weber: Essays in Reconstruction* and works like Laurence Scaff’s *Fleeing the Iron Cage*, another image of Weber is slowly becoming visible. He is not so much the tortured soul of “Left Weberianism” who railed against the bureaucratization and concomitant “disenchantment of the world,” resorting despairingly to dubious political models of charismatic leadership. Rather he stands in a longer tradition of “practical philosophy” that stretches back to antiquity, in particular to Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*, for which the cultivation of “insight” in the student is paramount. Weber’s historical studies, such as that of the Protestant ethic, are less about the origins of capitalism than they are in the tradition of Nietzsche’s *Genealogy of Morals*: they investigate the evolution of a distinct personality type, characteristic of the modern West, for which the problem of personality and meaning in a meaningless world becomes imperative. Weber’s concern, then, was with the character formation of students, and he devised his theory of “ethical neutrality” to that end. Likewise with research, “ethical neutrality” did not entail “moral indifference.” On the contrary, “in the social sciences the stimulus to the posing of scientific problems is in actuality always given by practical questions.” Understanding how and why he came to the opposite conclusion from White about the bearing of the scholar and the public role of history (and science in general) will illuminate why his approach to the public use of history is preferable.

How could “ethical neutrality” be linked to a practically-oriented teaching and research program? The answer is based on Weber’s Nietzschean understanding of the existential demands of modernity and on his residual faith in science, one that I think we can also find implicitly in White. Weber welcomed the end of the Christian monopoly on values because it permitted the return of warring gods

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and demons that he regarded as the central feature of the vitality of Greek civilization. Conducting one’s life according to a consciously chosen set of ultimate values (Lebensführung) invested human existence with dignity. These choices were not subject to the laws of cause and effect—that is why they were free—and so they should not be confused with science. Consequently, the professor should not conflate the two. Weber did “not wish to see the student so influenced by the teacher’s suggestions that he is prevented from solving his problems on the basis of his own conscience” because he was concerned with cultivating the agency and autonomy of the student. The teacher was to make a student give an account of his or her views on a particular subject, present uncomfortable facts, and “distinguish them from his [the students’] own evaluations,” a pedagogy that would promote a realistic ethics of responsibility rather than a utopian one of ultimate ends. Students, then, were challenged to take responsibility for their views, and given the plurality of values, they had to struggle alone, and productively, to develop their Lebensführung. A professor can disturb this process by indulging in a “cult of personality.” Such “officially accredited prophets” are dangerous because they “do not do their preaching on the streets, or in the churches or other public spaces or in sectarian conventicles, but rather feel themselves competent to enunciate their evaluations on ultimate questions ‘in the name of science’ in governmentally privileged lecture halls in which they are neither controlled, checked by discussion, nor subject to contradiction.” Similarly, scholars should not confuse their ideological commitments with their research.

Although Weber rejected the Enlightenment belief that reason and science issued necessarily in freedom—they issued, in fact, in an “iron cage”—he also rejected the cultural pessimism of Oswald Spengler and other doomsayers. Science (Wissenschaft) contributed to technical mastery of social problems, as well as laying bare causal connections, and was therefore an institutionalized site of rational enquiry and means of social self-clarification. Weber was all the more convinced of the political value of an “ethically neutral” university toward the end of the First World War when unrealistic and utopian politics dominated the public sphere. The “ideas of 1914,” for instance, with which the intelligentsia, including a young Thomas Mann, had proclaimed the superiority of German culture over Anglophone civilization, had been thought up by “dilettantes” and had led to disastrous consequences. “Today,” he wrote in 1917, “fanatical office-holding patriots are invoking the spirit not only of German philosophy, but of religion as well, to justify these purely technical measures [‘further bureaucratization and interest group administration’] instead of soberly discussing their feasibility, which is quite prosaically conditioned by financial factors.”

15. Ibid., 4.
In this context, Weber wanted to emphasize that knowledge was possible, despite warring gods and demons, for those committed to scientific method. His journal, the Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, sought to cut across party lines and depoliticize scholarship. It “excludes no one from its circle of contributors who is willing to place himself within the framework of scientific discussion.” Concretely, the historian, for example, should avoid injecting personal evaluations lest they distort the analysis: “He runs the risk, for example, of ‘explaining’ as the result of a ‘mistake’ or of a ‘decline’ what is perhaps the consequence of ideals different from his own, and so he fails in his most important task, that is, of ‘understanding.’”

Edward Said implemented this advice in his argument about the causal relationship between the Holocaust and the Nakbah. Of course, his practical aim was also to have Israelis recognize that the birth of their nation is at once the dispossession of the Palestinian one, but his point is that this is a historical relationship, not an ideological one, such as the common Arab equation of the Holocaust and Nakbah, and the Israeli blindness to the causes of the Palestinian refugee problem. The difficulty of separating the ethic of the scholar and the ethic of ultimate ends is readily apparent in the reaction to his argument. It has been attacked in a learned journal as poisonous propaganda; in fact, it is “charged . . . with sophisticated motifs of Holocaust denial discourse.” Why? Because the “recognition of the Holocaust is instrumental, and the persecution of the Jews is acknowledged, but at the same time is linked to the Palestinian tragedy and its acknowledgement by Israel and the West. The comparison between the two, either directly or by inference, involved by definition relativization of the Holocaust.” How do we disentangle the value spheres here?

Today we are less inclined to believe that facts and values can be separated as neatly as Weber thought. White is doubtless correct to state that presenting more historical facts will not lessen the appeal of narratives of victimization. But most likely there is nothing one can say to people firmly committed to such an identity to make them change their minds. They are not “willing to place [themselves] within the framework of scientific discussion.” For those who are—that is, those who seek to give reasons for their position to an audience beyond the boundaries of their victim group—the rational moment of validity testing is maintained by asking and answering difficult questions. Had it been possible for the article accusing Said of Holocaust denial to be submitted to Weber’s Archiv, for instance, what might the referees have asked of its authors? “Are you suggesting Said of Holocaust denial to be submitted to Weber’s Archiv, for instance, what might the referees have asked of its authors? “Are you suggesting that the Holocaust is an event of a type—unique, unprecedented, unparalleled, ineffable, or sacred?—that cannot be integrated into narratives with cotemporal

18. Ibid., 33.
events?"  "Is any such contextualization akin to Holocaust denial?"  "Indeed, is casting doubt on the proposition of the uniqueness of the Holocaust also tantamount to Holocaust denial?"  "Are you suggesting there is no relationship between the linear sequence: Holocaust–foundation of Israel–Nakbah?"  

In answering these and similar questions the authors would have had to give reasons for their assertions. That would not settle the matter in the manner of a mathematical proof, but they would have been forced to answer the questions to the satisfaction of the editors, and in the process have been provoked to some critical self-reflection. Had the authors refused, they would have revealed themselves as the "academic prophets" Weber so despised.

The scholar is not necessarily an activist. The experience of a politically-active university colleague who organized an academic boycott of Israeli universities several years ago makes the distinction plain. Doubtful that such a boycott was still a sound strategy in 2005, he was assailed by an activist acquaintance: "how could you think not to support the boycott?"  My colleague replied: "You may stop thinking, but I don’t forbid myself any thoughts."  The message for me here is that freedom from the discipline and imperatives of political movements is a condition of scholarship, but also of critical thinking generally, and therefore indispensable for a useful intellectual. Not for nothing are many major intellectuals also serious scholars, like Said. In such cases, the figure of the intellectual bridges the poles between academic and activist. Is White suggesting we relinquish the one for the other?  Weber seemed to think that the tension was productive: he himself participated in public affairs and entreated scholars to do likewise. "In the press, in public meetings, in associations, in essays, in every avenue which is open to every other citizen, he [the professor] can and should do what his God or demon demands."

Despite the apparent differences between White and Weber, perhaps they have much more in common after all. For White’s second solution to the Palestinian/Israeli conflict appears much like a Habermasian, post-metaphysical discourse ethic:

In this kind of dispute, it might be better to abandon all claims to sober “clarity” and “objective” subjectivity (Weber) in order to seek a common ground on which to dissolve disagreements fueled by religious fanaticism. In which case the discipline of history would have to show its anti-transcendental, religiously agnostic, and ethically relativistic credentials, without which it is prone to become merely another arm of religious dogmatism and political correctness. (336)


22. Weber, “The Meaning of ‘Ethical Neutrality’ in Sociology and Economics,” 5. At 47: “We shall only state that if the professional thinker has an immediate obligation at all, it is to keep a cool head in the face of the ideals prevailing at the time, even those which are associated with the throne, and if necessary, ‘to swim against the stream.’”

If we leave aside White’s caricature of a positivist Weber, what he seems to be recommending are the bridging narratives (the “common ground”) that Ilan Pappe and others are trying to construct in Palestine/Israel on the basis of a perspectival historiography that challenges nationalist narratives by presenting, in the spirit of Weber, both uncomfortable facts and rival interpretations. White is correct in pointing out that a rival narrative—an anti-nationalist one, perhaps—will have to be developed to appeal to Jewish Israelis and Palestinians, but it will need to be based on a common recognition of events, such as the “ethnic cleansing” of Palestinians in 1948, if it is to be plausible, in which case it will require the patient research of historians on all sides to sift through the records and reconstruct the events of that fateful year.

There is reason to believe that White may agree with this proposition given what he writes about the Holocaust. For far from being the relativist who gives comfort to deniers, he does not doubt the historical facts of the Holocaust. “The idea that the Holocaust never happened is simply absurd. We have more than enough evidence to compel belief in its occurrence” (337). This evidence did not drop out of the sky. It has been dug out of archives by several generations of scholars. Specialist research is constantly revealing under-illuminated or little understood aspects of the Holocaust, such as the involvement of the business community. Surely, White cannot be enjoining the abandonment of this scholarly enterprise to return to a prior, less mediated relationship between critical reflection and historical consciousness. If he is, then there really is a gulf between him and Weber, who retained a residual faith in the emancipatory power of science. There was no turning back the process of rationalization: any future solutions to modernity’s problems would have to be built on the foundations of science, not against it. Expert knowledge was to be utilized, not abandoned.

Where are we, then, with respect to White’s question about the practical use of history for life? Or, rather, what do we mean when we say “the historical is the ethical”? For White, in its ethical irrationality the past presents us with a challenge to existential self-determination; we must make personal choices regarding issues of life, death, trauma, and suffering. White has not changed his position on this question for over forty years. Writing in 1963, he outlined his vision for historiography:

The task of the true historian is to describe the encounter between man’s various projected ideals of life and the social-psychical world operative around and within himself which that ideal is meant to explain, contain, and order. And therefore, when properly narrated, history becomes the equal in transforming power to tragic poetry, inspiring fear and pity when it forces contemplation of an aspiring humanity cut down in its every effort to realize its projected ideals, but also inspiring pride and emulation of heroic virtue when it shows a defeated humanity repeatedly returning to the battle for its own proper freedom.


The experience of autonomy in surveying the wreck of history and opting for a better life is the ethical for White. Weber would concur, I think. To be fully human is to contend with warring gods and demons. But White separates ethics from morality: how and what we choose is a question of morality for which he thinks history or the discipline of history cannot provide guidance. In fact, in its theoretical rather than practical comportment to the past, the historical profession is designed to prevent the cultivation of ethically conscious thinkers. Is that so? Is there not a practical dimension to the discipline’s theoretical orientation?

History, like other disciplines in the humanities, retains it usefulness for life by incarnating a form of knowledge developed, ideally, by symmetrical intersubjectivity. In a world in which rival historical mythologies terrorize people in the name of taming the past and present, the way historians go about making and redeeming validity claims offers an alternative. A morality of cosmopolitanism is implicit in its assumptions about how knowledge should be produced: advancing interpretations based on evidence addressed to the entire profession. If insisting that the historical is the ethical ends up with violent intransigence in Palestine/Israel, as much among Israelis and Palestinians themselves as against each other, it does not get us very far. The temptation may be strong for historians to defend or avenge their people, but by virtue of their discipline they are also members of an international community of scholars that subscribes to a culture of critical discourse: they make claims to which everyone could ideally assent, not just the comparatively small circle of their own group. Holding fast to the implicit moral norms of communicative action is always better than actually or metaphorically lobbing a homemade rocket into a civilian settlement or firing a Hellfire missile from an Apache helicopter into a crowded Gaza marketplace in a sort of “targeted assassination.” The historical is the ethical when it is also the moral.

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27. For an exemplary analysis of the repressed, mythical, and messianic elements of Zionist thought and of the West generally that seeks to open them to the other in a moral way, see Jacqueline Rose, The Question of Zion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).