Genocide and Holocaust Consciousness in Australia

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Abstract

Ever since the British colonists in Australia became aware of the disappearance of the indigenous peoples in the 1830s, they have contrived to excuse themselves by pointing to the effects of disease and displacement. Yet although ‘genocide’ was not a term used in the nineteenth century, ‘extermination’ was, and many colonists called for the extermination of Aborigines when they impeded settlement by offering resistance. Consciousness of genocide was suppressed during the twentieth century – until the later 1960s, when a critical school of historians began serious investigations of frontier violence. Their efforts received official endorsement in the 1990s, but profound cultural barriers prevent the development of a general ‘genocide consciousness’. One of these is ‘Holocaust consciousness’, which is used by conservative and right-wing figures to play down the gravity of what transpired in Australia. These two aspects of Australian public memory are central to the political humanisation of the country.

Consciousness of racial extinction and extermination in Australia preceded the Holocaust by over a century. Already in the 1830s, observers of British colonialism in Van Diemen’s Land (Tasmania), South Africa and North America noted the ‘passing’ and ‘dying out’ of indigenous peoples in the vicious competition for survival on the frontier. The British Colonial Office wrung its hands in worry that the settlers might exterminate the native Tasmanians and thereby leave an ‘indelible stain’ on the reputation of the Empire, but there was little, they thought, that could be done:

The causes and the consequences of this state of things are clear and irremediable [wrote one official], nor do I suppose that it is possible to discover any method by which the impending catastrophe, namely, the elimination of the Black Race, can be averted.

Less concerned with Aboriginal welfare, Anthony Trollope visited the colonies in 1871–2, declaring its indigenous peoples ‘ineradicably savage’ and doomed to extinction. His prediction came partially true several years later in 1876, when the last of the ‘full blood’ Tasmanians died. In the late nineteenth century, this case of indigenous disappearance became
the classic instance of the inability of the so-called ‘lower races’ to withstand the European march of civilisation, a fact that confirmed for Charles Darwin the validity of his theory of natural selection for the human race. In genocide scholarship today, the fate of the Tasmanian Aborigines is still regarded as a paradigmatic instance of ‘colonial genocide’. Of course, no-one used the term ‘genocide’ in the nineteenth century, because it was only coined in 1944 by the Polish–Jewish jurist Raphael Lemkin to describe Nazi occupation policies in Europe. Still, when settlers called for the extermination of indigenous peoples – and they often did – they were advocating genocide – the destruction of a people – particularly if we view the Australian Aborigines as comprising many locally based peoples rather than a single nation.

And yet, although many British Australians were well aware of the violence on the frontier, they pointed to the fact that Aborigines succumbed mainly to disease and dislocation to absolve themselves of direct responsibility for the indigenous demographic catastrophe. The Aborigines, anthropologists advised, were a ‘dying race’, and the best that could be done was to render their exit from history as humane as possible by segregating them in reserves, where they could be protected from exploitation. Children of mixed British–Aboriginal descent (‘half-castes’) should be ‘rescued’ by sequestering them from their indigenous mothers and raising them as lower-class whites.

With tremendous confidence in the quality of the civilisation spreading across the continent, British Australians felt no reason to harbour guilty consciences about the passing of the Aborigines or regard the foundation of their new nation–state as morally tainted.

What has been called the ‘Great Australian Silence’ about indigenous suffering continued until the later 1960s, notwithstanding a small and vocal minority of white and black activists and publicists. It was then that whites had to ‘adjust to the idea that Australian Aborigines are not a dying race after all’, as one observer noted at the time. A new generation of historians, inspired by post-colonial liberation movements and appalled by the continuity of popular and institutionalised racism, began systematic, empirical work on frontier violence, and what they found changed the received view of the peaceful ‘settlement’ of the country. The subtitle of one of these books, Exclusion, Exploitation and Extermination, summed up the new perspective, although such historians were always a minority. Nonetheless, despite a counter-trend in the historiography in the 1980s that stressed Aboriginal initiative and accommodation with white settlement, the ‘destruction of Aboriginal society’ thesis received official endorsement with the High Court’s 1992 ‘Mabo’ decision on native land title, based as it was on the proposition that the dispossession of the indigenous peoples was ‘the darkest aspect’ of Australian history, which had bequeathed a legacy of ‘unutterable shame’. In the same year, the then Labor Party Prime Minister, Paul Keating, delivered his noted
‘Redfern Speech’, in which he publicly avowed ‘our’ (i.e. European–Australian) responsibility for the lethal practices and policies towards Aborigines in the past.\textsuperscript{14}

Did this élite recognition of what can be called the victims’ perspective signal the breakthrough of ‘genocide consciousness’ in Australia? Would white Australians now recognise the legitimacy of Aboriginal land rights? Could what is known as ‘reconciliation’ now take place? In fact, the vast majority of Australians and the conservative intelligentsia resisted this consciousness for the reason they always had – they were fundamentally uninterested in Aborigines – but part of the reason was now attributed to the rise of a perceived competitor: Holocaust consciousness. Already in 1985, the historian Tony Barta noted that genocide was equated in the public mind with the systematic mass murder of European Jewry:

The images which cluster round the name Auschwitz make the concept concrete. And these images, making pale all other deeds of violence committed by one people against another, now play an active role not only in Germany history [sic] and Jewish history but in our [Australians’] understanding of Australian history as well. By associating genocide uniquely with the Holocaust, Australians have been able to make a classical transference of an unacknowledged shadow in their own past to a publicly acknowledged worse – indeed worst – case.\textsuperscript{15}

This was an acute observation. Symptomatic is the complaint of Inga Clendinnen (his colleague at La Trobe University in Melbourne) about the official \textit{Bringing Them Home} report’s (1997) charge of genocide levelled against the policies of forcibly ‘removing’ mixed-race children (the ‘Stolen Generations’) from their indigenous mothers:

When I see the word ‘genocide’ I still Gypsies [sic] and Jews being herded into trains, into pits, into ravines, and behind them the shadowy figures of Armenian women and children being marched into the desert by armed men. I see deliberate mass murder: innocent people identified by their killers as distinctive entities being done to death by organised authority. I believe that to take the murder out of genocide is to render it vacuous.\textsuperscript{16}

Newspaper editorials shared her indignation that the good intentions of white administrators in rescuing ‘neglected’ black children had been traduced by association with the so-called ‘g-word’: ‘Many Jews and non-Jews familiar with the intrinsic evil and systematic course of the Holocaust in all its extraordinary horror find any notion of parallels with the removal of Aboriginal children utterly offensive.’\textsuperscript{17}

Why has this conflation of genocide and Holocaust taken place? After all, the United Nations definition of genocide does not equate it with mass murder. Article II reads:

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or
mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

The authors of the Bringing Them Home report insisted that section (e) was applicable to the Australian context, in which the policies had been designed to prevent the transmission of indigenous culture. This is what Aboriginal leader Mick Dodson meant when he wrote:

the fact is if you look at the government’s politics and laws set in place to back them up, their central intention was to destroy the Aboriginality of these kids. I am not equating the Holocaust to the removals, but they fall under the same heading of genocide. They’re just a different form of genocide. 18

To be sure, Lemkin had specified cultural techniques of committing genocide, which refers to a coordinated plan aimed at destruction of the essential foundations of the life of national groups so these groups wither and die like plants that have suffered a blight. The end may be accomplished by the forced disintegration of political and social institutions, of the culture of the people, of their language, their national feeling and their religion. It may be accomplished by wiping out all basis of personal security, liberty, health and dignity. When these means fail the machine gun can always be utilized as a last resort. 19

But did this mean that he made ‘cultural genocide’ – the extermination of group culture – intrinsic to genocide? Native American scholars and activists such as Ward Churchill think he did, and so do the defenders of the Bringing Them Home report. 20 In fact, Lemkin took pains to distinguish between genocide and cultural effacement, that is, assimilation:

Such terms as ‘denationalization’ or ‘Germanization’ which have been used till now do not adequately convey the full force of the new phenomenon of genocide. They signify only the substitution of the national pattern of the oppressor for the original national pattern but not the destruction of the biological and physical structure of the oppressed group. 21

Clearly, genocidal policies must intend to destroy the ‘biological and physical structure’ of a group, so policies that attack a group’s culture are only genocidal when motivated by this intention. There is no evidence that this was the case in Australia in the post-1945 period, although there is for the inter-war years. 22 The United Nations decided ultimately to omit ‘cultural genocide’ from the final draft. 23

Is it sufficient, however, to dismiss Clendinnen and the general public for their ignorance of Lemkin’s writings and international law? Can genocide be so readily separated from the Holocaust? 24 As a scholar, Clendinnen should know better, but the problem lies in the tension between Lemkin’s formulations and the context of their publication. Genocide, he argued, has poisoned human history for millennia:
They [the Nazis] almost achieved their goal in exterminating the Jews and Gypsies in Europe. Obviously, the German experience is the most striking and the most deliberate and thorough, but history has provided us with other examples of the destruction of entire nations, and ethnic and religious groups. There are, for example, the destruction of Carthage; that of religious groups in the wars of Islam and the Crusades; the massacres of the Albigenses and the Waldenses; and more recently, the massacre of the Armenians.25

Indeed, he also hinted at the colonial nature of the crime:

Genocide has two phases: one, destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed group; the other, the imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor. This imposition, in turn, may be made upon the oppressed population which is allowed to remain, or upon the territory alone, after removal of the populations and the colonization of the area by the oppressors’ own nationals.26

Evidently, Lemkin, who never spoke of the ‘Holocaust’, wanted to emphasise the continuity in a radicalised form of genocidal policies in National Socialism. But with the subsequent construction of ‘the Holocaust’ as a symbol of radical evil, the novelty of these policies was emphasised. According to some observers, the Holocaust has become a ‘cosmopolitan memory’, a transnational moral source – at least in the West – on which everyone can agree, even if it is interpreted in different ways. At the ‘Intergovernmental Conference on the Holocaust’ that took place in Stockholm in 2000, the European powers committed themselves to fighting ‘genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism, anti-semitism and xenophobia’, signalling that the Holocaust has become the ‘civilizational foundations of a new official European memory’.27

What we need to understand is how and why it has become the iconic symbol of evil in the Western world in general.28 Why are all atrocities and calamities measured against the Holocaust? Does the evolution of ‘Holocaust consciousness’ in Australia mirror that in North America and Europe? Several authors point to the activism of the Jewish community in North America, but the promotion of the link between the Holocaust, Zionism and communal solidarity in the diaspora by some Jewish organisations cannot explain why the Holocaust has come to have such power in contexts, such as in Western Europe, where Jewish communities are far less important in setting the tone of national culture.29

The sociologist Jeffrey C. Alexander has recently presented a compelling explanation for the tremendous resonance of the Holocaust.30 It has become a ‘cultural trauma’ of universal appeal through a complex process of symbolic transference and inversion. When the concentration camps were first liberated, there was no such thing as ‘the Holocaust’. Western, largely Christian, publics were appalled by Nazi crimes, but regarded them as simply a very large atrocity, and identified with the Allied soldiers rather than the liberated Jewish survivor inmates. Nazism, not the ‘Holocaust’, was the symbol of evil, and its polluting presence was to be expunged by
the worldwide victory of liberal democracy. In this way, Nazi crimes were narrated into a progressive philosophy of history and left behind, as they were in the founding decade of Israel, when future-oriented pioneers, not defeated survivors, were demanded.

The inner logic of symbolic association, however, undermined this rather smug narrative. For if Jews had been Hitler’s primary target, then they must be of a piece with liberal democracy, and therefore the task is to expunge anti-semitism and racism from Western societies. Moreover, by deriving abstract moral criteria from the Second World War experience, the ethical foundation of the West could be held up to scrutiny by domestic critics. And in doing so, elements of Nazism could be found there by association and analogy, a process that Alexander calls ‘symbolic extension’. Simultaneously, with the acculturation of the Jewish community and the popularisation of ‘accessible’ Jewish Holocaust victims such as Anne Frank, psychological identification with Jewish victims became possible for non-Jews. Consequently, what enables the Jewish experience to be singled out from that of other victims of Nazism (and other demographic calamities, such as the policies of Mao and Stalin) and invested with ‘extraordinary gravitas’ so that it is considered a ‘radical evil’ and a unique ‘world historical’ event, is that it can function as a ‘trauma drama’ for everyone. The drama of Jewish victimisation is de-historicised and becomes an emblem for the disastrous consequences of racism and intolerance in general. Henceforth, the Holocaust is a proper, not a common noun – the ‘archetypal sacred-evil of our time’.

The progressive narrative is supplanted by a tragic one of innocent victims and damaged survivors, the memory of whose fate must be kept alive to prevent such suffering from recurring.

Yet, the insistence on its uniqueness brings with it an inescapable dilemma, Alexander continues. For to be sacred, the Holocaust needs to be protected from profanation by association with ‘normal’ evil, although as the ultimate standard of evaluation, it will be brought inevitably into association with other events. There is no avoiding ‘symbolic extension’, then, and those who are thereby associated with its evil are automatically polluted and need to undergo ritual cleansing; that is, purification. ‘One must do justice and be righteous’, notes Alexander. ‘This performative purification is achieved by returning to the past, entering symbolically into the tragedy, and developing a new relation to the archetypal characters and crimes.’

These are useful terms with which to revisit the Australian context. The reason that genocide cannot be severed completely from the Holocaust is because it is publicly constructed as the prototypical genocide. The comparison is implicit in the ‘dilemma of uniqueness’, and consequently, critics who want to put pressure on Australian history will associate it with the Holocaust. For example, in a recent, popular history, the journalist Phillip Knightley could not resist quipping:
It remains one of the mysteries of history that Australia was able to get away with a racist policy that included segregation and dispossession and bordered on slavery and genocide, practices unknown in the civilized world in the first half of the twentieth century until Nazi Germany turned on the Jews.35

On a more serious note, the Melbourne-based social scientist Mary Kalantzis poured scorn on the self-congratulatory tone of the centenary of federation celebrations in 2001.

[Australia’s] is a modern story which in its fundamental shape is not dissimilar to Germany’s. The big picture ideas are no different to those of the German thirties and forties: of the necessity to create ‘one people … without admixture of races’ (to use Deakin’s words again); of unbridgeable racial inferiority; of races destined to die out; and of the eugenics of progress. Nor were the technologies of race management so dissimilar: the enforced separation in concentration camps; the petty regulation of freedoms of movement and association. Nor too were the effects so different – in the Australian case, a genocide in which ninety per cent of the Aboriginal population died over the period of a century, and the wholesale destruction of peoples with distinctive languages and ways of life.36

Other scholars also draw links between Germany and Australia, without, however, reducing one to the other.37 Consistent with Alexander’s model, those Australians who make such connections tend also to insist that the federal government issue an apology to indigenous Australians; in particular, to the ‘Stolen Generations’. The ‘sorry people’, as these con-trite white Australians are called somewhat ironically, do indeed demand righteousness from the perpetrator collective and its leaders in order to put the relationship between indigenous and non-indigenous Australians on a new footing.38 They invoke Holocaust analogies such as ‘banality of evil’ and ‘denialism’ to denounce the government’s refusal to oblige them.39 But the public has sided with the government, which defiantly refuses all gestures of purification.

Why has this case of ‘symbolic extension’ failed? There are two reasons. First, in Australia the progressive narrative that insists on the historical specificity of the Holocaust, thereby disabling the heuristic potential of abstracting moral criteria, has not been supplanted by the tragic one. Like the British, Australians regard their civilisation as universally salutary and find it difficult to discern elements within it that can be somehow associated with German fascism. After all, did they not fight on the right side of history? Secondly, Aborigines are not available for identification in the same way as Jews. They are neither European nor bourgeois.

Consequently, right-wing publicists get themselves a profile by attacking the ‘charge that the British colonisation of this country was a process comparable to the Nazi destruction of the Jews in Europe’, which only Knightley has made.40 And although he is no friend of ‘genocide deniers’, the historian Andrew Markus has likewise expressed concern that the term ‘genocide’ not be used in the Australian context, as it can only be
properly applied to the Holocaust. In doing so, he follows in the footsteps of Israelis and Americans who insist that the Holocaust be quarantined off as unique and unprecedented. Because he likewise rejects any association between Australia and genocide, the Prime Minister, John Howard, is prepared to ‘express his sorrow and distress at the appalling tragedy which overcame the Jewish people’, but no more than ‘regret’ (rather than saying ‘sorry’, with its connotations of responsibility) at what previous Australian governments and settlers had done to Aborigines. His inability or reluctance to identify psychologically with the suffering of Aborigines resonates with most Australians.

What, then, is the status of the tragic narrative and its critical potential? An important precursor to the ‘genocide controversy’ of the late 1990s is the so-called ‘Demidenko debate’ in 1996, surrounding the prize-winning novel by Helen Darville (a.k.a. Demidenko), The Hand that Signed the Paper, about Ukrainian migrants to Australia who had participated in the Holocaust. The political scientist Robert Manne took exception to the book and the literary recognition it received because it was suffused with anti-semitism. Where was the cultural sensitivity that would prevent such an expression of primitive hatred? ‘Are we [Australians] not too part of that common civilisation which experienced the shock of Auschwitz and which internalised its meaning?’ he asked. In his review of Manne’s book on the subject, the conservative commentator Frank Devine articulated the other side of the dilemma of uniqueness: the Holocaust should not be used as a weapon of ‘political correctness’ or a criterion by which to judge Australia.

All this means that genocide and Holocaust consciousness cannot be separated in Australia, or anywhere else for that matter. Indigenous Australians and their supporters will be advantaged when the dilemma of uniqueness works in their favour. At those few moments when they are available for psychological identification, as they were after the tales of woe recounted in the Bringing Them Home report in 1997, and where the genocide concept can be clearly invoked, as in frontier massacres, the imperative to symbolic contrition and purification will come to the fore. These are important moments in the political humanisation of the country, which is why right-wing commentators campaign furiously against such findings. Facile exaggerations, such as those of Knightley, trigger the predictable response, thereby making the use of the genocide concept more difficult. When that happens, the generally held sacrality of the Holocaust and enduring Australian apathy about the indigenous peoples of the continent will conspire to ensure that people feel, to use John Howard’s words, ‘relaxed and comfortable’ about their national past, and that does no one any good.

Notes

My thanks go to Max Friedman and Stuart Ward for helpful comments on a draft. They are neither responsible for the opinions expressed here nor for any errors.
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In an important reflection on the ‘Stolen Generations’ debate, the Australian philosopher Raimond Gaita interrogated the genocide concept, and concluded that a separate category of ‘Holocaust’ might need to be considered for cases of total, physical destruction. See his A Common Humanity: Thinking about Love, Truth and Justice (London, 2000).


Alexander, pp. 30ff.

This issue is also discussed in A. D. Moses, ‘Conceptual blockages and definitional dilemmas in the racial century, 1850–1950: genocide of indigenous peoples and the Holocaust’, Patterns of Prejudice, 36 (4), 2002, pp. 7–36.

Alexander, p. 45.


An excellent dissection of these arguments is D. Stone, Constructing the Holocaust: Genocide and History (London, 2003).


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47 Moses, ‘Coming to terms with the past in comparative perspective’.