

– Section I –

INTELLECTUAL HISTORY AND CONCEPTUAL QUESTIONS

– Chapter 1 –

EMPIRE, COLONY, GENOCIDE

Keywords and the Philosophy of History

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If we demonstrate by our behavior that we consider the native population merely as an obstacle to be circumvented or smashed, if by our rule we bring them not well-being and enlightenment but destruction, then the only issue between the two races will be that of life and death. Sooner or later Algeria will become the bloody area for a mortal combat between these two peoples with mercy neither offered nor accepted. In such a struggle, one or the other would have to die. May God forbid that this be our destiny.¹

—Alexis de Tocqueville

Thus we constantly approach the South American Indian with both the attitude of the scientific researcher, trying to be objective, and the consciousness of being part of a civilization that has committed a kind of unpardonable sin—in my opinion the greatest sin ever committed in the history of humanity, which is to have destroyed or attempted to destroy half of the richness of humankind.²

—Claude Levi-Strauss

Introduction

Empire,” “colony,” and “genocide” are keywords particularly laden with controversial connotations. Few are the societies that were not once part of empires, whether its core or periphery. Few are the societies that are not the product of a colonization process, whether haphazard or planned. Many are the genocides that have marked imperial conquest through the ages. What is more, the first two of these terms are generally viewed through the lens of their nineteenth and twentieth century relatives, imperialism and colonialism, words of implicit opprobrium because they

connote European domination of the non-European world. Imperialism was coined in the middle of the nineteenth century to criticize ambitions for domination and expansion. A century later, to accuse a country of colonialism was to condemn it for enslaving and exploiting another.³

These keywords imply an interpretation of world history—indeed, human history tout court—shared by both proponents and critics of this European hegemony. Thus F. A. Kirkpatrick of Cambridge University referred to “colonization” and “empire” rather than “colonialism” or “imperialism” when he told his audience in 1906: “Down to the fifteenth century our ancestors were confined to this little Europe, and knew nothing of empty or half-empty countries inviting their occupation beyond the seas. Modern colonization and empire means the spread of Europe over the world.”⁴ Writing almost twenty years earlier, the future US president Theodore Roosevelt attributed the expansion of civilization solely to the “English-speaking Peoples.” Unlike the Spanish colonists who intermarried with *Indigenes* in the Americas, Anglophone settlers had retained the conquering prowess and racial purity of their Germanic ancestors: “The average Englishman, American, or Australian of today who wishes to recall the feats of power with which his race should be credited in the shadowy dawn of its history, may go back to the half-mythical glories of Hengist and Horsa, perhaps to the deeds of *Civilis the Batavian*, or to those of the hero of the *Teutoburger fight*.” Roosevelt also distinguished the English Teuton from the Spanish and French by the nature of his ruthless nation building. “The English had exterminated or assimilated the Celts of Britain, and they substantially repeated the process with the Indians of America.”⁵ The cause of progress assuaged the conscience. Writing between the world wars, the English soldier, collector, and archaeologist George Augustus Henry Lane Pitt-Rivers advised that when a “superior race” overwhelmed an inferior race, “humanitarian sentiments [are] often irrelevant and for the most part quite unreasonable . . . there should be no reason for members of a superior race to regret the gradual extinction of an inferior race if only the future enrichment and welfare of the world is considered.”⁶

Critical observers shared such frank recognition about the price of civilization, but without the celebration. The French anthropologist Georges Balandier noted somberly in 1951: “One of the most striking events in the recent history of mankind is the expansion throughout the entire world of most European peoples. It has brought about the subjugation and, in some instances, the disappearance of virtually every people regarded as backward, archaic, or primitive.”⁷

Frantz Fanon, the Martinican psychiatrist who wrote influential books on “third world” liberation, essentially concurred, turning Hegel upside down: “The West saw itself as a spiritual adventure. It is in the name of

the spirit, in the name of the spirit of Europe, that Europe has made her encroachments, that she has justified her crimes and legitimized the slavery in which she holds four-fifths of humanity.”⁸ Although they were writing soon after the United Nations passed the “Convention on the Punishment and Prevention of Genocide” in 1948, Balandier and Fanon did not use this neologism, invented during World War II by Raphael Lemkin (1900–1959), to describe the fate of “people regarded as backward, archaic, or primitive.” Nonetheless, the link between human catastrophes and the metanarrative of human progress was clearly in the minds of Europeans and non-European intellectuals at this time.

What precisely this link was and is has bitterly divided debate on the three keywords of this book because the moral legitimacy of Western civilization is at stake, as well, by implication, as the legitimacy of anti-colonial struggles of national liberation, especially in light of the anti-imperial rhetoric of postcolonial dictators. Contributors to the debate pose a number of conflicting questions. Was the expansion of the West—that, is, European colonialism and imperialism since the late fifteenth century—inherently genocidal and generally criminal?⁹ Or were non-European societies so nasty and brutish that they screamed out for the milk of European civilizational uplift?¹⁰ And did not genocide and totalitarianism really inhere less in European empires than in their negation, the anti-imperial, anti-Western “liberation movements,” of Islamism, Pan-Arabism, the “third world socialism” of the Khmer Rouge and Afrocommunism, even National Socialism?¹¹

If these terms seem improbably stark, anachronistic, even crude, consider discussions in the first decade of the twentieth-first century by supposedly subtle intellects. Benny Morris, the Israeli historian whose assiduous archival work helped dispel myths about the “Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem” in 1948, nonetheless defended ethnic cleansing and genocide as integral to the formation of (some) nation states and march of human progress. “Even the great American democracy could not have been created without the annihilation of the Indians,” he told an interviewer in 2004. “There are cases in which the overall, final good justifies harsh and cruel acts that are committed in the course of history.”¹² Also weary of leftist anticolonialism, antiracism, and anti-Zionism, the French philosopher Alain Finkielkraut sought to trump the victim narratives of the non-European colonized with his own:

I was born in Paris, but I’m the son of Polish immigrants. My father was deported from France. His parents were deported and murdered in Auschwitz. My father returned from Auschwitz to France. This country deserves our hatred: What it did to my parents was much more violent than what it did to Africans.

What did it do to Africans? It did only good. It put my father in hell for five years. . . . I think that the lofty idea of “the war on racism” is gradually turning into a hideously false ideology. And this anti-racism will be for the 21st century what communism was for the 20th century. A source of violence. Today, Jews are attacked in the name of anti-racist discourse: the separation fence, “Zionism is racism.”¹³

What these stances show is that, in the wake of the so-called “war on terror” after 11 September 2001 in particular, the debate about empire, colony, and genocide is marked by a phallic logic. Commentators shout, “my trauma is bigger than yours” in order to defend or attack the theodicy that the brutal extermination and disappearance of peoples over the centuries is redeemed by human progress in the form of the Western-dominated global system of nation-states.¹⁴

Instead of indulging in speculation about the philosophy of history, scholars can offer their readers more than these simplistic polarizations by asking middle-range questions that are amenable to empirical scrutiny.¹⁵ The following are apposite: What did the founder of “genocide studies,” Lemkin, have to say about the links between empires, colonies, and genocides? What can one say more generally about their interrelationship? And how is the Holocaust linked to them? Posing these questions allows us to ponder whether colonial wars of conquest and counterinsurgency are qualitatively different to genocides in Europe. Indeed, whether “colonial genocide” or “indigenocide” should be a subcategory of analysis distinct from genocide proper.¹⁶ Or whether colonial logics inhere in all genocides. Must the state be the perpetrator in cases where settlers killed indigenous people without official authority? Conversely, can indigenous people commit genocide against the settler colonizer? And, finally, is any consistency or pattern discernible in the relations between our three keywords and in phenomena so complex and riddled with contradictions as empires, with their bewildering array of governing modes and varying types of enlistment of subject peoples in their projects?¹⁷

In answering these questions, historians would do well to consider a pitfall inherent in genocide studies.¹⁸ Because genocide was originally conceived as a legal concept and crime in international law, the temptation is great to “catch a crook” rather than “write a book.”¹⁹ If the moral and emotional satisfaction of identifying and excoriating the evil-doers strikes a symbolic blow for surviving victim communities, writing as a hanging judge brings with it the danger of oversimplifying the historical record by casting each genocidal conjuncture as a tidily organized drama of passive victims, wicked perpetrators, and craven bystanders.²⁰ The complexities of empire, such as the tensions between indirect rule and authoritarian administration, resource exploitation and economic modernization, settler

foundations and cultural adaptation cannot be reduced to the single question: was there a genocide? There are as many ways of studying these phenomena as there are instances of colonies and empires.²¹

At the same time, neither ought the cultural and physical destruction that attended the foundation of colonies and expansion of empires be played down by conservatives in the name of Western self-congratulation and Edwardian nostalgia, or ignored by the unintentionally quietist, postcolonial fascination with the construction of identities and intricate networks of cultural circulation.²² Notwithstanding the different political intentions between these two positions, they share a desire to disrupt the binaries of colonizer/colonized, dominator/dominated, and center/periphery in order to view empires and colonies in less rigid terms. Together, they see

colonialism as often being a source of creativity and experiment, and while certainly not being without pain, colonial encounters cause the dissolution of values on all sides, creating new ways of doing things in a material and social sense. A stress on creativity takes us away from notions such as fatal impact, domination and resistance or core and periphery, emphasizing that colonial cultures were created by all who participated in them, so that all had agency and social effect, with colonizer and colonized alike being radically changed by the experience.²³

This is a view of colonization and empire that does not really admit the possibility of genocide. But need the historiography be a zero-sum game? Investing agency in the colonized does not mean empire needs to be seen as a symmetrically structured opportunity for cultural exchange. Remaining faithful to the complexity and contingency of the past need not entail abandoning the search for patterns or logics. It means that the object of inquiry is the sum total of economic, social, and political relations between people in a colonial situation; the various bids for power and the resistances to them; the processes of escalation brought on by real, contrived, or perceived security crises; the success of the colonial state in “pacifying” and either absorbing or expunging the “native”; the conscription of parts of indigenous society in such projects; as well, equally, as the failure of metropolises to realize their ambitions. The right note has been sounded by Donald Bloxham, who observed in relation to the Armenian genocide that “it may be said categorically that the killing did constitute genocide . . . but recognizing this fact should be a ‘by-product’ of the historian’s work, not its ultimate aim or underpinning.”²⁴ Genocide is to be explained as the outcome of complex processes rather than ascribable solely to the evil intentions of wicked men. It is the job of historians to trace how highly structured relationships between geopolitics and states, states and subaltern groups, elites and their bureaucracies become incarnated in and are themselves affected by the agency of individuals in particular situations.²⁵

Raphael Lemkin, the Polish-Jewish lawyer who coined the term *genocide* in 1944 and campaigned for its criminalization in international law, wrestled with the dilemma of judging the past.²⁶ Historians, he thought, were in thrall to the Rankean fascination with interstate relations at the expense of “the role of the human group and its tribulations.”²⁷ “Maybe . . . historians are somewhat guilty because they are used to present history in most cases from the point of view of wars for territorial expansion, of royal marriages, but they did not stress enough the death of civilizations as a result of genocide.”²⁸ It was time to regard history in terms of human group survival, he thought, because “the fight against the destruction of the human group has a more profound moral significance than the fight between states.”²⁹ Lemkin’s intention to reorient historical study was therefore explicitly activist: historical knowledge was to serve consciousness-raising in the present. Consequently, the study of genocide was to be scientific, and he drew on the scholarship of his day to develop his concept and write his analyses. For that reason, any analysis of colony, empire, and genocide should commence with his body of ideas.

Lemkin, Genocide, and Empire

Demonstrating that genocide had been a recurring feature of human history was at the heart of Lemkin’s public campaign to outlaw genocide in international law in the late 1940s and 1950s. Before his death in 1959, he had almost completed a book on genocide in world history but, unfortunately, publishers were uninterested in his manuscript.³⁰ Apart from his book manuscript, he also wrote about genocide in the press. Here is a typical statement from his publications at the time of his campaign: “The destruction of Carthage, the destruction of the Albigenses and Waldenses, the Crusades, the march of the Teutonic Knights, the destruction of the Christians under the Ottoman Empire, the massacres of the Herero in Africa, the extermination of the Armenians, the slaughter of the Christian Assyrians in Iraq in 1933, the destruction of the Maronites, the pogroms of Jews in Tsarist Russia and Romania—all these are classical genocide cases.”³¹ Many of these cases occurred in colonial and imperial contexts, or were instances of colonization as with the “Teutonic Knights and the Prussian Pagans” in the thirteenth century where “partial physical and total cultural genocide” occurred.³² In fact, most of his case studies from the Eurasian land mass were taken from continental empires: the Roman Empire, the Mongols, the Ottoman Empire, Charlemagne and the spread of German peoples eastwards since the Middle Ages.³³

Extra-European colonial cases also featured prominently in this projected global history of genocide. In “Part III: Modern Times,” he wrote the following numbered chapters: (1) Genocide by the Germans against the Native Africans; (3) Belgian Congo; (11) Hereros; (13) Hottentots; (16) Genocide against the American Indians; (25) Latin America; (26) Genocide against the Aztecs; (27) Yucatan; (28) Genocide against the Incas; (29) Genocide against the Maoris of New Zealand; (38) Tasmanians; (40) S.W. Africa; and finally, (41) Natives of Australia.³⁴ And he thought carefully about the modalities of genocide in situations where the Europeans were usually outnumbered by the indigenous inhabitants. “It must be clarified here that subjected group may be a majority controlled by a powerful minority *as in the case in colonial societies*. If the majority cannot be absorbed by the ruling minority and is considered a threat to the minority’s power, genocide is sometimes the result (i.e., the American Indian).”³⁵

But Lemkin did not just write about genocide in colonial contexts; he defined the concept as intrinsically colonial. On the first page of the relevant chapter in his book, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*, he wrote: “Genocide has two phases: one, destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed group; the other, the imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor. This imposition, in turn, may be made upon the oppressed population which is allowed to remain, or upon the territory alone, after removal of the population and the *colonization* of the area by the oppressor’s own nationals.”³⁶

While Lemkin’s linking of genocide and colonialism may surprise those who think that his neologism was modeled after the Holocaust of European Jewry, an investigation of his intellectual development reveals that the concept is the culmination of a long tradition of European legal and political critique of colonization and empire.³⁷ Indeed, the new discipline of “genocide studies” is a continuation of the long-standing European debate about the morality and legality of occupying and dominating other peoples. As Andrew Fitzmaurice shows in this volume, European theologians, philosophers, and lawyers have been debating the morality of occupation since the Spanish conquest of the Americas in the sixteenth century. These Spanish intellectuals—in particular by Bartolomé de Las Casas and Francesco de Vitoria—based their case on natural law that invested rights in Indigenous peoples. Hugo Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf, Emeric de Vattel, and Christian Wolff continued this line of critique. It was incarnated in different ways in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by humanitarians who assailed the mistreatment of “native peoples” by colonial authorities and settlers.³⁸

Twentieth-century jurists who defended indigenous rights, like Charles Solomon and Gaston Jèze, studied Vitoria carefully in making out their views. So did Lemkin, who likely knew Jèze in the 1920s. But Las Casas

was his hero: his “name has lived on through the centuries as one of the most admirable and courageous crusaders for humanity the world has ever known.”³⁹ Lemkin explicitly appropriated Las Casas’ viewpoint in his study of the “Spanish Colonial Genocide.” He called his book on the Nazi empire *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe* in order to place it in the tradition of criticizing brutal conquests. Genocide for Lemkin, then, was a special form of foreign conquest and occupation. It was necessarily imperial and colonial in nature. In particular, genocide aimed to permanently tip the demographic balance in favor of the occupier. In relation to the Nazi case, he wrote that “in this respect genocide is a new technique of occupation aimed at winning the peace even though the war itself is lost.”⁴⁰ Any doubt that the roots of the genocide concept lie in the five-hundred-year tradition of natural law-based critique of imperialism rather than in Lemkin’s reaction to the Armenian genocide or Holocaust can be dispelled by his own words:

The history of genocide provides examples of the awakening of humanitarian feelings which gradually have been crystalized in formulae of international law. The awakening of the world conscience is traced to the times when the world community took an affirmative stand to protect human groups from extinction. Bartolomé de las Casas, Vitoria, and humanitarian interventions, are all links in one chain leading to the proclamation of genocide as an international crime by the United Nations.⁴¹

Anticolonialism and Anti-imperialism?

Although himself a liberal, Lemkin did not share the affirmation of empire by liberals like Alexis de Tocqueville, who passionately endorsed the violent French conquest of Algeria.⁴² Lemkin was shocked by the dismal record of subaltern suffering at the hands of occupiers, just as a postliberal like Jean-Paul Sartre was incensed by the French reprisals in the Algerian town of Setif and the bombing and shelling of Muslim civilians nearby that killed perhaps many thousands of Arabs in 1945, episodes that the Algerian government now regards as genocidal.⁴³ Indeed, Lemkin shared with such postliberal anti-imperialists a vision of a noncoercive human group interaction. If Aimé Césaire famously denounced colonialism because it did not enable an authentic blending of “different worlds,”⁴⁴ he and Lemkin doubtless would have affirmed what the historian Richard White calls the “middle ground”: spaces in which peoples traded and negotiated with one another in mutually created forms of accommodation that were not reducible to the simple binary relationships of domination and subordination.⁴⁵ Drawing on Bronislaw Malinowski’s theory of cultural change, Lemkin favored what he called “cultural diffusion” via intercultural exchange. It comprised

gradual changes occur[ing] by means of the continuous and slow adaptation of the culture to new situations. The new situations arise from physical changes, creative energies within the culture and the impact of outside influences. Without them the culture becomes static; if they appear but are not met with adaptation of the whole culture pattern, the culture becomes less integrated. In either case, it becomes weaker and may disintegrate entirely when exposed to strong outside influences. The rise and fall of civilizations have been explained on this general basis.⁴⁶

But whereas Césaire thought that “no one colonizes innocently,” Lemkin, like Las Casas, did not oppose colonization or empire per se.⁴⁷ Empires, humanely governed, contributed to human progress through “diffusion,” he implied. Like Malinowski, Lemkin thought that cultural change was induced by exogenous influences, as weaker societies adopt the institutions of more efficient ones or become absorbed by them because they better fulfill basic needs. “Diffusion is gradual and relatively spontaneous,” Lemkin wrote, “although it may lead to the eventual disintegration of a weak culture.”⁴⁸ He would not have opposed the Phoenician colonization of the western Mediterranean, where a “coming to terms with and utilization of the indigenous population” and fruitful cultural interaction resulted in their assimilation within two generations.⁴⁹ An empire that promoted diffusion governed by “indirect rule,” Malinowski argued, because it supposedly enabled the autonomous indigenous acquisition of European institutions.⁵⁰ Lemkin agreed with this assessment, as we will see below.

What is more, Lemkin possessed a liberal faith in international law that he regarded as the central civilizational instrument to combat genocide. For genocide, in his view, was a reversion to barbaric times when no laws of war existed to protect civilians. Since Western imperialism, however brutal at times, had spread this international law, Lemkin did not share the outright anti-imperialism of leftist intellectuals like Sartre and Fanon, for whom all empires, at least capitalist ones, entailed the exploitation and degradation of the indigenous people.⁵¹ As we have seen, Fanon had no truck with such liberal self-narrations of moral or ethical progress, which he regarded as inevitably taking place at the expense of non-Europeans.

Genocide and Culture

Lemkin was disturbed by occupations like German colonial rule in Africa that ultimately culminated in genocide in German Southwest Africa and German East Africa between 1904 and 1907. “In the German colonies no attempt was made to respect native tribal customs or to invest the chiefs with their former dignity and authority. The chiefs were deprived of their privileges and the only authority permitted them was that delegated to them by the German officials, such authority being solely used for the purpose

of recruiting forced labour. If the chiefs failed to cooperate in everything demanded of them, they were systematically ill-treated, flogged and imprisoned, even for the most trivial offenses.”⁵² This quotation gives us clues to Lemkin’s conception of genocide. He was more concerned with the loss of culture than the loss of life. In his correspondence with the Nuremberg prosecutors, he urged them to amend the indictment of the Nazi leaders to include genocide. He wrote,

It appears in light of this evidence that the term genocide is a correct one since the defendants aimed to destroy, cripple, or degrade entire nations, racial and religious groups. The terms mass-murder or mass-extirpation in the light of hitherto produced evidence seems to be inadequate since they do not convey the racial and national motivation of the crime. [M]ass-murder or extermination do not convey the elements of selection and do not indicate the losses in terms of culture represented by the nation’s victims. If all the 125 000 Islanders will be killed off, this would mean a disappearance not only of 125 000 human beings but also a disappearance of the Islandic culture with its old language, institutions, national aspirations and all contributions which the Islandic nation made or is able to make to mankind in the future.⁵³

Why was culture so central to Lemkin’s conception of genocide? Drawing on the functionalist anthropology of Sir James Frazer and Malinowski, he argued that culture, which he called “derived needs” or “cultural imperatives,” was as constitutive for human group life as individual physical well-being (i.e., basic needs). Culture integrated society and enabled the fulfillment of individual basic needs. These “so-called derived needs,” Lemkin wrote, “are just as necessary to their existence as the basic physiological needs.” He elaborated this point thus: “These needs find expression in social institutions or, to use an anthropological term, the culture ethos. If the culture of a group is violently undermined, the group itself disintegrates and its members must either become absorbed in other cultures which is a wasteful and painful process or succumb to personal disorganization and, perhaps, physical destruction.”⁵⁴ For these reasons, he concluded, “the destruction of cultural symbols is genocide.” To destroy their function “menaces the existence of the social group which exists by virtue of its common culture.”⁵⁵

Herewith, we come to the thorny issue of “cultural genocide,” an issue central to the study of colonialism because it so often involved projects of indigenous assimilation. Lemkin has been fundamentally misunderstood by scholars of genocide who contend that he did not support the concept of cultural genocide. In fact, he wanted cultural genocide included in the 1948 convention. Referring to the Secretariat’s draft convention of 1947 that included a section on cultural genocide, he wrote that “Cultural Genocide is

the most important part of the Convention.”⁵⁶ He only reluctantly acceded to its eventual exclusion on tactical grounds.⁵⁷ Even so, it is difficult to obtain a clear answer about his own definition of the term from his many statements on the topic. Was forced religious conversion genocidal? At times, he suggested it was: for instance, in the actions of Spanish priests in the Americas.⁵⁸ At others, he denied it: “cultural genocide need not involve the substitution of new culture traits (such as forced conversion), but may maliciously undermine the victim group to render its members more defenseless in the face of physical destruction.”⁵⁹ In *Axis Rule*, he suggested that terms like “denationalization” or “Germanization”—the imposition of the conqueror’s “national pattern” on the conquered people—were unsatisfactory because “they treat mainly the cultural, economic, and social aspects of genocide, leaving out the biological aspects, such as causing the physical decline and even destruction of the population involved.”⁶⁰ Was he hopelessly confused?

Closer inspection of his writings reveals that, true to his concept of group life, he did not consider cultural destruction in isolation from attacks on the physical and biological elements of a group. In the cases of genocide he studied, attacks on culture were inextricably interwoven with a broader assault encompassing the totality of group existence: “Physical and biological genocide are always preceded by cultural genocide or by an attack on the symbols of the group or by violent interference with religious or cultural activities. In order to deal effectively with the crime of Genocide one must intervene at the very inception of the crime.”⁶¹ Nazi mass murder, too, could not be separated from their attack on culture. “Side by side with the extermination of ‘undesirables’ went a systematic looting of artworks, books, the closing of universities and other places of learning, the destruction of national monuments.”⁶²

We can encapsulate Lemkin’s position on genocide by regarding it as a “total social practice” that affected all aspects of group life.⁶³ Certainly, it could not be reduced to mass killing, as it is so often in popular consciousness and even genocide studies. “Like all social phenomena,” he wrote, “it represents a complex synthesis of a diversity of factors.”⁶⁴ It was, therefore, “an organic concept of multiple influences and consequences.”⁶⁵ As a total social practice, genocide comprised various techniques of group destruction. In *Axis Rule*, he outlined eight techniques used by the Nazis. They warrant listing in full because they illustrate his holistic conception of genocide, and demonstrate that mass killing was only one of a number of methods of group destruction. They are discussed here briefly in the order given by Lemkin.⁶⁶

Political techniques refer to the cessation of self-government and local rule, and their replacement by that of the occupier. “Every reminder of former national character was obliterated.”

Social techniques entail attacking the intelligentsia, “because this group largely provides the national leadership and organizes resistance against Nazification.” The point of such attacks is to “weaken the national, spiritual resources.”

Cultural techniques ban the use of native language in education, and inculcate youth with propaganda.

Economic techniques shift economic resources from the occupied to the occupier. Peoples the Germans regarded as of “related blood,” like those of Luxembourg and Alsace-Lorraine, were given incentives to recognize this kinship. There were also disincentives: “If they do not take advantage of this ‘opportunity’ their properties are taken from them and given to others who are eager to promote Germanism.”

Biological techniques decrease the birth rate of occupied. “Thus in incorporated Poland marriages between Poles are forbidden without special permission of the Governor (*Reichsstatthalter*) of the district; the latter, as a matter of principle, does not permit marriages between Poles.”

Physical techniques mean the rationing of food, endangering of health, and mass killing in order to accomplish the “physical debilitation and even annihilation of national groups in occupied countries.”

Religious techniques try to disrupt the national and religious influences of the occupied people. In Luxembourg, the method entailed enrolling children in “pro-Nazi youth organizations” so as to loosen the grip of Roman Catholic culture. Alternatively, in Poland, where no such assimilation was possible, the Germans conducted “the systematic pillage and destruction of church property and persecution of the clergy,” in order to “destroy the religious leadership of the Polish nation.”

Moral techniques are policies “to weaken the spiritual resistance of the national group.” This technique of moral debasement entails diverting the “mental energy of the group” from “moral and national thinking” to “base instincts.” The aim is that “the desire for cheap individual pleasure be substituted for the desire for collective feelings and ideals based upon a higher morality.” Lemkin mentioned the encouragement of pornography and alcoholism in Poland as an example.

Genocide, Assimilation, and Indigenous Survival

The congruence of these techniques with those of many instances of European colonial rule is striking. Food rationing, forced conversion, inculcation of the new ruling culture, marriage and reproduction restrictions, the sequestration of economic resources, and introduction of European addictions have visited terrible cultural and physical devastation on indigenous peoples. London critics of British settlers listed abuses that largely replicate Lemkin’s techniques of genocide. The *Report of the Select Committee*

on *Aborigines (British Settlements)* in 1837 complained that “Too often, their [Aborigines’] territory has been usurped; their property seized; their numbers diminished; their character debased; the spread of religion impeded. European vices and diseases have been introduced amongst them, and they have been familiarized with the use of our most potent instruments for the subtle or the violent destruction of human life, viz. Brandy and gunpowder.”⁶⁷

Not for nothing do the perceptions of indigenous people about their experiences accord with Lemkin’s phenomenology of genocide. Consider this summary by an Australian indigenous leader.

While the 1788 invasion was unjust, the real injustice was the denial by [Governor] Phillip and subsequent governments of our right to participate equally in the future of a land we had managed successfully for millenniums [*sic*]. Instead, the land was stolen, not shared. Our political sovereignty was replaced by a virulent form of serfdom; our spiritual beliefs denied and ridiculed; our system of education undermined. We were no longer able to inculcate our young with the complex knowledge that is acquired from intimate engagement with the land and its waterways. The introduction of superior weapons, alien diseases, a policy of racism and enforced biogenetic practices created dispossession, a cycle of slavery and attempted destruction of our society. The 1997 report *Bringing Them Home* highlighted the infringement of the UN definition on genocide and called for a national apology and compensation of those Aborigines who had suffered under laws that destroyed indigenous societies and sanctioned biogenetic modification of the Aboriginal people.⁶⁸

One of the issues raised by the *Bringing Them Home* report was whether forcible assimilation was tantamount to cultural genocide.⁶⁹ Lemkin’s statements above and his unpublished studies on colonial behavior, especially his aversion to forced religious conversion, suggest that he equated the two. But he was also a pragmatist. In order to ensure that cultural genocide survived the objections to its inclusion in the various UN committees in 1947, he suggested that it be limited to “acts which are disapproved or incriminated [*sic*] by all national, penal courts such as arson, burning of books, destruction of churches and schools” rather than legal administrative measures, i.e., forcible assimilation by legal means.⁷⁰ In other words, he limited cultural genocide to “acts of violence which are qualified as criminal by most of the criminal codes.”⁷¹ Legal assimilation was not cultural genocide, then, a conclusion that advantaged states that sought to assimilate their indigenous populations and other minorities after World War II. Lemkin’s residual faith in Western civilization as the source of international humanitarian law may also have encouraged this narrower reading of cultural genocide. But in the end, even this restriction of cultural genocide’s meaning was unsatisfactory for most UN delegates,

who understood the secretariat's draft convention as equating the closing of libraries with mass murder. Cultural genocide was eventually dropped from the final version of the convention.⁷²

Lemkin's equivocation on forcible assimilation may be linked to his unwitting participation in the discourse on indigenous extinction common in the cultural evolutionism of anthropology since the nineteenth century.⁷³ In keeping with this view, he tended to regard the encounter between European and Indigene as grossly asymmetric, thereby playing down both indigenous agency and the often-tenuous European grip on power, particularly in the initial stages of colonization. In German Southwest Africa, for instance, he did not see that the German governor was initially reliant on local chiefs. In fact, such reliance was most likely the norm, because collaboration with indigenous elites made imperial rule both cheap and efficient. In such cases, the imperial overlords cooperated with these elites rather than trying to Europeanize local culture, although it goes too far to describe these dynamics as "empire by invitation."⁷⁴ In fact, indirect rule often disrupted indigenous polities as well by promoting chiefly authority at the expense of other social actors or by fetishizing ethnic differences ("tribes"), which programmed these societies for genocidal conflict after decolonization, as in the case of Rwanda.⁷⁵ Nor did Lemkin appreciate that the Herero survived the German genocide of 1904/05 because, as one scholar put it, he "just saw the Herero as helpless victims whose fate was sealed for all time."⁷⁶

Such pessimism about the "disappearing savage" and "fatal impact" of Western colonization conveniently left the Europeans in sole occupation of the land, and worked against the interests of indigenous groups who survived genocidal assaults and later made claims for recognition and recompense. Recent research contests the myth of the "disappearing savage" by arguing that indigenous peoples creatively adapted to new circumstances. The Natick Indians, contrary to the well-known assertions of de Tocqueville that Indian society dissolved upon contact with the settlers, successfully maintained an Indian dimension to the land. A little over a century after first contact, in 1767, 82 percent of them had married outside the community, and they sold property as individuals.⁷⁷

Lemkin's blindness to the question of survival and adaptation was rooted in his particular concept of culture. Despite his anthropological reading, he seems to have equated national culture with high culture. Consider how he regarded the matter in this quotation:

All our cultural heritage is a product of the contribution of all nations. We can best understand this when we realize how impoverished our culture would be if the people doomed by Germany such as the Jews had not been permitted to

create the Bible or give birth to an Einstein, a Spinoza; if the Poles had not had the opportunity to give the world a Copernicus, a Chopin, a Curie; the Greeks a Plato and a Socrates, the English a Shakespeare, the Russians a Tolstoy and a Shostakovich, the Americans an Emerson and a Jefferson, the Frenchmen a Renan and a Rodin.⁷⁸

In this statement, the value of culture inhered in its elites who made contributions valuable for humanity as a whole. Recall that the social technique of genocide usually targeted cultural bearers, such as the intelligentsia and priestly class. Genocide could occur when they were exterminated, and when libraries, houses of religious worship, and other elite institutions of cultural transmission were destroyed, even if the mass of the population survived and continued some hybrid popular culture. Here is what Lemkin wrote about the Maya in twentieth-century Mexico centuries after their ravaging at the hands of the Spanish: “While the condition of the Indians has been improving since then, under a more progressive Mexican administration, their lot is still hard and their *cultural heritage has been irrevocably lost*. One million Indians still speak Maya dialect today. They still till the land as their forefathers had done but they have lost their civilized habits, their remarkable skills and knowledge long ago.”⁷⁹ Clearly, this view is untenable today. Only white perceptions that “real” Indians must be “pure” prevented Europeans seeing that “Indianness” was retained even while Indians adapted their culture and intermarried with others. Lemkin does not seem to have considered the possibility that genocide could be attempted, that much destruction could take place, and that cultural diffusion occurred nonetheless.

The Question of Intention

Even if genocide cannot be reduced to mass killing, the conservative case against the colonial essence of genocide is that Lemkin, in *Axis Rule*, mentions a “coordinated plan of different actions” that attacks groups “with the aim of annihilating” them.⁸⁰ Indeed, what kind of plan can be discerned in processes so haphazard and uncoordinated as imperial and colonial expansion, particularly on frontiers that extended beyond the reach of the state? Yet in his writings on colonial cases, Lemkin never spoke of a plan, but he did try to identify the “intent” of the colonists. With regard to the Spanish conquest of the Americas, he wrote that their intent was, in the case of “the empire of Peru,” to “take possession of it as their lawful territory and to convert the Peruvians to the true faith.”⁸¹ The officially announced will of the Spanish Crown manifested an intention, such as the proclamation to the Maya about the Spanish right to their country: “If you do not [‘recognize the Church and his Majesty the king as your rulers’], we will

war on you, take your wives and children away, dispose of your property and harm you as much as we can ‘as to vassals who will not obey and refuse to receive their lord.’”⁸² The reading of the Spanish sovereignty proclamation, whether natives were present or understood it, Lemkin observed, “seemed quite sufficient, in the eyes of the Spaniards, to produce obedience and justify genocide.”⁸³ Lemkin did not take this claim on face value, regarding such announcements as “a mere fiction” because the preemptive massacres committed by Cortes were obviously “intended.”⁸⁴ Elsewhere he wrote that the “motivation” of the Spanish in killing “rebellious Indians” was the “self-righteous attitude towards the Indians as Spanish property.”⁸⁵ The Spanish assumption of sovereignty was ultimately a pretext to kill, a posture inherited by subsequent English thinkers such as John Locke, who wrote that rebellious natives had “declared war against all mankind, and therefore may be *destroyed as a lion or tiger, one of those wild savage beasts with whom men can have no society or security.* And upon this is grounded that great law of Nature, ‘Whoso sheddeth man’s blood by man shall his blood be shed.’ Also Cain was so fully convinced that every one had a right to destroy such a criminal, that, after the murder of his brother, he cries out, ‘Every one that findeth me shall slay me,’ so plain was it writ in the hearts of all mankind.”⁸⁶ Lemkin was effectively arguing that occupations and settlements conducted on terms that neither recognized indigenous rights nor engaged in subsequent negotiations were bound to issue in genocide because resistance and its brutal suppression was inevitable.⁸⁷ The Nazis, too, fitted this pattern for Lemkin. He thought that Hitler regarded the Russian partisan warfare as but a pretext to “eradicate everyone who opposes us.”⁸⁸

Lemkin held individuals responsible for acts of genocide. Thus he found various Spanish leaders in the Americas guilty of genocidal acts.⁸⁹ Individual settlers could be guilty of genocidal acts as well, even if they were not authorized by the state. Lemkin never stipulated that genocide was solely a crime of state, and the UN convention concurred in naming individuals as well as state officials as potential perpetrators. Nonetheless, the illusion that genocide is tantamount to the Holocaust continues. Consider the following by an Australian historian:

The wild times, which ended around 1850, spelt tragedy for Aboriginal people. However, it was not a story of genocide, as is often claimed, at least not according to the formal meaning of the word—that is, of official, intentional, premeditated killing. Intentional killing was carried out by settlers on a private and local level, however, leading to perhaps hundreds of deaths. Other deaths came from impulse and rage over property losses felt by possessive and fearful men. But there was never an official policy of killing Aborigines. Indeed, the British Government that held power during the era abhorred such violence and vainly tried to end it.⁹⁰

In fact, this *is* a story of genocide because of the intentional killing of hundreds of Aborigines. No “official policy” is necessary for genocide to occur according to Lemkin’s definition. An unofficial one is sufficient.

Lemkin also considered the issue of what might be called “unintended consequences.” Discussing Nazi concentration and labor camps that were not death factories per se but that experienced very high rates of mortality, he postulated that genocidal intent could be inferred where mass death was not explicitly intended but where it was highly probable and reasonably foreseeable. “This is the phenomenon of wasting somebody else’s life on a mass scale. This wanton relationship to human life was a natural result of the basic concept of genocide.” The camp director was guilty because he “does not object in his mind and agrees with the eventuality of such destruction. In the criminal law of civil law countries such an intent is called ‘*dolus eventualis*.’”⁹¹

This legal doctrine presents an interesting question for scholars of genocide and colonialism, because there is abundant evidence that Europeans were well aware of the devastation that their colonization wrought on indigenous populations. Robert Brown noted in 1873, for instance, that to save them one would need to keep “away from them . . . for where one is benefited and ameliorated by civilization a thousand are ruined . . . resulting sooner or later in . . . utter extinction.”⁹² To be sure, Europeans usually ascribed the inevitability of extinction to the supposed weakness of the “native” peoples, and they were well aware of the fatal factors: violence, disease, and fertility decline. But they were also confident that the value of their own civilization was sufficiently great to justify the destruction of the indigenous ones, howsoever caused.⁹³ President Andrew Jackson’s annual address in 1830 exhibited this belief very clearly:

Humanity has often wept over the fate of the aborigines of this country, and Philanthropy has been long busily employed in devising means to avert it, but its progress has never for a moment been arrested, and one by one many powerful tribes disappeared from the earth. To follow to the tomb the last of his race and to tread on the graves of extinct nations excite melancholy reflections. But true philanthropy reconciles the mind to these vicissitudes as it does the extinction of one generation to make room for another.⁹⁴

Whether Lemkin would ascribe a genocidal intention in these terms to settler colonialism in particular is probably impossible to say, but it is an important question to consider in light of recent jurisprudence in international law.⁹⁵ In the case of Radislav Krstic in 2001, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia held the accused not guilty of genocide because he had not been directly involved in the massacre of seven thousand Bosnian men and boys at Srebrenica. But his knowledge of

the genocidal intention of his comrades and their use of his troops was sufficient to convict him for participating in their “joint criminal enterprise,” that is, the secondary offence of aiding and abetting genocide.⁹⁶ The tribunal’s use of the law of conspiracy, complicity, and incitement means that international jurisprudence is catching up with social scientists who realized long ago that narrow, black-letter interpretations of the convention’s stipulations regarding genocidal intention cannot do justice to the messy reality in which such intentions evolve. For all that, the tribunal’s distinctions also help students of genocide and colonialism differentiate types of intention in collective projects like colonialism.

Whether colonialism is a joint criminal enterprise is not a question that is scientifically answerable. Who is to judge? Lemkin was caught on the horns of a dilemma. The (modern) empires he scrutinized for committing genocide were also those that spread civilization by the sword as well as the plough. Arguing that measures like forced assimilation, for instance, were only genocidal if considered illegal by civilized nations begs the question, because civilized nations were the states who engaged in such forced assimilation. The subaltern answer to the implicit theodicy has been given by Césaire: “They talk to me about progress, about ‘achievements,’ diseases cured, improved standards of living. *I am talking about societies drained of their essences, cultures trampled underfoot, institutions undermined, lands confiscated, religions smashed, magnificent artistic creations destroyed, extraordinary possibilities wiped out.*”⁹⁷

Nazi Imperialism and Colonialism

If Lemkin viewed colonies and empires as the heart of genocide, did he include Nazism and the Holocaust? In some respects, yes; in others, no. This is how he linked the issues in an unpublished draft manuscript:

The Nazi plan of Genocide was related to many peoples, races, and religions, and it is only, because Hitler succeeded in wiping out 6 million Jews, that it became known predominantly as a Jewish case.

As a matter of fact, Hitler wanted to commit G. against the Slavic peoples, in order to colonize the East, and to extend the German Empire up to the Ural mts. Thereupon after the completion of the successful war he would have turned to the West and to subtract from the French people the 20 million Frenchmen he promised in his conversation with Rauschnig. Thus the German Empire would have reached from the Ural Mts. to the Atlantic Ocean. Nazi Germany embarked upon a gigantic plan to colonize Europe, and since there are no free spaces local populations had to be removed in order to make room for Germans. Nazi Germany did not have a fleet to protect overseas possessions. Moreover Germany had never good experiences in the past with overseas colonization. It was thus much simpler to colonize the European continent.

Hitler's plan covered the Poles, the Serbs, the Russians, the Frenchmen. . . . The main purpose of the Nazis was a commission of a G. against nations in order to get hold of their territory for colonisation purposes. This was the case of the Poles, and the Russians and the Ukrainians.⁹⁸

It is evident that Lemkin did not think that genocide was restricted to the Jewish case. The Nazi empire and its colonization plans were central to its genocidal policies. At the same time, he distinguished the treatment of Europeans Jews and Roma from that of Slavs and colonization.

The case against the Jews and the Gypsies was not based upon colonisatery [*sic*] but upon racial considerations. . . . The case against the Jews and Gypsies was of a purely racial rather than emotional political nature. The race theory served the purpose of consolidating internally the German people. The Germans had to be shown that they are racially valuable Nordics. Their favorable racial classifications could be understood better by comparing them with those who were called and classified as vermin of the earth—the Jews and the Gypsies.⁹⁹

Given this distinction—if we cannot explain the Holocaust of European Jewry and genocide of the Roma in colonial terms—do we reach a conceptual limit in the linking of colony, empire, and genocide? To answer this question, we need to consider these keywords more generally.

Empire, Imperialism, Colony, Colonization, Colonialism

The vocabulary of our subject comes from the Roman Empire. The historian Sallust is apparently the first to refer to the Roman state as *Imperium* in the first century BCE. Settlements of soldiers on territory it conquered were called *colonia*. As noted already, empire and colonization have been associated with global European domination. With characteristic Eurocentrism, F. A. Kirkpatrick wrote a century ago that “the story of empire, of dominion over rich and populous cultures, apart from any considerable European emigration, deals chiefly with the commercial and political conquest of India and other Asiatic lands by Europeans; the study of colonization deals mainly with the migration of Europeans into the New World.”¹⁰⁰ This view may also suit anti-Orientalists for whom Europe is the root of all evil, but the fact is that empires of one type or another have dominated the political organization of humanity for thousands of years:¹⁰¹ from the Nuba in North Africa, Assyrians in the Middle East, Manchus in China, and Zulus in Africa, to the tribute systems of Mesoamerica, Mongols of Central Asia, Mughals in India, Safavids in Iran, and multinational land empires of the Ottomans, Habsburgs, and Romanovs, not to mention the

“blue water” modern empires of Great Britain, France, Belgium, and Germany. Not that Western empires wanted to admit they had acquired territory by violent conquest. That is what rivals were and did.¹⁰²

So can we conceptually clarify terms so laden with ideological and historical baggage? Are they irredeemably contaminated with political connotations? Careful differentiation is necessary. There is consensus that empire means the domination of one society by another, usually backed by military force. Imperialism is a process and set of policies to acquire such domination whether by annexation or through less formal means.¹⁰³ The imperial relationship to colonies has historical precedents. Empires customarily engaged in settlement and resettlement, colonizing frontier regions with loyal subjects. Russian monarchs, for example, encouraged Germans to settle in the Lower Volga in the eighteenth century because their serfs were immobile. By 1914, 1.7 million ethnic Germans lived in east-central Europe, vulnerable to Russian paranoia about their loyalties in the looming war with Germany.¹⁰⁴ Nonetheless, settlement does not necessarily imply colonization. The German settlements were not colonies of imperial Germany. Neither were the early Phoenician settlement colonies in this sense, nor English Puritans in North America, because they were autonomous migrations rather than outposts of a metropolitan center.

Agreement breaks down when colonialism is added to the mix. How does it relate to the other keywords? If Edward Said thought “imperialism was the theory, colonialism the practice of changing the uselessly unoccupied territories of the world into useful new versions of the European metropolitan society,” others simply equated the two.¹⁰⁵ Another viewpoint sees the relationship reversed: “Imperialism is a special case of colonialism where there are colonies tied together into one political structure.”¹⁰⁶ Still another group of scholars distinguish colonialism from imperialism by insisting that the former entails colonization—the permanent migration of settlers to new territories—whereas the latter does not.¹⁰⁷

The problem with these articulations of the relationship between the terms is that they omit consideration of colonial rule. Empire can exist without colonization or colonialism. Thus Ottoman rule in Egypt was not colonial because of the large measure of local self-administration and absence of permanent settlers. India was not an English colony for similar reasons. In practice, the sovereignty of empires was not as absolute as supposed by theories of empire.¹⁰⁸ Colonialism, by contrast, is a specific form of rule, and as a process supplements colonization. It means the occupation of societies on terms that robs them of their “historical line of development” and that transforms them “according to the needs and interests of the colonial rulers.”¹⁰⁹ Colonial rule can radically alter the structure of, even dismember, an indigenous society.

The distinction between colonization and colonialism is apparent in the difference between two related concepts, internal colonization and internal colonialism. The former is the settlement of peoples, usually in frontier areas, loyal to the metropole to ensure security and encourage economic development of semi- or unoccupied land within a national or imperial territory. The resettlement of Muslim Slavs from former Ottoman territory in the Balkans to the core territories of the empire in the leadup to the First World War, as described by Donald Bloxham in this volume, represents a version of internal colonization.¹¹⁰ By contrast, the concept of internal colonialism, which originated with Lenin, first meant the Russian metropole's economic exploitation of the periphery, that is, of the country by the towns. The sociologist Alvin Gouldner thought that Stalinism embodied this capitalist economic formation in a socialist context: "Here, internal colonialism refers to the use of the state power by one section of society (the Control Center) to impose unfavorable rates of exchange on another part of the same society (e.g., the Subordinate Remotes), each being ecologically differentiated from the other. The control center governs by using the state to impose unequal exchange. . . . Where these routine mechanisms fail, the control center uses force and violence against the remote subordinates."¹¹¹ In the 1970s in particular, Marxist scholars employed the concept of internal colonialism to explain the underdevelopment of certain geographical regions. Drawing on Immanuel Wallerstein's distinction between core and periphery, they were interested in mapping the congruence between cultural and economic divisions of labor.¹¹²

The turn to cultural history in subsequent decades has seen scholars focus on other dimensions of internal colonialism. It is said to represent the "civilizing project" advanced by the center and its dominant ethnicity over other peoples in remote areas, which contrasts with the usual combination of military conquest and cultural pluralism of the Mesoamerican empires, for instance.¹¹³ Nation building in France in the nineteenth century could be seen under this aspect.¹¹⁴ Recent research in Chinese history has combined this new approach with a focus on biopolitics, namely the efforts of the state to categorize and map the social class, gender, ethnicity, and nationality of a region in order to better govern peoples and establish borders—indeed, to constitute the nascent nation in the first place.¹¹⁵

The nature of colonial rule is significant because governance and cultural autonomy are central to the question of genocide. In light of Lemkin's elaborate techniques of genocide, the proposition can be ventured that the greater the intensity of colonial rule, the greater the likelihood that it is genocidal. As Dominik Schaller shows in this volume, German colonialism in Africa is of particular interest to scholars precisely because its relative lateness meant that the state was intimately involved in creating highly

authoritarian and racially segregated societies. German immigrants ruled over deracinated Africans whose political, cultural, and economic independence had been smashed in order to transform them into a helot class of workers for German agriculture.¹¹⁶

Lemkin himself identified this kind of direct rule as genocidal. But what about other modalities of colonialism? As might be expected, the demographic question is uppermost in the minds of indigenous leaders and intellectuals. In 1978, Aimé Césaire condemned the French encouragement of emigration to the West Indies as “genocide through substitution.”¹¹⁷ The fact is that disease most likely accounted for the vast majority of indigenous deaths as much as immigration issued in the growth of European populations around the world. One historian likened this astonishing population substitution to a “demographic takeover.” This phenomenon occurred in colonies—North America, South America, Australia, and New Zealand—that were less densely populated than Asia and Africa, and where diseases threatened locals rather than the colonists.¹¹⁸ Even if this population decimation was not solely attributable to “natural causes” (indigenous populations were most vulnerable to disease when they were experiencing dislocation due to colonization and colonial rule), it is hard to make the case that disease was deliberately spread in most cases.¹¹⁹ Unfortunately, Lemkin hardly reflected on the question of disease in colonial situations.¹²⁰

These societies of “demographic takeover” did not just succeed because of passive population substitution, however. Well before state-led “scientific” colonialism, settlers and pastoralists managed to destroy indigenous societies by other less systematic means. “The destruction of nomadic societies, and their succession by relatively prosperous settler societies,” Donald Denoon observed, “has occurred in temperate North America as well as temperate South America, in Siberia as well as Australia and southern Africa.”¹²¹ Here was a continuation of the transformation, since the early modern period, of pastoral societies displacing nomadic ones on the Eurasian continent. Denoon holds this displacement to be inevitable. “The coexistence of commercial farming and nomadism was impossible everywhere in the long run.” Arguing along similar lines, Patrick Wolfe holds that settlers’ interest in the land rather than labor of the nomads means that a logic of elimination characterizes settler colonialism: the nomads’ connections to the land needed to be vitiated by their absorption into or expulsion from the new society.¹²²

Conflict between “steppe and sown” had not been a zero-sum game in medieval central Asia. Although contemporaries regarded the Khazars, Pechenegs, and Western Oguz as aggressors, such mobile societies did not in fact seek to despoil sedentary ones, because they were needed for trade. The limitations of the nomadic economy, based on herds of stock, meant that

luxury and other goods had to be extracted from agricultural societies—whether by “trade or raid”—with which they lived in tense symbiosis.¹²³ This coexistence was possible because the interrelations were not colonial.

Wolfe’s pattern certainly holds true when a “middle ground” became a colony. For instance, in British Columbia, approximately symmetrical relations of trade between British and Indians obtained until the 1850s, when it became a formal colony and land acquisition was the central determinant of interaction. The customary pattern of events unfolded. The British military tried to keep the peace, but imperatives for local rule and economizing in London meant that land policies were ultimately decided by settler politicians. They enclosed common land and legislated exclusive property rights over multiple usage so as to ensure that investments could be made good.¹²⁴ Indians could resist by moving, submitting petitions, and not cooperating with the new dispensation, but state and settler violence underwrote the eventual victory of the British social system.¹²⁵

This victory was not always total. Indigenous agricultural communities were better able to resist settlers than nomads, often serving as a source of labor. Not all Indigenes “disappeared.”¹²⁶ Indeed, the story is anything other than genocidal in many colonial contexts. Where was genocide in plantation and trading colonies: for instance, in the British occupation of Singapore (1819), the Falkland Islands (1833), Aden (1839), Hong Kong (1842), and Lagos (1861)?¹²⁷ The distinction between types of imperial rule was made well by Alexis de Tocqueville: “There are two ways to conquer a country; the first is to subordinate the inhabitants and govern them directly or indirectly. That is the English system in India. The second is to replace the former inhabitants with the conquering race. This is what Europeans have almost always done. The Romans, in general, did both. They seized the country’s government, and in several parts of it they founded colonies that were nothing other than far-flung little Roman societies.” He recommends a combination of the two approaches in Algeria: domination of the interior so the coast could be settled.¹²⁸ As we shall see, it is not only cases of settler colonialism that are potentially genocidal.

Genocide and “Savage Wars of Peace”

Colonial and imperial wars are not usually considered genocidal. Once regions are “pacified”—that is, armed resistance is broken—the occupiers settle down to the business of governing. This rather benign view of such conflicts precludes the question of genocide by equating it with the Holocaust of European Jewry: where no death camps can be found, genocide cannot be said to have occurred. Leaving aside the issue of whether the

Holocaust unfolded in the clockwork fashion entertained in popular consciousness, and whether it can be understood apart from the Nazi imperial and colonial project in Europe, colonial conquest and warfare possess a number of potentially genocidal dimensions. In the first place, the aim of the colonizer was not just to defeat military forces but also to annex territory and rule over a foreign people. War aims were not limited, as they customarily were in intra-European wars; they were absolute. "Colonial conquerors came to stay." Second, the colonizer often ended up waging war against the entire population because it was difficult to distinguish between civilians and combatants, especially when guerilla-style resistance ensued. The often flat political structures of indigenous peoples meant that the colonizer could not easily identify leaders and "decapitate" the local polity.¹²⁹ Colonial war could mean total war on a local scale.

In the main, imperial troops prevailed over numerically superior opponents because they were regularly paid, well supplied, and trained. The ability to concentrate forces at one point was more decisive than technological superiority alone, especially if indigenous agents could be conscripted, such as the Native Mounted Police in colonial Queensland.¹³⁰ Such asymmetry did not always obtain, however. Consider the case of the Karifuna in the Antilles in the seventeenth century. The Spanish had smashed indigenous resistance by the middle of the seventeenth century and enslaved the inhabitants in agriculture and mining, but they were followed by French and English colonists on neighboring islands who wanted the land and to continue the slave economy. Difficulties in subduing the Karifuna on Antigua resulted in dozens of English deaths in the 1620s and 1630s, which led to a joint French and English effort on St. Kitts to kill and drive off as many of the natives as possible. Their survival and mingling with escaped African slaves led to calls in the 1670s for the extermination of the "Carib Indians." But the apathy of plantation owners and divisions between French and British authorities meant that such rhetoric remained hollow. Only the eventual hegemony of the British by the late eighteenth century enabled the roundup and depositing of the survivors on an inhospitable island off Honduras, where a third of them starved within four months.¹³¹

Equally difficult to subdue were the Indians of the Argentine frontier in the nineteenth century. Their experience demonstrates not only the tenacity of indigenous resistance, but also that neat models of invasion/resistance cannot capture the complexity of the colonial encounter. Well-armed and excellent horsemen, Indians prospered in the pampa, where their mobile lifestyle rendered them less vulnerable to the disease that devastated those who attempted agriculture. Roaming Spanish patrols made little inroads into the region in the early eighteenth century, so the imperial authorities were forced to ally themselves with certain tribes against others. Tribute

was paid to some of them for peace and information. A “middle ground” was achieved at this point with rough parity between different groups. The Roman model of settling soldiers on the frontier failed in the face of resistance by ranchers and plutocratic governments loathe to give away land. Domestic Argentine imperatives in the 1830s led to the demand for more grazing land and a military solution, but 50 percent of the badly paid and trained soldiers and militia were casualties of frontier service. By the 1850s, alternative policies to propitiate Indians by granting them land allotments had also failed, with Indians driving off ranchers and settlers. Other efforts in the 1870s to integrate Indians into frontier society by winning them from their raiding/tribute economy also failed. Anxious about the interests of neighboring Chile in the region, a hardline military solution was suggested in 1875 by Julio A. Roca, chief of frontier forces. “In my judgment, the best system to finish the Indians, that is, exterminating them or removing them beyond the Rio Negro, is an offensive war,” by which he meant lightning strikes by mobile forces. With the telegraph, railroad, and better-armed troops, his offensives in 1878 were successful. Thousands were killed, with survivors driven to Chile. Missions were built in the place of destroyed villages.¹³²

Imperial thinkers devoted considerable thought to the problem of “small wars,” with their pattern of conquest followed by resistance. Although they advised against exasperating the conquered population, the destruction of villages and crops was countenanced if necessary. Certainly French and Russian authorities were happy to indulge in such scorched-earth tactics in their respective North African and Caucasian conquests during and after the 1830s.¹³³ Alexis de Tocqueville’s liberal scruples were not shared by many French in Algeria, as he reported in 1833. On one view,

to subjugate the Arabs, we should fight them with the utmost violence and in the Turkish manner, that is to say, by killing everything we meet. I have heard this view supported by officers who took it to the point of bitterly regretting that we have started to take prisoners in some places, and many assured me that they encouraged their soldiers to spare no one. For my part, I returned from Africa with the distressing notion that we are now fighting far more barbarously than the Arabs themselves. For the present, it is on their side that one meets with civilization.

At the same time, he regarded burning harvests, emptying silos, and internment of civilians as “unfortunate necessities, but ones to which any people that wants to wage war on the Arabs is obliged to submit.” The reason was because war was being waged on populations, not governments.¹³⁴

Indeed, such tactics were a feature of imperial rule generally. In 133 BCE the Romans destroyed Numantia on the Iberian Peninsula for defying

Roman rule, as they had Carthage thirteen years earlier. Even the late sieges and subsequent destruction of Jerusalem between 70 and 136 CE can be seen in this light. In the euphemistically termed “Harrying of the North,” William I (“the Conqueror”), who invaded England in 1066, put down serious Saxon resistance around Yorkshire by destroying all villages and livestock between York and Durham, causing famine and the starvation of up to one hundred thousand people. The aim was to destroy the local society so that it could not provide sustenance to rebels, who hid in marshes and forests, and so that it could not serve as a base for future Danish attack. The country was largely uninhabited for a century thereafter.¹³⁵ Continuing the tradition of vicious reprisals, the Elizabethan conquest and colonization of Ireland, which was contemporaneous with significant contact of Englishmen with Native Americans in the sixteenth century, saw the slaughter of men, women, and children where English conquest was resisted. The women and children were considered fair game because they sustained the men, and because the Irish were regarded as pagan.¹³⁶ The violent Cromwellian quelling of Catholic uprisings in Ireland in the next century, such as the massacre of Drogheda in 1649, followed the same logics, as did the Spanish counterinsurgency against the Yucatec Mayan uprising of 1761.¹³⁷ This pattern was repeated in the Anglo-Zulu war in 1879, when British forces used scorched-earth tactics and massacred wounded fighters and prisoners in their desperate efforts to put down Zulu resistance to imperial rule.¹³⁸

Likely, no power surpassed the Mongols in the extent and violence of their reprisals. Chinggis Khan was pitiless towards disloyalty, exterminating the Merkit in 1217 for attacks on his forces years before. Although they were more interested in booty than conquest, the Mongols were prepared to launch bloody war where sedentary peoples would not hand over their goods. Cities that resisted were razed, and devastated regions took generations to recover. Samarkand was reduced in population by 75 percent in the first decades of the thirteenth century. When Chinggis died in 1227, the mourning army slaughtered the entire population of Zhongxing city.¹³⁹ All these cases would be considered genocide under international law today.¹⁴⁰

Imperial and national elites were constantly worried about security on their peripheries.¹⁴¹ In 1914, the imperial Russian army deported up to one million Jews living in its western borderlands because they were suspected of disloyalty and potential espionage for the Germans.¹⁴² Between 1935 and 1938, similar paranoia led Soviet authorities to deport nine nationalities away from sensitive border areas. During the Second World War, they violently deported Chechen and Ingush people of the North Caucasus, some of whose number had allegedly collaborated with the invading Germans. In

the early 1930s, the famine in the Ukraine had been precipitated by anxieties that it might secede from the union.¹⁴³

The security syndrome led to mass deaths in violent counterinsurgency. The contemporaneous Italian subjugation of Cyrenaica in Libya resulted in the deaths of over 6,000 local fighters and the internment in camps of some 76,000 people, about half the total population.¹⁴⁴ In 1952, British authorities in colonial Kenya interned hundreds of thousands of supposed insurgents, killed up to 20,000 in combat, hanged over 1,000, and tortured many others. One historian claims up to 100,000 Mau Mau insurgents died in the camps.¹⁴⁵ Much of the murderous radicalization of the Pol Pot regime in mid-1978 was driven by regime paranoia about rebellious eastern border cadres and other Cambodians thought to be tainted by Vietnamese influence. The Cham nationality, which was targeted for destruction, was likewise considered “rebellious.”¹⁴⁶

The common motivation for deporting or destroying subnational groups is the accusation that they are rebellious, supporting rebellions, or cooperating with enemies across borders, such as the Ottoman Armenians in 1915.¹⁴⁷ The genocide in Darfur is also a counterinsurgency unfolding according to this pattern.¹⁴⁸ What these cases show is that real or imagined resistance to imperial or national rule can radicalize a policy of conquest or “pacification.” Resistance leads to reprisals and counterinsurgency that can be genocidal when they are designed to ensure that never again would such resistance occur.¹⁴⁹ In the words of one scholar, such practices possess a “strategic logic” that can culminate in “final solutions.”¹⁵⁰

Subaltern Genocide

If security anxieties have led to genocidal measures of military coercion, another policy option has been to colonize one’s own borderlands. Imperial Germany’s concerns about Polish population growth within its eastern border led to various schemes to counter “Polonization” with “Germanization,” including the purchase of Polish-owned estates and their distribution to German peasant colonists. The sociologist Max Weber was one of many who such measures.¹⁵¹ The Sri Lankan government engaged in rural colonization schemes to displace Tamils.¹⁵² The government of the Dominican Republic tried to counter the “pacific invasion” of Haitians by “colonizing” the border areas with Dominican peasants in the first decades of the twentieth century.¹⁵³

What these examples show is that the perception of being colonized by outsiders leads to colonization projects of one’s own. As might be expected, such perceptions are highly subjective. Thus nationalist Czechs in the first

half of the twentieth century regarded Germans who had lived in Bohemia and Moravia for hundreds of years as colonists, while German nationalists regarded those Germans as a beleaguered minority subject to an oppressive colonial rule.¹⁵⁴ Ukrainian nationalists saw themselves as subject to Polish colonial rule in the eastern borderlands of the interwar Polish state. Poles settled those expelled by the Ukrainians on their western border with Germany in order to colonize that vulnerable region. Ukrainians redistributed the lands of “former Polish colonists” to their compatriots.¹⁵⁵ In Rwanda, Hutus regarded themselves as indigenous and Tutsis as colonists from North Africa.

These points lead to broader questions: Can the founding of empires can be linked to the experience of a society’s having been colonized and subjected to imperial conquest and rule? Are empires created to ensure that never again is that society dominated by another? Does the impulse for empire—the desire for invulnerability—come from previous feelings of abjection: empire both as security and compensation for past humiliations? Does, in other words, empire have an indigenous origin?

The beginning of the Spanish Empire in the Americas in the late fifteenth century is a case in point. It came in the wake of the *reconquista*, the Christian reconquest, conducted under Papal aegis, of the Iberian peninsula from the Moors who had occupied the area since the eighth century. Christians were settled in reconquered land.¹⁵⁶ Some view the continuation of the *reconquista* in the Americas as the beginning of Europe’s poisoned gift to the world: the catastrophe of the ethnically and ideologically homogeneous nation-state that replaced the multicultural utopia of Islamic rule in Spain, with its harmonious coexistence of the three monotheistic faiths.¹⁵⁷ It can also be seen as chain in the continuity of conquest, reconquest, and yet more conquest that has marked human group interaction for thousands of years.

A contemporaneous example is imperial Russia. The Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century were overthrown by the Muscovite princes in the later fifteenth century in a Russian *reconquista*.¹⁵⁸ Within one hundred years, the Tsars, who were centralizing control of their lands, began to conquer the Mongol successor states of Kazan, Astrakhan, and Sibir (later Siberia) on the southeastern boundary. Expansion into the Caucasus and central Asia, at times genocidal as Robert Geraci’s chapter in this book shows, ensued in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.¹⁵⁹

That indigenous people would resist colonization did not always seem obvious to Europeans, who thought their gift of civilization would or should make them welcome. In the wake of Palestinian Arab riots against Jewish settlement in 1920 and 1921, Vladimir Jabotinsky berated Labor Zionist leaders for believing their presence would be tolerated by the “natives”:

Every reader has some idea of the early history of other countries which have been settled. I suggest that he recall all known instances. If he should attempt to seek but one instance of a country settled with the consent of those born there he will not succeed. The inhabitants (no matter whether they are civilized or savages) have always put up a stubborn fight. Furthermore, how the settler acted had no effect whatsoever. The Spaniards who conquered Mexico and Peru, or our own ancestors in the days of Joshua ben Nun behaved, one might say, like plunderers. But those "great explorers," the English, Scots and Dutch who were the first real pioneers of North America were people possessed of a very high ethical standard; people who not only wished to leave the redskins at peace but could also pity a fly; people who in all sincerity and innocence believed that in those virgin forests and vast plains ample space was available for both the white and red man. But the native resisted both barbarian and civilized settler with the same degree of cruelty.¹⁶⁰

Jabotinsky's mention of cruelty raises the issue of the ritualized excess that often characterized indigenous resistance to colonialism, especially in decolonization struggles. Certainly, racism and oppression by the Other are factors in generating murderous fantasies.¹⁶¹ But racism and oppression do not account for the atrocities in indigenous revenge. The reason for the excess, I suggest, is that the genocidal impulse and national liberation impulse are effectively the same: to preserve the endangered genus or ethnos against an Other that supposedly threatens its existence. This is the origin of what we might call *subaltern genocide*: the destruction of the colonizer by the colonized.

Examples abound of anxieties that one's people will be extinguished or erased by demographic supplanting or mortally endangered by security threats. Thus in 1804, a Haitian slave revolt targeted the island's entire white population.¹⁶² In 1937, fifteen thousand ethnic Haitians in border areas were slaughtered by Dominicans who thought they were endangering the nation.¹⁶³ Many Serbs (especially those in Bosnia and Kosovo), still traumatized by the genocidal experience of the Second World War, felt demographically threatened in the early 1990s because 25 percent of Serbs lived outside of Serbia; they wanted a state to defend their ethnicity. The paranoia exhibited by the Khmer Rouge in their self-understanding as liberators of the homeland from foreign influence demonstrates this point in a gruesome manner.¹⁶⁴ The genocidal violence perpetrated against civilians in the Balkans was so grotesque because they were not held to be innocent, but dangerous bearers of a nationality that vitiated the identity of the other.¹⁶⁵ What is more, the subaltern "millenarian rebellions" against exploitative colonial rule were directed against perceived foreign elements that were threatening the survival of the indigenous people—just as in classical cases of imperial genocide.¹⁶⁶

The connection between genocidal fantasies and national liberation movements has been made by anti-imperial thinkers who have blamed subaltern genocide on imperialism. Writing of the so-called Indian Mutiny, Karl Marx thought the “infamous” conduct of the “sepoys” was “only the reflex, in a concentrated form, of England’s own conduct in India, not only during the epoch of the foundation of her Eastern Empire, but even during the last ten years of a long-settled rule. . . . There is something in human history like retribution; and it is a rule of historical retribution that its instruments be forged not by the offended, but by the offender himself.”¹⁶⁷ Writing in the same vein, Jean-Paul Sartre noted that “In Algeria and Angola, Europeans are massacred at sight; it is the moment of the boomerang; it is the third stage of violence; it comes back on us, it strikes us, and we do not realize any more than we did the other times that it’s we who have launched it.”¹⁶⁸ Fanon agreed: “The violence of the colonial regime and the counter-violence of the native balance each other and respond to each other in an extraordinary reciprocal homogeneity.”¹⁶⁹ The Tunisian Jew Albert Memmi was also attracted to the Marxist proposition that colonialism produced its own negation by bringing forth an utterly alienated colonized population whose only prospect of dignified life was the “complete liquidation of colonization.”¹⁷⁰

If an alienated “native” issued from colonialism, how was this alienation generated? These Francophone anticolonial thinkers in particular pointed out that the foundational binary between settler and native was a colonial product. In such a “Manichean world” (Fanon) of colonialism, in which the settler cast the native as the incarnation of absolute evil, the native had to invert this value hierarchy for his or her own self-respect. “Colonialism creates the patriotism of the colonized,” wrote Sartre.¹⁷¹ Memmi explained the source of this nativism in his famous book from 1957, *The Colonizer and the Colonized*. His basic message was also that “being considered and treated apart by colonialist racism, the colonized ends up accepting this Manichaeian division of the colony and, by extension, of the whole world.” Consequently, “in the eyes of the colonized, all Europeans in the colonies are *de facto* colonizers.”¹⁷²

What is more, the practical impossibility of assimilation—because of the colonizer’s refusal and because of the self-denial entailed—meant that the native inevitably resorted to traditional values as a compensatory orientation. But these values, usually familial and religious, had become petrified by colonial pressure, and did not promote social progress. Nativism was reactionary. By ontologizing collectives in the same way as the settler, and “condemning each individual of that group,” the colonized became “a xenophobe and racist.”¹⁷³

Sartre and Memmi did not applaud the chauvinism and racism of anticolonialist struggles, and Fanon’s aversion to nativism is well known.

Racism and “a legitimate desire for revenge” could not “sustain a war of liberation,” he thought. Memmi eventually left Tunis for Paris because, as a Jew, he found life impossible in postcolonial Muslim Tunisia.¹⁷⁴ As Marxists, they were cosmopolitan internationalists who preferred a popular front of anticolonialists that included sympathetic settlers, some closer to the liberation ideal than the Africans or Arabs. National liberation entailed transcending the terms of settler/native to create a new socialist nation of equal citizens. The colonial system needed to be transformed by expropriating the collaborating indigenous bourgeoisie, rather than simply expelling settlers.¹⁷⁵ They wished decolonization to be the assertion of freedom when the newly constituted people could gain political agency, enter history, and create its own authentic civilization, not just a variation of the colonizer’s.¹⁷⁶

At the same time, these writers told their European reading publics that their expectation of a nonviolent, nonracist, anticolonialist struggle was unrealistic.¹⁷⁷ Violent and racist anticolonialism was a predictable phase through which colonized peoples had to pass, even if it entailed “tragic mishaps.”¹⁷⁸ Fanon himself was ambivalent, famously praising this violence as a “cleansing force” through which “the native frees himself from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and restores his self-respect.” This redemptive nationalism was necessary to assert the new postcolonial national culture: “the most elementary, most savage, and the most undifferentiated nationalism is the most fervent and efficient means of defending national culture.”¹⁷⁹ Sartre supported Fanon’s rendition of the struggle with some stirring quotations: the struggle’s “irrepressible violence is neither sound and fury, nor the resurrection of savage instincts, nor even the effect of resentment: it is man recreating himself.”¹⁸⁰ For all the romanticization evident here, these thinkers both expressed and explained the revolutionary violence of the colonized as the moment of salvation. It is genocidal in character.

Even by the time he died prematurely in 1961, Fanon was aware that, far from being a transitional political emotion, racism was being used by the “national bourgeoisie” to secure its own position in the postcolonial order. Rather than constructing a new nation beyond race, these elites were allowing precolonial tribal rivalries to recur.¹⁸¹ Moreover, the new state appeared to the liberated populations less as their own democratic creation than as a distant apparatus that was milked by a dominant, rival ethnic grouping for its own benefit. Their security and identity was therefore more likely to inhere in pre-independence traditional ethnic attachments than in a chimerical supratribal national identity.¹⁸² The catastrophe of postcolonial African political stability, civil war, and genocide has been blamed on this failure to transcend race during and after decolonization. Writing

in the tradition of the Francophone intellectuals, the historian Mahmood Mamdani has blamed this failure on colonialism: “That greater crime was to politicize indigeneity, first as a settler libel against the native, and then as a native self-assertion.”¹⁸³

Colonialism, Subaltern Genocide, and National Socialism

Postcolonial chaos was not the only problem these thinkers blamed on European colonialism. They also held fascism in general, and National Socialism in particular, to be its poisoned fruit. Consistent with their Marxism, they saw colonialism as the apogee of capitalist exploitation. In a memorable phrase, Marx wrote of colonialism that “the profound hypocrisy and inherent barbarism of bourgeois civilization lies unveiled before our eyes, turning from its home, where it assumes respectable forms, to the colonies, where it goes naked.”¹⁸⁴ Lenin had written of imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism, and Rosa Luxemburg continued this line of thinking, fearing “the triumph of imperialism” would mean “the destruction of all culture, and, as in ancient Rome, depopulation, desolation, degeneration, a vast cemetery.” She is the source of the now well-known trope that Europe’s criminal exploitation of the non-European world would be dialectically imported in heightened form into Europe itself: “It was clear to everyone, therefore, that the secret underhand war of each capitalist nation against every other, on the backs of Asiatic and African peoples must sooner or later lead to a general reckoning, that the wind that was sown in Africa and Asia would return to Europe as a terrific storm, the more certainly since increased armaments of the European states was the constant associate of these Asiatic and African occurrences. . . .”¹⁸⁵

Of course, Luxemburg did not live to witness the Holocaust. It was the Francophone thinkers who applied the lesson to Nazism, regarding it as the culmination of both colonialism and capitalism. Nazism was intra-European colonialism.¹⁸⁶ In his famous *Discourse on Colonialism* of 1955, Césaire saw liberalism and capitalism as the essence of Nazism, which was less genocidal than exploitative and generally murderous. Writing fifteen years after the end of the Second World War, Fanon, who drew heavily on Césaire, connected colonialism, capitalism, and Nazism in the same way: “Deportations, massacres, forced labor, and slavery have been the main methods used by capitalism to increase its wealth, its gold or diamond reserves, and to establish its power. Not long ago, Nazism transformed the whole of Europe into a veritable colony.”¹⁸⁷

Fanon himself was ambivalent about who was the greater victim of this system, Jews or blacks—at one point likening the persecution and

extermination of Jews to “little family quarrels” (among Europeans), at another proclaiming his indignation and empathy because he could not disassociate himself “from the future that is proposed for my [Jewish] brother.”¹⁸⁸ Even the latter formulation is an undialectical equation of experiences that he may have learned from older, diasporic black intellectuals like Oliver Cox and W. E. B. Du Bois, who associated Nazism with slavery and white racism. Du Bois, for instance, wrote in *The World and Africa* in 1947 that “there was no Nazi atrocity—concentration camps, wholesale maiming and murder, defilement of women or ghastly blasphemy of children—which the Christian civilization of Europe had not long been practicing against coloured folks in all parts of the world in the name of and for the defense of a Superior Race born to rule the world.”¹⁸⁹ This kind of thinking, while understandable in a context when Europeans still ruled most of Africa, and African Americans were being lynched, participates in the phallic logic of trauma competition mentioned above and is not particularly helpful for understanding complex historical processes.¹⁹⁰

Despite such limitations, these thinkers warrant mention not only because they represent a subaltern intellectual tradition that continues to influence anti-imperialist writers today.¹⁹¹ In its more sophisticated moments, this tradition provides important insights into the relation of modern genocides to broader processes and structures by positing a theory of system radicalization. Hannah Arendt drew on them in her *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, which is receiving growing attention in the literature on colonialism and genocide because one-third of her book deals with imperialism.¹⁹² Consider Césaire’s work, which echoes many of Arendt’s key arguments regarding imperialism. Colonialism demoralized the colonizer, making a mockery of European humanism. In colonialism, capitalism produced its own negation in the form of a barbarized system that returned to its source to destroy Europe. Nazism was therefore not simply any colonialism, but “the supreme barbarism that sums up all the daily barbarisms.” He also advanced a theory about the phenomenon that Arendt later called “the banality of evil.” The greatest criminal was not the ideological fanatic, but the European bourgeois, “the ‘decent fellow’ across the way,” because he tolerated colonial abuses for over a century: the wars, the torture, and mass death, approving the hard line measures of politicians.¹⁹³

Arendt and Césaire did not have to infer the link between Nazism and imperialism. Hitler self-consciously placed his movement in the tradition of European imperialism:

We have the so-called white race that since the collapse of Antiquity has over around 2,000 years taken on a leading position in the world. I cannot understand the economic dominance of the white race over the rest of the world unless

I related it closely to a political dominance that the white race possesses naturally for hundreds of years and that it has projected outwards. Think of any area; consider India: England has not won India with justice and law but with regard for the desires, aspirations or laws of the natives, and it has when necessary maintained its dominance with the most brutal measures [*Rücksichtslosigkeit*]. Just as Cortez or Pizarro claimed Central America and the northern states of South America not on the grounds of some legal basis but out of the absolute, inherited feeling of dominance of the white race. The settlement of the north American continent succeeded just as little from some democratic or international conception of legal claims, but out of a sense of justice that is rooted only in the conviction of superiority and with that the right of the white race.¹⁹⁴

Having exhausted the prospects of “domestic (*innere*) colonization,” he thought, it was necessary to colonize Europe itself.¹⁹⁵

Hitler drew on the imperial experiences of other European nations in formulating his vision of Nazi German imperialism. British India provided the model for German ambitions in Ukraine: a thin layer of military and civilian administrators could occupy a vast landmass and population.¹⁹⁶ North America was a model of settler colonialism. “There is only one duty—to Germanise the country by immigration of Germans and to look upon the natives as redskins.”¹⁹⁷ These quotations (and others could be adduced) give clues to Hitler’s imperial vision. He wanted both an extractive/tribute empire in the manner of the British in India, but also settler colonies like North America. In Hitler, the imperial models of centuries of human history crystallized into a single, total, imperial fantasy of genocidal conquest and exploitation.¹⁹⁸ Indeed, an increasing body of research is bearing out Lemkin’s insight into the imperial and colonial nature of Nazi rule in Europe.¹⁹⁹

But why the enthusiasm for conquest and colonial rule at all? As Maria Klotz has shown in her analysis of the film *Die Weltgeschichte als Kolonialgeschichte* of 1926, a film sponsored by colonial revisionist groups that lobbied for the return of Germany’s empire, Europeans at the time plotted the course of world history in colonial terms. *Kulturvölker* enter history by conquering and colonizing other nations and peoples. The defining distinction between nations was that of colonizer or colonized. Only the former was a participant in world history, in progress, civilization, in uplift. Preventing colonization was tantamount to relegation to an object rather than subject of history, indeed a denial of the right to existence. An examination of Hitler’s philosophy of history reveals that he thought very much in these terms. He was convinced that conquest drives world history and human progress, and he spoke often about how the German conquest over Jewry and Bolshevism would rescue western civilization for the good of humanity.²⁰⁰

But even if the Nazis established an empire and subjected conquered peoples to colonial rule, can the Holocaust of European Jewry be explained in terms of imperial and colonial logics? Lemkin himself did not think so, referring to race hatred of Jews and Roma as the motivating force of their persecution, which has been a feature of “intentionalist” explanations of the Holocaust for decades.²⁰¹ What if we take a transnational or global approach that situates the Holocaust in processes that are universal in imperial and colonial situations? There are four aspects to such an approach:

1. The Nazi genocidal policies against Slavic peoples in occupied Poland and Ukraine stood in the tradition of imperial conquests since antiquity. It was never the intention of the Nazis to exterminate Poles or Ukrainians in their entirety, just as it was not the intention of European colonial powers in Africa to exterminate the Africans and Asians they occupied. The “natives” were needed for labor, although it should not be forgotten that the Nazis envisaged the starvation of tens of millions of “superfluous” people in their plans for the region. During the contingencies of total war, however, as David Furber and Wendy Lower demonstrate in their chapter here, utopian plans of Slavic expulsion and German settlement had to be shelved in favor of food production and stability. The vicious partisan warfare that developed in occupied Eastern Europe stood in the continuity of colonial wars, as well.²⁰²

2. The extermination of European Jews, by contrast, needs to be understood, to begin with, in terms of subaltern genocide. The Nazis regarded Germans as an indigenous people who had been colonized by Jews, principally from Poland, the perceived home of world Jewry. From the time of Jewish emancipation, anti-Semites in Germany (and not just in Germany) had complained of a “Judaization” of public life, a term equating “Jewish rule” with capitalist modernization and social liberalization. Typical was Wilhelm Marr, the inventor of the term “anti-Semitism,” who in 1879 likened Jewish emancipation to the might of the Roman Empire. “With the entire force of its armies, the proud Roman Empire did not achieve that which Semitism has achieved in the West and particularly in Germany.”²⁰³ Hitler thought in these terms. A careful reading of *Mein Kampf* reveals that he thought Germany had been under foreign occupation—that is, Jewish domination—since the middle years of the First World War, when the war industry supposedly fell into Jewish hands. For Hitler, “the Jew robbed the entire nation and pressed it under his rule.”²⁰⁴ He was wont to speak of Jews in terms of colonists, mixing bacteriological and colonial metaphors: “Never was a State founded by peaceful economy, but always only by the instincts of preserving the species, no matter whether they are found in the field of heroic virtues or sly cunning; the one results then in Aryan states of work and culture, the other in Jewish colonies of parasites.”²⁰⁵

The colonization trope is also a feature of the notorious 1940 Nazi propaganda film *Der Ewige Jude*. Jews are depicted as a people with “Asiatic and Negroid” elements that enter central Europe by parasitically attaching themselves to previous empires. Maps of the globe show their spread.

Everywhere they made themselves unwelcome. In Spain and France the people rose openly against them in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and they wandered on, mainly to Germany. From there they followed the path of the Aryan culture-creative Germans, colonizing the East—until they finally found a gigantic, untapped reservoir in the Polish and Russian sections of eastern Europe.

And from there the Jews colonized the world, that is, the African, American, and Australian continents.²⁰⁶

What is more, his perception that Jews were undermining German nationality is couched in terms strikingly similar to Lemkin’s eight techniques of genocide. Jews undermined German morality through prostitution, its strength through pacifism, its national spirit via the cosmopolitan press, and so on. Writing in the early 1920s when Germany was in the grip of the inflation crisis and paying massive reparations, Hitler concluded that “the [Weimar] Republic is a slave colony of foreign countries and has no citizens, but at best subjects.” The internal enemy serving foreign interests was “the Jew.” This situation spelled the end for his beloved Germany: “Carthage’s fall is the horrible picture of such a slow self-earned execution of a nation.”²⁰⁷

The perception that Germany was occupied was widespread in the early Weimar years in particular, as African French troops were stationed in the Rhineland to enforce the reparations stipulations of the Versailles treaty. A hysterical and largely successful propaganda campaign, focused especially on alleged rapes by the troops, was waged by rightwing activists who accused the western powers of betraying the white race by using their non-European troops to occupy and suppress a *Kulturvolk*, the Germans. This occupation, combined with the sequestration of German colonies by the Treaty of Versailles and League of Nations, reinforced the German impression that they had been cast outside the privileged community of colonizers and had become the colonized. Four hundred of the so-called Rhineland Bastards, the offspring of African soldiers and German women, were sterilized under the Nazi regime.²⁰⁸

The relentless drive to exterminate the Jews entirely, then, is best explained in terms of the subaltern’s racist nationalism. The Nazis thought of themselves as a national liberation movement, a self-consciousness that continued the German policy during the First World War of supposedly liberating central European nations from Russian domination. If the Nazis’

anti-Semitism was “redemptive,” its particular intensity at this historical conjuncture cannot be read from centuries of anti-Semitism, which had not resulted in genocide like this before.²⁰⁹ In the Nazi mind, the Second World War was a war of national liberation, and redemption inhered in the elimination of foreign Jewish rule. Understanding this version of anti-Semitism in light of both the political emotions common in central European nationalisms since the nineteenth century, and later anticolonial movements allows us to contextualize the Holocaust in broader, transnational trends. The racist rage of the subaltern subject was not confined to the non-European world.

3. The uncompromising nature of the Jewish persecution by the Nazis cannot be understood solely in terms of subaltern genocide, however.²¹⁰ That persecution also shared elements of the security syndrome of other empires. Although it was a fantastical belief, the vehemence of the Nazi conviction that Jews and socialists were responsible for Germany’s defeat in 1918 and subsequent civil chaos needs to be appreciated more fully. The racial hatred that congealed in the paranoia around “Judeo-Bolshevism” was all too real. But if Jews were the primary target in this syncretistic formulation rather than Bolsheviks, this racial hatred cannot solely be read from centuries-long traditions of popular anti-Semitism either. The hatred was directed towards an Other that was not only the threatening colonizer, but also, paradoxically, a deadly security threat in the manner of civil and colonial wars. The nationalist trauma of 1918 to 1920—the military defeat and communist uprisings in Germany—drove many Germans to extreme measures to ensure that, like in so many other genocides, never again would inner enemies undermine the nation and war effort.²¹¹ In fact, in this instance, the genocide would *preempt* insurgency and red terrorism. *Ein-satzgruppen* shot Jewish men as potential partisans in the summer of 1941, and this measure was expanded to women and children soon thereafter, a “prophylactic” measure that the Soviets also used to eliminate perceived “unreliable elements” before they could foment rebellion and betray the state.²¹² Heinrich Himmler articulated the link between the murder of the Jews and preemptive counterinsurgency in his notorious Posen speech in 1944: “In our history this is an unwritten and never-to-be-written page of glory, for we know how difficult we would have made it for ourselves if today—amid the bombing raids, the hardships and the deprivations of war—we still had the Jews in every city as secret saboteurs, agitators, and demagogues. If the Jews were still ensconced in the body of the German nation, we probably would have reached the 1916–17 stage by now.”²¹³

4. Finally, the Nazis also viewed the eastern Jews they encountered in Poland and the Ukraine in terms of the traditional colonial Other: dirty, lazy, stateless, uncivilized.²¹⁴ They were treated in the customary colonial

manner: labor, food, and security considerations combined to determine their fate. Once areas were conquered and secured, surviving Jewish men were put to work until they were no longer needed. Women and children were murdered immediately by German forces because they were held to be “useless eaters.” Food shortages led German civilian authorities to mass execution of ghettoized Jews in Poland. The extent and consistency of this pattern of exploitation and murder is striking, contingencies and exceptions notwithstanding.²¹⁵

Conclusion

The phobic consciousness responsible for this genocide continues to baffle historians because, in the main, they have confined their search to European sources.²¹⁶ The recent interest in colonial genocides, stimulated in part by the rediscovery of Hannah Arendt’s writing on imperialism, goes some way to situating the Nazi project in global patterns. But the Holocaust was no colonial genocide in the common understanding of the term. It was an event, or multitude of events, that united four different, even contradictory imperial and colonial logics into one terrible paranoid mentality and praxis borne of a frustrated imperial nation struggling against a perceived colonizer.

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Notes

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 12. Benny Morris and Ari Shavit, "Survival of the Fittest," *Ha'aretz*, 9 January 2004; Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 2004).
 13. Dror Mishani and Aurelia Smotriez, "What sort of Frenchmen are they?" *Ha'aretz*, 17 November 2005; Alain Finkielkraut, "J'assume," *Le Monde*, 26 November 2005: "The intention of the Enlightenment was ambiguous. This ambiguity must keep us from aligning colonialism in purely criminal company. To integrate men in the catholicity of the Enlightenment is something different than a will to extermination. That can have, here or there, positive effects." A study in this vein praising W. E. B. Du Bois for being one of the few African American leaders to recognize the primacy of Jewish suffering over black suffering is Harold Brackman, "'A Calamity Almost Beyond Comprehension': Nazi Anti-Semitism and the Holocaust in the Thought of W. E. B. Du Bois," *American Jewish History* 88 (2000): 53–93. For an alternative approach that highlights mutual recognition rather than hierarchy, see Michael Rothberg, "W. E. B. Du Bois in Warsaw: Holocaust Memory and the Color Line, 1949–1952," *Yale Journal of Criticism* 14, no. 1 (2001): 169–89.
 14. After the end of the Cold War, a discourse of empire has accompanied one on globalization in relation to North American ascendancy: Niall Ferguson, *Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire* (New York, 2004); Bernard Porter, *Empire and Superempire: Britain, America and the World* (New Haven, CT, 2006); Charles S. Maier, *Among Empires: American Ascendancy and its Predecessors* (Cambridge, MA, 2006); Pratap Bhanu Mehta, "Empire and Moral Identity," *Ethics & International Affairs* 17, no. 2 (2003): 49–62; David Cannadine, "'Big Tent' Historiography: Transatlantic Obstacles and Opportunities in Writing the History of Empire," *Common Knowledge* 11, no. 3 (2005): 375–92; Linda Colley, "Some Difficulties of Empire—Past, Present and Future," *Common Knowledge* 11, no. 2 (2005): 198–214. A study influenced by Edward Said that claims the "post-9/11" world is structured by colonial logics is Derek Gregory, *The Colonial Present* (Oxford, 2004).
 15. Victoria E. Bonnell, "The Uses of Theory, Concepts and Comparison in Historical Sociology," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 22, no. 2 (1980): 156–73.

16. Jürgen Zimmerer, "Kolonialer Genozid? Vom Nutzen und Nachteil einer historischen Kategorie für eine Globalgeschichte des Völkermordes," in *Enteignet, Vertrieben, Ermordet: Beiträge zur Genozidforschung*, ed. Dominik J. Schaller et al. (Zürich, 2004), 109–29; Alison Palmer, "Colonial and Modern Genocide: Explanations and Categories," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 21, no. 1 (1998): 89–115; Raymond Evans, "Crime Without a Name: Colonialism and the Case for 'Indigenocide,'" in this volume.
17. For important studies, see Tony Barta, "Relations of Genocide: Land and Lives in the Colonization of Australia," in *Genocide and the Modern Age*, ed. Isidor Wallimann and Michael Dobkowski (Westport, CT, 1987), 237–52; Barta, "Discourses of Genocide in Germany and Australia: A Linked History," *Aboriginal History* 25 (2001): 37–56; Barta, "Mr. Darwin's Shooters: On Natural Selection and the Naturalizing of Genocide," *Patterns of Prejudice* 39, no. 2 (2005): 116–137; Norbert Finzsch, "It is Scarcely Possible to Conceive that Human Beings Could be so Hideous and Loathsome": Discourses of Genocide in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century America and Australia," *ibid.*, 97–115; Jürgen Zimmerer and Joachim Zeller, eds., *Völkermord in Deutsch-Südwestafrika: Der Kolonialkrieg (1904–1908) in Namibia und seine Folgen* (Berlin, 2003); Ann Curthoys and John Docker, "Introduction—Genocide: Definitions, Questions, Settler Colonies," *Aboriginal History* 25 (2002): 1–15; A. Dirk Moses, ed., *Genocide and Settler Society: Frontier Violence and Stolen Indigenous Children in Australian History* (New York and Oxford, 2004); Moses, ed. (with Dan Stone), *Colonialism and Genocide* (London, 2007); Richard H. King and Dan Stone, eds., *Hannah Arendt and the Uses of History: Imperialism, Nation, Race, and Genocide* (Oxford and New York, 2007).
18. There is more detailed discussion in A. Dirk Moses, "The Holocaust and Genocide," in *The Historiography of the Holocaust*, ed. Dan Stone (Houndmills, UK, 2004), 533–55.
19. See Evans, "Crime Without a Name," for this pithy formulation.
20. Symptomatic of this danger are Peter Balakian, *The Burning Tigris: The Armenian Genocide and America's Response* (New York, 2003), and Samantha Power, *"A Problem from Hell": America in the Age of Genocide* (New York, 2002).
21. Frederick Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley, CA, 2005).
22. For example, Niall Ferguson, *Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World* (London, 2004); David Cannadine, *Ornamentalism: How the British Saw their Empire* (London, 2002); Alan Lester, *Imperial Networks: Creating Identities in Nineteenth Century South Africa and Britain* (London and New York, 2001); Nicholas Thomas, *Colonialism's Culture: Anthropology, Travel, and Government* (Cambridge, 1994). Robert J.C. Young avers that his book assumes the subject position of the subaltern intellectual but the index does not contain the word genocide: *Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction* (Oxford, 2001).
23. Chris Gosden, *Archaeology and Colonialism: Cultural Contact from 5000 BC to the Present* (Cambridge, 2004), 25.
24. Donald Bloxham, "The Armenian Genocide of 1915–1916: Cumulative Radicalization and the Development of a Destruction Policy," *Past and Present*, no. 181 (November 2003): 189.
25. An exemplary recent contribution is Mark Levene, *Genocide in the Age of the Nation State*, 2 vols. (London, 2005).
26. See the special issue of the *Journal of Genocide Research* 7, no. 4 (2005) devoted to Lemkin as historian. See also John Docker's chapter in this volume.
27. Raphael Lemkin, "War Against Genocide," *Christian Science Monitor*, 31 January 1948, 2.

28. "Genocide (the Newest Soviet Crime)," as discussed by Professor Raphael Lemkin and Joseph P. Burns, WHHC-TV College Roundtable, 30 January 1953. Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives, Collection 60, Box 4, Folder 2.
29. Lemkin, "War Against Genocide," 2.
30. The chapters remain in the archives. Most of Lemkin's papers are contained in three places: the Manuscripts and Archive Division of the New York Public Library (LCNYPL), 42nd Street, New York; The American Jewish Historical Society (AHJS), 15 West 16th Street, New York; and The Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives (JRMCAJA), 3101 Clifton Avenue, Cincinnati, Ohio. His chapter on Tasmania is now published: Raphael Lemkin, "Tasmania," *Patterns of Prejudice* 39, no. 2 (2005): 170–96; For commentary, see Ann Curthoys, "Raphael Lemkin's 'Tasmania': An Introduction," *ibid.*, 162–69.
31. Lemkin, "War Against Genocide," 2.
32. Cultural genocide was perpetrated by forced conversion and the coercive use of the German language, Lemkin argued. The knights dominated the sparsely settled inhabitants economically and socially by colonizing the area with peasants and towns people. JRMCAJA, Collection 60, Box 7, Folder 14. See Roger Bartlett and Karen Schönwälder, eds., *The German Lands and Eastern Europe* (London, 1999).
33. Eg. Raphael Lemkin, "Charlemagne," American Jewish Historical Society, P-154, Box 8, Folder 6. On the Mongols: JRMCAJA, Collection 60, Box 7, Folder 6. Lemkin was very interested the Pan-German interest in colonizing Poland in the nineteenth century: JRMCAJA, Collection 60, Box 6, Folder 13.
34. Raphael Lemkin "Description of the Project," LCNYPL, Reel 3, Box 2, Folder 1.
35. Raphael Lemkin, "The Concept of Genocide in Sociology," LCNYPL, Box 2, Folder 2. Emphasis added.
36. Raphael Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe* (Washington, DC, 1944), 79. Emphasis added.
37. A good recent discussion of the genocide concept is Martin Shaw, *What is Genocide?* (Cambridge, 2007).
38. Andrew Fitzmaurice, "Anti-Colonialism in Western Political Thought: The Colonial Origins of the Concept of Genocide." Cf. Tzvetan Todorov, *The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other* (New York, 1984), 146–82.
39. Raphael Lemkin, "Spain Colonial Genocide," AJHS, P-154, Box 8, Folder 12. For analysis, see Michael A. McDonnell and A. Dirk Moses, "Raphael Lemkin as Historian of Genocide in the Americas," *Journal of Genocide Research* 7, no. 4 (2005): 501–29.
40. Lemkin, *Axis Rule*, 81.
41. Raphael Lemkin, "Proposal for Introduction to the Study of Genocide," LCNYPL, Reel 3, Box 2, Folder 1.
42. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Writings on Empire and Slavery*, ed. Jennifer Pitts (Baltimore, MD and London, 2001); Jennifer Pitts, "Empire and Democracy: Tocqueville and the Algeria Question," *Journal of Political Philosophy* 8, no. 3 (2000): 295–318; Cheryl B. Welch, "Colonial Violence and the Rhetoric of Evasion: Tocqueville on Algeria," *Political Theory* 31, no. 2 (2003): 235–64;
43. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Colonialism and Neo-Colonialism*, preface Robert C. Young, eds. Azzedine Haddour, Steve Brewer, and Terry McWilliams (London and New York, 2001); James McDougall, "Savage Wars: Codes of Violence in Algeria, 1830s–1990s," *Third World Quarterly* 26, no. 1 (2005): 117–31; "Row with France," *Dreiser Studies* (June 2006): 5.
44. Aimé Césaire, *Discourse on Colonialism*, trans. Joan Pinkham (New York, 1972 [1955]), 11.

45. Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815* (Cambridge, 1991).
46. Raphael Lemkin, “The Concept of Genocide in Anthropology,” LCNYPL, Box 2, Folder 2. He cited Bronislaw Malinowski, *A Scientific Theory of Culture and Other Essays* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1944); Arthur Toynbee, *A Study of History* (London, 1947); Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture* (London, 1935); Leo Louis Snyder, *Race: A History of Modern Ethnic Theories* (New York, 1939); Herbert Seligmann, *Race Against Man* (New York, 1939).
47. Césaire, *Discourse on Colonialism*, 17.
48. Lemkin, “The Concept of Genocide in Anthropology.”
49. C.R. Whittaker, “The Western Phoenicians: Colonisation and Assimilation,” *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* CC (1974): 77–78.
50. Paul T. Cocks, “The King and I: Bronislaw Malinowski, King Sobhuza II of Swaziland and the Vision of Culture Change in Africa,” *History of the Human Sciences* 13, no. 4 (2000): 25–47.
51. For an analysis of the different strains of British anti-imperialism, see Bernard Porter, *Critics of Empire: British Radical Attitudes to Colonialism in Africa 1895–1914* (London, 1968).
52. Raphael Lemkin, “The Germans in Africa,” JRMCAJA, Collection 60, Box 6, Folder 9. Lemkin’s views were similar to those of the leftist critics of German colonialism in Imperial Germany. They did not oppose colonial rule per se, but its abuses. For such criticisms, see Helmut Walser Smith, “The Talk of Genocide, the Rhetoric of Miscegenation: Notes on Debates in the German Reichstag Concerning Southwest Africa, 1904–14,” in *The Imperialist Imagination: German Colonialism and Its Legacy*, ed. Sara Friedrichsmeyer, Sara Lennox, and Susanne Zantorp (Ann Arbor, 1998), 107–23.
53. Memorandum from Raphael Lemkin to R. Kempner, 5 June 1946. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, R. Kempner Papers (RS 71.001). My thanks to Jürgen Matthäus for drawing my attention to this document.
54. Raphael Lemkin, “The Concept of Genocide in Anthropology.”
55. *Ibid.*
56. Raphael Lemkin, “Memorandum on the Genocide Convention,” AHJS, P-154, Box 6, Folder 5. Representative of this misunderstanding is Helen Fein, *Genocide: A Sociological Perspective* (London, 1993), 9–11.
57. William A. Schabas, *Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes* (Cambridge, 2000), 179–85.
58. McDonnell and Moses, “Raphael Lemkin as Historian of Genocide in the Americas.”
59. Lemkin, “The Concept of Genocide in Anthropology.”
60. Lemkin, *Axis Rule*, 80. Emphasis added.
61. Lemkin, “Memorandum on the Genocide Convention.” I have corrected his spelling of “proceeded.” Because attacks on cultural symbols were embedded in a general attack, “where cultural genocide appears to be merely a step towards physical extermination, there will certainly be no difficulty in distinguishing it from diffusion.” Lemkin, “The Concept of Genocide in Anthropology.”
62. Raphael Lemkin, *Raphael Lemkin’s Thoughts on Nazi Genocide: Not Guilty?*, ed. Steven L. Jacobs (Lewiston, NY, 1990), 299, 303. See Robert Bevan, *The Destruction of Memory: Architecture at War* (London: 2006) for an argument highlighting the destruction of the buildings as a signpost for ethnic cleansing and genocide.
63. I am adopting Patrick Wolfe’s term “total cultural practice” that he himself adapted from Marcel Mauss, who wrote of “total social phenomena”: Patrick Wolfe, “On Being

- Woken Up: The Dream Time in Anthropology and in Australian Settler Culture," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 33, no. 2 (1992): 198.
64. Raphael Lemkin, "The Concept of Genocide in Sociology," JRMCAJA, Collection 60, Box 6, Folder 13, 1.
 65. Raphael Lemkin "Description of the Project," LCNYPL, Reel 3, Box 2, Folder 1.
 66. This discussion of the eight techniques is taken from Lemkin, *Axis Rule*, 82–90. Lemkin was probably not thinking in terms of the "microphysics of colonial rule" that postcolonial historians have laid bare in their studies of the intimate spheres of colonialism. Cf. Ann Laura Stoler, *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule* (Berkeley, CA, 2002).
 67. Cited in Porter, *Critics of Empire*, 22. Cf. Elizabeth Elbourne, "The Sin of the Settler: The 1835–36 Select Committee on Aborigines and Debates Over Virtue and Conquest in Early Nineteenth-Century British White Settler Empire," *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History* 4, no. 3 (2003).
 68. Patrick Dodson, "Short-Term Fix Demeans Nation: We Have Proved Incapable of Confronting Our Past," *The Australian*, 26 May 2006. On Dodson, see Kevin Keeffe, *Paddy's Road: Life Stories of Patrick Dodson* (Canberra, 2003). The *Bringing them Home* report and various policies of "removing" mixed-descent indigenous Australian children from indigenous mothers are discussed in chapters by Robert Manne, Anna Haebich, and Russell McGregor in Moses, *Genocide and Settler Society*.
 69. Robert van Krieken, "Rethinking Cultural Genocide: Aboriginal Child Removal and Settler-Colonial State Formation," *Oceania* 7, no. 2 (2005): 125–51. For an important study of French assimilation practices from the early modern period, see Saliha Belmessous, "Assimilation and Racialism in Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century French Colonial Policy," *American Historical Review* 110, no. 2 (2005): 322–49.
 70. Raphael Lemkin, "Memorandum on the Genocide Convention," AHJS, P-154, Box 6, Folder 5. I have corrected Lemkin's spelling of "disapproved."
 71. Raphael Lemkin, "Genocide as Crime under International Law," *United Nations Bulletin* 15 (January 1948): 71.
 72. Matthew Lippman, "The Drafting of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide," *Boston University International Law Journal* 3, no. 1 (1985): 45.
 73. On that discourse, see Maximilian C. Forte, "Extinction: The Historical Trope of Anti-Indigeneity in the Caribbean," *Issues in Caribbean Amerindian Studies* 6, no. 4 (August 2004–August 2005); Patrick Brantlinger, *Dark Vanishings: Discourse on the Extinction of Primitive Races, 1800–1930* (Ithaca, NY, 2003); John W. Burton, "Disappearing Savages? Thoughts on the Construction of an Anthropological Conundrum," *Journal of African and African Studies* 34, no. 2 (1999): 199–209.
 74. Ronald Robinson, "Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration," in *Studies in the Theory of Imperialism*, ed. Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe (London, 1972), 117–41; Geir Lundestad, "Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945–1952," *Journal of Peace Research* 23, no. 3 (1986): 263–77.
 75. Mahmood Mamdani, "Historicizing Power and Responses to Power: Indirect Rule and Its Reform," *Social Research* 66, no. 3 (1999): 859–86; Leroy Vail, "Introduction: Ethnicity in Southern African History," in *The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa*, ed. Leroy Vail (Berkeley, 1989), 1–19; C. S. L. Chachage, "British Rule and African Civilization in Tanganyika," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 1, no. 2 (1988): 199–223; Archie Mafeje, "The Ideology of 'Tribalism'," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 9, no. 2 (1971): 253–61; cf. Michael Crowder, "Indirect Rule: French

- and British Style,” *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 34, no. 3 (1964): 197–205.
76. Dominik J. Schaller, “Raphael Lemkin’s View of European Colonial Rule in Africa: Between Condemnation and Admiration,” *Journal of Genocide Research* 7, no. 4 (2005): 534; Tess Lea, Emma Kowal, and Gillian Cowlishaw, eds., *Moving Anthropology: Critical Indigenous Studies* (Darwin, 2006).
 77. Frederic W. Gleach, *Powhatan’s World and Colonial Virginia: A Conflict of Cultures* (Lincoln, Neb., 1997); Jean M. O’Brien, *Dispossession by Degrees: Indian Land and Identity in Natick, Massachusetts, 1650–1790* (Cambridge, 1997); Noenoe K. Silva, *Aloha Betrayed: Native Hawaiian Resistance to American Colonialism* (Durham, NC, 2004).
 78. Memorandum from Raphael Lemkin to R. Kempner, 5 June 1946. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, R. Kempner Papers (RS 71.001). I have corrected spelling and punctuation in this quotation.
 79. Raphael Lemkin, “Yucatan,” AJHS, P-154, Box 8, Folder 12. Emphasis added.
 80. Lemkin, *Axis Rule*, 79; cf. Steven T. Katz, *The Holocaust in Historical Context* (Oxford, 1994).
 81. Raphael Lemkin, “Incas,” JRMCAJA, Collection 60, Box 7, Folder 7/1.
 82. Lemkin, “Yucatan.”
 83. Ibid. On the theory of universal monarchy, see Anthony Pagden, *Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain, and France, c. 1500–1800* (New Haven, CT, 1995), chap. 2.
 84. Raphael Lemkin, “Aztecs,” AJHS, P-154, Box 8, Folder 12.
 85. Lemkin, “Yucatan.”
 86. John Locke, *Two Treatises on Civil Government* (London, 1884), 196–97 [para. 2:11]. Emphasis added. For an analysis of the English reception of the Spanish debates on colonialism, see Andrew Fitzmaurice, *Humanism and America* (Cambridge, 2003).
 87. Lemkin, “Aztecs.” His research notes taken on Native North American conflicts and massacres begin with some kind of Indian uprising.
 88. Lemkin, *Thoughts on Nazi Genocide*, 196–97.
 89. See McDonnell and Moses, “Lemkin as Historian of Genocide in the Americas.”
 90. Richard Broome, *Aboriginal Victorians* (Sydney, 2005), 84.
 91. Lemkin, “The Concept of Genocide in Sociology,” 2.
 92. Brantlinger, *Dark Vanishings*, 9.
 93. I discuss the nature of this theodicy in A. Dirk Moses, “Conceptual Blockages and Definitional Dilemmas in the Racial Century: Genocide of Indigenous Peoples and the Holocaust,” *Patterns of Prejudice* 36, no. 2 (2002): 7–36.
 94. Quoted in Patrick Brantlinger, “Forgetting Genocide: or the Last of the Last of the Mohicans,” *Cultural Studies* 12, no. 1 (1998): 19–20.
 95. See the chapters in this volume of John Docker and Ann Curthoys for arguments that such acceptance of indigenous destruction is tantamount to genocide.
 96. Mark Drumbl, “Prosecutor v Radislav Krstic: ICTY Authenticates Genocide at Srebrenica and Convicts for Aiding and Abetting,” *Melbourne Journal of International Law* 5, no. 2 (2004): 434–50.
 97. Césaire, *Discourse on Colonialism*, 21–22. Emphasis in the original.
 98. Raphael Lemkin, “Hitler Case-Outline.” Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives, Collection 60, Box 7, Folders 12 and 13. I have corrected spelling in this quotation. Thanks to Steven L. Jacobs and Dan Stone for furnishing me with a copy. For commentary, see Dan Stone, “Raphael Lemkin on the Holocaust,” *Journal of Genocide Research* 7, no. 4 (2005): 539–50.

99. Lemkin, "Hitler Case-Outline."
100. Kirkpatrick, *British Colonization and Empire*, 5–6.
101. Anthony Pagden, *Peoples and Empires: Europeans and the Rest of the World from Antiquity to the Present* (London, 2001), 8–10.
102. Anthony Pagden, "Fellow Citizens and Imperial Subjects: Conquest and Sovereignty in Europe's Overseas Empires," *History and Theory* 44 (December 2005): 28–34; Peter C. Perdue, "Comparing Empires: Manchu Colonialism," *International History Review* 20, no. 2 (1998): 255–61.
103. See the lucid discussion in Ronald Grigor Suny, "The Empire Strikes Out: Imperial Russia, 'National' Identity, and Theories of Empire," in *A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin*, ed. Ronald Grigor Suny and Terry Martin (Oxford, 2001), 23–66; also Ross Hutchings, "Empire and the State: a Critical Theoretical Assessment," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 60, no. 3 (2006): 429–38. I leave aside the question of the reasons for imperialism expounded in Marxist theories.
104. James W. Long, *From Privileged to Dispossessed: The Volga Germans, 1860–1917* (Lincoln and London, 1988); Eric Lohr, *Nationalizing the Russian Empire: The Campaign against Enemy Aliens during World War I* (Cambridge, MA, 2003).
105. Edward Said, *The Question of Palestine* (New York, 1979), 78; Michael Doyle, *Empires* (Ithaca, NY, 1986), 31.
106. Gosden, *Archaeology and Colonialism*, 5. Cf. Young, *Postcolonialism*.
107. Ronald J. Horvath, "A Definition of Colonialism," *Current Anthropology* 13, no. 1 (1972): 45–51; Herbert Lüthy, "Colonization and the Making of Mankind," *Journal of Economic History* 21 (1961): 483–95.
108. Frederick Cooper, "Empire Multiplied: A Review Essay," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 46, no. 2 (2004): 247.
109. Jürgen Osterhammel, *Colonialism: A Theoretical Introduction*, trans. Shelley L. Frisch (Princeton, NJ, 1997), 15. Cf. D.K Fieldhouse, who is far less critical of European colonial rule but comes close to this definition: Fieldhouse, *Colonialism 1870–1945: An Introduction* (London, 1983), 12–15.
110. Peter Calvert, "Internal Colonisation, Development and Environment," *Third World Quarterly* 22, no. 1 (2001): 51–63; Donald Bloxham, "Internal Colonization, Inter-Imperial Conflict, and the Armenian Genocide," in this volume.
111. Alvin W. Gouldner, "Stalinism: A Study in Internal Colonialism," *Telos*, no. 34 (1978): 5–48; David Goodman, "Guizhou and the People's Republic of China: The Development of an Internal Colony," in *Internal Colonialism: Essays around a Theme*, Monograph No. 3, Developing Areas Research Group, Institute of British Geographers, ed. David Drakakis-Smith and Stephen Wyn Williams (Edinburgh, 1983), 107–28.
112. Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536–1966* (London, 1975); Mervyn C. Hartwig, "Capitalism and Aborigines: The Theory of Internal Colonialism and its Rivals," in *Essays in the Political Economy of Australian Capitalism*, 4 vols., ed. Edward L. Wheelwright and Ken Buckley (Sydney, 1978), 3:119–41; *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 2, no. 3 (1979) special issue on internal colonialism; Colin W. Mettam and Stephen Wyn Williams, "Internal Colonialism and Cultural Divisions of Labour in the Soviet Republic of Estonia," *Nations and Nationalism* 4, no. 3 (1998): 363–88.
113. Steven Harrell, "Introduction: Civilizing Projects and the Reaction to Them," in *Cultural Encounters on China's Ethnic Frontier*, ed. Steven Harrell (Seattle and London, 1995).

114. Eugene Weber, *From Peasants to Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914* (Palo Alto, CA, 1976), 485. Thanks to Lorenzo Veracini for drawing my attention to this reference.
115. Dru C. Gladney, *Dislocating China: Muslims, Minorities, and other Subaltern Subjects* (Chicago, 2004), 360–66; Laura Hostetler, *Qing Colonial Enterprise: Ethnography and Cartography in Early Modern China* (Chicago and London, 2001). Historians of China have been inspired by historians of colonialism: Emma Teng, *Taiwan's Imagined Geography: Chinese Colonial Travel Writing and Pictures, 1683–1895* (Cambridge, MA, 2004); James A. Millward, *Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759–1864* (Stanford, CA, 1998); Daniel McMahon, "Identity and Conflict on a Chinese Borderland: Yan Ruyi and the Recruitment of the Gelao During the 1795–97 Miao Revolt," *Late Imperial China* 23, no. 2 (2002): 53–86; Peter C. Perdue, "Empire and Nation in Comparative Perspective: Frontier Administration in Eighteenth-Century China," *Journal of Early Modern History* 5, no. 4 (2001): 282–304; Perdue, "Boundaries, Maps, and Movement: Chinese, Russian, and Mongolian Empires in Early Modern Central Eurasia," *International History Review* 20, no. 2 (1998): 263–86; Perdue, "Military Mobilization in Seventeenth and Eighteenth-Century China, Russia, and Mongolia," *Modern Asian Studies* 30, no. 4 (1996): 757–93.
116. Dominik Schaller, "From Conquest to Genocide: Colonial Rule in German Southwest Africa and German East Africa," in this volume.
117. Cited in Mireille Rosello, "The 'Césaire Effect', or How to Cultivate One's Nation," *Research in African Literatures* 32, no. 4 (2001): 86–87. See generally Robert Aldrich and John Connell, *France's Overseas Frontier* (Cambridge, 1992), 108.
118. Alfred Crosby, *Germs, Seeds, and Animals: Studies in Ecological History* (Armonk, NY, and London, 1994), 29–30.
119. A good critique of Crosby's fatalistic downplaying of human agency is Tom Griffiths, "Ecology and Empire: Towards an Australian History of the World," in *Ecology and Empire: Environmental History of Settler Societies*, ed. Tom Griffiths and Libby Robin (Melbourne, 1997), 2–3. See also McDonnell and Moses, "Lemkin as Historian of Genocide in the Americas," 519.
120. McDonnell and Moses, "Lemkin as Historian of Genocide in the Americas," 517–20.
121. Donald Denoon, *Settler Capitalism: The Dynamics of Dependant Development in the Southern Hemisphere* (Oxford, 1983), 1.
122. *Ibid.*, 26. See Patrick Wolfe, "Structure and Event: Settler Colonialism, Time, and the Question of Genocide," in this volume. For literature on settler colonialism, see Andrew Armitage, *Comparing the Policy of Aboriginal Assimilation: Australia, Canada, and New Zealand* (Vancouver, 1995); Lynette Russell, ed., *Colonial Frontier: Indigenous-European Encounters in Settler Societies* (Manchester, 2001); Ronald Weitzer, *Transforming Settler States: Communal Conflict and Internal Security in Northern Ireland and Zimbabwe* (Berkeley, CA, 1990); Kate Darian-Smith, Liz Gunner and Sarah Nuttall, eds., *Text, Theory, Space: Land, Literature and History in South Africa and Australia* (London and New York, 1996); David Trigger and Gareth Griffiths, eds., *Disputed Territories: Land, Culture and Identity in Settler Societies* (Hong Kong, 2003); Tim Murray, *The Archaeology of Contact in Settler Societies* (Cambridge, 2004); Moses, *Genocide and Settler Society*.
123. Michael Adas, ed., *Agricultural and Pastoral Societies in Ancient and Classical History* (Philadelphia, 2001); Peter B. Golden, "Nomads and their Sedentary Neighbors in Pre-Cinggisid Eurasia," *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi* 7 (1991): 41–81; Denis Sinor, "Inner Asian Warriors," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 101, no. 2

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