– Section I –

CONCEPTUAL AND HISTORICAL DETERMINANTS
The “Gorgon Effect” and Colonial Genocide

The Gorgon were three mythical sisters, originally beautiful priestesses serving the goddess of wisdom and war, Athena. After the only mortal among them, Medusa, was raped by Poseidon, they vented their anger by torturing men passing Athena’s temple. Outraged by such transgressions, Athena turned the sisters into hideous creatures whose image of “Hate, Violence, and Onslaught … chills the blood.” Ever since, the sight of the Gorgon has turned men to stone. Similarly, some have observed, the imagination and will of scholars freezes when they regard the Holocaust. Such is its enormity that conventional categories of analysis fail to apply, and conceptual activity is paralyzed.

Judging by the comparative paucity of publications on colonial genocide, the metaphor of the “Gorgon effect” is equally relevant to this field of inquiry, although it is perhaps less a matter of awed passivity than willful blindness. Consider this observation by a European historian of the Holocaust:

I think there may have also been a widely-held unspoken assumption that the mass of killing of African or American peoples was a distant

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and in some senses an “inevitable” part of progress while what was genuinely shocking was the attempt to exterminate an entire people in Europe. This assumption may rest upon an implicit racism, or simply upon a failure of historical imagination; it leads, in either case, to the view that it was specifically with the Holocaust that European civilization—the values of the Enlightenment, a confidence in progress and modernity—finally betrayed itself. This view claims both too much and too little. If there had indeed been such a betrayal, had it not occurred rather earlier, outside Europe?

At least some non-Europeans concur with this suggestion. “From the standpoint of numerous Asian and Third World scholars,” wrote one, “the Holocaust, alongside the killings of homosexuals, gypsies, and the purportedly deranged, visited upon the peoples of Europe the violence that colonial powers had routinely inflicted on the ‘natives’ all over the world for nearly five hundred years.”

It is not necessary to join the polemic over the status of the Holocaust in relation to colonial genocides to recognize that vastly more scholarly and popular attention has been devoted to the former, and state-sponsored killing in the twentieth century in general, than to the latter. The “Gorgon effect” here is a product of the paradox that the largest of the modern empires, Great Britain, was at once an implacable opponent of totalitarianism and the source of those settlers who swept aside millions of Indigenous peoples to establish progressive democracies in North America, New Zealand, and Australia. Bulwarks of liberty, Britain and its former colonies also have blood on their hands.

This paradox has issued in two incommensurable responses. In its extreme incarnation, the first of these condemns European imperialism as a murderous conspiracy against non-Europeans. Typical is the Native American activist and scholar Ward Churchill, who regards the English as “global leaders in genocidal activities, both in terms of overall efficiency — as they consummated the total extinction of the Tasmanians in 1876 — and a flair for innovation embodied in their deliberate use of alcohol to effect the dissolution of many of North America’s indigenous peoples.” A rival view lauds Britain as the mildest of Europe’s imperial powers: the “natives” were lucky that the British colonized their country and not, say, the French or Belgians. Hannah Arendt, for example, was fascinated by the Anglophone colonies as exceptions to the continental pattern of conquest because they were not “seriously concerned with discrimination against other peoples as lower races, if only for the reason that the countries they were talking about, Canada and Australia, were almost empty and had no serious pop-

ulation problem.” To be sure, Arendt qualified this extraordinary statement in a footnote that acknowledged “comparatively short periods of cruel liquidation” of the few original inhabitants. Nonetheless, her basic conviction was that British civilization blessed the continents of America and Australia, which, until its arrival, were “without a culture and history of their own.”

Likely she would have rejected the proposition of Churchill and David E. Stannard that the Native Americans suffered an “American Holocaust,” but her naïve paean to British expansion simply repeated contemporary European prejudices about their civilization and non-European barbarism despite the fact that the Holocaust occurred in the heart of Europe.

A closer look at British commentary on Britain’s encounter with Indigenous peoples in the nineteenth century reveals that both views are one-sided. Rarely can exterminatory intent be discerned in British authorities, but there was a greater degree of consciousness about the fatal impact of their presence than Arendt was willing to consider. Writing in 1839, for instance, Charles Darwin noted, “Wherever the European has trod, death seems to pursue the aboriginal. ... The varieties of man seem to act on each other; in the same way as different species of animals the stronger always extirpating the weaker.” In the same year, the ethnologist James Prichard sounded the tocsin about “the extinction of human races” in *The Edinburgh New Philosophical Journal*: “Wherever Europeans have settled, their arrival has been the harbinger of extermination to the native tribes.” Fearful that a further century of colonization would mean “the aboriginal nations of most parts of the world will have ceased to exist,” he asked “whether any thing [sic] can be done effectually to prevent the extermination of the aboriginal tribes.”

Subsequent instances of Indigenous massacres of settlers and the rise of scientific racism meant that the novelist Anthony Trollope and imperial ideologue Charles Dilke expressed no such anxieties when they wrote about their respective antipodean tours several decades later. The Aborigines were “ineradicably savage,” declared the former in 1872; the male possessed the deportment “of a sapient monkey imitating the gait and manners of a ... that the Aborigine had to go” was hardly mitigated by the wish that they “should perish without unnecessary suffering.” Dilke commented in simi-
lar terms in relation to Indigenous population collapse. The “aboriginal Australian blacks … were so extraordinarily backward a race as to make it difficult to help them to hold their own.” They were “rapidly dying out, and it is hard to see any other fate could be expected for them.”14 Many such statements from the period could be adduced.15

**Australian Settler Society and its Conscience**

Clearly, the British understood the effects of their presence in Australia and other colonies. But this did not mean they took responsibility for the anticipated disappearance of the Indigenous peoples, despite the obvious connection between colonization and depopulation. Since the nineteenth century, they, and later, Australians, have engaged in often-acrimonious debate about the causes of the Aboriginal demographic catastrophe and the apportionment of blame. As one visitor to New South Wales observed in the early 1840s, colonial society was split between those for whom the Aborigines were “not entitled to be looked upon as fellow creatures,” and those who viewed “with horror the inroad made into the possessions of the natives.”16 An English settler made the same observation in 1844 when he reported that two friends “argued that it is morally right for a Christian Nation to extirpate savages from their native soil in order that it may be peopled with a more intelligent and civilized race of human beings … [while] … (Frederick) McConnell and myself were of the opposite opinion and argued that a nation had no moral right to take forcible possession of any place.”17 The stakes were, and remain, high. Was white Australia born with the mark of Cain? Or had the settlers built a society about which they could feel justly proud and that ultimately benefited the Aborigines, at least those prepared to relinquish their “stone-age” culture for the modern European one? The arguments fall roughly into the same two camps sketched above: “humanitarian” and “triumphalist.”

“**That Thin Strand of Humanitarianism**”18

Australian colonization was triumphant, but its human cost troubled a small minority of Britons. From the 1820s, they believed the settlers were unjustly treating the original inhabitants and exterminating them when they resisted. Where Aboriginal warriors had committed “depredations” or “outrages,” these critics pointed out, were they not reacting to white violation of their food supplies and women? Even if disease carried off the majority of the Aborigines, they continued, had not Indigenous society and its reproductive capacities been fatally smashed by rapacious settlers? Furthermore, it was iniquitous that Aborigines were forbidden from testifying in legal proceedings when they were otherwise regarded formally as British subjects, equal before the law.19 Expressing the Enlightenment and Christian belief in a universal human nature, they insisted that Aborigines were fully human and children of God, and therefore “civilizable.” Such were the assumptions of the colony’s first governor, Captain Arthur Phillip, whose orders were to treat the Aborigines well.20

In this vein, liberal officials in the Colonial Office in London worried greatly about the frontier struggle transpiring on the other side of the world. In 1837, a Select Committee Inquiry urged the British government to assume moral responsibility for the Indigenous peoples of South Africa, the Australian colonies, and North America lest they become extinct. A year later, Sir George Gipps, Governor of New South Wales, embodied this spirit when he explicated the prosecution and execution of whites who had massacred Aborigines at Myall Creek—one of the very few occasions in the nineteenth century that the law making the murder of Aborigines a capital offence was enforced.21

Toward the end of the nineteenth century and early in the next, the humanitarian impulse issued in “protection” legislation for “pacified” Aborigines in the self-governing British colonies (which became the constitutive states of the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901). Such measures, which confined many Aborigines in isolated reserves under oppressive regimes of discriminatory regulation, were designed to afford them security from the exploitation and violence of frontier existence. But these laws also suited the majority of colonists, who were happy to have Aborigines removed from fertile farmland and country towns.22

The public, having also applauded the prohibition of non-white immigration into the country (the “White Australia Policy”) after Federation in 1901, showed little interest in the “native question” in the two decades of the twentieth century. The question was back on the table, however, after police massacres of Aborigines in northwest and central Australia in 1926 and 1928 scandalized local and international opinion. Small groups of metropolitan Aborigines, as well as white anthropologists, Christians, socialists, and feminists began campaigns to highlight that Aborigines were not in fact a “dying race,” as commonly supposed. Their targets were the official policies in the different states in the 1930s that
Indigenous population recovery meant whites had to “adjust to the idea that Aboriginal Australians are not a dying race after all,” as one observer noted at the time. In 1967, after a vigorous campaign, Australians voted to change the constitution to grant the federal government power to make special laws affecting Aboriginals—an innovation that promised policy progress and consistency across the country.

“Freedom-riders” from the University of Sydney, following in the footsteps of the American civil rights movement, exposed racist practices in rural towns and raised public consciousness about inequality in a country that prided itself on the egalitarian spirit. All the while, the Aboriginal struggle for land rights assumed a higher profile, culminating in a permanent “tent embassy” on the lawns of the federal parliament in Canberra in 1972.

The White Australia Policy was also officially abolished in favor of “multiculturalism.” This mood of change was reflected in historical scholarship, although it was two older social scientists who were responsible for coining the terms that became the watchwords of research for a younger generation of historians. W.E.H. Stanner’s prestigious Boyer Lectures of 1968, published as After the Dreaming, decried that Aborigines be “absorbed” into the population and eventually disappear as distinct peoples, that their “color” be “bred out” by racial engineering, or that they be strictly segregated until they “died out.” By way of resistance, Aboriginal groups and humanitarians lobbied—in vain—for full citizenship rights and policies of “uplift.”

During and after the Second World War, however, official policy abandoned racial engineering for “assimilation.” The new approach entailed integrating Aborigines into the white community as fellow citizens. Ultimate Indigenous extinction was abandoned as an assumption of governance, although large sections of the public continued to entertain the fantasy of a white Australia. Assimilation, therefore, marked a paradigm change in which the long-standing Enlightenment optimism of the humanitarian position became official policy. And yet, “uplifting” Aborigines entailed the continuity of heavy-handed legal restriction, including the practice of “removing” children of mixed Indigenous-European parentage from their Indigenous mothers. In practice at least, assimilation appeared to some as sharing much with the absorption policies of the 1930s. The anthropologist W.E.H. Stanner (1905-1981) spoke for many when he observed in 1964 that the terms of assimilation were “still fundamentally dictatorial.” Aboriginal activists, and humanitarians who formerly had favored “civilizing” Aborigines, now criticized state paternalism in general, advocating not only legal equality, but also self-determination and sovereignty. Because of assimilation’s firm commitment to the nation-building project and consequent hostility to any Aboriginal autonomy, it belongs firmly in the triumphalist tradition.

It is important to appreciate that Australians in the 1950s regarded their modernity as unimpeachable, having passed the test of prosperity and viability by generating enormous wealth and fending off Japanese imperial designs. Assimilation was therefore a considered progressive. When Australians thought of racial conflict at all, their eyes turned to South Africa and the American South. Invidious parallels could be made here, so the conservative federal government funded research into Aboriginal culture to showcase its benevolent credentials. As might be expected, the new Australian Institute for Aboriginal Studies, established in Canberra in the early 1960s, was not meant to probe current policy and welfare issues, but to limit itself to apolitical “scientific, cultural and anthropological research.”

By the late 1960s, however, the small minority that had rowed against the tide was scoring some successes. This was the time when Indigenous population recovery meant whites had to “adjust to the idea that Aboriginal Australians are not a dying race after all,” as one observer noted at the time. In 1967, after a vigorous campaign, Australians voted to change the constitution to grant the federal government power to make special laws affecting Aborigines (who had been empowered to vote in federal elections in 1962)—hitherto the prerogative of the states—an innovation that promised policy progress and consistency across the country. “Freedom-riders” from the University of Sydney, following in the footsteps of the American civil rights movement, exposed racist practices in rural towns and raised public consciousness about inequality in a country that prided itself on the egalitarian spirit. All the while, the Aboriginal struggle for land rights assumed a higher profile, culminating in a permanent “tent embassy” on the lawns of the federal parliament in Canberra in 1972. The White Australia Policy was also officially abolished in favor of “multiculturalism.”

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The call for a new historical approach was begun in 1964 by the sociologist Charles Rowley (1906-1985), who published a trilogy of works in 1970 and 1971 that established the subdiscipline of Aboriginal History. The Destruction of Aboriginal Society, the first continent-wide treatment of the subject, provided the motto for a number of dissertations that aimed to break the great Australian silence. Inspired by post-colonial liberation movements around the globe and appalled by the continuity of popular and institutionalized discrimination in Australia, these young historians began systematic, empirical work on frontier violence and racist traditions, and what they found changed the received view of the peaceful “settlement” of the country. The titles of these books, such as Exclusion, Exploitation, and Extermination and Invasion and Resistance, captured the new spirit. Their narratives also recast the
moral drama of the national history. No longer were Australians to forge a “New Britannia” by carving out a European utopia from the rock of a harsh land. They had to make good the white abuse of Aborigines, non-Anglo immigrants, and the environment. The triumphalist narrative was making way for the humanitarian one.

Journalists and popular writers made use of this “revisionist” scholarship for moral-political purposes. In thrall to the “perpetrator trauma”—the shock of realization at the crimes committed by one’s compatriots—such writers urged Australians to face up to their dark past, which they depicted in simplistic terms of good and evil:

The blood of tens of thousands of Aborigines killed since 1788, and the sense of despair and hopelessness which informs so much modern-day Aboriginal society, is a moral responsibility all white Australians share. Our wealth and lifestyle is a direct consequence of Aboriginal dispossession. We should bow our heads in shame.

The Gorgon Effect—the freezing of the imagination—was evident when they occasionally made wild analogies with Nazi genocide, such as the journalist Phillip Knightley’s naïve exclamation:

It remains one of the mysteries of history that Australia was able to get away with a racist policy that included segregation and dispossession and bordered on slavery and genocide, practices unknown in the civilized world in the first half of the twentieth century until Nazi Germany turned on the Jews.

Scholars, by contrast, have been very circumspect, occasionally drawing some links or parallels between German and Australian history, but without crudely equating the two cases. When one complained in 1987 that the “dispossession-resistance” model of frontier relations had become an “orthodoxy,” and suggested supplementing it with the paradigm of “accommodation” between Aborigines and settlers, he was echoing the unease of many historians with such crude popularizations. But this did not mean they abandoned the humanitarian tradition. The “need to decolonise Australian writing” continued.

Indeed, historians applauded the developments in the 1990s when the then Labor Prime Minister, Paul Keating, advocated reconciliation with Indigenous peoples on the basis of a left-liberal perspective of the national past, one strongly influenced by his speechwriter, Don Watson, himself the author of an important book on the frontier. The highest court in the land took much the same view in two key decisions recognizing “native title,” Mabo (1992) and Wik (1996), grounded as they were in a generation of revisionist scholarship, especially that of Henry Reynolds, and the tenacity of the Indigenous litigants like Eddie Mabo.

Yet despite such advances, the humanitarian agenda struck only shallow roots in Australian culture. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, conservatives complained bitterly about the “political correctness” of the Labor Party’s shibboleths of multiculturalism and Aboriginal land rights, which they thought criminalized the national past. These positions, they charged, were propounded illegitimately by “elites” who brainwashed the public through their domination of the key institutions of cultural transmission: universities, school curricula, museums, and the national television and radio broadcaster, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation.

A sufficient number of Australians agreed with them in 1996 to elect a conservative federal government determined to replace the “black armband” view of history—as it derided the humanitarian perspective—with pride in settler traditions. To be sure, the government does not advocate renewing the White Australia Policy, although after September 2001 some of its supporters wanted to ban Islamic migrants because of their supposed inability to integrate. In fact, it dines out internationally on the country’s “authentically cosmopolitan civic culture of which I for one am very proud,” as one commentator expostulated, while cruelly detaining refugees in camps, pouring scorn on the United Nations’ competence to scrutinize its deteriorating human rights record, and denouncing humanitarian dissenters as traitorous fifth columnists.

Yet Indigenous issues gained increasing attention despite official efforts to sweep them under the carpet. In 1997, the Bringing them Home report on stolen Aboriginal children—thousands of children of mixed Indigenous/European descent “removed” from their Indigenous mothers by state authorities until the late 1960s—commissioned before the conservative government came to power, hit the headlines. It accused the states of genocide, and was backed by massive public demonstrations across Australia in 2000 for a government apology to the victims. The formal “reconciliation process,” initiated after the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody in 1991, culminated in a controversial “Australian Reconciliation Convention” in 1997 during which the dismay of delegates about the truculently unapologetic Prime Minister John Howard was readily apparent.

These developments, and renewed talk of a treaty between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians, were met with sneers by conservatives who exulted when the testimony of some Aboriginal people in Bringing them Home was questioned. Not only was
On the basis of these assumptions, the British argued the “natives” had rights only to what they caught and gathered, while uncultivated land belonged to no one (res nullius), and was therefore available to Europeans to settle and exploit.54

This agriculturalist argument is well-known—especially as expounded by John Locke (1632-1704) in his Two Treatises on Government (1690)—as is James Cook’s annexation of the whole east coast of Australia in 1770 on the grounds that it was terra nullius, unclaimed waste land.55 It remains popular in Australia today.56 What is usually overlooked is that Locke licensed not only such dispossession, but also wars of extermination against Indigenous people if they resisted the loss of their land and customary ways. By breaking natural law in defying the perceived European right to the land and rejecting European entreaties to enter civilization, so the case goes, “natives” rejected “friendship” and “trade,” as it was articulated by apologists for English colonists in the seventeenth century. The colonists were justified, therefore, in invoking the theory of just war to defend themselves against the Indigenous attacks on their rightful presence and claims.57 As Locke put it, such “natives” had declared war against all mankind, and therefore may be destroyed as a lion or tiger, one of those wild savage beasts with whom men can have no society or security. And upon this is grounded that great law of Nature, ‘Whoso sheddeth man’s blood by man shall his blood be shed.’ Also Cain was so fully convinced that every one had a right to destroy such a criminal, that, after the murder of his brother, he cries out, ‘Every one that findeth me shall slay me,’ so plain was it writ in the hearts of all mankind.58

That Locke could issue warrants for genocide is counterintuitive, because he, and the English generally, condemned the Spanish for violating the natural rights of the Indigenous people and for not attempting to civilize them. By contrast, English colonialism, he wrote, did not proceed by “the sword,” respected the property rights of the hunter-gatherers, and sought their uplift.59 Judging by the furious reaction of British settlers to attacks on their property, however, the presumption that by their presence they were doing the Aborigines a favor only fuelled their indignation and proclivity to take savage reprisals.60

Not only was the spirit of revenge rife on the frontier—as several chapters in this volume make plain—the “justice” of crushing Indigenous resistance was as obvious to contemporaries like Trollope in the 1870s as it was to later Australian establishment histori-
So serious had been the troubles in the Murray area [in southeastern Australia] that settlement virtually ceased until troops were sent to the district, and at the “battle of Pinjarra” [in western Australia] in 1834 half the males of the Murray tribe were destroyed. This conflict enabled F.F. Armstrong and others to establish better relations with the natives, although the difficulty was not completely removed for many years.62

Two years later, in 1935, the professor of history at the University of Sydney, Stephen H. Roberts, who shortly afterwards would write the critique of Nazi Germany, published an analysis of squatters in colonial Australia that betrayed the same Lockean assumptions. Such grievances as the natives had against the whites “were usually the result of their own ungovernable dispositions and their failure to see any sense in the white man’s laws of property.” While Roberts was prepared to concede that “Squatting life certainly impinged on native existence,” the point was that “the interaction was as between landowner and raiders.” Little wonder, he implied, that “Outrage, real or imaginary, was met by outrage, and Europeans killed natives on the slightest pretext.”63

Roberts’ work incarnated other aspects of the triumphalist posture towards Aborigines and colonization. Primary among them was his disapproval of humanitarians, like well-meaning missionaries, whose civilizing aspirations he regarded as naïve. There was no getting around the “nature of the natives.”64 Similarly, Governor Gipps, who tried to guard Indigenous rights, came in for Roberts’ hefty criticism. Because of Gipps’ leniency, “The natives became unbearably impudent, and no longer were flocks or even human life safe. Seven or eight years of virtual terror set in after 1837.” What is more, the governor was hard on the settlers. They were incredulous when seven of them were hanged for massacring a harmless group of Aborigines. “It would be difficult to exaggerate the stir this caused in the squatter ranks, for it changed one of the basic assumptions of life in the bush,” noted Roberts. After all, “the colonists had not deemed it possible to try white men for killing natives.”65

Lampooning the humanitarians in the colonial capitals and London for their ignorance of frontier realities was typical of the colonial press. In 1838, the Sydney Morning Herald took aim at James Stephen of the Colonial Office, “being one of those kind-hearted ‘Liberals’ who bestow so much of their pity on devastating and murderous savages, that they have none to spare for the white people.”66 But such rhetoric also expressed anxiety that the author-
wretches. It seems that nothing short of extermination will check their animosity to the whites and all that is theirs.” And: “Desperate diseases call for strong remedies and while we would regret a war of extermination, we cannot but admit that there exists a stern, though maybe cruel necessity for it.” Newland, for example, wrote of “the wiping out process” in Queensland, where the “dispersal” of natives, “put plainly, meant nearly indiscriminate slaughter.” With remarkable prescience, he added, “Of course, these stories will be denied.”

As already noted, the “doomed race” theory was hegemonic until the Second World War, after which the triumphalists enjoined an authoritarian assimilation, a policy that opposed any notions of “separate development” and self-determination for, or a treaty with, Indigenous peoples. In their symbolic struggles with the humanitarians today, the triumphalists’ primary target is the proposition that Aborigines were the victims of genocide because it underwrites anti-assimilationist ideologies and policies.

the greatest falsification of Australian history is that the nation was born in genocide and oppression and after 200 years remained in what [the historian, Manning] Clark has termed the “age of ruins.” You can judge a nation only by reference to contemporary alternatives. So judged, Australia has done well enough to have established our own proven symbols. Regrettably … this has not been possible, due essentially to the fact that so much of popular history is taught by the alienated and the discontented.

Plainly, the genocide concept is not only a politically-neutral, heuristic device of social science, at least in public discourse. How has it been used in relation to Australia?

The Genocide Concept in Australia

The term genocide is used to refer to two phenomena in Australian history: frontier violence, mainly in the nineteenth century, and the various policies of removing Aboriginal children of mixed descent from their families, mainly in the twentieth century. The structure of this book reflects this division. Both of these phenomena have made for bitter controversies in the “history wars” of the 1990s. But the term has been used for decades in a variety of ways by different people in a variety of contexts.

International consciousness about genocide in Australia has been limited to the case of Tasmania, often cited as a “classical” instance of colonial genocide. Recent Australian scholarship has questioned this view, although no one denies the demographic catastrophe that befell the Aboriginal Tasmanians, who are supposed to have “died out” as “full bloods” in 1876. Of course, the term was not used before it was coined in 1944 and enshrined in international law by the United Nations four years later. Contemporaries spoke instead of “extermination” and “extirpation.”

It should come as no surprise that Indigenous peoples have used genocide to name their traumatic experiences because the colonial enterprise is experienced as criminal. “The black extermination drives of the Hawkesbury and Manning Rivers. The genocide of the Tasmanian blacks,” declared Aboriginal activist Kevin Gilbert. “These and many, many more were the links in the chain of white inhumanity that lives on in the memories of the southern part-blooms today.” In 1963, secretary of the Federal Council for Aboriginal Advancement, Stan Davey, attacked the official policy of assimilation in a pamphlet called Genesis or Genocide? Would Australia condone a process of racial elimination by stealth, he asked provocatively, like the Nazis, Czarists, and Russian communists had attempted to solve their national minority problems by outright extermination? Aboriginal leader Mick Dodson continued this line of argument in relation to the Stolen Generations of Aboriginal children:

the fact is if you look at the government’s politics and laws set in place to back them up, their central intention was to destroy the Aboriginality of these kids. I am not equating the Holocaust to the removals, but they fall under the same heading of genocide. They’re just a different form of genocide.

As we shall see, conservatives objected vehemently to this proposition, insisting that the United Nations genocide convention did not criminalize “cultural genocide” (cultural rather than physical destruction), but who will gainsay the point of Indigenous jurist Larissa Behrendt that “the political posturing and semantic debates do nothing to dispel the feeling Indigenous people have that this is the word that adequately describes our experience as colonized people”?

Activists on the left throw up their hands in exasperation at the definitional precision demanded by academics because it detracts from ongoing political struggles. “Even if events in Australia don’t fit the genocide convention to the letter, is that the point?” one of them asks. “Continuing policies toward Indigenous people continue to result in such serious discrimination and disadvantage that genocide is the only appropriate term to use.”
As might be expected, lawyers also insist on exactness when they speak of genocide, but that does not render them immune from ethical considerations. A model of moral clarity was one of the royal commissioners into Aboriginal deaths in custody, J.H. (Hal) Wooten, who in 1989 was shocked by the “foreshadowing of Holocaust languages in the references to the achievements of a ‘solution’ and of ‘finality’” in the reports he read of state protection authorities from 1921. “In its crudest forms,” he concluded, “the policy of assimilation fell within this modern definition of genocide, and in particular the attempt to ‘solve the Aboriginal problem’ by taking away children and merging them into white society fell within that definition.”

This viewpoint would cause a national scandal eight years later. Initially, it was played down by the national commissioner who rejected the proposition that, in principle, assimilation amounted to genocide. He in turn was vehemently contradicted by the subsequent *Bringing them Home* report, which focused on Article 2 (e) of the UN Convention on genocide, the section that criminalizes the forcible transfer of children from one group to another with the intention of destroying a racial, ethnic, or religious group. This inquiry was understandably sympathetic to the Indigenous victims, whose shocking stories of abuse and privation received wide publicity for the first time. It concluded with the now famous accusation that postwar assimilation policies had aimed to eliminate Aborigines as a cultural unit, and were therefore genocidal.

Australian historians, by contrast, have been reluctant to invoke genocide despite the fact that the Indigenous population declined from approximately 750,000 in 1788 to 31,000 in 1911. (By way of comparison, the immigrant population rose to 3,825 million by 1901.) Thinking it means total physical destruction, and concerned to stress that Aborigines had survived to make political claims today, these academics were disinclined to use the term. Another reason for this hesitancy was the misconception that genocide entailed the state’s intention to exterminate all Australian Aborigines as a single people. “It is not appropriate to refer to the frontier violence as attempted genocide,” concluded Richard Broome, “because—despite the desires of individuals—there was no official policy or attempt to eliminate the Aboriginal population.”

Writers in the 1970s and 1980s proceeded without much awareness of the UN Convention and its intellectual origins, which was hardly surprising given that the social scientific literature on the subject only began to develop at this time. If historians used the term at all, they did so more or less as a synonym for “extermination,” reflecting the rhetoric of the sources they read. “What can be said,” affirmed one of them, “is that the spirit of genocide was abroad in eastern Australia from the 1820s until the final ‘pacification’ of Queensland Aborigines in the first decade of this [the twentieth] century, and that it survived in Western Australia and the Northern Territory until the 1920s.”

At the same time, local and regional studies undercut the homogenization of Indigenous peoples into a single entity—“the Aborigines”—by the colonizing perspective. The fact that many of the approximately 600 Indigenous cultural-linguistic groups regarded themselves as separate peoples raised interesting questions about genocide. For adopting their self-understanding in terms of the UN definition can lead to the conclusion that each willed act of extermination by settlers and/or the state ... as genocide. In that case, many genocides took place in Australia, rather than being the site of a single genocidal event.

Most recently, a number of Australian scholars have begun to consider the issue systematically in light of the UN Convention and the now-voluminous literature on comparative genocide. This work is still in progress, but has already met stiff resistance from those for whom genocide is consubstantial with the Holocaust. The Gorgon Effect is most evident in this blanket refusal to consider its meaning in international law and implications for Australian history. The philosopher Raimond Gaita attempted to clear up the confusion about the relationship between genocide and the Holocaust in many articles and in his book, *A Common Humanity*, but the subtleties of his finely-grained analysis were missed by many readers. For instance, Inga Clendinnen, an historian of the Aztecs, complained of the *Bringing them Home* report in the following terms:

> when I see the word “genocide,” I still see Gypsies and Jews being herded into trains, into pits, into ravines, and behind them the shadowy figures of Armenian women and children being marched into the desert by armed men. I see deliberate mass murder: innocent people identified by their killers as distinctive entities being done to death by organised authority. I believe that to take the murder out of genocide is to render it vacuous.

Conservative newspaper columnists shared her indignation that the good intentions of white administrators in “rescuing” white-looking black children had been traduced by association with genocide.

To be sure, in the 1930s and early 1940s disturbing parallels between the treatment of Aborigines and that of German Jews were
made by some observers. Aboriginal leader William Cooper, for example, pointed to the categorization of Aborigines according to genetic inheritance, their treatment as an “enemy people,” and banishment to camps. The Jewish refugee artist Josl Bergner saw matters in much the same terms. But no one equated the Australian case and the Holocaust of European Jewry. Regardless, an editorial in a provincial newspaper in 2001 felt it necessary to complain that “Many Jews and non-Jews familiar with the intrinsic evil and systematic course of the Holocaust in all its extraordinary horror find any notion of parallels with the removal of Aboriginal children utterly offensive.” The professor of Jewish Studies at Monash University in Melbourne, Andrew Markus, insisted similarly that genocide not be used in the Australian context because it can only be properly applied to the Holocaust.

The Gorgon Effect is palpable in the doubts that some now entertain about the genocide term. One historian who noted disapprovingly in 1983 that “Such terms as ‘invasion’ and ‘attempted genocide’ ... still appear to stick in the typewriters of some historians and others,” ate his words eighteen years later, regarding them as dubiously “emotive and arguable.” There is a danger that the genocide term will become stuck in the keyboards of historians and social scientists if the confusion over its meaning and relationship to the Holocaust continues to cloud debate.

What is Genocide?

In order to understand the nature of the crime of genocide, it is important to appreciate the intentions of the formulator of the term, the Polish-Jewish jurist Raphael Lemkin (1900-1959). Growing up in multiethnic eastern Poland, where Jews lived as neighbors with Poles and Russians, he became convinced that

the diversity of nations, religious groups and races is essential to civilization because every one of these groups has a mission to fulfill and a contribution to make in terms of culture. To destroy these groups is opposed to the will of the Creator and to disturb the spiritual harmony of mankind.

The “formula of the human cosmos,” then, comprised culture-creating human groups, rather than contingent ones like political associations. There were four such groups: national, racial, religious, and ethnic.

Indignant that the perpetrators of the Armenian genocide had largely escaped prosecution, Lemkin, who was a young state prosecutor in Poland, began lobbying in the early 1930s for international law to criminalize the destruction of such groups. Initially, he sought to establish two new crimes: barbarity (destruction of national groups), and vandalism (destruction of their unique cultural artifacts). Such “acts of extermination directed against the ethnic, religious or social collectivities whatever the motive (political, religious, etc.),” he implored, should be considered “offences against the law of nations by reason of their common feature which is to endanger both the existence of the collectivity concerned and the entire social order.” But his lobbying could not overcome the entrenched belief in national sovereignty, and so European peoples had no legal protection in the coming bloodletting unleashed by the German state.

An academic and government advisor in the United States during the Second World War, Lemkin found it almost impossible to convince policy-makers that the Nazis were waging a war of extermination rather than a conventional campaign. To make his case, he compiled the decrees issued by the Germans in the countries they occupied, along with his commentary and a discussion of a new crime, genocide, in his now well-known book, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe. Combining barbarism and vandalism into “a generic term,” he defined genocide as “the criminal intent to destroy or cripple permanently a human group.” It was a new word “to denote an old practice in its modern development.” What did it mean? Destruction or crippling did not necessarily entail mass murder: “Generally speaking, genocide does not mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except when accomplished by mass killings of all members of a nation.” In fact:

The end may be accomplished by the forced disintegration of political and social institutions, of the culture of the people, of their language, their national feeling and their religion. It may be accomplished by wiping out all basis of personal security, liberty, health and dignity. When these means fail the machine gun can always be utilized as a last resort.

In elaborating his definition, Lemkin adumbrated eight “techniques of destruction”: political, social, cultural, economic, biological, physical, religious, moral. They covered such broad a spectrum of policies because nationhood was constituted by each of these elements according to his conception of ethnogenesis. The capaciousness of his definition of genocide is captured well by his discussion of the attack on a nation’s morality:
In order to weaken the spiritual resistance of the national group, the occupant attempts to create an atmosphere of moral debasement within this group. According to this plan, the mental energy of the group should be concentrated upon base instincts and should be diverted from moral and national thinking. It is important for the realization of such a plan that the desire for cheap individual pleasure be substituted for the desire for collective feelings and ideals based upon a higher morality. Therefore, the occupant made an effort in Poland to impose upon the Poles pornographic publications and movies. The consumption of alcohol was encouraged, for while food prices have soared, the Germans have kept down the price of alcohol, and the peasants are compelled by the authorities to take spirits in payment for agricultural produce. The curfew law, enforced very strictly against Poles, is relaxed if they can show the authorities a ticket to one of the gambling houses which the Germans have allowed to come into existence.\textsuperscript{112}

Consequently, Lemkin is understood by some to have supported the notion of “cultural genocide,” that is, that cultural effacement or assimilation is genocidal.\textsuperscript{113} Indeed, a recently released fragment of his autobiography reveals that he strongly supported the retention of an article on cultural genocide in early drafts of the UN’s convention on genocide.\textsuperscript{114} Judging by his work as a whole, however, it would be safe to infer that he did not equate assimilation with cultural genocide. In fact, using the Nazi example, he took pains to distinguish between genocide and cultural effacement, that is, assimilation. Terms like “denationalization” or “Germanization” of foreign peoples were not synonyms with genocide, he thought, because “they treat mainly the cultural, economic, and social aspects of genocide, leaving out the biological aspects, such as causing the physical decline and even destruction of the population involved.”\textsuperscript{115} In Lemkin’s notion of ethnogenesis, the “biological and physical structure” was elemental, so that policies that attack a group’s culture—its morality, for instance—are only genocidal when motivated by the intention to destroy this structure. His unpublished manuscripts confirm this interpretation. The gradual assimilation of a people by processes of “cultural diffusion,” even that entailing the incremental disintegration of a culture, was not genocidal; but “premeditated” “surgical operations,” and “deliberate assassinations” of them were.\textsuperscript{116}

The United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide of 1948 omitted cultural genocide from the final version of the drafts it considered, but otherwise remained faithful to Lemkin’s intentions.\textsuperscript{117} Important to note here is that killing is only one of five techniques of destruction, that the state is not named as the perpetrator, and that the intention to permanently cripple a group is gestured to with the wording that destroying “part” of a group can be genocidal. Genocide is not a synonym for the Holocaust. Article II defines genocide as

any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

\section*{Rival Paradigms of Genocide}

Despite these clear guidelines from Lemkin and the UN, scholars have wrangled with one another over the meaning of genocide, or suggested alternative definitions. Part of the reason for this is that Lemkin’s writings are open to rival interpretations. Another is that, as a lawyer, he was concerned above all with criminalizing behavior, rather than accounting for it. Like the UN, his priority was to identify what genocide is, not to explain why it happens. Regrettably, his projected history of genocide, of which a rough draft exists and in which he presents a differentiated analysis of many case studies, was never published. Until this work is made available to the scholars, they must either visit the archives in New York and Cincinnati where it is stored, or limit themselves to his publications. Understandably, they have done the latter—including this writer until recently—and have therefore won the impression that genocide is a massive hate crime based purely on prejudice, rather than on the material, ethnic and other rivalries that usually subvert the escalation of conflict in an exterminatory direction.\textsuperscript{118}

Consequently, scholars developed their own definitions of genocide and explanatory frameworks. In general, they have done so in two ways. One paradigm, which I call “intentionalist,” regards the Holocaust as the archetypal genocide and therefore emphasizes the official, exterminatory goal of the state to kill groups of people. The other, a reaction to the first, is “structuralist” because it averts the issue of perpetrator agency and intention by highlighting anonymous “genocidal processes” of cultural and physical destruction.\textsuperscript{119} Both have important implications for the relationship between genocide and colonialism.

The dominant approach has been the intentionalist one, because until recently genocide studies has been virtually monop-
The second problem with the intentionalist approach is that most Indigenous deaths in colonizing contexts resulted from European diseases, as well as from intensified intra-Indigenous violence that attended the displacement of peoples from their traditional lands. Because these consequences were not an intended result of British colonization or policy, they are not pertinent to the question of genocide. After all, colonization was a complex and unplanned process, as Sir Robert Seeley observed of the British Empire in 1881: “We seem, as it were, to have conquered and peopled half the world in a fit of absence of mind.” But does insisting that the catastrophic collapse in Indigenous populations after the arrival of Europeans was an unfortunate accident constitute a satisfactory response?

Thirdly, the intentionalist view of the causes of colonial genocides—if they are considered genocides at all—offers an attenuated account of why they happen. Such scholars are wont to typologize genocides according to motive, distinguishing for example between “developmental” or “utilitarian” genocides of Indigenous peoples, and “ideological” genocides against scapegoated or hostage groups. The motive in imperial contexts is held to be individual and collective “greed.” In this vein, nineteenth-century settlers would attribute Indigenous deaths to scurrilous whites, or former convicts, rather than to the colonization project as a whole. Typical were Adam Smith’s observations in his *The Wealth of Nations* of the “dreadful misfortunes” that befell the natives of the East and West Indies. But they seem to have arisen rather from accident than from anything in the nature of those events themselves. At the particular time when these discoveries were made, the superiority of force...
peoples on coveted land by attributing blame to genocide on anti-liberal ideologies that commit mass crimes in the name of utopian fantasies. As a prominent intentionalist Frank Chalk reminds us, “we must never forget that the great genocides of the past have been committed by [state] perpetrators who acted in the name of absolutist or utopian ideologies aimed at cleansing and purifying their worlds.” The intentionalist paradigm of genocide is really a species of totalitarianism theory. It is not equipped with the intellectual tools to consider the issues raised by colonialism.

Are we left, then, having to choose “between a pre-meditated and an accidental wrongdoing,” the former deemed genocide, the latter trivialized as the unintended consequences of an otherwise benign colonization? A rival school of structuralist scholars has attempted to come to terms with this conundrum. An important contribution is Tony Barta’s 1987 intervention, “Relations of Genocide: Land and Lives in the Colonization of Australia.” Barta was interested in explaining the “genocidal outcomes” in colonial societies, and he found in the concept of “relations of genocide” a way of obviating the centrality of state policy and premeditation in the hegemonic intentionalist definition of the term:

Genocide, strictly, cannot be a crime of unintended consequences; we expect it to be acknowledged in consciousness. In real historical relationships, however, unintended consequences are legion, and it is from the consequences, as well as the often muddled consciousness, that we have to deduce the real nature of the relationship.

Barta concluded that all Australians live in objective “relations of genocide” with Aborigines, and that Australia was a “genocidal society,” because its original inhabitants were fated to die in enormous numbers by the pressure of settlement, irrespective of the protective efforts of the state and philanthropists. White Australians continued to occupy the land on which Aborigines had once thrived, even if they had no subjective intention to eliminate them. A similar argument has been made recently by Alison Palmer, who shows how colonial genocides are often “society-led” rather than “state-led.”

The Australian historians Raymond Evans and Bill Thorpe have continued this line of reasoning, proposing a new term altogether—“indigenocide”—which they distinguish from Holocaust with its concerted, state-driven, bureaucratic, and industrial killing. Although Lemkin does not appear in their footnotes, the concept has clear affinities with his definition:

“Indigenocide” is a means of analysing those circumstances where one, or more peoples, usually immigrants, deliberately set out to supplant a group or groups of other people whom as far as we know, represent the Indigenous, or Aboriginal peoples of the country that the immigrants usurp.

Indigenocide has five elements: the intentional invasion/colonization of land; the conquest of the indigenous peoples; the killing of them to the extent that they can barely reproduce ... is consistent with the continued existence of indigenous peoples so long as they are classified as a separate caste.

Accordingly, not all imperialisms are genocidal. The British occupation of India, for example, was not a project of settlement, and the fact that the colonizers relied on the labor of the locals was an impediment to physical genocide.

Other structuralist scholars like Ann Curthoys and John Docker have pointed to Lemkin’s writings that make the link between genocide and colonization.

“Genocide has two phases,” he wrote:

... one, destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed group; the other, the imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor. This imposition, in turn, may be made upon the oppressed population which is allowed to remain, or upon the territory alone, after removal of the population and the colonization of the area by the oppressor’s own nationals.

In fact, Lemkin hints that genocide is intrinsically colonial and that therefore settler colonialism is intrinsically genocidal. The basis of this conclusion is the aim of the colonizer to supplant the original inhabitants of the land. In relation to the Nazis, he thought that the coordinated German techniques of occupation must lead to the conclusion that the German occupant has embarked upon a gigantic scheme to change, in favor of Germany, the balance of biological forces between it and the captive nations for many years to come. The objective of this scheme is to destroy or to cripple the subjugated people in their development.

Indeed, although he regarded the United States as a refuge and potential agent for the reform of international law to criminalize genocide, Lemkin was under no illusion about the nature of European colonialism. His projected publications on the history of world genocide included the cases of the Indigenous peoples of
South and North America, the Aboriginal Tasmanians, and the Herero of German Southwest Africa. In what follows, I propose to transcend the conceptual tension between intentionalist and structuralist approaches in a manner that, I hope, keeps faith with Lemkin’s ecumenical definition of genocide.

Genocide and Settler Society

There are three ways in which the genocide concept and settler society can be brought into a productive relation. One entails considering the nature of intention in colonial contexts, the second reflects on the structure of settler colonialism, and the third isolates processes of radicalization that lead to “genocidal moments.”

Rethinking Intention

The current definition of intention—mens rea—means subjectively willing a particular outcome of policy, a definition that favors the intentionalist paradigm of genocide. But this is not the only way to think about the question. In nineteenth-century English law, a person was inferred to have intended the “natural consequences” of his or her actions: if the result proscribed was reasonably foreseeable as a likely consequence of his or her actions, the presumption was that the accused had intended the result. Very few genocide scholars have taken seriously this capacious notion of intention. One of them, Roger Smith, however, has seen the implications for colonialism:

Sometimes ... genocidal consequences precede any conscious decision to destroy innocent groups to satisfy one’s aims. This is most often the case in the early phase of colonial domination, where through violence, disease, and relentless pressure indigenous peoples are pushed toward extinction. With the recognition of the consequences of one’s acts, however, the issue is changed: to persist is to intend the death of a people. This pattern of pressure, recognition, and persistence is typically what happened in the nineteenth century.

Let us consider the case of the British in nineteenth-century Australia in terms of this pattern of recognition and consciousness of consequences in which authorities were implicated. The Colonial Office was constantly warning the settlers—both the governors and the pastoralists—not to exterminate the Aborigines. The Aboriginal population declined drastically because of malnutrition, starvation, disease, frontier violence with whites, increased intra-Aboriginal conflict, and reduced fertility. If we use a differentiated concept of intention, authorities in London cannot escape responsibility for this consequence of British settlement. For while they wrung their hands about the frontier violence and the tribal extinctions, they were unwilling to cease or radically amend the colonization project. The Select Committee Report of 1837, which exhorted greater London supervision, made no impact. Despite admonishing missives from London and occasional colonial compromises, the fatal pattern of events continued to unfold unchanged, such that Colonial Office officials resigned themselves to the inevitable. Wrote one official:

The causes and the consequences of this state of things are clear and irremediable, nor do I suppose that it is possible to discover any method by which the impending catastrophe, namely, the elimination of the Black Race, can be averted.

Writing soon thereafter, Herman Merivale, a young professor of political economy at Oxford University, prophesied the same conclusion, because of the perverse wickedness of those outcasts of society whom the first waves of our colonization are sure to bring along with them. If their violence and avarice cannot be restrained by the arm of power—and it must be confessed that there appears scarcely any feasible mode of accomplishing this—it is impossible but that our progress in the occupation of barbarous countries must be attended with the infliction of infinite suffering.

... The history of the European settlements in America, Africa, and Australia presents everywhere the same general features—a wide and sweeping destruction of native races by controlled violence of individuals, if not of colonial authorities, followed by tardy attempts on the part of governments to repair the acknowledged crime.

Darwin, too, saw extinction as predictable: “We can see that the cultivation of the land will be fatal in many ways to savages, for they cannot, or will not, change their habits.” Certainly, colonialism in Australia, as elsewhere, could not be halted in the manner of flicking a light switch. The Colonial Office, for example, was only a small part of a massive state apparatus. Nonetheless, the rhetoric of Indigenous decline also served to mask choices open to policy-makers, choices they were not prepared to entertain because they fundamentally approved of the civilizing process in which they were engaged. The fact is that they did not take their own humanitarian convictions seriously enough to implement the radical measures necessary to prevent Indigenous deaths—negotiating over land rights, for instance—whether caused...
by massacre and starvation, for these measures would entail relinquishing control of the land and jeopardizing the colonizing mission. Talk of inexorable extinction reflected a racist theodicy as much as governmental impotence.

The fact is that European colonial powers knew the outcome of their settlement projects. They were well aware of the choices, and were prepared to countenance their consequences. This awareness extended to the mass death caused by diseases like smallpox. Only an attenuated concept of intention would exculpate the European powers in these circumstances: after all, the disappearance of many indigenous peoples from the face of the earth was a natural consequence of their actions, and they knew it on the frontier, in the colonial capital, and back home at the imperial seat of power. Where genocide was not consciously willed, then it was implicitly intended in the sense of the silent condoning, sometimes agonized acceptance, of a chain of events for which they were co-responsible and were not prepared to rupture.  

Nor did the British colonial states stand by neutrally as the settlers had their way with the Indigenous peoples. They often aided and abetted their annihilation by disallowing Aboriginal testimony in legal proceedings or by acting vigorously on their behalf. Indeed, Aboriginal status as British subjects, equal before the law, existed more in the breech than the observance, their “criminal” activity the object of merciless punitive raids that went unpunished by the authorities.

*The Deep Structure of Settler Colonialism*

Of course, by definition settler societies had emancipated themselves from imperial sovereignty, a fact that historians have regarded as sealing the fate of the Indigenous peoples. “When neither intervention nor mediation was feasible,” wrote one, “victory was certain to go to the stronger—that is, to the white settlers—as most of those in London who were officially concerned with the problem had foreseen with dismay.” The Aboriginal defeat was a “tragedy” and “the almost inevitable result of a conflict between the settlers and the Aborigines.” But why was British “victory”—the meaning is undefined—an inevitable tragedy? Here we touch on an intrinsic dimension of settler colonialism that has only recently received explicit recognition in Australian historiography, namely that, as the historian Patrick Wolfe observed pithily, European “invasion is a structure not an event.” Because of incommensurable modes of production between the Europeans and Aborigines, settler colonialism entails a “zero-sum contest over land,” at least over land that Europeans coveted. The Europeans wanted Aborigines’ land, not their labor, except, ultimately, in various rural industries in northern Australia. “Thus the primary logic of settler colonialism can be characterized as one of elimination.”

The objective imperative to eliminate the Aboriginal presence endures apart from the subjectively-held racist beliefs of immigrant Australians. This model does not preclude the granting of reserves of Aborigines or the creative adaptation of Aborigines to European land-use. In the former, where Aborigines were granted reserves on fertile ground in NSW, they were eventually dispossessed in the face of white lobbying. In fact, reserves were conceived, because, as one government official noted in 1905, “Carrying the present policy of Might against Right to a logical conclusion, it would simply mean that, were all the land in the northern areas of the State to be thus leased, all the blacks would be hunted into the sea.” In the case of Aboriginal cultural adaptation, the fact remains that the European economic system had supplanted its hunter-gatherer rival. This enduring deep structure thereby undercuts the humanitarians’ redemptive hope that harmonious “race relations” would obtain once they had banished subjectively-held racist beliefs.

This fact has been recognized in the past, but not in a systematic way. Clive Turnbull, for example, who in 1948 wrote *Black War* on “the extermination of the Tasmanian Aborigines,” was unclear whether the state or society was responsible for the Indigenous disaster. But the either/or nature of this encounter between the British and Aborigines was clear: “No doubt many men were appalled by the atrocities committed upon the natives; but, as the only logical remedy would have been to deny to the invaders all property rights in the island one pious palliative after another was put forward until eventually the aborigines solved the problem in the most convenient way for all by dying.”

That the Indigenous peoples as unintegrated, autonomous communities in the body politic would have to be eliminated one way or the other was patent even to humanitarians like Merivale in the 1830s. There were only three paths open for the Aborigines, he told his Oxford audience: their “extermination,” training for civilizing in isolated reserves, or “amalgamation” with the colonists. Rejecting the first option of the triumphalists, and discounting the second as unfeasible, he advocated the “union of natives with the settlers in the same community,” a notion he confessed would appear “wild and chimerical” to his listeners. And yet, he continued, it was “the only possible *Euthanasia* of savage communities,”
by which he meant their disappearance as peoples by intermarriage and integration into the productive community.154

Settler society thereby reveals itself to typify those attributes that the sociologist Zygmunt Bauman regards as inherent to modernity. Borrowing categories from Claude Levi-Strauss, he identifies two strategies by which modern societies deal with alterity:

One was *anthropophagic*: annihilating the strangers by devouring them and then metabolically transforming into a tissue indistinguishable from one’s own. This was the strategy of *assimilation*: making the different similar; smothering of cultural and linguistic distinctions; forbidding all traditions and loyalties except those meant to feed the conformity to the new and all-embracing order; promoting and enforcing one and only one measure of conformity. The other strategy was *anthropoemic*: vomiting the strangers, banishing them from the limits of the orderly world and barring them from all communication from those inside. This was the strategy of *exclusion*—confining the strangers within the visible walls of the ghettos or behind the invisible, yet no less tangible, prohibitions of *commensality, connubium and commercium*; “cleansing”—expelling the strangers beyond the frontiers of the managed and manageable territory.155

These are compelling terms with which to consider the settler colonial project. A logic of elimination toward Indigenous peoples does indeed constitute its essence. And yet, the historian will want to pose three questions. First, does the term “elimination” obscure as much as it reveals? The American political scientist Daniel J. Goldhagen infamously mounted a case that Germans were possessed by “eliminationist antisemitism,” by which he meant both the liberal desire to assimilate Jews and the Nazi fantasy to exterminate them. True, public “Jewishness” would be effaced in both cases, but they are also qualitatively different “solutions” to a perceived “Jewish problem”; murder cannot be regarded as simply a functional equivalent of assimilation.156 In any event, is assimilation really genocide? Russell McGregor makes a compelling case in his chapter that it is not. The third question would be when and why the various modalities of settler colonialism change. As it stands, the structuralist schema is too static. It needs to be supplemented by an account of how and why the settler-colonial system radicalizes from assimilation to destruction.

*Processes of Radicalization as the Generation of “Genocidal Moments”*

The deep structure of settler society shows us that the objective and inherent character of the British occupation of the Australian continent necessarily entailed the large-scale attack on Aboriginal society as a culture and vast numbers of Aborigines—their “euthanasia”—even if mass death was not its aim. Triumphalists will point to the benign intentions of policy-makers to excise them of direct responsibility for the consequences for colonization. Does this mean that we must leave the question of cultural dislocation and mass death that accompanies colonization to the theodicies of the apologists for “economic development”? Not if we can find instances of genocidal policy. To understand such how polices evolve, however, it is necessary to frame them as features of radicalization processes. Colonial decision-makers need to be linked to the structures and contexts in which they were embedded. The intentionalist-structuralist dichotomy can be mediated by embedding subjective genocidal policy development and implementation in the “objective” dimension of the colonial process, highlighted by Barta, Wolfe, and others.157

The mechanism of policy radicalization is the intensity of Indigenous resistance. How did authorities respond when Aborigines did not “melt away,” and put up sufficient resistance to pastoralists and pastoralism—a key sector of the economy—such as to threaten the viability of one of the colonies? The answer is that governments in the metropolis came under intense pressure from the frontier periphery, and sometimes were prepared to entertain “final solutions” to the “Aboriginal problem.” Instead of arguing statically that the colonization of Australia was genocidal *tout court*, or insisting truculently that it was essentially benevolent and progressive, it is analytically more productive to view it as a dynamic process with genocidal potential that could be released in circumstances of crisis. The place to look for genocidal intentions, then, is not in explicit, prior statements of settlers or governments, but in the gradual evolution of European attitudes and policies as they were pushed in an exterminatory direction by the confluence of their underlying ideological assumptions, the acute fear of Aboriginal attack, the demands of the colonial and international economy, their plans for the land, and the resistance to these plans by the Indigenous peoples.

In other words, the British colonization of Australia was objectively and inherently “ethnocidal” (i.e., the attack of Aboriginal cultures) and fatal for many Aborigines, and potentially genocidal. The destruction of Aboriginal society as a nomadic form of life was an aim of the colonizers after the 1820s in places where British land-use demanded sententiarism; this is what they meant by “civilizing” the Aborigines. But only after the initial illusions of
peaceful coexistence had been dispelled with increasing contact between the two sides did the deadly implications inherent in the process become apparent to all and, in a particular constellation of circumstances, its objective implication become subjectively located in the consciousness of the colonial agents themselves. This is the origin of those “genocidal moments” when the triumphalists determine policy.

In their clamor for government protection and the implementation of exterminatory policies, the Europeans on the frontier articulated the logic of the colonization process in its most pure form: driven by international market forces, they seized the land of Aboriginal groups without compensation or negotiation, and excluded them from their sources of food. A struggle for survival ensued in which, from the European perspective at the time, the Aborigines had to be subdued, and, if necessary, exterminated.\textsuperscript{158} For if the settlers did not get their way and were forced to abandon the land, the economic system would collapse and with it the colonization project itself. In these circumstances, the structure or objective implication of the process became consciously incarnated in its agents, and this is the moment when we can observe the development of the specific genocidal intention that satisfies the UN definition.

The radicalization of official policy was most intensive where the lobbying by frontier whites was most successful. The variable here is the extent to which the colony was a settler society, that is, an autonomous, self-governing polity free from the supervision of the imperial parent and its humanitarian agenda of Aboriginal legal equality. The Australian colonies that were settled in the first half of the nineteenth-century—New South Wales, Tasmania, Victoria, and South Australia—remained under the scrutiny of London and colonial governors. The colony of Queensland, however, which achieved independence from New South Wales in 1859, represented the interest of the squatter—that is, the priorities of the frontier—without the inhibiting factor of control from Sydney or London. It was the purest incarnation of settler priorities and their pragmatist supporters, as Raymond Evans shows in this volume.

The imperial view was certainly that the settlers could not be trusted to treat the Indigenous peoples justly. Merivale, for example, advised that colonial legislatures should not be responsible for “protecting” the natives, nor that settlers have “any share in judicial proceedings against” them.\textsuperscript{159} It is with this intuition that one British historian opined recently that “had Australia been an independent republic in the nineteenth century, like the United States, the genocide [of the Tasmanians] might have been on a continental scale.”\textsuperscript{160}

This approach towards the genesis of the genocidal moments affords an insight into the character of the colonization process itself. The tendency of historians to isolate the Tasmanian and Queensland cases—Tasmania because “total extinction” is thought to have occurred, and Queensland because it was notoriously violent—from the rest of the colonization experience of Australia and class them as exceptions to the rule of peaceful settlement, can be disposed of by the argument that they were in fact the inevitable consequences of particularly resolute Aboriginal resistance. The extreme measures seen in those cases did not occur to the same extent elsewhere because they did not need to. Invading whites usually were able to clear the land of Aborigines by other, less-systematic methods, or disease and other factors did the work for them.

The colonization process was objectively lethal for Aborigines, irrespective of initial intentions of the state and settlers, and where Aborigines did not “fade” or “melt away,” the settlers, and where necessary the state, ensured that the process of elimination was continued by consciously expediting its fatal logic.

## Conclusion

The traditional settler society model of comparative analysis, which typically traced the different ways in which white male settlers heroically conquered the land and established democracies of one sort or another, has been criticized by post-colonial theorists and anthropologists for ignoring questions of race, ethnicity, and gender.\textsuperscript{161} Even in its critical humanitarian incarnation, the settler society paradigm still posits narrative of redemption—a morally clean settlement—once Aborigines have been given native title to land.\textsuperscript{162} For these reasons, comparative histories of societies of those European settlements along these lines have gone out of fashion.

And yet, comparative historical analysis is more urgent than ever before, as these societies grapple with questions of Indigenous sovereignty and other legacies of colonization.\textsuperscript{163} This book suggests that the settler society paradigm remains a useful way of proceeding when viewed under the aspect of the genocide concept. \textit{Genocide and Settler Society} focuses on Australia—an ignored case in the genocide studies literature—but also considers others, as in the chapters by Jürgen Zimmerer, Paul Bartrop, and Isabel Heinemann. I am not suggesting that the entirety of Australian history
can be reduced to genocide. (No one suggests that studying the Holocaust reduces German history to Nazi genocide.) But neither is it possible to regard the country’s genocidal moments in the manner of an industrial accident. They are not contingencies, attributable to misguided or wicked men, but intrinsic to the deep structure of settler society. Indeed, the logic of elimination reappears from time to time, as in the hysteria over native title in the 1990s, when certain groups of Aborigines were temporarily granted the right to exercise veto power over mining projects. This impediment to the economic system—in this case represented by mining companies—needed to be eliminated, and so it was, with the so-called easy “extinguishment” of native title legislated by the conservative government in 1997.

The genocide perspective and, in particular, the focus on radicalization offers other advantages. Unlike the alternative approaches of military history or generic frontier violence (especially the preoccupation with massacres), it highlights the complex interplay between settler communities on the frontier and metropolis and the state in its various incarnations. And because it does not insist that total physical extermination take place, and argues that cultural technologies of governance can entail group extinguishments, it draws our attention to the fantasies of racial engineering that policy-makers entertained after the “pacification” on the frontier.

Plainly, more work needs to be done, especially with local and regional analyses. This book does not pretend to provide a conclusive answer to the genocide question in Australian history. Nor does it purport to be a history of Indigenous peoples. It is about the settlers and the society they established. It presents the latest research of scholars in various fields, and by shattering the Gorgon effect in thinking about genocide in settler societies, hopes to stimulate still more research and informed discussion. Through such critical reflection, the authors hope that the potential for genocidal moments inherent in settler societies will be disappear.

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Notes

1. The Iliad, 5.741.
2. Dan Diner, Beyond the Inconceivable: Studies on Germany, Nazism, and the Holocaust (Berkeley, 2000); Saul Friedlander, “The ‘Final Solution’: On the Unease in Historical Interpretation,” History and Memory 1 (Fall/Winter 1989): 61-75. Inga Clendinnen uses the term “Gorgon effect” in Reading the Holocaust (Cambridge, 1999), 4. She wrote her book to defeat it.
7. Ward Churchill, A Little Matter of Genocide (San Francisco, 1997), 405. Churchill is aware that the residue of the Indigenous population was relocated to Flinders Island, noting that “This ... of the Aboriginal Tas-manians is “a stain which has never been removed from the banners of the British Empire.” See his The Savage Empire: Forgotten Wars of the 19th Century (Thrupp, UK, 2000), 62.


Henry Reynolds, *This Whispering in our Hearts* (Sydney, 1998), 247.


40. See Don Watson, *Caledonia Australis: Scottish Highlanders on the Frontier of Australia* (Sydney, 1984); idem, *Recollections of a Bleeding Heart: A Portrait of Paul Keating* PM (Sydney, 2002).


42. An excellent analysis of this nationalist anxiety is Ghassan Hage, *White Nation: Fantasies of White Supremacy in a Multicultural Society* (Sydney, 1998).


44. For a critique, see Geoffrey Brahm Levey and A. Dirk Moses, “Debate Should Focus on the Apple, not the Core: Cultural Criteria in Determining Suitable Immigrants are Historically Bankrupt,” *The Australian*, 31 December 2001, 11.

45. Inga Clendinnen, *True Stories* (Sydney, 1999), 102. For a critical assessment of Clendinnen’s recent neocolonialist turn, see Tony Birch, “‘History is Never Bloodless’: Getting it Wrong after One Hundred Years of Federation,” *Australian Historical Studies* 118 (2002): 42–53.


51. Cf. Moses, “Coming to Terms with the Past in Comparative Perspective.”

78. Kevin Gilbert, Because a White Man’ll Never Do It (Sydney, 2002, 1973), 4f.
86. The Encyclopaedia of Aboriginal Australia, Vol. 2 (Canberra, 1994), 889. In the 1930s, Aboriginal numbers began to grow, and are believed to have reached around 160,196 by the time of the 1976 census. Between 1986 and 1991, the official number of people identifying as Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders increased by 37,813, reaching a total of 265,458. By the late 1990s, these numbers had increased to 352,000. Stuart Macintyre, A Concise History of Australia (Cambridge, 1999), 261. In 2001, the Australian Bureau of Statistics listed the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander population at 410,000. See the detailed treatment by Tim Rowse in this volume.
91. Norman B. Tindale, Aboriginal Tribes of Australia: Their Terrain, Environmental Controls, Distribution, Limits and Proper Names (Canberra, 1974).
97. Andrew Markus, Governing Savages (Sydney, 1990), 189; Smith, The Spectre of Truganini, 32.


104. See the account in Samantha Power, “A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide (New York, 2002), chapters one and two.


110. Lemkin, Axis Rule, xi, 79.


112. Lemkin, Axis Rule, 82-90.


119. Readers familiar with Holocaust historiography will recognize that I have taken these terms from a prominent debate in that literature. See Ian Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation, 2nd ed (London, 1989).


121. Chalk and Jonassohn, History and Sociology of Genocide, 23.

122. Lemkin, Axis Rule, xi, 79.


130. Stanner, After the Dreaming, 7f. This blindness to the insuperable structural determinants of violence is visible, for example, in Inga Clendinnen, Dancing with Strangers (Melbourne, 2003). Although she recognizes that the British “wanted land, and they took it,” and that “racial frontiers, pushing irresistibly
outwards, would be marked in blood, and many [Indigenous] Australians would die,” she concludes nonetheless that the basic problem was “the depth of cultural division” between the peoples (286). Is she proposing that the conflict would not have happened had they been able to understand one another? If not, then the ethnographic method Clendinnen proposes is unable to do the conceptual work she demands of it.


140. Lemkin, Axis Rule, xi.

141. Lemkin, “Totally Unofficial Man,” 388, 378 for his positive views of the USA. Various drafts of his work on world genocide are kept by the American Jewish Historical Society, 15 West 16th Street, New York, and by the Jacob Reader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives in Cincinnati, Ohio. His paper on Tasmania is located in the New York Public Library, 42nd Street, Manhattan. Special issues of Patterns of Prejudice and the Journal of Genocide Research in 2005 will make available selections of, and commentary on, Lemkin’s unpublished work. It will also be discussed by various authors in Moses, ed., Genocide and Colonialism.

142. See the discussion of Lord Diplock in the Crown v. Lemon, H.L.(E) (1979): 636. I owe this reference to Lawrence McNamara, Faculty of Law, Macquarie University, Sydney.


144. Recce, Aborigines and Colonists, 139.


157. The following paragraphs rely on Moses, “An Antipodean Genocide?”

158. Mary Anne Jebb, Blood, Sweat and Welfare: A History of White Bosses and Aboriginal Pastoral Workers (Perth, 2002), 36-63 shows how the state backed the Kimberley pastoralists against the Indigenous peoples, such that hundreds of native men were arrested and removed from the area, effectively smashing their communities.

159. Merivale, Lectures on Colonization and Colonies, 495, 497.


162. See the discussion of the literature in Ian Tyrrell, “Beyond the View from Euro-America,” in Rethinking American History in a Global Age, ed. Thomas Bender (Berkeley, 2002), 168-91.


